In her brilliant paper Vygotsky's Uses of History, Sylvia Scribner (1985) describes the four moments of Vygotsky's methodology as follows.
1. Vygotsky begins with observations about the behavior of contemporary, not primitive, adults. His starting points were little noticed but everyday cultural forms of behavior. Vygotsky called these phenomena 'rudimentary forms'. Each reveals the tripartite structure of cultural forms of behavior consisting of environmental stimulus and response and a human-created symbolic stimulus mediating between the two. Each form reveals the 'key to higher behavior'.
2. To determine how rudimentary forms change to new forms requires a shift away from observations of everyday contemporary behavior to the historical transformation of structures. Historical and ethnopsychological information permits the reconstruction of the phases through which rudimentary forms pass on the way to becoming higher systems.
3. The historical sequence can serve as a model for an artificially evoked process of change in children, a process evoked through experimental means. The experiments will reveal in 'pure and abstract form' how cultural development proceeds in ontogeny. The experimental-genetic method thus constitutes the third methodological moment and the source of the richest and most vital evidence.
4. Observations about the actual developmental progress of contemporary children constitute the fourth moment of theory building. Vygotsky believed that models emerging from experimental studies are, of necessity, schematic and simplified. The experiment fails to inform us about how higher systems are actually realized by the child; an experimentally induced process never mirrors genetic development as it occurs in life. Nor do experiments capture the rich variety of child behavior in the many settings in which children grow up. Although the experiment models the process, concrete research is required to bring the observations made there into harmony with observations of naturally occurring behavior. Thus, Vygotsky begins with and returns to observations of behavior in daily life to devise and test models of the history of higher systems. (Scribner 1985, 135-137; see also Wertsch 1985c, Chapter 2.)
Scribner's reconstruction of Vygotsky's methodology may be summarized with the help of Figure 5.1.
Scribner herself adds important considerations to Vygotsky's original scheme.
"In Vygotsky's theory, (...) history appears as a single unidirectional course of sociocultural change. It is a world process that informs us of the genesis of specifically human forms of behavior and their changing structures and functions in the past. (...) for purposes of concrete research, and for theory development in the present, such a view seems inadequate. Societies and cultural groups participate in world history at different tempos and in different ways. Each has its own past history influencing the nature of current change. (...) Individual societal histories are not independent of the world process, but neither are they reducible to it. To take account of this plurality, the Vygotskian framework needs to be expanded to incorporate (...) the history of individual societies." (Scribner 1985, 138-139.)
Scribner also points out the insufficiency of focusing on child development alone. She proposes that 'child history' be replaced with 'life history' (Scribner 1985, 140).
In a recent paper, Michael Cole (1986) goes a step further in the elaboration of the cultural-historical methodology. He analyzes the research efforts of the Soviet cultural-historical school and their later counterparts carried out by himself and his colleagues, especially in the field of cross-cultural psychology. After that, he draws the following conclusion.
"The Soviet tradition (...) emphasized broad historical changes in the nature of mind somewhat at the expense of synchronic variability arising from differences across concrete activity settings. Empirical research came late in the experience of the Soviet socio-historical scholars, and that research, when it at last became possible, followed the early tendency to concentrate on major historical shifts in political economic formations in place of detailed studies of particular activity systems and the functional psychological systems to which they give rise.
The American tradition began from an applied-empirical demand to explain synchronic, culturally conditioned differences in quite specific domains of cognition in connection with equally specific domains of socio-cultural practice. It generated a great deal of research with relatively shallow, ahistorical, and eclectic underpinnings but a strong methodological, interdisciplinary base as a warrant for claims about the factors controlling different levels of performance across contexts within cultural groups.
(...) Overall, I see current progress in the development of the socio-historical school growing out of its cross-cultural research program as a process of combining the American emphasis on cultural context and the study of concrete activity systems with the Soviet emphasis on the mediated structure of higher psychological functions and the importance of history and political economy." (Cole 1986, 19-21.)
The methodological extensions put forward by Scribner and Cole are fully in line with the original intentions of Vygotsky, Luria and Leont'ev, intentions which remained "imperfectly implemented in their research" (Cole 1986, 21).
It is instructive to compare Vygotsky's methodological moments with the cycle of expansive transition put forward in Chapter 3. For this purpose, the cycle is once again depicted in Figure 5.2.
