Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality

[Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>]

On 29 June 2012 15:03, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> I think we are at cross purposes here, Huw. Symbolic logic can only deal
> with various kinds of propositional calculus, but always comes down to
> "atoms" whose truth value is "outside the theory". I am not really
> interested (these days) in formal languages. I am talking about real
> languages.
>

Thank goodness!   I thought you were only interested in Andy language.

That does beg the question why you're making assertions about formal logic
though.

But lets drop it and let Martin continue with the thread.

Huw


> Andy
>
> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 29 June 2012 14:16, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>>    Huw, I think the scope for using formal logic is very limited in
>>    the case of true concepts.
>>
>>    Basically, you are limited to chains of inferences from true
>>    propositions.
>>    But as I see it, pseudoconcepts, like the concepts of Set Theory,
>>    are native to Formal Logic. The type of logic and the type of
>>    concept are, as you point out, two different things, but I think
>>    there is a definite and strong connection between defining a
>>    concept as a set and the applicability of syllogistic logic.
>>
>>
>>
>> That connection is one of activity.  Discriminating on 'types' of logic
>> by application is pseudoconceptual.  In fact if you look at the various
>> kinds of logics, it becomes apparent that their key difference is in terms
>> of application, each introduces a particular 'library' of notations
>> particular to certain kinds of problems, yet these are actually built out
>> simple logical operations.  One can describe one formal language in terms
>> of another, which is what Godel did.
>>
>>
>>    Andy
>>
>>    Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>
>>        On 29 June 2012 11:50, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>            **
>>
>>            I wasn't talking about examples so much as archetypes of
>>            "scientific
>>            concepts", and for archetypes he uses exploitation, class
>>            struggle,
>>            exploitation, or the Paris Commune (T&S Ch 5 and 6).
>>
>>            The system of nature does of course provide ample material
>>            for talking
>>            about the difference between taxonomy and true concepts.
>>            So for example:
>>
>>            "In its external characteristics, the pseudoconcept is as
>>            similar to true
>>            concept as the whale is to the fish. However, if we turn
>>            to the 'origin of
>>            the species' of intellectual and animate forms, it becomes
>>            apparent that
>>            the pseudoconcept is related to complexive thinking and
>>            the whale to the
>>            mammals [ie true concepts]." [T&S ch 5]
>>
>>            which allows LSV to show how sorting by contingent
>>            attributes (rather than
>>            according to essential relations within a system)
>>            corresponds to
>>            pseudoconcepts and formal logic.
>>
>>
>>
>>        I think you'll find its the types used that are
>>        pseudoconceptual, rather
>>        than the logic.
>>
>>        Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>            True, he does not confine himself to the concepts of
>>            Marxist social
>>            science. He uses different sets of concepts for different
>>            purposes. The
>>            reasons for falling off your bicycle (somethign within a
>>            child's
>>            experience) at one point; kulaks from prerevolutionary
>>            days at another
>>            point (outside a child's experience), at another. I was
>>            just saying that he
>>            takes scientific conepts as the purest form of true
>>            concept and the
>>            concepts of marxist social science as the purest type of
>>            scientific concept.
>>
>>            Andy
>>
>>            Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
>>
>>            And yet, most of LSV's own examples are biological, no?
>>
>>            -----Original Message-----
>>            From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >
>>            [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >
>>            <xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>>>]
>> On Behalf Of Andy
>>            Blunden
>>            Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 10:54 PM
>>            To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>            Subject: Re: [xmca] Culture & Rationality
>>
>>            Oh, and also, when Vygotsky uses "scientific concepts" as
>>            the archetype for a true concept, remember that he *does
>>            not* use the concepts of
>>            *natural* science, as Piaget did, but the concepts of
>>            Marxist social theory. So, when we are considering
>>            Vygotsky's ideas about "scientific concepts" it is
>>            probably useful to *not* have in mind concepts like those
>>            of physics which Piaget, not Vygotsky, took as ideal types.
>>
>>            Andy
>>
>>            Andy Blunden wrote:
>>
>>
>>             Stephen Toulmin, in "The Philosophy of Science. An
>>            Introduction"
>>            (1953) I thought definitively proved that the method of
>>            reasoning of
>>            science is not formal logic, or what Toulmin called
>>            "syllogistic"
>>            inference. For example, on p.33: "Certainly none of the
>>            substantial
>>            inferences that one comes across in the phsyical sciences
>>            is of a
>>            syllogistic type. This is because, in the physical
>>            sciences, we are
>>            not seriously interested in enumerating the common
>>            properties of sets
>>            of objects." In other words, the concepts of the physical
>>            sciences are
>>            not pseudoconcepts, therefore we can't use formal logic to
>>            makes
>>            inferences about them. Brandom uses the idea of "formal" and
>>            "material" inference to make the distinction.
>>
>>            So scientific, and in fact all true, concepts imply going
>>            past formal
>>            logic, which only works with pseudoconcepts.
>>
>>            Andy
>>
>>            Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
>>
>>
>>             Yes, exactly Martin, this work is consistent. I do think
>>            Vygotsky
>>            privileges dialectical logic over formal logic; by
>>            definition, it
>>            subsumes formal logic and moves beyond it. From my
>>            cultural position,
>>            growing up comfortably with formal logic and having to
>>            practice
>>            thinking dialectically, the above statement doesn't bother
>>            me. But I
>>            would take a different position relative to an Indigenous
>>            perspective, and be much more circumspect about saying that
>>            dialectical logic can or should be privileged there. The
>>            difference
>>            in the two positions is one of power. In the first, it
>>            seems that a
>>            marginalized position (Marx's in North America) works to
>>            challenge a
>>            privileged position (formal logic in North America). In
>>            the second,
>>            privileging a dialectical perspective seems like another
>>            act of
>>            colonization.
>>
>>            If we look equally across these three positions, which is
>>            problematic
>>            because the is no single homogenous Indigenous
>>            perspective, but let's
>>            say for this one exercise, then it seems like we are
>>            comparing three
>>            different cultural, historical perspectives on reasoning,
>>            right and
>>            logical, or rational,behavior.
>>
>>            The question remains to the effects of these different ways of
>>            thinking, but for the people thinking within these
>>            systems, what is
>>            the evidence to show that they cannot think at the adult
>>            level of
>>            their cultural form of rationality? Yikes, now that I've
>>            written
>>            this, I'm not even sure it's the question. