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Developmental Phases of Personality Formation in Childhood (I)

Today it is a well-established fact that qualitatively new psychological structures that are not reducible to elementary psychological functions develop throughout childhood.

These developmentally acquired psychological structures are integrative systems varying in complexity and are composed of less complex psychological functions. Operating as a kind of integrated mechanism, they determine the characteristics of an individual's behavior and activities, his interactions with others, and his attitude toward his environment and himself.

Research, which is still ongoing (L.S. Vygotsky and colleagues), has revealed that each elementary psychological function—perception, memory, thinking, and others—has its own developmental logic through which it is transformed into a higher psychological function [HPF], including logical memory, categorical perception, verbal thinking, and so forth.

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Higher psychological functions are a kind of “alloy” of elementary psychological functions, which would lose their distinctive features if they were decomposed into their individual components. Once HPFs arise they develop into stable structures that can only disintegrate as a result of senility or pathology.

However, in addition to this type of developmentally acquired structure, there are other, more complex integrative systems. These systems have a different developmental course, a different structure, and different functional characteristics.

An example of such a system is volition, which does not have any correlate among the elementary psychological functions and includes in its structure not only consciously set goals, but also other higher-order psychological functions (emotional memory, imagination, morality etc.) a particular combination of which allows an individual to control his own behavior.¹ Such psychological systems may change over the course of a lifetime under the influence of the experience an individual acquires and of changes in his general personality traits.²

Vygotsky analyzed child consciousness as an example of a complex psychological system that is relatively stable but develops throughout life. He showed that, in the course of ontogeny, this systemic psychological structure follows its own developmental logic. According to his theory, in infancy, consciousness is characterized by undifferentiated and nonautonomous psychological functions, which, during this period are a direct function of perception and only operate in this context. (In this period memory exists in the form of recognition; and thinking in the form of emotionally colored impressions in which the objects of the environment are not yet differentiated. Even the infant’s emotions last only while the stimulus that evoked them remains in his perceptual field.)

However, in the process of development, other psychological functions, first memory and then thinking, sequentially replace perception as the dominant function. These psychological functions are dominant at the developmental phase optimum for them,

as determined by the developmental challenges of biosocial integration the infant encounters. The particular function that is at the forefront subordinates the others, thus determining the integration that occurs at this particular age, that is, the nature of the system that is the child's consciousness.

In other words, according to Vygotsky, during the individual's development, the system that is the child's consciousness changes.³

According to this line of theoretical reasoning it follows that the human personality is also a relatively stable psychological system, only at a higher level of integration. And this system, too, has its own developmental logic and its own laws.

As an introduction to our examination of these laws, let us describe the end result of the child's personality development.

In all the work we have published to date, we started with the assumption that the psychologically mature personality is that of an individual who has reached a certain, relatively high level of psychological development. **We noted that the basic characteristic of this level was the individual's ability to act independently of (or even counter to) the circumstances directly impinging on him, guided instead by his own consciously set goals.** The appearance of this capacity enables active, rather than reactive, behavior and makes a person the **master** of his circumstances and of himself, rather than their **slave**.

In accordance with this understanding, we searched for laws underlying the appearance of this ability (and thus, we reasoned that the psychological nature of personality) in the development of the functional system is known as will (or volition) in psychology. **We thus began to study the development of motivating, that is, affectively saturated, goals, and especially the development of "an internal plan of action," which allows an individual to organize his motivational sphere in order to ensure the dominance of his consciously selected goals over motives that, although they do not reflect what the person wants in the given situation, still have more immediate salience.** In other words, we studied the operation of the functional system that enables a person to consciously control his behavior.⁴

We consider this developmental path central to the psychological description of personality.