In Vygotsky's methodological cycle, the final object of investigation is the higher functional system or the higher form of behavior in its ontogenetic development. General cultural history as well as the history of particular societies and activity settings serve as sources of hypothesis for understanding and reconstructing ontogenesis. Ontogenesis, in turn, is basically understood in terms of interiorization. The general direction of investigation goes from the socio-culturally given to the individually acquired and interiorized. The papers of Scribner and Cole are consistent with this basic direction.
What is left unexplained is how the socio-culturally mediated forms of behavior, or the activity settings, or even societies, are generated or created in the first place. The fourth moment in Vygotsky's cycle provides for variation but not for creation.
The cycle of expansive transition addresses this very question. It traces the generation of socio-culturally new activity systems by collectives of concrete human beings. Here, individually manifested doubt, hesitation and disturbance is the starting point. The direction is from the individual to the societal. However, the individual point of departure is itself understandable only as a cultural-historical product.
Obviously both cycles tell their own aspect of reality, or better, their own aspect of the cyclic movement of history. History is both interiorization and expansion. As was shown in Chapter 2, in connection with The Psychology of Art, the aspect of expansive transition was not foreign to Vygotsky. But it remained unintegrated into his general methodology. In Leont'ev's work, expansion appears as the phenomenon of actions growing into activities. But again, this remains a sidetrack.
Though the general directions of the two cycles are opposite, their inner structures are remarkably similar in terms of steps of concrete research. This similarity becomes even more visible when the cycle of expansive transition is transformed into a cycle of developmental research (Figure 5.3).
In the following, each step of the methodological cycle depicted in Figure 5.3 shall be briefly elaborated. It will be a methodological sketch or outline, not a comprehensive presentation of expansive research methodology. The latter can only be made in connection with and saturated by concrete empirical research. That remains a task for the future.
The first step of expansive developmental research consists of (a) gaining a preliminary phenomenological insight into the nature of its discourse and problems as experienced by those involved in the activity and (b) of delineating the activity system under investigation.
As to (a), the researcher's task is to get a grasp of the need state and primary contradiction beneath the surface of the problems, doubts and uncertainties experienced among the participants of the activity. This may be accomplished through comprehensive reading of the internal and public discussion concerning the activity, through participant on-site observations, discussions with people involved in the activity or having expertise about it, and the like.
As to (b), expansive research is not dealing with activities 'in general' but with real activities realised by identifiable persons in identifiable locations. Delineation is this very act of identifying the personal and geographical locus and limits of the activity. The reason for putting delineation after phenomenology is obvious. Often the locus and limits of activity can be properly defined only after a relatively extensive 'dwelling' in it.
The second step consists of rigorous analyses of the activity system. These analyses may be divided into three (see Holzkamp 1983): (a) the object-historical analysis, (b) the theory-historical analysis, and (c) the actual-empirical analysis.
(a) The object-historical analysis implies identifying and analyzing the successive developmental phases of the activity system. However, it aims not only at periodization but especially at uncovering the secondary contradictions giving rise to the transitions from one developmental phase to another. The analysis is carried out with the help of the general models of activity (presented in Figures 2.6 and 2.7), as well as with the help of techniques for describing the sequential structure of transitions (such as used above in the four cases).
As Leont'ev stressed, the identity of any activity is primarily determined by its object. Thus, the analysis takes as its point of departure the qualitative transformations of the object, itself understood as an activity system. However, the system of object-activity cannot be regarded as external to the central activity, to be only 'connected' with it. To the contrary, the object is to be analyzed above all as an integral component of the central activity while simultaneously acknowledging it as a relatively independent activity system of its own. This procedure, moving 'from within' the central activity out to the object-activity and back into the central activity, is essential if the researcher is to preserve his grasp of the self-movement, the self-organizational dynamics of the activity under investigation. In other words, the object-historical analysis cannot be reduced to the self-contained object. The object becomes an object (Gegenstand) only as a component of the developing central activity.
(b) The theory-historical analysis is motivated by the fact that an activity system in any of its developmental phases utilizes a set of shared secondary artifacts, that is, concepts and models. These cultural artifacts are embodied in different modalities (i.e., handbooks, working instructions, fixed procedures for classification and diagnosis, etc.), but all they are in principle public knowledge and function as general conceptual instruments of the practical activity. The degree to which these conceptual instruments are acknowledged as theoretical or theory-based is immaterial here. What is essential is that they are partly constructed within the central activity, partly imported into it from without. The latter aspect requires a special analysis of the development of the theories introduced into the central activity and eventually of the instrument-producing activities behind those theories. Here again, though a descriptive periodization may be the necessary beginning, the main aim of the analysis is to identify and trace the formation of the secondary contradictions initiated by or connected to the secondary instruments of the successive developmental periods.
