RE: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

[Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi>]

Hello,

Larry  presents very interesting point. I think Gadamer's  comment is addressed to Gadamer's teacher Heidegger who wanted to overcome history of metaphysics.

Rauno

P.S. With Leena Kakkori I have made article (manuscript) on Vygotsky, Heidegger and Gadamer. Is there anybody with kind of interests? We might need some help with that article. 

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 17:13
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term

Hello rauno,

Gadamet's commentary on Hegel and metaphysics is interesting. Gadamer
writes,

Thus something seems to have become true that Hegel, from a position of
full engagement with the reality of philosophy, still perceived as an
impossible contradiction when he said that a people without a metaphysics
would be like a temple without a sanctuary, an empty temple, a temple in
which nothing dwells any longer and hence is itself nothing anymore. That
is it: "a people without a metaphysics!"

Larry

On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 7:14 AM, Rauno Huttunen <rakahu@utu.fi> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Creating rational criteria for ontology/metaphysics is very challenging
> task. Immanuel Kant tried create metaphysics that is as strict as
> mathematics and its is science. The best attempt so far I would say but
> still not plausible today.
>
> There is no rational way to answer the basic ontological question:
> materialism or idealism (or Spinozian panteism as synthesis of them both).
> For idealist, reason (ratio) itself is a substance and there cannot be any
> speak on "rational solution" if not the idea of reason is not presupposed
> as a priori entity. For reductionistic materialist, materia is the basic
> entity and "reasoning" is just causal material happening in our brain.
> There is no "reason" to choose theory A or B. We think that we are
> reasoning, but our brain just follow "causal laws of thinking". Of course
> there is other forms of materialism like Karl Popper's emergent materialism
> and Karl Marx's dialectical materialism. I like them both but I have no
> "real reason" to do so. My best rational arguments works only within the
> paradigm I have chosen (or learn).
>
> Rauno Huttunen
>
>
> ________________________________________
> Lähettäjä: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> k&#228;ytt&#228;j&#228;n Martin Packer [packer@duq.edu] puolesta
> Lähetetty: 25. maaliskuuta 2013 15:50
> Vastaanottaja: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Aihe: Re: [xmca] On metaphysics: origin of the term
>
> Hi Brecht,
>
> Yes, a rational critique of ontology is possible, and indeed necessary. I
> was trying to engage in such a critique of activity theory, which it seems
> to me departs considerably rather the admirable (though not unquestionable)
> ontology that Marx proposed. (And yes, as you suggest, the claim to be
> "purely empirical" seems to me a return to the outdated and simplistic
> notion that there is on the one hand 'metaphysics' and on the other hand
> 'genuine science.' But let that pass.) Activity theory, in my view,
> essentializes a particular organization of human activity and in doing so
> obscures the historical character of that organization. Would you agree?
>
> Martin
>
>
> On Mar 25, 2013, at 4:00 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
> wrote:
>
> > Martin, I obviously agree with your presentation of the historical
> lineages of the "word" metaphysics. However, with regard to the current
> discussion on the "terms of the debate", it is quite obvious that Andy's
> original remark: "So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states
> of mind", or intelligent infants, etc" clearly deployed metaphysics in the
> critical (derogatory?) sense of a "false ontology", i.e. the domain of
> fantastic "a priori" speculation. Retorting that everyone uses metaphysics,
> a.k.a. an ontology-epistemology, paradigm, Weltanschauung, etc. obscures
> the fact that a rational critique of particular ontologies is possible and
> even a necessary part of the scientific project.
> >
> > With regard to the "concept" of metaphysics, the Marxian critique is
> important because at the time it did not only posited its "own" metaphysics
> against the dominant paradigms, but, instead of analyzing the social
> relations and politics that emerged from a certain philosophy, it studied
> the concrete historical social relations and politics that gave rise to
> shapes of metaphysics. In this sense it constituted a "Copernican
> revolution". Superficially, yes, "the materialist method" as Marx calls it
> in the German Ideology has an "ontology", in the sense that it is based on
> a number of premises, but, in contradistinction to the theories that came
> before: "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not
> dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
> imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material
> conditions under which they live, both those which they find already
> existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be
> verified in a purely empirical way." (
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm)
> >
> > Of course we can make a lot of fuss about the supposed empiricism of
> this passage, but its essence amounts to a call for an emancipatory project
> with at its core real, historical humanity. Within the history of this
> project, the "insult of metaphysics" has taken on many forms, from a
> rational critique of a-historical, idealist, or anti-humanist ontologies to
> the sectarian attacks by the ideologists of (ironically the extremely
> "metaphysical" ossified doctrine of) "Marxism-Leninism". We may deem such
> insults as unfortunate, but they are perhaps unavoidable when the domain of
> ontology is as much penetrated by politics as politics is by metaphysics.
> To conclude: if anything, Marx subverted the "neutrality" of the
> philosophical "category" of ontology/epistemology and its "constitutive"
> position within society.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Brecht
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Hi Brecht,
> >>
> >> Yes, of course you're correct, Andy is reading Hegel from a Marxist
