Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Greg,

The quote is in Gadamer's book *Reason in the Age of Science*  (fourth
printing,1986). This book is a series of articles translated by Frederick
Lawrence. The quote comes from gadamer's  essay "Hegel's Philosophy  and
its Aftereffects". On page 30.

Greg, I am reading the various articles as I follow along with the theme of
this thread on metaphysics, activity theory, expressive signs, and
internalization.
This book, read AS  a conversation, is a meandering walk through the
same understandings as discussed on this theme.

As mike mentioned,   Rauno's article may generate further
conversation/thinking on this theme. I'm looking forward to the next
installment.

Larry

On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> The question of institutional objective *spirit* was central to Hegel's
> metaphysics of freedom for all.
> Gadamer wrote,
>
> "This doctrine of the spirit objectified in institutions is not concerned
> with defending the existing institutions in their unchangeable correctness.
> Hegel defended institutions not in a wholesale fashion but against the
> pretence of knowing better on the part of the individual. With his
> overpowering spiritual force, he showed the limitations of moralism in
> social life and the untenability of a purely inward morality that is not
> made manifest in the objective structures of life that hold human beings
> together. So in fact he was able to show what kind of discrepancies, not to
> say what kind of injustices, as well as what kind of dialectic of
> unrighteousness, is connected with abstract moralism.
>
> Gadamer suggests the sociological *spirit* LIVES out of THIS way of
> understanding or approach to interpretation.
>
> The question of understanding *institutions* and *instituting*  processes
> AS objective spirit is one tradition which Andy invites us to return to on
> this theme.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 6:52 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Brecht,
>> Your commentary was very helpful and clarifying.
>> Your use of the word *inviting* and *invitation* also shifts the
>> conversation towards dialogue and being addressed.
>> Entering the conversation from two directions/perspectives also helps
>> clarify the relationships.
>>
>> Haydi,, you mentioned a direction from material to ideal.
>> Is this always an orientation from material to ideal, or is it possible
>> to also orient from the ideal to the material once the ideal is developed??
>>
>> Also is it possible to consider the *spark* that mediates the transition
>> of one to the other AS *imaginable* or *creative* sparks???
>>
>> Larry
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 3:22 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Brecht
>>> Leontiev speaks in clear words :
>>>
>>> [[The old metaphysical psychology knew only abstract individuals being
>>> subjected to the action of an environment that resisted them, who on
>>> their
>>> part exhibited characteristic psychic capabilities: perception, thought,
>>> will,
>>> feelings. Indifferently the individual under these circumstances was
>>> thought
>>> of as some kind of reactive machine (if even a very complexly programmed
>>> machine), or he was ascribed innately developed spiritual strength. Like
>>> St. Sancho, who naively believed that with a blow of steel we will chop
>>> out fire
>>> that is hidden in rock and who was derided by  Marx,9 the
>>> psychologist-metaphysician thinks that the psyche can be extracted from the
>>> subject him-self, from his head. Like Sancho, he does not suspect that the
>>> fiery sparks
>>> are cast off not by the rock but by the steel, and what is most
>>> important, that
>>> the whole point is that in the white heat the sparks are the interaction
>>> of the
>>> rock and the steel. The psychologist-metaphysician also drops the
>>>  mainlink -the processes that mediate the ties of the subject with the real
>>> world, the only
>>> processes in which their psychic reflection of reality takes place, the
>>> transi-tion of the material into the ideal. And these are the very
>>> processes of the ac-tivity of the subject that always are external and
>>> practical first and then as-sume the form of internal activity, the
>>> activity of consciousness.]]
>>> Best
>>> Haydi
>>>
>>>
>>> ________________________________
>>>  From: Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, 26 March 2013, 11:37:22
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
>>>
>>>
>>> Martin,
>>>
>>>
>>> Ironically, I think it is not only a question of methodology pertaining
>>> to a specific discipline, but a problem of "metaphysics" as well :)
>>>
>>>
>>> In the model of "individuals constituting a crowd", the "individual" is
>>> a genetic and logical given before the "crowd". But, again, individual
>>> bodies come to a demonstration already participating in numerous projects.