(c) Publicly available objectified instruments are powerful constraints, but, being generalizations, they are always interpretable and applicable in multiple ways, for a multitude of purposes. Therefore, object-historical and theory-historical analysis are not enough. They need to be complemented by actual-empirical analysis of the internalized and invented models professed and actually used or upheld by the participants of the activity.
Three tenets may be put forward for the actual-empirical analysis. First, the models actually applied in the activity should if possible be analyzed on all the three levels of activity/motive, action/goal and operation/conditions (recall Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Second, the models should be analyzed as declarative conceptions, as procedural performances, as social discourses or interactions, as communicational networks, and as organizational structures. Third, the models should be evaluated with the help of the results of the historical analyses ([a] and [b] above) and with the help of the five general historical types of models presented earlier in this chapter (prototypes, classificatory models, procedural models, systemic models, germ cell models).
One essential outcome and instrument of the three complementary types of analyses presented above is the definition of the object-unit of the given developmental phase of the activity under investigation. By object-unit I mean the typical slice or chunk of the object handled and molded by the subject at a time. Such a unit enables us to follow the 'life-span' of the object from rawmaterial to finished product. Being handled directly or indirectly by all compartments and hierarchical levels within the community of the activity, it also enables us to study in a compact form the breaches and links between individual actions and the overall activity. Once identified, the object-unit thus provides a strategic lens or magnifying glass through which the inner movement of the activity system becomes visible.
Another outcome of the analyses is a hypothetic picture of the next, more advanced developmental form of the activity system. Such a provisional model, however, is not yet a sufficient general instrument for accomplishing the expansive transition. Rather, it is a necessarily sketchy general device for quiding the process further.
The ultimate aim of the analysis is not just to reveal the inner contradictions and developmental logic of the activity to the researcher. The aim is to make the participants, the potential subjects of the activity, themselvels face the secondary contradiction. In other words, the analysis functions as the midwife for bringing about the double bind, or at least an anticipatory grasp of the double bind in the form of an intense conceptual conflict. This can be achieved by letting the participants reconstruct the analysis through their own actions. Such a reconstruction typically takes place on the basis of selected and condensed materials as well as tasks involving debate between the participants. Much like in the case of Seven Brothers, the emergence and aggravation of the double bind may occur in several successive steps, each being at first only partially or temporarily resolved.
The third main step is easily recognized as the most dramatic one in the expansive methodology. The participants of the activity system under investigation are pushed into formulating qualitatively new models as genuine keys for resolving the double bind. As was shown earlier in this chapter, this step consists of three main elements: (a) finding a springboard, (b) formulating the general instrumental model and its derivative models, and (c) constructing a microcosm for taking over the responsibility of elaborating further the instrumental models and turning them into new forms of practice.
(a) How is a springboard found? Is it an intuitive event that cannot be purposefully facilitated and directed?
I shall use the work of G. S. Altshuller (1984) on 'creativity as an exact science' to formulate an alternative conception. For Altshuller, the crucial problem of technical inventions is how to overcome the object-indifferent search, typical to the various methods of brainstorming, syncetics, etc.
"For instance, the focal object method consists in transposing features of a few objects chosen at random to an object needing improvement as a result of which one can come up with unusual combinations and overcome psychological inertia. Thus if a 'tiger' is taken as an accidental object and 'pencil' as the (focal) object to be improved, then one obtains a combination such as 'striped pencil', rapacious pencil', 'fanged pencil'. By examining these combinations and developing them one can sometimes come up with original ideas." (Altshuller 1984, 13.)
Needless to say, such an object-indifferent method may require thousands of chance combinations before it 'hits the jackpot'. Altshuller characterizes such methods with the help of metaphor. "Imagine that we are studying the actions of a helmsman aboard ship on a meandering river. We want to know nothing about the river itself but only try to explain the actions of the helmsman in purely psychological terms." (Altshuller 1984, 8.)