> point of view, therefore upside down, so to speak. But Marx's materialism
> is still an ontology, still a metaphysics.
> >>
> >> Your confusion comes from the fact that there have been two uses of the
> word 'metaphysics.' One use is to label some kind of talk as having no
> basis in reality, as completely speculative and unverifiable. The logical
> positivists, for example, wanted to eliminate metaphysics in this sense
> from science - for them any notion was metaphysical if it was not
> verifiable. They realized that Newtonian physics contained unverifiable
> concepts, and they believed that Einstein's physics had eliminated
> metaphysics by defining everything in terms of operations of observation
> and measurement.
> >>
> >> We know now how narrow, unfruitful, and inconsistent the positivist
> view of science turned out to be. The second use of the word 'metaphysics'
> helps us understand why: "'metaphysics' refers to accounts of what truly
> exists, and to accounts of relationships between 'existences' (e.g.
> reduction relations, and perhaps other forms of dependence or priority)"
> (Kreines, 2006). That is, metaphysics is the brach of philosophy that deals
> with ontology (and sometimes epistemology is included), as well as the
> assumptions that any science makes about the entities that it studies.
> >>
> >> One person's ontology is another person's metaphysics. That is, when
> someone disagrees with another's ontological claims, a quick and easy
> insult is to label them "metaphysical." But the word itself simply came
> from the sequence of titles in Aristotle's texts: the text which dealt with
> what we would now call ontology and epistemology was simply next in the
> traditional list of titles after the 'Physica,' and so was called
>  'Meta-physica.'
> >>
> >> Did Marx make ontological assumptions? Certainly! For example, as you
> point out, for Marx the "essence of man" is "in reality,' "the ensemble of
> social relations." In this passage Marx states one of his core ontological
> assumptions. Much has been written about the ontological assumptions of
> Marxism (e.g. Gould, 1978). In the same passage Marx himself confuses
> things by using the term metaphysics in its first, derogatory sense.
> Unsympathetic readers of Marx's writings have also at times judged them
> merely metaphysical. Others, sympathetic readers, have also often referred
> to them as metaphysical, but in a positive sense. The negative use of the
> term is falling into disuse, with good reason. As the importance of
> ontology is now understood, it no longer makes sense to reject all talk
> about ontology as speculative and unscientific, or unphilosophical.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> Gould, C. C. (1978). Marx's social ontology: Individuality and
> community in Marx's theory of social relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
> >>
> >>
> >> Kreines, J. (2006). Hegel's metaphysics: Changing the debate.
> Philosophy Compass, 1(5), 466-480.
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:16 AM, Brecht De Smet <Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Because I do not want to derail the current thread, I start a new one:
> >>>
> >>>> My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to turn to if one wants
> to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal, Particular - there's a whole
> metaphysics here.
> >>>
> >>> Well, if you look how Andy appropriates Hegel in his various writings
> I think you can hardly call what he does a form of metaphysics. On the
> contrary, he turns Hegel upside down, reading his logic in a materialist
> and non-metaphysical way.
> >>>
> >>> In this regard I think the philosophical implications of Marx's Theses
> on Feuerbach are still grossly underestimated. In a few lines he summarizes
> the deficiences of both idealism and materialism, subjectivism and
> objectivism, finishing off a few centuries of philosophical thought (of
> course the theses were but the end product of a whole project). After the
> theses Marx largely moves on from philosophical critique to developing his
> "materialist method".
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm
> >>>
> >>> Thesis 1: with regard to "ontology": Marx criticized classical
> materialism because it conceived of the actual world not as human practice
> (subjective), but as merely objective. Whereas for Hegel the world
> consisted merely of thought-objects, for Feuerbach the world was
> constituted by sensuous objects. In both perspectives human practice was
> absent, as either an objective or subjective activity. As such both were
> forms of metaphysical thinking, i.e. a form of thinking and activity that
> did not place human practice at its core. (Also see thesis 5)
> >>>
> >>> Thesis 2: with regard to "epistemology": "The question whether
> objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of
> theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
> reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in
> practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is
> isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."
> >>>
> >>> This is almost a Copernican revolution with regard to epistemology.
> True knowledge, "truth", is not derived from either formal or dialectical
> logic, but from the encounter between human thought and human practice. The
> reality of any phenomenon outside this encounter "is a purely scholastic
> question" or an exercise in metaphysics. Cf. snare theory, dark matter,
> etc. Thesis 8 reasserts this premisse: "All social life is essentially
> practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational
> solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." Real
> human practice or activity is the only base for gaining true knowledge
> about humanity.
> >>>
> >>> Thesis 3: with regard to "emancipation": classical (mechanical)
> materialism pointed out that humans are the product of their environments.
> Changing their environments resulted in changed humans. Of course, who
> changes their environments? Humans themselves. So transformation of
> circumstances + human activity = self-change = revolutionary practice.
> >>>
> >>> Thesis 4: with regard to the position of a critical or emancipatory
> science: It is insufficient to just deconstruct oppressive ideological