However, these studies showed that attainment of conscious goals does not always occur through the mechanism described above, that is, through an individual's use of an internal action plan designed to consciously reproduce his motivational hierarchy. Under conditions that are still inadequately understood, **the goals themselves can acquire direct motivational force** that is capable of inducing behavior in a person without his experiencing any internal conflict, competition among motivations, reflection, choice, imaging, or intentions; in a word, **bypassing the volitional act in the strict sense of the word**. Such behavior is only phenomenologically similar to the behavior traditionally called volitional. It is under the control of "secondary" motivations, which have become primary in the process of the child's social development. Analysis shows that such ("postvolitional") motivation is supported by a linkage between the goals a person has set and his higher feelings, which gives the goals direct motivational force. If such higher feelings are lacking (or weak) the individual is compelled to resort to the nonspontaneous type of a volitional act.

Our research has shown that each of the developmentally acquired systemic structures that arises during a person's life, and is an essential condition for his existence as a social individual, includes certain affective components, and thus has its own motivational force. A person is directly motivated by his convictions, morality, and the traits of his personality. But because many needs and motivations simultaneously influence every act, there is a conflict among them that, when they are in opposition to each other but of equal strength, is experienced by the person as an internal conflict within himself. If the stronger but rationally rejected motives triumph in this conflict, the person experiences unpleasant feelings. If immediate desires triumph over his moral convictions, these feelings take the form of shame, regret, and so forth, which the individual tries to attenuate with various types of defense mechanisms, such as repression or "conscience neutralization techniques,"

as described by U.S. criminologists.⁵ It should be clear from this that an individual who constantly encounters internal conflicts will show indecisiveness, unstable behavior, and an inability to achieve the goals that he sets himself, that is, he will be lacking exactly those traits that are considered essential to a psychologically mature personality.

Thus, a person cannot have an integrated, noncontradictory personality when he is only capable of conscious self-control. This is a very important development, but it is not the only one. Of no less, and perhaps even more importance is the development of motivating systems, such as we described above, which have such a compulsory force that they ensure that the required behavior will occur without a person having to endure a painful battle with himself. For the personality to develop in this way, cognitive and affective processes, and thus processes both subject to and not subject to conscious control must be in a harmonious relationship with each other.

There are thus grounds for concluding that the formation of personality cannot be marked by the independent development of a single aspect—rational, volitional, or emotional. Personality is truly a higher-order integrated system, an indissoluble whole. It can also be concluded that there exist a number of developmentally acquired systems that arise in sequence and mark the phases of the central line of personality development.

Unfortunately, there has not yet been a systematic investigation of this problem, but almost all the psychologists who study personality acknowledge the development of a nucleus, which they call either the “ego system,” or the “system ego” or simply the “ego.” They use these concepts as explanatory when they look at the psychological life of an individual and his behavior. However, the psychological content and structure of this nucleus is not elucidated, and even more important, no laws underlying its development have been established. Evidently, these psychologists assume here that each individual, in one way or another, understands what is being referred to on the basis of his empirical experience of his own “ego.”

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The current article does not claim to give a scientifically grounded answer to the problem posed. However, data generated by investigations performed at the Personality Formation Laboratory (the General and Pedagogical Psychology Scientific Research Institute, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences), as well as data in the literature permit us to offer several hypotheses about the content and structure of the central psychological structure that develops at the end of each age period and is responsible for the personality characteristics typical of children at each phase.

For this purpose, on the basis of considerations that will be presented below, we analyzed the so-called crisis periods of child development.

Crisis here refers to the transitional period between one phase of child development and the next one. Crises occur at the juncture of two phases and mark the end of the preceding developmental phase and the start of the next one. It also should be remembered that each new systemic psychological structure developing in response to the needs of the child includes an affective component and thus has a motivational force. For this reason, the new structure that is central for a given phase, which is a sort of generalized result, the culmination of the child's overall psychological development during that phase, is not neutral with respect to further development but becomes the starting point for the formation of the child's personality during the following phase. This allows us to look at these crises as turning points in the ontogeny of the personality, the analysis of which allows us to uncover the psychological essence of this process.

