Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice

[Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>]

Andy --

Very complicated, but illustrative because of that.

To start with, in the US, bank employees are almost never represented by
unions (I do not know of any at all, in fact, except at the Amalgamated
Bank in Chicago where they are represented by UNITE, for historical
reasons that I won't go into here). Most bank employees are part of the
swelling low-wage workforce that clings to the bottom rung of a ladder
into white-collar, "professional" jobs, often offering no job
security,access to healthcare, benefits, etc.

However, if one of these workers showed up in one of our training courses
(and unrepresented workers sometimes do) they would probably discuss their
working conditions with us and the rest of the class, but be advised
never, never to get into a fit of rage at work. They would be advised
instead to talk privately with other workers about any bullying that was
going on, see if their interpretation of the supervisor's behavior was
confirmed by others, and take good notes in the likelihood that some of
the supervisor's behavior violated company policy or one of the state or
federal laws governing discrimination or safety (which includes harassment
and stress) at work. After a period of collective planning with other
workers and some comprehensive note-taking, there might be something that
can be done. It might be possible to get the supervisor disciplined, for
example, or even removed.

You may note that I'm not using the terms "superior" or "menial." Do you
supposed there's a translation factor here? I also wonder at the use of
the phrase "social etiquette."  I think I will substitute the phrase
"professional behavior."

So we are imagining a bank customer who is taken aback by the sight and
sound of a bank employee who gets very angry, and who expresses that
anger, at a person who appears to be his boss. Well, if I were that
customer, I would think first about what this tells me about the social
context of that particular workplace. I am very aware of the levels of
stress experienced by workers who have to behave in a certain
"professional" manner while at the same time doing complex tasks involving
record-keeping and counting, and who are held to all-or-nothing standards
regarding the property that they handle. This is true of clerks in the
Post Office, too, who handle money and stamps.

Before this gets too long, I'll just say that I agree, there is no
omniscient observer to tell us what the "societal meaning" of something
is. In fact, if Manfred and I were standing in line at that bank where
this happened, it might be fun for us to compare our "personal sense" of
what we saw.