>>> These bodies cannot dress, talk, or move without explicitly and
>>> "empirically" acknowledging their participation in various "social forms",
>>> i.e. systems of activity, projects, etc. Returning to Marx, individuals are
>>> really ensembles - coherent wholes - of social relations. An individual
>>> actor is, on the one hand, a discrete agent participating in countless
>>> activities, and, on the other, a microcosm of the activities (s)he
>>> participates in. "Individuality" (cf. Voloshinov 1973) is just one of the
>>> many projects an individual participates in.
>>>
>>>
>>> It is important to realize that individuals do not assemble into a
>>> "crowd" independently from the activity. Their intentions are not an a
>>> priori as well. They are, in fact, formally and informally "invited" to
>>> participate. With regard to the 25 January demonstrations, people were
>>> formally invited through leaflets, facebook and twitter messages, and face
>>> to face conversations. But people were also informally "drawn into" the
>>> activity of protesting by the saliency of its actions. The organizers of
>>> the first protesters had decided to gather first in popular neighborhoods
>>> and move in mini-demonstrations from there to Tahrir, in order not to get
>>> arrested on an individual basis. This action had the unintended side-effect
>>> that people from the neighborhood began discussing with the protesters and
>>> began to physically join the demonstrations. Groups of a few hundred
>>> protesters swiftly swelled to a few thousands. The rest is history.
>>>
>>>
>>> At the moment of the "invitation" people were already drawn into the
>>> activity of protesting. What was left for them was to *recognize* the
>>> project as their own and participate in its leading action: the
>>> demonstration. Conversely, the project had to prove its rationality and
>>> necessity to potential participants. The basis on which each discrete
>>> individual decided to agree and participate was quite varied. Often the
>>> decision to participate was not taken on an individual basis, but already
>>> as a collaborative activity, "in group", for example the Ultras (hardcore
>>> football supporters), families living in the same street, or workers
>>> belonging to a strike committee. But the fact that, in the end, millions
>>> did, indicated that the activity of resistance (expressed in vague concepts
>>> such as "the regime is a bunch of thieves" and survivalist or basic forms
>>> of resistance such as evading taxes, not going to vote, etc.) already
>>> existed and was taken to the next level
>>>  of open and explicit mobilization.
>>>
>>> Likewise, a strike is not the first moment of resistance, it is the
>>> moment where already existing forms of resistance (often individual or by
>>> small groups) becomes organized, salient, collaborative, intentional, etc.
>>> Even when an individual engages in a singular activity he employs the tools
>>> and signs that are developed through his participation in projects. Even
>>> indirectly, his/her activity is still socially mediated. When participating
>>> in a collaborative activity this mediation becomes "direct" (dialogical?),
>>> and takes on a wholly different developmental logic.
>>>
>>>
>>> People who were "passively resisting" were suddenly thrown into the
>>> collaboration of "active protest". They came into confrontation with the
>>> police, and more importantly, in a few street battles, they "won". They
>>> came into confrontation with each other and realized they were "legion"
>>> because they were already practical-materially a massive force. They were
>>> already making a revolution in their deeds and demands before they fully
>>> realized they were making a revolution and conceptualized their own
>>> activity as a revolution. If anything, revolutionary intentions came
>>> *after* practically being a revolutionary - emerging from the activity.
>>> Their individual consciousness of the newly emerging goals of their
>>> activity was semiotically mediated by slogans such as "down with the
>>> regime", "bread, freedom, and social justice", revolutionary songs,
>>> graffiti and cartoons that expressed power relations and the necessity to
>>> overthrow them, ..., and practically by their
>>>  organization and crafting of tools (from molotov cocktails to stages
>>> for speeches).
>>>
>>>
>>> From *this* perspective, there are no two levels (1) "one perspective,
>>> actions in collaborations are drawn into a new activity, which then defines
>>> new actions"; and (2) the other perspective, individuals act intentionally
>>> (and reason and feel) towards and with others with whom they share a
>>> network, and this inspires and motivates others who have previously not
>>> participated." It is a story of mediation and of development, where
>>> individual intentions and actions are entwined with collaborative efforts.