Child psychologists most frequently cite three critical periods: the crises at ages three, seven, and twelve to sixteen, with the last one often called the adolescent crisis. Vygotsky analyzed an additional crisis at one year old and divided the adolescent crisis into two parts: negative (thirteen to fourteen years old) and positive (fifteen to seventeen years old).

If we examine these crises from the standpoint of the changes that occur in the child's behavior, we find they all have common traits. During the critical periods children become disobedient, capricious, and irritable and are often in conflict with the adults around them, especially their parents and teachers. They develop negative attitudes toward demands that they previously complied with and this can reach the point of negativism and stubbornness.

All the traits characteristic of children in critical periods suggest that the children are frustrated. Frustration, as is well known, occurs in response to deprivation of something essential to a person. Thus it may be concluded that **at the juncture of two age phases children have this reaction because the new demands that arise at the end of every phase of psychological development, along with the centrally acquired structures, that is, personality, appropriate to the age are not satisfied or are being actively suppressed.**⁶

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Study of the data in the literature and our own observations have revealed that the features of behavior engendered by frustration can be seen with relative frequency not only in children of three, seven, and thirteen but also in those at the juncture of one and two years of age. Particularly persuasive here are the data obtained in clinical studies of children conducted under the direction of N.M. Shelovanov. These data convinced him that it would be desirable to place children older than fourteen months in a new developmental group because an approach to dealing with them that is completely appropriate before this age induces resistance and capriciousness in them.

Thus, data from both educational research and psychology suggest that we should follow Vygotsky's lead and identify a crisis at one year.

The lack of special investigations prevents us from describing, with any confidence, the psychological nature of this crisis. However, analysis of the behavior of children before and after their

first birthdays, and material relating to their psychological development viewed from the perspective of certain theoretical ideas, casts some light on this issue.

Even in the first few days of life, an infant is not merely a “reactive device” as stimulus-response psychologists have claimed, but a being with his own individual psychological life, although of course it is very diffuse. He already has the primary biological needs (food, warmth, movement), psychological needs associated with the functional development of the brain (for example the need for new impressions), and, finally, there are the social needs, which are manifest in the need for interaction, attention, and support of another person that develops during the first years.⁷ (These needs subsequently become critically important for the moral development of the child.) Acknowledgment that these needs exist presupposes acknowledgment that the infant has affective experiences associated with them. Failure of any of these needs to be met induces negative feelings in the child, expressed in restlessness and crying; while their satisfaction leads to happiness and an increase in general tone, enhanced cognitive and motor activity (for example, the so-called activation complex), and so on.

Thus, the child’s psychological life during the first year consists first of sensations with affective coloration, and then of experiences that are globally affective. In other words, the infant’s consciousness initially is filled with emotional components associated with directly perceived environmental factors.⁸ It should be remembered, for purposes of further analysis, that during this period of a child’s development perception is the dominant factor in consciousness.

Now let us consider the social structure of a child’s development during the first year of his life. According to Vygotsky, all of the child’s behavior, all of his activity are implemented either through the agency of an adult or in collaboration with an adult. Vygotsky once asserted that in the absence of an adult it is as if the child were deprived of the use of his arms and legs, his ability to move, to change his position, to get hold of objects he wants, and so forth. In

short, literally all his needs—both biological and social—are met by an adult. As a result, all these needs are embodied and focused on the adult who is the means by which they are met and the adult becomes the center of gravity of every situation directly perceived by the infant.