Helena 





On 3/30/13 6:34 AM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

>Helena, consider the following scenario which Manfred uses to illustrate
>what he calls "personal sense" and "societal meanings":
>
>        "People do not appropriate the use of signs and their meanings
>        during social interactions in an impartial way.  They interpret
>        and use them in the light of their actually elicited motives
>        along with the motives they assign to the interaction partner.
>        The societal meaning of the used signs does not have to match
>        the individually assigned personal sense.  For example, an
>        outsider may well interpret a public fit of rage by a
>        low-ranking bank employee towards his superior as an inexcusable
>        violation of social etiquette. However, for the menial employee,
>        it may well be a reassertion of self-esteem in response to a
>        humiliating directive" (p. 22).
>
>What I see is that the "low-ranking bank employee" might, for example,
>have been a union member, maybe even attended one of your training
>course the previous week. Whatever the reason, the response is not
>immediately "personal", but arises from the employee's commitments to
>projects including projects other than that embodied in the practical
>norms of the bank as a profit-making enterprise (aka "social
>etiquette"). What is personal is "the motivating sphere of
>consciousness,  a sphere that includes our inclinations and needs, our
>interests and impulses, and our affect and emotion." (Vygotsky, Thinking
>and Speech, chapter 7, quoted on the same page by Holodynski). As
>Manfred points out, these motivations, etc., are not just a subset of
>"societal meanings". Personal sense is something qualitatively
>different, which is acquired in the course of participation in a variety
>of (societal) activities (or projects).
>
>The kind of conflict which could arise in this scenario is what Vasilyuk
>had in mind when he considered what he called "life relations" which may
>conflict with each other and generate personal crises. In fact, all of
>Vasilyuk's work depends on the fact that a person has commitments to
>multiple projects, which are both societal and personal in their
>ontological status. "Activities" (or projects) exist, and it is thanks
>to such activities that we have concepts, and only thus it is possible
>for us to understand human action, because human actions are not
>generally to be explained by their immediate goals, but rather make
>sense only when seen as part of larger ("molar") projects. Without being
>able to grasp, using concepts, the various of projects motivating a
>person's actions and underlying their emotional expression displayed as
>they do so, it would be impossible to understand human action. But I do
>agree with Martin in one respect (23/03/2013) - there is no omniscient
>observer to tell us what is the "societal meaning." In ANL's time, the
>Politburo was supposed to play that role, but that was an illusion
>anyway. Now we see life more as a fabric woven of divers threads. But I
>am not concerned about being provided with "a criterion for choosing
>between projects" - the individual's actions and their emotional
>responses signal to us their practical relation to the various projects
>underway in their life, and make them comprehensible to themselves and
>others.
>
>My point is just that the binary contast between personal sense and
>societal meaning is untenable.
>
>Rather, activities, as particular instances (or realisations) of a
>concept mediate between the universal concepts provided in our material
>culture, and individual actions. All these "can be verified in a purely
>empirical way."
>
>Andy
>
>Helena Worthen wrote:
>> Carol --
>>
>> Certainly. And this difference has implications. For example: Learning.
>> When one learns a job that one does for art's sake, one learns it
>> differently (or is taught it differently) than when one learns a job for
>> the utilitarian motive of receiving money. Or, another example: social
>> context.  The place where one practices a job that one does for art's
>>sake
>> is likely to be unregulated, whereas the place where one practices a job
>> that one does to earn money is going to be -- or is supposed to be
>> regulated. These regulations govern the relationship between the worker
>> and the person/s who employ him/her/. Etc.
>>
>> Helena
>>
>> On 3/27/13 9:40 PM, "Carol Macdonald" <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>   
>>> Helena
>>>
>>> Andy points out in his book (An interdisciplinary theory of activity)
>>>that
>>> people may work for arts sake, but they may have a utilitarian motive
>>>for
>>> their work, for example working for the money. I think you may be in
>>> agreement with this.
>>>
>>> Carol
>>>
>>> On 28 March 2013 00:20, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>     
>>>> Martin --
>>>>
>>>> Apologies for lurking, following by cryptic/petulant message.
>>>>
>>>> The point being that the same action can, depending on what activity
>>>> system you're looking at it from, mean two very different things. And
>>>> they
>>>> can be in conflict, ranging from a cool, subdued conflict, to a very
>>>>hot
>>>> one. Specifically (since my interest lies in how people negotiated
>>>> decent
>>>> conditions of work), someone can be doing a job for the purpose of
>>>> earning
>>>> a living, and care not one whit about what the industry is (could be
>>>> weaving cloth, making bombs, dumping garbage pails in a restaurant,
>>>> grading papers). Or the person can be doing a job for the purpose of
>>>> doing
>>>> the job. Most studies of the workplace assume that people at work are
>>>> working for the purpose that the firm/company/enterprise/industry is
>>>>set
>>>> up for. When they overlook the possibility that two very different,
>>>> sometimes conflicting activities are taking place (an activity system
>>>> defined by motive/purpose), then they can't discern how people are
>>>> feeling, how they're learning to do the job, how they're managing
>>>>their
>>>> effort, etc etc.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for asking.
>>>>
>>>> Helena
>>>>
>>>> On 3/27/13 1:42 PM, "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>       
>>>>> Hi Helena,
>>>>>
>>>>> Which point are you referring to? There have been so many!
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mar 27, 2013, at 1:13 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>         
>>>>>> Hello -- Exactly my point in my MCA article on using AT to study
>>>>>>           
>>>> work.
>>>>       
>>>>>> Helena Worthen
>>>>>> Hworthen@illinois.edu
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 3/22/13 8:40 AM, "Holodynski, Manfred"
>>>>>> <manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>           
>>>>>>> Dear colleagues,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
>>>>>>>            
>>>> There
>>>>       
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to
>>>>>>> follow
>>>>>>> all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer to
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> following:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
>>>>>>> activity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
>>>>>>> focused
>>>>>>> especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and its
>>>>>>>            
>>>> levels
>>>>       
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> activity that is related to motives, actions that are related to
>>>>>>>            
>>>> goals
>>>>       
>>>>>>> and operations that are related to the conditions under which an
>>>>>>>            
>>>> action
>>>>       
>>>>>>> is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he stated
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
>>>>>>>            
>>>> of an
>>>>       
>>>>>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
>>>>>>>            
>>>> one
>>>>       
>>>>>>> action can realize different activities.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> May I quote Andy's words:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have
>>>>>>>            