Altshuller's own solution is that creative solutions require specific, object-typical notational systems with the help of which one can represent, analyze and elaborate the problem. On the basis of painstaking analysis of thousands of patents and historical inventions, Altshuller has developed a complex apparatus of complementary notational systems for technical problems. First of all, he emphasizes that technical problems have to be transformed into techical contradictions and further into physical contradictions. "In physical contradictions [PC] the conflict of demands is intensified to the maximum. Therefore at first glance the PC seems absurd, inadmissible by definition." (Altshuller 1984, 29.)
To represent the problem, Altshuller applies what he calls 'S-Field Analysis'. "In any inventive problem there is an object (...). This object cannot realise the required action on its own but has to interact with its environment or with another object. In so doing any change is accompanied by the discharge, absorption or conversion of energy. The two substances and a field can be completely dissimilar, but they are necessary and suficient for the formation of a minimal technical system which has been given the name S-Field (from Substance and Field)." (Altshuller 1984, 52.) There is an elaborate notational system for constructing simple graphic S-Field representations out of complex problems. "There are rules which permit one to build an exact model of the problem. Thus, into a pair of conflicting elements it is necessary to introduce the artefact. (...) If one does not include the artefact in the conflicting pair, the model of the problem breaks down and we are back to square one." (Altshuller 1984, 79; recall the problem of thirdness.)
There is still a more specific system of notation, namely the Method of Little Men, as Altshuller calls it. This is a related to the use of empathy by the inventor 'becoming the object,' looking for a solution from the postion and viewpoint of the object. This method has disadvantages. "In identifying himself with a particular machine (or a part of it) and examining possible alterations to it, the inventor involuntarily selects those which are acceptable to man and rejects any which are unacceptable to the human organism, such as dissecting, splintering, dissolving in acid, etc. The indivisibility of the human organism prevents one from successfully employing empathy in solving many problems (...)." (Altshuller 1984, 108.) Representing and modelling parts of the object graphically in the form of groups of little men preserves the power of empathy without its inherent shortcomings.
Altshuller's notational systems are actually constructed languages for gaining a liberating holistic but at the same time analytic view of the overall structure and dynamics of the contradictory situation. In the four cases analyzed in this book, the springboard was invented as if out of lucky accidents because the language in which it was potentially embedded remained invisible and unrecognized. Expansive research and intervention proceeds the opposite way. The participants are provided with a language (or several complementary languages) for working out the springboard. These languages are not arbitrary. Their power depends on their ability to penetrate and organize the object. Thus, they are constructed on the basis of the object-historical, theory-historical and actual-empirical analyses.
(b) In expansive research, the transition from a provided language to a springboard and over to a new general model is seldom clearcut and uni-directional. Moreover, it would be fallacious to expect and demand that each step and sub-step is taken by the participants as if through their own discovery. Certainly it is important to let the participants proceed through tasks of problem solving and problem finding, so that the new general model is not acquired only mechanically and superficially at the outset. But no matter how cleverly such tasks are designed, the new model represents the given new and thus includes the aspect of guided or even imposed acquisition.
This aspect is related to the fact that the springboard - as a personal experience of revelation - does not necessarily appear before the formulation of the new general model. To many an individual participant in a process of expansive transition, the gist of the transition may be personally experienced, acquire a personal sense in Leont'ev's terminology, only in a postponed fashion, as the new general model is studied in an objectified form or even applied in practice. This is the meaning of the double-headed arrows in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. They imply the possibility of 'returning,' for example to the step of finding a personal springboard when the overall transition has reached the step of model formulation or application.
Such a postponement in itself is not necessarily a danger to be avoided. This implies that the formation of new instruments, though outwardly the most dramatic step of the transition, is in fact not the decisive step from the point of view of the solution of the contradictions. In this phase, there is generally much enthusiasm among the participants: keys are being found. But the awareness of obstacles, uncertainty and struggle is heightened in the phases of analysis and application.
Above I pointed out that the analysis of the activity produces a sketchy hypothetic model of the next, more advanced developmental form of the activity system. To make this sketchy hypothesis a real general instrument of expansion it is necessary to elaborate the strategic component(s) of the activity system (strategic 'corners' of the triangle) into novel models. Most typically, the strategic component is the object of the activity.