> concepts, "after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be
> done". The reverse movement should be explained as well: how real social
> relations are the basis for these ideological forms. Of course, this means
> that the contradiction cannot be resolved in thought, but has to be
> overcome in reality, in practice. This is the core meaning of thesis 11:
> "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the
> point is to change it."
> >>>
> >>> In this sense, metaphysics was also a way of resolving real
> contradictions in the realm of thought.
> >>>
> >>> Thesis 6: with regard to the "essence" of humankind: "...the essence
> of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it
> is the ensemble of the social relations." Taking "the individual" as the
> unit of philosophy/social sciences is an a-historical and atomizing
> abstraction which "belongs in reality to a particular social form" (Thesis
> 7). A social science basing itself on the actions, intentions, emotions,
> etc. of discrete individuals takes a metaphysical and abstract view of
> humanity as its departure point. See also thesis 9 and 10.
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> Brecht De Smet
> >>> Assistant Professor at the Department Conflict and Development Studies
> >>> Researcher at MENARG (Middle East and North Africa Research Group)
> >>> Department of Political and Sciences
> >>> Ghent University
> >>> www.psw.ugent.be/menarg
> >>> Universiteitsstraat 8 / 9000 Gent / Belgium
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Citeren Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>:
> >>>
> >>>> Oh! (he exclaims). My point was that Hegel is hardly the person to
> turn to if one wants to avoid metaphysics! Individual, Universal,
> Particular - there's a whole metaphysics here. Take a look at the Stanford
> Enc of Philosophy entry on Hegel (link below) for a sense of the debate
> over this. There has been an "orthodox or traditional understanding of
> Hegel as a ?metaphysical? thinker in the pre-Kantian ?dogmatic? sense. This
> was followed by a view by some that "particular works, such as the
> Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy,
> especially his ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as
> standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system
> sketched above."  (But Andy hates the Phenomenology!) And then there are
> people who are "appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics as
> exemplifying a legitimate project of philosophical inquiry into fundamental
> ?features? or ?structures? of the world itself."
> >>>>
> >>>> Myself, I'm closest to the last of these views. I don't think we want
> to *avoid* metaphysics (ontology and epistemology) ; indeed I don't think
> that is possible. rather, we need to adopt the *right* metaphysics. We can
> debate what the criteria of that need to be. But to claim of a position, in
> philosophy or the social sciences, that there is "No metaphysics here!" is
> a tad naive.
> >>>>
> >>>> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/>
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mar 23, 2013, at 12:36 PM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> I thought that what he said was avoiding it: back up your
> exclamation Martin
> >>>>> Carol
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 23 March 2013 16:48, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I though you wanted to *avoid* metaphysics, Andy!
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On Mar 22, 2013, at 8:17 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Thank you Manfred for that clear explanation, and for correcting my
> >>>>>> typing mistake! :(
> >>>>>>> This might be an occasion to mention how my own development of
> Activity
> >>>>>> Theory differs from yours and that of ANL.
> >>>>>>> I do not work with duality of "the publically assigned meaning and
> the
> >>>>>> personally felt sense". Rather I use Hegel's approach in which the
> >>>>>> Individual and Universal are mediated by the Particular. This is a
> relation
> >>>>>> which is applicable not just to motives, but any concept. It allows
> the
> >>>>>> meaning of the situation to be something which is *realised*. This
> word
> >>>>>> "realised" is what Wiulliam James would have described as a
> >>>>>> "double-barrelled word" (following Charles Dickens' "double
> barrelled
> >>>>>> compliment), in that it means both "realised" in the objective
> sense of
> >>>>>> "made real", as in "The plan was at last realised when the judge
> delivered
> >>>>>> his verdict," and subjective in the sense of "woke up to", as in "I
> >>>>>> realised that my efforts to reconcile with my wife were doomed to
> failure."
> >>>>>> I believe that this resolves certain problems which arise in Actvity
> >>>>>> Theory, but remaining within the Activity approach as outlined in
> your
> >>>>>> excellent paper.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Dear colleagues,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
> There
> >>>>>> are a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties
> to
> >>>>>> follow all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to
> answer to the
> >>>>>> following:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
> >>>>>> activity.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
> >>>>>> focused especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and
> its
> >>>>>> levels of activity that is related to motives, actions that are
> related to
> >>>>>> goals and operations that are related to the conditions under which
> an
> >>>>>> action is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he
> stated
> >>>>>> that my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
> how the
> >>>>>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
> of an
> >>>>>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
> one
> >>>>>> action can realize different activities.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> May I quote Andy's words:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they
> have to
> >>>>>> be inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
> success,
> >>>>>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
> both
> >>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