>>>
>>>
>>> When I speak of revolutionary institutions I mean this in a broad sense
>>> of stable and systemic objectifications of struggle. An ad hoc meeting to
>>> organize a demonstration or a strike is not yet an institution, but it can
>>> become one. The occupation of Tahrir at one point had the potentiality of
>>> becoming an institution (it was even called the "Republic of Tahrir"). Why
>>> did this institution not crystallize? Because the military was successful
>>> in drawing a majority of protesters into its own project of "transition".
>>> It demobilized the participants of the occupation action which then played
>>> a leading role in the revolutionary process. How was this possible?  It was
>>> the outcome of a specific hegemonic struggle, which the military won,
>>> because of reasons I won't detail here now. To put it in abstract terms:
>>> the military formally agreed with the goal of the popular project, but
>>> substituted its own top-down actions for the grassroots action of the
>>> protesters.
>>>  This created confusion, and the rest is, unfortunately, also history.
>>>
>>> On the other hand, many strike committees that popped up during the
>>> revolution DID crystallize into more or less stable independent
>>> trade-unions. Why? Because these strike committees often had a longer
>>> history of organized struggle and collaboration, because they were better
>>> organized, and because the fall of Mubarak, which demobilized broad layers
>>> of "political" protesters, was appropriated as a call for *increased*
>>> mobilization from "social" protesters. But that's also a different story
>>> which would lead us too far.
>>>
>>>
>>> In conclusion there is a no strict separation between "social movements"
>>> and "institutions". Organizing a demonstration (movement) already
>>> presupposes degrees of organization (institutions), and from the activity
>>> of a collective action organizations may develop. However, in the
>>> development of an activity, there are phases where "movement" or
>>> "institution" is leading or dominant. After the fall of Mubarak, it was
>>> obvious that mobilizations were still important, but that the point of
>>> gravity shifted to building revolutionary institutions. And the fact that
>>> this formation process was fragmented, diverted, and retarded because of
>>> the so-called "democratic transition" from above (= counter-revolution) is
>>> the reason Egypt is still a mess today.
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>>
>>> Brecht
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
>>>
>>>
>>> > Brecht,
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > I can see the logic of exploring the mutual constitution of actions
>>> and activities, rather than of individuals and crowds. Especially since
>>> you're in a Department of Conflict and Development Studies. But speaking as
>>> a psychologist, what would happen if one looked this phenomenon in Egypt in
>>> *both* ways - rather like MCM and CMC in Capital?
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> >> From one perspective, actions in collaborations are drawn into a new
>>> activity, which then defines new actions. From the other perspective,
>>> individuals act intentionally (and reason and feel) towards and with others
>>> with whom they share a network, and this inspires and motivates others who
>>> have previously not participated.
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > It may even be that what seems organic and spontaneous from the one
>>> perspective seems logical and inevitable from the other. And vice versa.
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > Finally, you write that...
>>>
>>> >>>  by instances of "institutionalization"...  Only a few of the
>>> spontaneous movements of the insurrection have been crystallized and
>>> developed as stable and coherent "systems of activity".
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > I'm trying to make sense of institutions these days. Do you have ideas
>>> as to why this has not occurred? What does it take to constitute an
>>> institution? The power to declare it? I mean, in a non-revolutionary
>>> society this is precisely what happens: one institution designates people
>>> (role inhabitants) who define a new institution. In a situation where all
>>> institutions, I suppose, are questionable, what alternative basis might
>>> there be?
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > Martin
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > On Mar 25, 2013, at 1:58 PM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> >> I think a "crowd" is too loose a concept to investigate such a
>>> process.
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Firstly, the category of "crowd" lumps together fundamentally
>>> different actions and activities. A lynch mob or a mass concert obviously
>>> has a different developmental logic than a political demonstration or a
>>> strike.
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Secondly, I rather study the relation between collaborative actions
>>> and collaborative activities than between "individuals" and "groups".
>>> Individual bodies are not entering actions as individuals, but because they
>>> are already a part of existing collaborations which are drawn into a new
>>> activity/project. So the "seeds" of any "crowd" already exist before its
>>> formation as a "crowd". For example, the first demonstrations on 25 January
>>> 2011 in Cairo mobilized (1) existing "networks" of activists that had been
>>> built slowly since the last decade, both "real" (organizations) and
>>> "virtual" (internet-based); (2) non-organized people from popular
>>> neighborhoods who "spontaneously" joined the smaller protest marches
>>> towards Tahrir. But even these people joined the action (concrete
>>> demonstration) as part of an already existing project (neighborhood,
>>> workplace, community, etc.).