For example, in order to find an expansive solution to the mounting contradictions of the work activity of general practitioners of family physicians (recall the example in Chapter 2), it may be necessary to create a new model of the object of their work. Traditionally the object is conceived of as 'a sickness' or as 'a patient,' understood as an individual with certain symptoms and illnesses to be cured. Today, the symptoms have become increasingly complex and subtle, including psychic and social factors intertwined and not reducible to the classified biomedical illnesses. A reconceptualization of the object may require a model of the patient as situated in his/her life activity, embedded in a model for conducting 'community diagnosis' (see e.g. Haglund 1983). Such models would be general instruments with which the practitioners could reorganize their diagnostic procedures.
On the other hand, the strategic component may also be the instrument of the activity. This is typically the case when the research is dealing with an activity faced with the incorporation and implementation of a major new complex technology. Toikka's (1986) analysis of the implementation of a FMS (Flexible Manufacturing System) in a machine engineering factory is a case in point. On the basis of collective modeling of the historical development and inner contradictions of the production process in question (germ-cell models), systemic models for planning and mastering the implementation were worked out with the workers.
"The system model of FMS consists of two main parts: on the one hand of the process model (layout + material flow), on the other hand of the control system model (units and hierarchy of control functions as a graphical model). Actually the system model is a paper simulator with which we analysed the process and control events needed for manufacturing a certain gear. On the basis of the system model it was possible to develop concrete models for special problem situations. So far we have developed the procedures for both a change of batch and restarting after breakdown in the turning cell." (Toikka 1986, 4.)
An acquisition process based on historical insight and leading to real application is far from mechanic and unidirectional.
"(...) the final models produced in working groups and plenary discussions increasingly often exceed the quality of the model solutions made by the researchers. This also means that the collective modelling process is a valuable method of obtaining new information about the system. An interesting thing, too, is that there is no qualitative difference between the results of the worker and management groups. (...) The training increasingly includes elements of planning. The more concrete the analysis of the system has become, the more open questions have entered the discussion. For instance, while simulating the operations required in the breakdown situation of the turning cell, the workers found out a more elegant and simple procedure for restarting the cell than that planned by the designer of the central control system." (Toikka 1986, 4.)
(c) For the formation of microcosms, the developmental nature of intersubjectivity is of essential importance. Fichtner (1984) has suggested a developmental sequence of three basic forms of intersubjectivity.
The first and most rudimentary form of intersubjectivity is called coordination. Individuals are gathered together to act upon a common object, but their individual actions are only externally related to each other. They still act as if separate individuals, each according to his individual task. Interaction is not reflected upon, it occurs mainly in the form of spontaneous reactions and attachments.
The second, intermediate form is that of cooperation. "Each individual has to relate an over-individual task to the individual aim of the action and he has to maintain the relationship. With regard to the common task, he has to balance both actions and action results of his partner with his own actions and their results. In addition to this, he must influence actions and results of his partner if necessary, again with regard to the common task." (Fichtner 1984, 217.) There are conscious, goal-directed sequences of interaction, aiming at successful joint completion of given tasks or successful joint solution of given problems.
The third form of intersubjectivity is called reflective communication. The living knowledge of personal subjects here develops in spoken and other symbolic processes. It becomes concrete as collective reflectiveness, or collective subjectivity. "The collective subject manifests itself and the laws of its functioning not so much through the inner structures of the individual's consciousness as through external practical activity involving objects and through collective cognitive activity with systems of objectified knowledge" (Lektorsky 1984, 241). In this most advanced form of intersubjectivity, the interaction system as a whole, in its spatial and temporal-historical dimensions, becomes the focus of reflection and self-regulation.
Fichtner's three forms of intersubjectivity correspond to the three levels of operation, action and activity, as presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In Fichtner's argument, the developmental forms of intersubjectivity are not regarded as ontogenetic stages but as phases of any cycle of genuine learning activity. This corresponds very well to the idea of expansive cycles. Each expansive transition is a transition from the individual to the collective, or from coordination to reflective communication.
A microcosm is a social testbench and a spearhead of the coming culturally more advanced form of the activity system. The conscious formation of a microcosm as a substep of expansive research corresponds to the formation of a vehicle for transition from cooperation to reflective communication. In other words, the microcosm is supposed to reach within itself and propagate outwards reflective communication while at the same time expanding and therefore eventually dissolving into the whole community of the activity.