However, over the course of the year the infant develops and he acquires certain psychological functions, then the first sensory generalizations appear, and he begins to use primitive words to designate objects. In connection with all this, the infant's needs increasingly begin to be embodied (“crystallized”) in environmental objects. As a result these objects themselves acquire motivational force. Thus, when they enter the child's perceptual field they trigger needs that were previously in a latent state, thus engendering activity on his part directed at the given situation. This is the reason why the behavior of children of up to one year is so dependent on the situation. Their actions are completely a function of whatever stimuli enter their perceptual fields.⁹

The helplessness of an infant and his lack of extrasituational (internal but not biological) drives also determine the behavior of adults toward children of this age. **They bind infants to their will**, imposing particular schedules of sleep, feeding, and outings. During their first year children are typically not asked whether they want to go for a walk, sleep, or eat. They are simply dressed and taken out; and at certain hours put to sleep, fed, or played with. If the child does not immediately accede to these demands and cries or resists, the adult either ignores this or distracts him by introducing a new stimulus into the infant's perceptual field, which has an unfailing effect because of the infant's constant readiness for new impressions.

But at the start of the second year there comes a moment when the child ceases to submit meekly to the adult and the adult is no longer able to control his behavior by manipulating external stimulation. Observations show that at this very point the child also begins to be able to act, not only under the influence of directly perceived impressions, but under the influence of images and ideas in his memory.

Evidently, this occurs because at this period memory begins to play an ever-increasing role in the child's psychological development occupying the dominant place in, and thus restructuring the child's consciousness and behavior.

Many of the factors that we have observed or seen described in N.A. Menchinskaia's child development journal are very revealing in this regard.¹⁰ Because she did not possess the trained eye of a psychologist, she attended to factors that made their first appearance in the child's behavior and then became typical.

When her son was sixteen months old she noted the following in her journal:

For a month Sasha did not see his father and during that time he never once mentioned him. His father returned home late one night and Sasha caught only a glimpse of him and was not able to interact as much as he would have liked. And suddenly, on the first morning after his father's arrival, his first word was "papa."

In subsequent entries, she began to note that Sasha had remembered one thing or another. Then she wrote that the child began frequently to use the word "der" [*tama*; there] accompanying this with a pointing gesture, evidently attempting to refer to something lying outside of his perceptual field. Analogous observations are also found in the journal kept by V.S. Mukhina. She notes that before her children were sixteen months old, she could remove any of the objects the children were playing with when they were not looking and they "never tried to retrieve them."¹¹ However, at eighteen months, they had clearly developed reactions based on memory. A dog jumped on one of her twins and scared him tremendously.

Kirill did not calm down for a long time. It would seem that he had forgotten about it . . . and then he would again start to scream. I would try to soothe him or distract him with a toy. He would start to play, but suddenly his lips would start to tremble, he would put his head down, and again begin to scream.¹²

During this same period Menchinskaia notes the occurrence of capricious behavior in Sasha (seventeen months). He has begun to

show stubbornness in response to being told not to do something, and persistently attempts to do what has been forbidden. Sometimes when he is told “no,” he begins to cry, throws himself on the floor, pounding his hands and feet, although such “hysterics” are not frequent.

It seems to us that these facts are interesting and that they persuasively attest to the fact that starting in the second year of life, memory is able to function actively and it is not only directly perceived objects that give rise to affective experiences but also mental representations of them, their images.

An incident involving a little boy aged fifteen months, we happened to observe, attests to this new type of drive-triggering stimuli, the conditions under which they occur, and also the fact that it is the frustration of them that causes the behavior characteristic of this critical period.¹³

This little boy, while playing in the yard, found a ball belonging to another child and he did not want to relinquish it. At some point, the parents were able to hide the ball and take the child home. At dinner, he suddenly became extremely upset, began to refuse to eat, acted capriciously, climbed down off his chair, and tore off his bib. When he was put down on the floor (i.e., given his freedom), with a shout of “Baw, baw” [*mia, mia*] he ran back out into the yard and calmed down only when he retrieved the ball.

This incident also attests to the fact that the child had a definite mental image that was capable of rousing him to action, and also that this image embodied (but did not fully realize) the appropriate drive. Finally, this case also suggests that the circumstances that prevented him from fulfilling this drive, when they reoccurred in his consciousness, was what led to his aggressive behavior, which was not motivated by his immediate situation.