> is tied
> >>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
> activity.
> >>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different ??actions
> activities (!)
> >>>>>> (MH)??. It is the emotions which signal (internally and externally)
> the
> >>>>>> success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an
> activity, and it
> >>>>>> is this which makes manifest and actual that connection between
> action and
> >>>>>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
> subject.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of
> mind", or
> >>>>>> intelligent infants, etc."
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
> behavior.
> >>>>>> What's the goal?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
> >>>>>> greet his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is
> the
> >>>>>> activity?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the
> speech is a
> >>>>>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
> victory.
> >>>>>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
> there
> >>>>>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
> personally
> >>>>>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
> he
> >>>>>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
> >>>>>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
> societal
> >>>>>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the
> personal sense
> >>>>>> assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader framed
> this
> >>>>>> situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able to
> fulfill
> >>>>>> the leadership.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
> about
> >>>>>> an advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
> >>>>>> infants who start to have intentions but still not a mental image
> of a
> >>>>>> future state of affairs.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
> >>>>>> level in older children:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level
> of
> >>>>>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
> >>>>>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
> >>>>>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
> desired
> >>>>>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
> system
> >>>>>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in the
> here
> >>>>>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point,
> not
> >>>>>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
> them and
> >>>>>> to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play that
> color
> >>>>>> one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth striving for
> and
> >>>>>> that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to
> transform
> >>>>>> them into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It
> emerges in
> >>>>>> a long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment
> of goals
> >>>>>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
> >>>>>> children are
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure
> of an
> >>>>>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
> >>>>>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Best
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Manfred
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Fliednerstr. 21
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> D-48149 Münster
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >>>>>>>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> >>>>>>>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
> >>>>>>>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>>>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
> >>>>>>>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is
> choice
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather
> than
> >>>>>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives.
> So
> >>>>>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
> how the
> >>>>>> structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because
> motives
> >>>>>> are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
> inferred/learnt.
> >>>>>> Emotional expression and experience signal the success, failure,
> >>>>>> frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
> >>>>>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
> is tied
> >>>>>> up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
> activity.
> >>>>>> One and the same action could be part of different actions. It is
> the
> >>>>>> emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success,
> etc., etc.,
> >>>>>> that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is this
> which makes
> >>>>>> manifest and actual that connection between action and activity,
> for both
> >>>>>> the observer/participant and the individual subject.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of
> mind", or
> >>>>>> intelligent infants, etc.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> It's all in there.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity
> were
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
> views in
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems
> important
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> for me to get clear about!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Mike
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
> the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity
> -
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> fundamental.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >>>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> >>>>>>> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>>>>>> _____
> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> __________________________________________
> >>>>>> _____
> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> --
> >>>>> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
> >>>>> Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
> >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
> >>>>> __________________________________________
> >>>>> _____
> >>>>> xmca mailing list
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> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> __________________________________________
> >>>> _____
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