The new instruments can only be implemented in selected strategic tasks. Such tasks represent the points of probable breakthroughs into the qualitatively more advanced form of practice. In carrying out these tasks with the help of the new instruments, the participants of the activity system face intense conflicts between the old and the given new ways of doing and thinking - the tertiary contradiction.
These conflicts take various forms. They may be struggles between the old rules and the new instruments, or between the old division of labor and the new communication emerging in the microcosm. They may also be clashes between the traditional and the novel instruments, often experienced as fear, resistance, stress and other intense psychic conflicts within individuals and collectives.
The task of research is not only to register and support this drama. The most demanding task is to trace and analyze the solutions to the conflicts produced by the participants in their daily actions. The created new resides in such practical solutions. The practical solutions that represent the unexpected, the unrecognizable, are actually initial forms of new theories. Most likely they are uneasily incorporated into the given new, somehow rebelling against it but still indispensable for it as its most dynamic ingredients - like Eero was indispensable for the seven brothers in spite of his arrogance.
For the researchers, this step of expansive research is the most difficult and the most rewarding one. The difficulty is twofold. Firstly, the application and generalization of the new instrument is a lengthy process requiring patient on-site data collection. Secondly, in the preceding phase the researchers and key participants of the expansive transition have strongly committed themselves to the given new general model and derivative instruments. Now the researchers suddenly have to give up the advocation of those instruments and open their eyes to record events and ideas that are all but foreign to the models or sometimes make the models look outright ridiculous.
The reward awaits in the careful analysis of such data. The researchers face the fact that all their skillful efforts to make the participants acquire and apply the culturally more advanced models according to a plan have been partially futile. A genuine expansive cycle inevitably produces not only civilization but also an ingredient of wilderness. To get a theoretical grasp of this wilderness, to find and understand something unexpected as a piece of the history of the future is the reward.
Reporting and assessing outcomes of expansive research is not easy. The voyage through the zone of proximal development is best followed and recorded by employing a set of multiple methods, ranging from phenomenlogical and anthropological observation and historical analysis to rigorous cognitive analysis of performances, conceptions and discourse processes. The sheer amount and variety of data collected make new types of reporting necessary.
There is a simple rule for such reporting. One should apply the historico-genetic method also in the presentation of the research findings. In other words, one should reproduce the actual course of the expansive transition, following its basic temporal structure. This does not exclude seemingly atemporal excursions and digressions into conceptual, descriptive, statistic, experimental and comparative terrains.
This type of reporting has ancestors and relatives in the genres of the diary, the expedition report, the travel story, and the developmental novel. On the other hand, the chronicle, the biography and the historical novel are not its closest relatives. There is an important difference between these two groups. The former group is characterized by committed quest for new visions and conquests. The latter group is characterized by a kind of outsider's wisdom, easy to profess after the events are over.
What is the historical mission of expansive developmental research? Against the background of the analysis presented in this book, the task may be defined as follows.
Expansive developmental research aims at making cycles of expansive transition collectively mastered journeys through zones of proximal development. In other words, it aims at furnishing people with tertiary and secondary instruments necessary for the mastery of qualitative transformations of their activity systems.
What are the main findings of this study? In a simplified and condensed manner, the findings may be presented as the following set of categories.
1. The category of activity, expressed in the form of the triangular models depicted in Figures 2.4 - 2.7.
2. The category of learning activity, or learning by expanding, expressed in the form of the triangular models depicted in Figures 2.11 and 2.12.
3. The reinterpreted and extended category of the zone of proximal development, corresponding to the sequential structure of learning by expanding, expressed in the cyclic model depicted in Figure 3.3.
4. The categorical framework for identifying and analyzing historical types of activity systems and expansive transitions, depicted in Figure 4.9.
5. The categorical framework for identifying and analyzing instruments of learning by expanding, elaborated in Tables 4.5 - 4.8.
6. The outline of a methodology for expansive developmental research, summarized in Figure 5.3.
It is the nature of theoretical research that the categories found do not corroborate, verify or falsify themselves. This kind of research resembles an expedition. When Columbus returned from his expedition, he claimed he had found India. The categorical content of this claim was erroneous, yet his findings initiated an unforeseen expansive cycle of practical and conceptual development.
Analogously, I am sure the contents of the categories found in this study will be proven inadequate many times over. The real question is, will they become instrumental in bringing about and mastering expansive cycles in different levels and branches of theoretical and practical activity.
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