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Thirdly, instead of "individuals" constituting a "crowd", the mass
>>> mobilizations rather represented a coming together of different projects
>>> into a joint action, which then "organically" gave rise to a new project of
>>> "revolution". I say organically and spontaneously, because the goal of
>>> revolution emerged from the coming together of these various projects and
>>> the development of their joint action - no organized political force had
>>> dreamed of moving forward the call for an end to the regime. There was a
>>> dual developmental process: A. the goals of the activity developed from a
>>> vague and soft critique of the regime to the radical demand of overthrowing
>>> the current order; B. the actions that comprised the activity changed from
>>> mass demonstrations, over small-scale "guerrilla warfare" in the streets
>>> against the police at night, to occupation of public spaces.
>>>
>>> >> This dual developmental process was determined by, on the one hand
>>> the internal relation between actions and activity, and, on the other, the
>>> external encounter between the actions and organized state power. For
>>> example, internally, from the occupation of Tahrir emerged the need for
>>> grassroots forms of governance (tents, food, doctors, art and songs,
>>> prisoners, etc.), which, in turn, strongly encouraged the feeling that a
>>> societal revolution was taking place. Externally, the withdrawal of the
>>> police from the streets stimulated the formation of popular committees to
>>> protect neighborhoods from thugs and criminals (who were often set loose by
>>> the regime...), which, in popular and working class neighborhoods, became
>>> pillars of revolutionary self-organization.
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Fourthly, this touches upon activity as a developmental process where
>>> moments of "movement" that bring together individual bodies in new forms of
>>> collaboration has to be grounded by instances of "institutionalization" (or
>>> systematization) if it is to become a stable social form. And this is where
>>> the Egyptian revolution has largely failed, up until now. Only a few of the
>>> spontaneous movements of the insurrection have been crystallized and
>>> developed as stable and coherent "systems of activity". But that's another
>>> discussion.
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Best,
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Brecht
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> Quoting Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >>> What an interesting investigation, Brecht!
>>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> >>> You write of a relationship of 'constitution' that runs both ways
>>> between individual actions and group activity. Years ago I read Elias
>>> Canetti's book Crowds and Power, and the memory I have of that book
>>> (probably distorted by the passage of time) is that Canetti was exploring
>>> the way a crowd has an existence that is more than the sum of its parts:
>>> when individuals 'constitute' a crowd this really gives rise to something
>>> emergent, new. Do you see that in Egypt?
>>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> >>> Martin
>>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> >>> On Mar 25, 2013, at 11:01 AM, Brecht De Smet
>>> <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> >>>> Unfortunately, I don't know enough about Activity Theory to engage
>>> in a detailed criticism; during my brief encounter with CHAT I immediately
>>> "jumped" to Andy's concept of project collaboration (PC) (which is of
>>> course partially rooted in AT). Likewise, because my research focus is more
>>> on the "meso"-level of groups, movements, and organizations, I can't really
>>> say much about ethnographic descriptions of micro-activities such as
>>> opening windows on election days.
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> The advantage of PC for my research is that the object of an
>>> activity is conceived of as emerging within the developmental process of
>>> the activity itself. As I'm studying the revolutionary process in Egypt,
>>> such a perspective allows for an understanding of the real transformations
>>> of actions and activities involved. A concrete activity obviously
>>> constitutes concrete actions (e.g. the broad activity of protesting on 25
>>> January constituted the actions of meetings, demonstrations, etc.), but the
>>> development of actions has the potential to reconstitute the activity (the
>>> demonstration on Tahrir turned into an occupation, which, in turn, created
>>> a space for alternative politics; the mass character of the demonstrations
>>> reconstituted the object of the protest towards "an end to the regime",
>>> i.e. revolution; etc.). In abstract terms: the relation between individual
>>> protesters and the activity of protesting (the project) is mediated by
>>> particular actions
>>>  (their collaboration), and, vice versa, the relation between individual
>>> protesters and their particular actions is mediated by the "overarching"
>>> activity of protest.