Thus, the centrally acquired (personality) structure during the first year of life is the occurrence in consciousness of affectively charged ideas, which trigger behavior in the child regardless of the influence of his immediately perceived environment. We will call these “motivating ideas.”

The occurrence of motivating ideas fundamentally changes the

behavior of the child and all his interactions with the world around him. Their presence frees the child from the dictates of external influences (including those coming from adults); in short, they transform him into an actor [i.e., individual who initiates acts], although the child himself is still not aware of this. However, adults cannot ignore this. The stress induced by the new drives is so great that failure to consider them or direct attempts to suppress them cause the child frustration, which frequently colors his further interactions with adults and thus the future development of his personality.

* * *

The second year of life marks the start of a new period in personality development, which lasts until three years of age. During this time the child makes enormous progress in psychological development. However, we will be discussing only the processes that are directly associated with the formation of the centrally acquired structure of this period and the crisis that occurs at three years.

During this period the child is transformed from a being who has already become an actor (i.e., has taken the first step on the road to personality development) to a being who is aware of himself as an actor. In other words, a new psychological structure, which is generally associated with the appearance of the word "I" in the child's vocabulary, has taken shape.

This whole transformation occurs under conditions that differ in many respects from those that define an infant's life and activity. First of all, toddlers, as a result of their previous development as infants, begin to occupy a very different place in the world of people and objects that surround them. They are no longer helpless and irresponsible beings; they move around on their own, can take action by themselves, satisfy many of their own needs, and have mastered the first forms of verbal communication. In other words, they are already capable of performing actions that are not mediated by adults. This is the most important factor that distinguishes

the social situation of toddler development from that of infants.

During this period the child's cognitive activity is focused not only on the external world, but on himself.

The development of self-awareness evidently starts with the recognition of oneself as the initiator of an action. It has frequently been observed that children of this age love to repeat the same action a number of times, attentively following and monitoring the changes that the action (or more accurately, the children, by means of the action) are effecting. (For example, they may open and close a door, move objects, push them over, etc.)¹⁴ This is what helps the child sense that he is distinct from the objects around him, and thus, recognize himself as a special object (an actor).¹⁵

However, for the child himself, self-awareness during the second and third years of life remains (subjectively) the awareness of an "object" outside of himself.

This is confirmed by many facts of child development. For example, Mukhina notes in her diary that the twins at the age of sixteen months still could not play hide and seek properly. Instead of hiding, they covered their eyes and turned away "laughing and calling out," and apparently completely convinced that the adults could not find them.¹⁶

Generalized knowledge of oneself (as the journal entries show) appears along with speech, and as a result of it. First, children learn the name of objects in the outside world and then begin to associate their own names with themselves. (Mukhina notes that name play was the favorite occupation of her twins from the age of one to one and a half.) However, the fact that they make this connection does not yet mean that during this period the process of distinguishing oneself from the world of objects and awareness of oneself as an actor is complete (remember, the hide-and-seek game at this age). Evidently, such consciousness only comes with the appearance of the pronoun "I." Before this children use their names when they refer to themselves.

There are many interesting facts relating to this phenomenon in Menchinskaia's journal.

Until the age of two and a half, Sasha spoke of himself in the third person, calling himself by name. When he began to say “I,” he used this pronoun along with his own name, sometimes using the third person form of the verb as if he were using a proper name: “I is asleep.” Immediately after first using “I,” he began to use it very frequently, sometimes even when it was not required by Russian grammar. When he caught sight of his shadow, he was very surprised and began to make various motions, observing the corresponding changes in the shadow with great curiosity. He pointed at the shadow, saying, “A little boy,” and so forth.

All these facts confirm the idea that **the child is first aware of himself as a kind of external object**, and when he develops an integrated concept of himself he follows the adults and calls himself, as he does other objects, by his name.¹⁷ Only by the end of the second year is his name completely replaced by the pronoun “I.”

