Hello, Here is the article which I mentioned. Any comments are welcome. Rauno -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 26. maaliskuuta 2013 23:55 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term Hi Rauno-- You may have set off one of the longest threads in the history of xmca. When all the trailing headers are included, its quite a maze of symbols!! Could you send your paper out to XMCA, not just individuals? I am sure many would be interested. If that is not comfortable, then please send me a copy!! :-) mike On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 12:53 AM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote: > Hello, > > The origin of word metaphysics refers to ontology. Aristotles writings > concerning so called prima philosophia was in library placed in the section > named as "writing after physics". So it was just box of Aristotles nameless > writings related to the doctrine on substance. This Aristotle's work was > later on called as Metaphysics. > > At the time of Immanuel Kant metaphysics ment combination of epistemelogy > and ontology. Branch "epistemology" was invented by NeoKantians as a > descrition what happens in Kant's major work (Critique of Pure Reason). > > In 1950th Finnish communist Otto-Wille Kuusinen (born in my home town > Jyväskylä, Finland) organized a group of scientist in Soviet Union in order > to produce a book called Foundation of Marxism-Leninism in which the term > metaphycis was used as opposite to dialectical thinking. That usage of the > term is now mainly forgotten. > > Rauno Huttunen > ________________________________________ > Lähettäjä: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > käyttäjän Martin Packer [packer@duq.edu] puolesta > Lähetetty: 24. maaliskuuta 2013 16:27 > Vastaanottaja: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Aihe: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics > > Hi Brecht, > > Yes, of course you're correct, Andy is reading Hegel from a Marxist point > of view, therefore upside down, so to speak. But Marx's materialism is > still an ontology, still a metaphysics. > > Your confusion comes from the fact that there have been two uses of the > word 'metaphysics.' One use is to label some kind of talk as having no > basis in reality, as completely speculative and unverifiable. The logical > positivists, for example, wanted to eliminate metaphysics in this sense > from science - for them any notion was metaphysical if it was not > verifiable. They realized that Newtonian physics contained unverifiable > concepts, and they believed that Einstein's physics had eliminated > metaphysics by defining everything in terms of operations of observation > and measurement. > > We know now how narrow, unfruitful, and inconsistent the positivist view > of science turned out to be. The second use of the word 'metaphysics' helps > us understand why: "'metaphysics' refers to accounts of what truly exists, > and to accounts of relationships between 'existences' (e.g. reduction > relations, and perhaps other forms of dependence or priority)" (Kreines, > 2006). That is, metaphysics is the brach of philosophy that deals with > ontology (and sometimes epistemology is included), as well as the > assumptions that any science makes about the entities that it studies. > > One person's ontology is another person's metaphysics. That is, when > someone disagrees with another's ontological claims, a quick and easy > insult is to label them "metaphysical." But the word itself simply came > from the sequence of titles in Aristotle's texts: the text which dealt with > what we would now call ontology and epistemology was simply next in the > traditional list of titles after the 'Physica,' and so was called > 'Meta-physica.' > > Did Marx make ontological assumptions? Certainly! For example, as you > point out, for Marx the "essence of man" is "in reality,' "the ensemble of > social relations." In this passage Marx states one of his core ontological > assumptions. Much has been written about the ontological assumptions of > Marxism (e.g. Gould, 1978). In the same passage Marx himself confuses > things by using the term metaphysics in its first, derogatory sense. > Unsympathetic readers of Marx's writings have also at times judged them > merely metaphysical. Others, sympathetic readers, have also often referred > to them as metaphysical, but in a positive sense. The negative use of the > term is falling into disuse, with good reason. As the importance of > ontology is now understood, it no longer makes sense to reject all talk > about ontology as speculative and unscientific, or unphilosophical. > > Martin > > Gould, C. C. (1978). Marx's social ontology: Individuality and community > in Marx's theory of social relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. > > > Kreines, J. (2006). Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate. Philosophy > Compass, 1(5), 466-480. > > > On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:16 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> > wrote: > > > Because I do not want to derail the current thread, I start a new one: > > > >> My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn to if one wants to > avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - there's a whole > metaphysics here. > > > > Well, if you look how Andy appropriates Hegel in his various writings I > think you can hardly call what he does a form of metaphysics. On the > contrary, he turns Hegel upside down, reading his logic in a materialist > and non-metaphysical way. > > > > In this regard I think the philosophical implications of Marx's Theses > on Feuerbach are still grossly underestimated. In a few lines he summarizes > the deficiences of both idealism and materialism, subjectivism and > objectivism, finishing off a few centuries of philosophical thought (of > course the theses were but the end product of a whole project). After the > theses Marx largely moves on from philosophical critique to developing his > "materialist method". > http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm > > > > Thesis 1: with regard to "ontology": Marx criticized classical > materialism because it conceived of the actual world not as human practice > (subjective), but as merely objective. Whereas for Hegel the world > consisted merely of thought-objects, for Feuerbach the world was > constituted by sensuous objects. In both perspectives human practice was > absent, as either an objective or subjective activity. As such both were > forms of metaphysical thinking, i.e. a form of thinking and activity that > did not place human practice at its core. (Also see thesis 5) > > > > Thesis 2: with regard to "epistemology": "The question whether objective > truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but > is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and > power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. > The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated > from practice is a purely scholastic question." > > > > This is almost a Copernican revolution with regard to epistemology. True > knowledge, "truth", is not derived from either formal or dialectical logic, > but from the encounter between human thought and human practice. The > reality of any phenomenon outside this encounter "is a purely scholastic > question" or an exercise in metaphysics. Cf. snare theory, dark matter, > etc. Thesis 8 reasserts this premisse: "All social life is essentially > practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational > solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." Real > human practice or activity is the only base for gaining true knowledge > about humanity. > > > > Thesis 3: with regard to "emancipation": classical (mechanical) > materialism pointed out that humans are the product of their environments. > Changing their environments resulted in changed humans. Of course, who > changes their environments? Humans themselves. So transformation of > circumstances + human activity = self-change = revolutionary practice. > > > > Thesis 4: with regard to the position of a critical or emancipatory > science: It is insufficient to just deconstruct oppressive ideological > concepts, "after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be > done". The reverse movement should be explained as well: how real social > relations are the basis for these ideological forms. Of course, this means > that the contradiction cannot be resolved in thought, but has to be > overcome in reality, in practice. This is the core meaning of thesis 11: > "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the > point is to change it." > > > > In this sense, metaphysics was also a way of resolving real > contradictions in the realm of thought. > > > > Thesis 6: with regard to the "essence" of humankind: "...the essence of > man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is > the ensemble of the social relations." Taking "the individual" as the unit > of philosophy/social sciences is an a-historical and atomizing abstraction > which "belongs in reality to a particular social form" (Thesis 7). A social > science basing itself on the actions, intentions, emotions, etc. of > discrete individuals takes a metaphysical and abstract view of humanity as > its departure point. See also thesis 9 and 10. > > > > -- > > Brecht De Smet > > Assistant Professor at the Department Conflict and Development Studies > > Researcher at MENARG (Middle East and North Africa Research Group) > > Department of Political and Sciences > > Ghent University > > www.psw.ugent.be/menarg > > Universiteitsstraat 8 / 9000 Gent / Belgium > > > > > > > > Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>: > > > >> Oh! (he exclaims). My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn > to if one wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - > there's a whole metaphysics here. Take a look at the Stanford Enc of > Philosophy entry on Hegel (link below) for a sense of the debate over this. > There has been an "orthodox or traditional understanding of Hegel as a > ?metaphysical? thinker in the pre-Kantian ?dogmatic? sense. This was > followed by a view by some that "particular works, such as the > Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy, > especially his ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as > standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system > sketched above." (But Andy hates the Phenomenology!) And then there are > people who are "appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics as > exemplifying a legitimate project of philosophical inquiry into fundamental > ?features? or ?structures? of the world itself." > >> > >> Myself, I'm closest to the last of these views. I don't think we want > to *avoid* metaphysics (ontology and epistemology) ; indeed I don't think > that is possible. rather, we need to adopt the *right* metaphysics. We can > debate what the criteria of that need to be. But to claim of a position, in > philosophy or the social sciences, that there is "No metaphysics here!" is > a tad naive. > >> > >> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Mar 23, 2013, at 12:36 PM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> > >>> I thought that what he said was avoiding it: back up your exclamation > Martin > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 23 March 2013 16:48, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: > >>> > >>>> I though you wanted to *avoid* metaphysics, Andy! > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Mar 22, 2013, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Thank you Manfred for that clear explanation, and for correcting my > >>>> typing mistake! :( > >>>>> This might be an occasion to mention how my own development of > Activity > >>>> Theory differs from yours and that of ANL. > >>>>> I do not work with duality of "the publically assigned meaning and > the > >>>> personally felt sense". Rather I use Hegel's approach in which the > >>>> Individual and Universal are mediated by the Particular. This is a > relation > >>>> which is applicable not just to motives, but any concept. It allows > the > >>>> meaning of the situation to be something which is *realised*. This > word > >>>> "realised" is what Wiulliam James would have described as a > >>>> "double-barrelled word" (following Charles Dickens' "double barrelled > >>>> compliment), in that it means both "realised" in the objective sense > of > >>>> "made real", as in "The plan was at last realised when the judge > delivered > >>>> his verdict," and subjective in the sense of "woke up to", as in "I > >>>> realised that my efforts to reconcile with my wife were doomed to > failure." > >>>> I believe that this resolves certain problems which arise in Actvity > >>>> Theory, but remaining within the Activity approach as outlined in your > >>>> excellent paper. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> Holodynski, Manfred wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Dear colleagues, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article. > There > >>>> are a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to > >>>> follow all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer > to the > >>>> following: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of > >>>> activity. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I > >>>> focused especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and > its > >>>> levels of activity that is related to motives, actions that are > related to > >>>> goals and operations that are related to the conditions under which an > >>>> action is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he > stated > >>>> that my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how > the > >>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals of > an > >>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and one > >>>> action can realize different activities. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> May I quote Andy's words: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have > to > >>>> be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the > success, > >>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both > >>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is > tied > >>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an > activity. > >>>> One and the same action could be part of different ??actions > activities (!) > >>>> (MH)??. It is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) > the > >>>> success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, > and it > >>>> is this which makes manifest and actual that connection between > action and > >>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual > subject. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind", > or > >>>> intelligent infants, etc." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the > behavior. > >>>> What's the goal? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to > >>>> greet his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the > >>>> activity? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech > is a > >>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election > victory. > >>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory > there > >>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the > personally > >>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that he > >>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be > >>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the societal > >>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the personal > sense > >>>> assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader framed > this > >>>> situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able to > fulfill > >>>> the leadership. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak > about > >>>> an advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in > >>>> infants who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a > >>>> future state of affairs. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced > >>>> level in older children: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of > >>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first > >>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these > >>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the > desired > >>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign system > >>>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in the > here > >>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point, > not > >>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of > them and > >>>> to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play that > color > >>>> one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth striving for > and > >>>> that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform > >>>> them into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It > emerges in > >>>> a long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of > goals > >>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older > >>>> children are > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure > of an > >>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific > >>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Manfred > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> D-48149 Münster > >>>>>> > >>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html > >>>>>> > >>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > >>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > >>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13 > >>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred > >>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than > >>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So > >>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and > how the > >>>> structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because > motives > >>>> are not given to immediate perception; they have to be > inferred/learnt. > >>>> Emotional expression and experience signal the success, failure, > >>>> frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both > >>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is > tied > >>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an > activity. > >>>> One and the same action could be part of different actions. It is the > >>>> emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success, etc., > etc., > >>>> that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is this which > makes > >>>> manifest and actual that connection between action and activity, for > both > >>>> the observer/participant and the individual subject. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind", > or > >>>> intelligent infants, etc. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It's all in there. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity > were > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the > views in > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> for me to get clear about! > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e., the > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part, > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity - > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> fundamental. > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > >>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden > >>>>> > >>>>> __________________________________________ > >>>>> _____ > >>>>> xmca mailing list > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> __________________________________________ > >>>> _____ > >>>> xmca mailing list > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED > >>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor > >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>> __________________________________________ > >>> _____ > >>> xmca mailing list > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >>> > >> > >> > >> __________________________________________ > >> _____ > >> xmca mailing list > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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