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> This neat scheme becomes much more complex when you take into
>>> account the relations between various projects, both "horizontally" and
>>> "vertically". Horizontally, the spontaneous revolutionary project arises in
>>> contradiction /solidarity to a bunch of other projects (e.g. Islamism, the
>>> state, etc.). Vertically, and "from the bottom-up" this project is part of
>>> such historical systems as the Egyptian social formation and global
>>> capitalism; and "top-down" it is constituted by and reconstitutes a series
>>> of smaller projects (students' movements for better education; workers'
>>> movements for better wages; villages demanding water and electricity, etc.).
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> Added to this - and against the notion of the "omniscient"
>>> scientist-observer - the social researcher him/herself is a
>>> constitutive/constituted actor vis-à-vis the project, in the sense that
>>> his/her actions (publishing papers, doing fieldwork, writing books,
>>> attending conferences, conducting interviews, etc.) plays a potential
>>> mediating role, for example in the understanding of the project of itself,
>>> in crafting intellectual tools to achieve (or undermine) the goals of the
>>> project, etc.
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> I do not know if this amounts to a critique of AT, but this is the
>>> way "actions" and "activity" have been productive concepts for my research.
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> Best,
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> Brecht
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> Quoting Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>> Hi Brecht,
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>> Yes, a rational critique of ontology is possible, and indeed
>>> necessary. I was trying to engage in such a critique of activity theory,
>>> which it seems to me departs considerably rather the admirable (though not
>>> unquestionable) ontology that Marx proposed. (And yes, as you suggest, the
>>> claim to be "purely empirical" seems to me a return to the outdated and
>>> simplistic notion that there is on the one hand 'metaphysics' and on the
>>> other hand 'genuine science.' But let that pass.) Activity theory, in my
>>> view, essentializes a particular organization of human activity and in
>>> doing so obscures the historical character of that organization. Would you
>>> agree?
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>> Martin
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>> On Mar 25, 2013, at 4:00 AM, Brecht De Smet
>>> <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>> Martin, I obviously agree with your presentation of the
>>> historical lineages of the "word" metaphysics. However, with regard to the
>>> current discussion on the "terms of the debate", it is quite obvious that
>>> Andy's original remark: "So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical
>>> "states of mind", or intelligent infants, etc" clearly deployed metaphysics
>>> in the critical (derogatory?) sense of a "false ontology", i.e. the domain
>>> of fantastic "a priori" speculation. Retorting that everyone uses
>>> metaphysics, a.k.a. an ontology-epistemology, paradigm, Weltanschauung,
>>> etc. obscures the fact that a rational critique of particular ontologies is
>>> possible and even a necessary part of the scientific project.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>> With regard to the "concept" of metaphysics, the Marxian critique
>>> is important because at the time it did not only posited its "own"
>>> metaphysics against the dominant paradigms, but, instead of analyzing the
>>> social relations and politics that emerged from a certain philosophy, it
>>> studied the concrete historical social relations and politics that gave
>>> rise to shapes of metaphysics. In this sense it constituted a "Copernican
>>> revolution". Superficially, yes, "the materialist method" as Marx calls it
>>> in the German Ideology has an "ontology", in the sense that it is based on
>>> a number of premises, but, in contradistinction to the theories that came
>>> before: "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
>>> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
>>> imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material
>>> conditions under which they live, both those which they find already
>>> existing and those
>>>  produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a
>>> purely empirical way." (
>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm
>>> )
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>> Of course we can make a lot of fuss about the supposed empiricism
>>> of this passage, but its essence amounts to a call for an emancipatory
>>> project with at its core real, historical humanity. Within the history of
>>> this project, the "insult of metaphysics" has taken on many forms, from a
>>> rational critique of a-historical, idealist, or anti-humanist ontologies to
>>> the sectarian attacks by the ideologists of (ironically the extremely
>>> "metaphysical" ossified doctrine of) "Marxism-Leninism". We may deem such
>>> insults as unfortunate, but they are perhaps unavoidable when the domain of
>>> ontology is as much penetrated by politics as politics is by metaphysics.