Without special investigations it would be difficult to understand the transition “mechanism” for progressing from the child’s own name to the pronoun “I,” that is, **the mechanism of the transition between self-awareness and self-consciousness**. However, it seems clear to us that the so-called ego system contains both rational and affective components and especially the child’s attitude to himself. Literally all the facts of child development attest to this: the fact that, from the very beginning, affective components have dominated in his consciousness; the fact that any cognitive attainment occurs first in the context of primary motivations; and the fact that all children’s first words either express affect or are associated with its satisfaction. All this suggests that the process of self-awareness, which culminates in development of the concept of “I,” is based not only on intellectual but also on **affective generalizations**. Moreover, some facts indicate that affective identification of the self (“affective self-awareness,” if we can express ourselves thus) occurs even earlier than the analogous rational process.

One fact established by Mukhina is interesting in this regard. She writes that during their first year, her twins began to associate their names with themselves. When she asked where Kirill was,

Kirill began to smile and bounce joyfully like a spring. If she asked where Andrei was, he manifested the same reaction.¹⁸

The entries in her journal concerning how the children discovered their “I” are extremely interesting. “Andrei,” she writes, “looks in the mirror and says gleefully: “That’s me! [I in Russian].” Then he leads me over to the mirror and says, “There’s Mama!” indicating the reflection. “There’s mama!” he repeats a number of times.¹⁹ This occurred at twenty-one months. The next week, she writes, upon awakening, the boys turned to each other and called each other by name. Furthermore, during that week they played incessantly with the mirror. “That’s me!” they would say poking themselves in the chest. Could it be that consciousness of ourselves as individuals, which has been prepared by the entire course of our psychological development, actually develops into the “ego system” through such a discovery?

Thus, the central newly acquired structure that arises at the end of the toddler stage is the “ego system” and the resultant new drive to act independently. As is well known, this is expressed in children’s constant and insistent demand to “do it myself.” The strength of this drive is so great that it can triumph over many other children’s drives, some of them also quite strong.

A clear illustration of this can be found in the fact described in Menchinskaia’s journal: Sasha did not want to take his medicine and it had to be administered forcibly, after which he cried long and loud every time. Once his father said, “Sasha, you are a man, you should take your medicine by yourself.” The effect was astonishing: the little boy opened his mouth wide and took his medicine. Typically, Sasha did not come over to take his medicine at once. After being called, he first moved away, shaking his head no, and pretending he was very busy doing something else; but then he would decisively come over and drink it down. If an adult began to approach him with a spoon, he absolutely refused to take it. But if the adult stopped and said, “Come over and take it yourself,” he would do so.

Thus, the drive to manifest and confirm the child’s ego is dominant during this period.

It is completely obvious that the appearance of this powerful drive dictates the need to make significant changes in the child's life and in the pedagogic approach to his upbringing. An analysis of the psychological content of the crisis at three years, and the course it takes, suggests that frustration of this drive induces major difficulties in the behavior of children at the end of their second and the beginning of their third year of life. It is no accident that the most severe crises are experienced by children who are overprotected by adults or those whose upbringing is excessively authoritarian and accompanied by strict punishments. In both cases, the child's drive for autonomy (for doing things himself) is suppressed. On the other hand, children living in large families or reared in institutions show crisis reactions much less frequently and in an attenuated form.

After the development of the "ego system," other new structures develop in the child's psyche. The most significant of these are self-appraisal and the associated desire to meet adult demands that they be "good."

According to many observations, self-appraisal appears in a clear form toward the end of the second year of life, but it does not stem from the child's evaluation of his actions; it appears earlier and is emotional in nature.

When Sasha was asked who he was, he answered. "I am good boy, Sasha" (from Menchinskaia's journal). Another child whom we observed during this developmental period said, "I am always a good boy," "I am good and nothing else" (two years, eleven months).

