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[xmca] VYGOTSKY




Merry all with your Christmas Time !

WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT WITH A CHILD , SPEECH IS ALREADY PRESENT IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT BUT WITH THE GENUS (SPECIES) , WE SHOULD FIRST OF ALL THINK OF HOW THE VERY SPEECH CAME INTO BEING .

THESE SELECTED PARAGRAPHS OF "TOOL AND SYMBOL IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT" TALK FOR THEMSELVES :

Best 

Haydi

This social nature of all the higher psychological functions has until now escaped
 the attention of scholars, to whom it never occurred to regard the development of
 logical memory or voluntary activity as part of the child 's social formation, for in its
 biological beginning and at the end of its psychological development it appears as an
 individualfunction. 

 The most important and basic of genetic laws, to which the
study of the higher psychological functions leads us, reads that every symbolic
activity of the child was onceasocial form of co-operationand preserves through-
out its development, to its highest point, the social method of its functioning.



On
the other hand , the operation here alsogoesbeyond the limits of natural, intra-
cortical processes, also adding to the psychological structureenvironmental elements
that begin to be used as active agents governing the psychological process from
without. 



Obviously, such a superior symbolic operation as the use of signs for remembering
is the product of the most complex historical development; comparative analysis
shows that such types of activity areabsent in all species of animals , including the
highest, and there is reason to believe that it is the product ofspecific conditions of
social development.


It would be equally
  wrong to believe that the symbolic attitude to some stimuli is reachedintuitivelyby
  the child, derived as it were from the depths of the child 's own spirit, or that
  symbolization is the primaryand further irreducible Kantian facultas signatrix, from
  the beginning a part of human consciousness capable of creating and comprehending
  symbols.


This means that they are not simply
invented or passed down by adults, but rather arise from something that is originally
not a sign operationand that becomes one only after a series of qualitativetransfor-
mations, each of which conditions the next stage and is itself conditioned by the
preceding one and thus links them like stages of an integral process, historical in
nature. 


We found that the earliest flowering of the most complex sign operation
occurs as early as in the system of purely natural forms of behaviour, and thus that the
higher functions have their 'pre-natal' period of developmentlinking them with the
natural foundation of the child's psyche. Objective observations showed that between
the purely natural layer of the elementary functioning of psychological processes and
the higher layer of indirect forms of behaviour, there lies a huge area of transitional
psychological systems; in the history of behaviour, an area of primitive forms lies
betweenthe natural and the cultural. We qualify these two points, that is, the idea
of the development of higher psychological functions and their genetic connection
with the natural forms of behaviour, as 'the natural history of the sign',


To change (or swap) meanings
  for the child means to change the properties of objects.

Social forms of behaviour are more complicated and are in advancein their develop-
ment in the child; when, however, they become individual, they are 'lowered' and
begin to function according to simpler laws. Egocentric speech per se, for instance,
is structurally lower than normal speech, but as a stage in the development of thou-
ght it is higher than social speech in the child of the same age.


form of behaviour

  whenever a persThe two schools of psychology described above as the school of pure spiritualism,
 on the one hand, and that of pure naturalism, on the other, led co the creation of two
 absolutely independent methods of psychological research; in due time they both
acquired a certain degree of finality and both must become the subject of complete
 revision as soon as their philosophic basis undergoes criticism.


Thus, if the first of these saw a specific object for psychological research in the
states ofconsciousness, proposing that these higher forms were a special property of
 the human spirit, closed cofunher analysis, then pure phenomenology, inner descrip-
 tion and self-observation could be the only adequate methods for psychological
studies. One aspect, however, proved to be fatal to spiritual attempts to create a
method for the study of pychological processes: the higher psychological functions
always evaded spiritualistic attempts to establish their origin and structure. They
proved once and for all to be beyond the grasp of spiritualistic description because of
their socio-historicgenesis and indirect structure. These methods found a particularly
unsuitable soil in child psychology, and it may be said that they suffered defeat in
that field even before their philosophic premises were subjected to criticism and
revision.


And consider-
   ing the study of these to be its task, by bringing to the surface the auxiliary operations
   with the help of which the subject masters this or the other problem, it brings them
   within reach of objective study; in other words, it objectivizes them. We regard the
 objectivizarion of inner psychological processesas incomparably more correct and
  adequate, where the goals of psychological research are concerned, than the method
  of studying ready objective responses, for only the former guarantees scientific
  research the actual exposure of specific forms of higher behaviour as opposed to
  subordinate forms.