>>> To conclude: if anything, Marx subverted the "neutrality" of the
>>> philosophical "category" of ontology/epistemology and its "constitutive"
>>> position within society.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>> Best,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>> Brecht
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Hi Brecht,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Yes, of course you're correct, Andy is reading Hegel from a
>>> Marxist point of view, therefore upside down, so to speak. But Marx's
>>> materialism is still an ontology, still a metaphysics.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Your confusion comes from the fact that there have been two uses
>>> of the word 'metaphysics.' One use is to label some kind of talk as having
>>> no basis in reality, as completely speculative and unverifiable. The
>>> logical positivists, for example, wanted to eliminate metaphysics in this
>>> sense from science - for them any notion was metaphysical if it was not
>>> verifiable. They realized that Newtonian physics contained unverifiable
>>> concepts, and they believed that Einstein's physics had eliminated
>>> metaphysics by defining everything in terms of operations of observation
>>> and measurement.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> We know now how narrow, unfruitful, and inconsistent the
>>> positivist view of science turned out to be. The second use of the word
>>> 'metaphysics' helps us understand why: "'metaphysics' refers to accounts of
>>> what truly exists, and to accounts of relationships between 'existences'
>>> (e.g. reduction relations, and perhaps other forms of dependence or
>>> priority)" (Kreines, 2006). That is, metaphysics is the brach of philosophy
>>> that deals with ontology (and sometimes epistemology is included), as well
>>> as the assumptions that any science makes about the entities that it
>>> studies.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> One person's ontology is another person's metaphysics. That is,
>>> when someone disagrees with another's ontological claims, a quick and easy
>>> insult is to label them "metaphysical." But the word itself simply came
>>> from the sequence of titles in Aristotle's texts: the text which dealt with
>>> what we would now call ontology and epistemology was simply next in the
>>> traditional list of titles after the 'Physica,' and so was called
>>> 'Meta-physica.'
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Did Marx make ontological assumptions? Certainly! For example,
>>> as you point out, for Marx the "essence of man" is "in reality,' "the
>>> ensemble of social relations." In this passage Marx states one of his core
>>> ontological assumptions. Much has been written about the ontological
>>> assumptions of Marxism (e.g. Gould, 1978). In the same passage Marx himself
>>> confuses things by using the term metaphysics in its first, derogatory
>>> sense. Unsympathetic readers of Marx's writings have also at times judged
>>> them merely metaphysical. Others, sympathetic readers, have also often
>>> referred to them as metaphysical, but in a positive sense. The negative use
>>> of the term is falling into disuse, with good reason. As the importance of
>>> ontology is now understood, it no longer makes sense to reject all talk
>>> about ontology as speculative and unscientific, or unphilosophical.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Martin
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Gould, C. C. (1978). Marx's social ontology: Individuality and
>>> community in Marx's theory of social relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> Kreines, J. (2006). Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate.
>>> Philosophy Compass, 1(5), 466-480.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:16 AM, Brecht De Smet
>>> <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Because I do not want to derail the current thread, I start a
>>> new one:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn to if one
>>> wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - there's a
>>> whole metaphysics here.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Well, if you look how Andy appropriates Hegel in his various
>>> writings I think you can hardly call what he does a form of metaphysics. On
>>> the contrary, he turns Hegel upside down, reading his logic in a
>>> materialist and non-metaphysical way.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> In this regard I think the philosophical implications of Marx's
>>> Theses on Feuerbach are still grossly underestimated. In a few lines he
>>> summarizes the deficiences of both idealism and materialism, subjectivism
>>> and objectivism, finishing off a few centuries of philosophical thought (of
>>> course the theses were but the end product of a whole project). After the
>>> theses Marx largely moves on from philosophical critique to developing his
>>> "materialist method".