Evidently, there is almost no rational component in the first self-appraisal. Instead, it stems from the child's desire to receive the approval of a significant adult and thus retain his emotional well-being.²⁰

The presence of simultaneously strong, but opposing affective tendencies (to act in accordance with the child's own wishes and to conform to the demands of adults) creates an unavoidable internal conflict in the child and thus complicates his internal

psychological life. At this developmental phase, the contradiction between “I want” and “you’re supposed to” already gives rise to contradictory emotional experiences and is the cause of contradictory behavior.²¹

As an illustration I cite two very striking facts from Menchinskaia’s journal.

Sasha did something he was not supposed to do and immediately afterward said, “But now I’m being good!” He took his medicine off the table (he had been told not to), and put it back, saying “But now, I’m being good.” He stuck his finger in his mouth, took it out and repeated this phrase. According to another entry, Sasha lay on the upper berth in a train and spit downward. His parents got angry, forbade him to do this, and told him what he had to say. Sasha said in a soft voice “Good boy!” and then much louder, “I won’t do it again.”

The presence of this contradiction in the behavior and emotions of children accentuate the crisis at three years. At the end of the second year children get through it with relative ease, but after the age of three it is often accompanied by severe stubbornness and negativism, which leads to distorted attitudes to behavioral norms and distorted interactions with adults. We have observed a child (about four years old) who inserted “not” before everything he repeated. Another child of the same age wanted to draw but when the adults approved this intention, he started to cry and demanded “Tell me not to draw,” and only then began drawing.

Thus, **duality, or split in personality**, can have its source in early childhood, and, if it is ignored, there is a risk that in subsequent years the **gap between knowing the norms and rules of behavior and spontaneous desire to meet** them will be intensified. And this, in turn, can have a negative effect on the future moral development of the child and on the harmonious structure of his personality.

Thus, during the toddler years, child development culminates in the appearance of a central personality structure in the form of the “ego system.” This system includes not only knowledge but also the child’s attitude to himself.²² Thus, all further personality

development is intimately associated with the development of self-consciousness, which has special characteristics during each developmental phase.

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With our consideration of the crises occurring in the first and third years of life we conclude our analysis of the first two phases of personality development in ontogeny. The next stages—the crisis at seven and the adolescent crisis—require special consideration and cannot be presented in a single article. In future we will devote a separate article to each of them. Here we will only say that the crisis at age seven is associated with the appearance of a new central personality structure, which we call “internal positioning.” At the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth year, the child begins to perceive and experience himself as an “active member of society” and he develops the drive to have a new role and to perform socially significant activity in support of this role.

Finally, the adolescent crisis is the most complex and prolonged, and is marked during its first phase (ages twelve to fourteen) by the appearance of the ability to orient oneself toward objective goals that stretch beyond the present moment (capacity for delayed gratification), and during the second phase (ages fifteen to seventeen) by the consciousness of one’s place in the future, that is, the birth of a life perspective: it also involves the concept of one’s ideal “I” and what one would like to achieve in one’s life.

At the present time, everything that was presented in this article consists of theoretical hypotheses based on previously isolated established facts. To verify these hypotheses, we need broadly conceived psychological studies. They are required not just to enrich the scientific understanding of personality formation, but also to help us construct an appropriate methodology for bringing up children and determining the criteria for judging a child’s psychological level.

Notes

1. See L.I. Bozhovich, L.S. Slavina, and T.V. Endovitskaia, “Psikologicheskoe izuchenie proizvol’nogo povedeniia” [A Psychological Study of Volitional Behavior], *Voprosy psikhologii*, 1976, no. 4.

2. There are also psychological systems that arise in response to the requirements of a given situation or in association with the solution of some particular problem. Temporary and episodic, these systems break down as soon as the activity they “support” terminates. We will not be considering such systems in this work.

3. It should be noted that in further remarks Vygotsky included affective components in the structure of consciousness, speaking of “the semantic and systemic” structure of consciousness.