We are of the opinion that the solution of this problem is related to that change
  of principle viewpoint in contemporary psychology upon which Lewin 63 insists
 and which he defines as the transition from the 'phenotypical to the conditional-
 genetic' point of view. Further, we believe that psychological analysis, penetrating
  beyond the external manifestation of phenomena and revealing the inner structure of
 psychological processesand , particularly, the analysis of the development of higher
 forms , compels us to acknowledge the unity, but not the identity , of higher and lower
                                                                    y
 psychological functions.


 As they put it, a living creature is
 not only a system that meetswith stimuli, but also a system that pursues aims
(Ch. BUhler).


Some of them, as for instance Lewin, see the solution of this
problem in the concept of 'needs', i.e. in the fact that objects of the external world
may have a definite relationto needs. They may have a positive or negative
'Aufforderungscharakter' .


We can speak of a higher on masters his own behavioural processes (in the first place, when the
 person can control his reactions ). The individual, subjecting the process of his own
 responses to his will , thus enters into a principally new relation with the environ-
 ment, arrives at a new functional use of environmental elements as stimuli signs, by
 means of which relying on external means, he guides and regulates his own behaviour
 externallymasters himself externallyforcing the stimuli signs to influence him and
 to provoke and stimulate the desired responses. Inner regulation of purposeful activ-
 ityoriginates an external regulation. Responsive action provoked and organized by
 man himself ceases to be responsive and becomes purposeful.
     In this sense, the phylogenetic history of man's practical intellect is closely tied,
 not only to mastering nature, but also to mastering himself. The history of labour and
 that of speechcan scarcely be understood without each other. Man not only invented
 tools, by means of which he conquered nature, but he invented also stimulithat
 motivated and regulated his own behaviour and by means of which he subjugated his
 own forces to his will. This becomes apparent at the earliest stages of the development
 of man.


'Thus, on Borneo and the Celebes,' says Bticher," 'special sticks made to dig the
soil were found , each having a small stick attached to its top part. When the digging
stick is used as a hoe to sow rice, the small stick produces a sound .' This sound is
something like a work call or command, the aim of which is to produce a rhythmic
pattern to regulate work .The sound of the small stick , fixed atop the hoe stick,
replaces the human voice or, at any rate, performs an analogous function.
    This intertwining of sign and tool which found its concrete symbolic expression in
a primitive hoeing stick shows how earlythe sign (and later, its highest form, the
word) begins to participate in the use of tools by man, and how early it begins to fulfill
a highly specific function, to be compared with nothing else in the general structure
of these operations that stand at the very beginning of the development of human
labour. This stick is fundamentallydifferent fromthat used by apes, although                             without doubt they are related to each other genetically. If we ask ourselves in what
 does this fundamental psychological difference between man's tool and that of an
 animal rest, we must answer this question with yet another question, first formulated
  by Kohler in connection with his discussion of a chimpanzee's activities, activities
 geared to the future and guided by a notion of the external conditions that must
 manifest themselves in the near or distant future. Kohler asks: to what limitation of
 capacities in the chimpanzee must we ascribe the fact that they do not demonstrate
 even the slightest element of cultural development, this notwithstanding evidence of
 them manifesting many elements usually found only in civilization (even if they be
 the most primitive)?


The fact that he makes the tool in advanceis without the least doubt
 related to thebeginning of culrure. 


Thus, there are two types of activity between which the psychologist
must discriminate in principle: one is the behaviour of animals, the other that of man;
activity as a product of biological evolution and activity originating in the process of
man's historical development.


The temporality of life, cultural development, work - in short, everything that
distinguishes man from animals in the psychological field - all this is intimately
related to the fact that, parallel to his conquest of natureover the course of his
historical development, man also mastered his own self, his own behaviour. The stick
mentioned by Bucher is a stick for future use. This is already a work tool. As Friedrich
Engels so aptly put it, 'labour created man himself'," i.e. created the higher psycho-
logical funerions which distinguish man as man. Primitive man, using his stick, by
means of outer sign masters the processes of his own behaviour and subordinates his
activityto the aim which he forces external objects to serve: tool, soil, rice.
    In this sense, we may once more touch on Koffka's remark, briefly noted earlier.
He asks: is there any sense in calling the actions of a chimpanzee in Kohler's
experiments volitional actions? From the point of view of old psychology, this
activity, being non-instinctive, non-automatized and, what is more, intelligent, must
without doubt be classed as volitional action. But new psychology answers this
questionin the negative- and with reason. In that sense, Koffka is absolutely right.
                 