>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Thesis 1: with regard to "ontology": Marx criticized classical
>>> materialism because it conceived of the actual world not as human practice
>>> (subjective), but as merely objective. Whereas for Hegel the world
>>> consisted merely of thought-objects, for Feuerbach the world was
>>> constituted by sensuous objects. In both perspectives human practice was
>>> absent, as either an objective or subjective activity. As such both were
>>> forms of metaphysical thinking, i.e. a form of thinking and activity that
>>> did not place human practice at its core. (Also see thesis 5)
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Thesis 2: with regard to "epistemology": "The question whether
>>> objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of
>>> theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
>>> reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in
>>> practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is
>>> isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> This is almost a Copernican revolution with regard to
>>> epistemology. True knowledge, "truth", is not derived from either formal or
>>> dialectical logic, but from the encounter between human thought and human
>>> practice. The reality of any phenomenon outside this encounter "is a purely
>>> scholastic question" or an exercise in metaphysics. Cf. snare theory, dark
>>> matter, etc. Thesis 8 reasserts this premisse: "All social life is
>>> essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find
>>> their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this
>>> practice." Real human practice or activity is the only base for gaining
>>> true knowledge about humanity.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Thesis 3: with regard to "emancipation": classical (mechanical)
>>> materialism pointed out that humans are the product of their environments.
>>> Changing their environments resulted in changed humans. Of course, who
>>> changes their environments? Humans themselves. So transformation of
>>> circumstances + human activity = self-change = revolutionary practice.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Thesis 4: with regard to the position of a critical or
>>> emancipatory science: It is insufficient to just deconstruct oppressive
>>> ideological concepts, "after completing this work, the chief thing still
>>> remains to be done". The reverse movement should be explained as well: how
>>> real social relations are the basis for these ideological forms. Of course,
>>> this means that the contradiction cannot be resolved in thought, but has to
>>> be overcome in reality, in practice. This is the core meaning of thesis 11:
>>> "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the
>>> point is to change it."
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> In this sense, metaphysics was also a way of resolving real
>>> contradictions in the realm of thought.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Thesis 6: with regard to the "essence" of humankind: "...the
>>> essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In
>>> reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations." Taking "the
>>> individual" as the unit of philosophy/social sciences is an a-historical
>>> and atomizing abstraction which "belongs in reality to a particular social
>>> form" (Thesis 7). A social science basing itself on the actions,
>>> intentions, emotions, etc. of discrete individuals takes a metaphysical and
>>> abstract view of humanity as its departure point. See also thesis 9 and 10.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> --
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Brecht De Smet
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor at the Department Conflict and Development
>>> Studies
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Researcher at MENARG (Middle East and North Africa Research
>>> Group)
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Department of Political and Sciences
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Ghent University
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> www.psw.ugent.be/menarg
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Universiteitsstraat 8 / 9000 Gent / Belgium
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> Oh! (he exclaims). My point was that Hegel is hardly the
>>> person to turn to if one wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal,
>>> Particular - there's a whole metaphysics here. Take a look at the Stanford
>>> Enc of Philosophy entry on Hegel (link below) for a sense of the debate
>>> over this. There has been an "orthodox or traditional understanding of
>>> Hegel as a ?metaphysical? thinker in the pre-Kantian ?dogmatic? sense. This
>>> was followed by a view by some that "particular works, such as the
>>> Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy,
>>> especially his ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as
>>> standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system
>>> sketched above."  (But Andy hates the Phenomenology!) And then there are
>>> people who are "appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics as
>>> exemplifying a legitimate project of philosophical inquiry into fundamental
>>> ?features? or ?structures? of the world
>>>  itself."
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> Myself, I'm closest to the last of these views. I don't think
>>> we want to *avoid* metaphysics (ontology and epistemology) ; indeed I don't
>>> think that is possible. rather, we need to adopt the *right* metaphysics.
>>> We can debate what the criteria of that need to be. But to claim of a
>>> position, in philosophy or the social sciences, that there is "No
>>> metaphysics here!" is a tad naive.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mar 23, 2013, at 12:36 PM, Carol Macdonald <
>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> I thought that what he said was avoiding it: back up your
>>> exclamation Martin
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 23 March 2013 16:48, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I though you wanted to *avoid* metaphysics, Andy!
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2013, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you Manfred for that clear explanation, and for
>>> correcting my
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> typing mistake! :(
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This might be an occasion to mention how my own development
>>> of Activity
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Theory differs from yours and that of ANL.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I do not work with duality of "the publically assigned
>>> meaning and the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> personally felt sense". Rather I use Hegel's approach in
>>> which the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Individual and Universal are mediated by the Particular.