4. For more detail on this topic see: L.I. Bozhovich, L.S. Slavina, and T.V. Endovitskaia, “Opyt eksperimental’nogo izucheniia proizvol’nogo povedeniia” [An Attempt at Experimental Study of Volitional Behavior], *Voprosy psikhologii*, 1976, no. 4.

5. Cited from G.G. Bochkareva, “Psikhologicheskaia kharakteristika motivatsionnoi sfery podrostkov-pravonarushitelei” [A Psychological Description of the Motivations of Adolescent Lawbreakers], in *Izuchenie motivatsii detei i podrostkov* [A Study of the Motivations of Children and Adolescents], ed. L.I. Bozhovich (Moscow, 1972).

6. Here we should distinguish between a need that is frustrated because of its forced suppression by social requirements (either on the part of other people or the individual himself) and those cases where the need is not satisfied as a result of the individual’s lacking appropriate means to satisfy it. The contradiction between the individual and his capacities is not a conflict, it is the basic motive force (impetus) in psychological development.

7. More detail on this topic may be found in a doctoral dissertation by M.I. Lisina, “Vozrastnye i individual’nye osobennosti obshcheniia so vzroslymi u detei ot rozhdeniia do semi let” [Developmental and Individual Characteristics of Children Between Birth and Seven Years in Interaction with and Adult] (Moscow, 1974).

8. The fact that the most elementary forms of psychological life (its sources) are emotions is easy to explain. The infant has virtually no true ability to satisfy his own needs, which must be satisfied through the intervention of an adult. Thus, it is more biologically important for him to respond to his need status than to his real environment and to provide some external signal of that status. Emotions trigger these signaling responses.

9. This dependence on a situation is not uniquely characteristic of children of this age. It is typical, in a somewhat different form, of toddlers, preschoolers, and even school-age children. Dependence on a situation is overcome only gradually, and this process to a significant extent, is an indicator of the development of the child’s personality. We will try to demonstrate this later in the article.

10. N.A. Menchinskaia, *Dnevnik o razviti rebenka (ot rozhdeniia do 8 let)* [Journal of a Child's Development (from Birth to Age Eight)] (Moscow, 1948).

11. V.S. Mukhina, *Bliznetsy* [Twins] (Moscow, 1969), p. 38.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

13. For more detail, see: L.I. Bozhovich, *Lichnosti i ee formirovanie v destkom vozraste* [Personality and Its Formation in Childhood] (Moscow, 1968).

14. Description of analogous facts may be found in the journal entries of Klara Shtern, cited in V. Shtern, *Psikhologii rannego detstvo* [The Psychology of Early Childhood] (Moscow, 1922), cited in Mukhina, *Bliznetsy*.

15. Of course, the child's awareness of his own body starts a great deal earlier than this age. This can be seen, particularly, in his persistent examination of first his hands and then his feet (cf. Mukhina, *Bliznetsy*, pp. 9, 11, 32). After this they begin to recognize the other, less mobile, parts of their bodies.

16. Mukhina, *Bliznetsy*, p. 38.

17. It is interesting that, according to our observation of two children at this age, calling oneself by one's proper name coincides with the period when children begin to take an interest in the name of every object around them and rapidly add to their vocabularies. V. Shtern, K. Buhler, and other psychologists associate this with the fact that children "make the discovery" that every object has a name.

18. Mukhina, *Bliznetsy*, p. 32.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

20. Analogous facts have been established in studies directed by M.I. Lisina.

21. T.M. Sorokina's 1977 dissertation "Issledovanie fenomena ambivalentnogo povedeniia u detei rannego vozrasta" [Study of the Phenomenon of Ambivalent Behavior in Toddlers], provides evidence of the occurrence of ambivalent attitudes to adults and associated emotions in toddlers, although this fact is analyzed from a different standpoint than ours.

22. If anything more substantive is to be said about the structure of the child's "ego system," special research must be performed.

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