>>>> to
>>>>       
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
>>>>>>> success,
>>>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
>>>>>>>            
>>>> both
>>>>       
>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
>>>>>>>            
>>>> is
>>>>       
>>>>>>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
>>>>>>>            
>>>> an
>>>>       
>>>>>>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different
>>>>>>>            
>>>> ""actions
>>>>       
>>>>>>> activities (!) (MH)"". It is the emotions which signal (internally
>>>>>>>            
>>>> and
>>>>       
>>>>>>> externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's
>>>>>>>            
>>>> furthering
>>>>       
>>>>>>> an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that
>>>>>>> connection between action and activity, for both the
>>>>>>> observer/participant
>>>>>>> and the individual subject.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
>>>>>>>            
>>>> or
>>>>       
>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
>>>>>>>            
>>>> behavior.
>>>>       
>>>>>>> What's the goal?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
>>>>>>> greet
>>>>>>> his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the
>>>>>>> activity?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech
>>>>>>>            
>>>> is a
>>>>       
>>>>>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
>>>>>>> victory.
>>>>>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
>>>>>>> personally
>>>>>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
>>>>>>>            
>>>> he
>>>>       
>>>>>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
>>>>>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
>>>>>>>            
>>>> societal
>>>>       
>>>>>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the
>>>>>>>personal
>>>>>>> sense assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
>>>>>>> framed
>>>>>>> this situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able
>>>>>>>            
>>>> to
>>>>       
>>>>>>> fulfill the leadership.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
>>>>>>>            
>>>> about
>>>>       
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>> advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
>>>>>>> infants
>>>>>>> who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a
>>>>>>>            
>>>> future
>>>>       
>>>>>>> state of affairs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
>>>>>>> level
>>>>>>> in older children:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of
>>>>>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of
>>>>>>>first
>>>>>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
>>>>>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
>>>>>>> desired
>>>>>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
>>>>>>>            
>>>> system
>>>>       
>>>>>>> which enables the person to evoke and  imagine a future state in
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> here
>>>>>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point,
>>>>>>>            
>>>> not
>>>>       
>>>>>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
>>>>>>>            
>>>> them
>>>>       
>>>>>>> and to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play
>>>>>>>            
>>>> that
>>>>       
>>>>>>> color one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth
>>>>>>>            
>>>> striving
>>>>       
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>> and that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform
>>>>>>> them
>>>>>>> into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It emerges
>>>>>>>            
>>>> in
>>>>       
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of
>>>>>>> goals
>>>>>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
>>>>>>> children are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure
>>>>>>>            
>>>> of an
>>>>       
>>>>>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
>>>>>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Manfred
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> D-48149 Münster
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>            
>>>> 
>>>>http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>>>>       
>>>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>>>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
>>>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
>>>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is
>>>>>>>choice
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather
>>>>>>>than
>>>>>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives.
>>>>>>>So
>>>>>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
>>>>>>>            
>>>> how
>>>>       
>>>>>>> the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals.
>>>>>>>            
>>>> Because
>>>>       
>>>>>>> motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
>>>>>>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
>>>>>>> success,
>>>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
>>>>>>>            
>>>> both
>>>>       
>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
>>>>>>>            
>>>> is
>>>>       
>>>>>>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
>>>>>>>            
>>>> an
>>>>       
>>>>>>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different
>>>>>>>            
>>>> actions.
>>>>       
>>>>>>> It
>>>>>>> is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the
>>>>>>>            
>>>> success,
>>>>       
>>>>>>> etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it
>>>>>>>            
>>>> is
>>>>       
>>>>>>> this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action
>>>>>>>            
>>>> and
>>>>       
>>>>>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
>>>>>>>            
>>>> subject.
>>>>       
>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
>>>>>>>            
>>>> or
>>>>       
>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's all in there.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>            
>>>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity
>>>>>>>>           
>>>> were
>>>>       
>>>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
>>>>>>>>           
>>>> views in
>>>>       
>>>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems
>>>>>>>>important
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>> for me to get clear about!
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening
>>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
>>>>>>>>           
>>>> the
>>>>       
>>>>>>>>    meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a
>>>>>>>>           
>>>> part,
>>>>       
>>>>>>>>    which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
>>>>>>>>           
>>>> activity -
>>>>       
>>>>>>>>    is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state
>>>>>>>>           
>>>> and
>>>>       
>>>>>>>>    intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    fundamental.
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>>    Andy
>>>>>>>>           
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>>> _____
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>>            
>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>>           
>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>> _____
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>>>>>         
>>>> __________________________________________
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>>>>       
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
>>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
>>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
>>> __________________________________________
>>> _____
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>>>     
>>
>>
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>>
>>   
>
>-- 
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>*Andy Blunden*
>Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
>
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