 Only man's action, subordinated to his will power, can be qualified as volitional
 action.
    In his excellent analysis of the psychology of purposeful activity, Lewin makes a
 clear-cut definition of free and volitional intention as a product of the historico-
 cultural development of behaviour and as a specific feature of man's psychology. He
 says:

    The fact that man displays extraordinary freedom in what concerns the formation of any,
    even the most senseless intention, is astounding in itself ... This freedom is character-
    istic of cultural man. It is incomparably less characteristic of a child and, probably, of
    primitive man , too; there is reason to believe that this, more than his highly developed
    intellect, distinguishes man from the animals which stand closest to him. This division
    corresponds to the problem of self-control (Beherrsch ung),


The development of this 'freedom of action ', as we have tried to show above, is in
direct functional dependence on the use of signs. The specific word-action relation
which we have constantly been studying , occupies a central placein the ontogenesis
of practical intellect in man , this notwithstanding the fact that in the field of higher
functions ontogenesis repeats phylogenes is to an even lesser degree than in the field
of elementary functions . Anyone who from this point of view follows the develop-
ment of free action in the child will agree with K. BUhler's statement that the history
of the development of child volition has not yet been written. In order to lay the
foundations of this history we must first of all establish this relation between word
and action, which lies at the beginnings of the formation of the child's will. Simul-
taneously this will signify the first resolute step along the way to the solution of the
problem of the two types of human activity which we have mentioned above.


To certain psychologists the ancient biblical 'In the beginning was the Word' retains
 all its fascination. New investigations, however, do not leave any doubt as to the fact
 that the word does not stand at the beginning of the development of the child's mind.
     
As Buhler correctly notes along the same lines: 'It was said that speech stands at
the source of man's coming to be; perhaps this is true , but prior to speech there is
instrumental thinking (Werkzeugdenken)'. Practical intellect is genetically more
ancient than verbal; action precedes the word, even intelligent action precedes the
intelligent word. Now, however, while repeating this thought, very true in itself,
there is a tendency to overestimate action at the word's expense. The most common
approach is to conceive the relation between word and action (independence of action
from the word and primacy of action) characteristic of early age, as remaining thus
during all the following stages of development and throughout life.


 Together with Gurzmann,69 we say: 'Even if we, following Goethe, refute the
 "word's" high value per se, that is, the "sounding" word 's," and if we translate
 together with him the biblical dictum as "in the beginning was the deed", it is
 nevertheless possible to read this verse (understanding it from the point of view of
 historical development)thus: "in the beginning was the deed'.. 


He points out that only action
as a more general concept can embrace, on the one hand, expressive movement
(speech) and, on the other, actions as co-ordinative, parallel, co-ordinate, co-relative
and more particular concepts. 


'Speech',
says he, 'always signifies a higher stage of man's development than even the supreme
expression of action - the deed (die Tat).-72    /critique/


He who pays no attention to these facts inevitably presents the psychological
 nature of speech and of action in a false light, for the source of their changes rests in
 their functional junction. Anyone who ignores this fundamental fact and who, having
 the purity of concept classification as his purpose , tries to represent speech and action
 as two never-meeting parallels, willy-nilly limits the real scope of both concepts
 because this scope of content is rooted first and foremost in the ties of both of them.


The essence of the matter, as demonstrated in investigations of these ties between
 word and action in child-age and in cases of aphasia, lies in the fact that speech lifts
action to its highest stage, action that was previously independent of it. 


 We cannot dwell, as should be sufficiently obvious from the preceding passages,
on either the evangelical or Goethean formula, no matter which word we accentuate.
But we must remark that all these formulae, Gutzmann's included, necessarily
                 
 require a continuation. Each speaks about what occurred at the beginning. But what
 happened later? The beginning is only a beginning, i.e. the starting point of move-
ment.The process of development per se, however, must by necessity includea denial
of this starting pointand movement towardhigher forms of action lying not at the
beginning but at the end of the whole process. How does this process occur? The
attempt to answer this question induced us to write this article. In it we have tried
to show how the word, becoming intellectualized and developing on the basis of
action,lifts this action to a supreme level, subjects the child to its power, stamps it
with the seal of will. But since we wanted to express all this in one short formula, in '
one sentence, we might put it thus: if at the beginning of development there stands the
act, independent of the word, then at the endof it there stands the word which
becomes the act, the word which makes man's action free.
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