>>> This is a relation
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> which is applicable not just to motives, but any concept. It
>>> allows the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of the situation to be something which is
>>> *realised*. This word
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "realised" is what Wiulliam James would have described as a
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "double-barrelled word" (following Charles Dickens' "double
>>> barrelled
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> compliment), in that it means both "realised" in the
>>> objective sense of
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "made real", as in "The plan was at last realised when the
>>> judge delivered
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> his verdict," and subjective in the sense of "woke up to",
>>> as in "I
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> realised that my efforts to reconcile with my wife were
>>> doomed to failure."
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I believe that this resolves certain problems which arise in
>>> Actvity
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Theory, but remaining within the Activity approach as
>>> outlined in your
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> excellent paper.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear colleagues,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my
>>> article. There
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some
>>> difficulties to
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> follow all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like
>>> to answer to the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> following:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the
>>> macrostructure of
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> activity.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN
>>> Leont'ev and I
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> focused especially on his concept of macrostructure of
>>> activity and its
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> levels of activity that is related to motives, actions that
>>> are related to
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> goals and operations that are related to the conditions
>>> under which an
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> action is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it
>>> when he stated
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that my article needs to be read with attention to
>>> motivation and how the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and
>>> goals of an
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different
>>> actions, and one
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> action can realize different activities.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> May I quote Andy's words:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception;
>>> they have to
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience
>>> signal the success,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives
>>> for both
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself,
>>> emotion is tied
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure
>>> of an activity.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different ??actions
>>> activities (!)
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (MH)??. It is the emotions which signal (internally and
>>> externally) the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an
>>> activity, and it
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is this which makes manifest and actual that connection
>>> between action and
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the
>>> individual subject.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states
>>> of mind", or
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc."
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's
>>> the behavior.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What's the goal?
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in
>>> order to
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> greet his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal.
>>> What is the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> activity?
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that
>>> the speech is a
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the
>>> election victory.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the
>>> victory there
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and
>>> the personally
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be
>>> possible that he
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally
>>> feels to be
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
>>> societal
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the
>>> personal sense
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
>>> framed this
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> situation under an achievement perspective whether he is
>>> able to fulfill
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the leadership.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we
>>> speak about
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> an advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults,
>>> but not in
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> infants who start to have intentions but still not a mental
>>> image of a
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> future state of affairs.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and
>>> advanced
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> level in older children:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven
>>> level of
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition
>>> of first
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But
>>> these
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about
>>> the desired
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a
>>> sign system
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state
>>> in the here
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting
>>> point, not
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select
>>> one of them and
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into
>>> play that color
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth
>>> striving for and
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to
>>> transform
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> them into actions is not something that occurs
>>> automatically. It emerges in
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> a long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the
>>> attainment of goals
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly
>>> optimized. Older
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> children are
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the
>>> macrostructure of an
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a
>>> specific
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an
>>> activity.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Best
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Manfred
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> D-48149 Münster
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article
>>> is choice
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev,
>>> rather than
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and
>>> motives. So
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to
>>> motivation and how the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> structure of an activity is related to motives and goals.
>>> Because motives
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
>>> inferred/learnt.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Emotional expression and experience signal the success,
>>> failure,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself,
>>> emotion is tied
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure
>>> of an activity.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different actions.
>>> It is the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> emotions which signal (internally and externally) the
>>> success, etc., etc.,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is
>>> this which makes
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> manifest and actual that connection between action and
>>> activity, for both
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the observer/participant and the individual subject.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states
>>> of mind", or
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> intelligent infants, etc.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It's all in there.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why
>>> operation/action/activity were
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out
>>> the views in
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems
>>> important
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for me to get clear about!
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in
>>> opening the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader.
>>> I.e., the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is
>>> a part,
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer
>>> this to
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that
>>> the
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation
>>> to an
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
>>> activity -
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal
>>> state and
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity,
>>> not
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental.
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> --
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>>> _____
>>>
>>> >>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>>>
>>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> >>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >>> _____
>>>
>>> >>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> >> _____
>>>
>>> >> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> > __________________________________________
>>>
>>> > _____
>>>
>>> > xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> __________________________________________
>>>
>>> _____
>>>
>>> xmca mailing list
>>>
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>> __________________________________________
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>>
>>
>
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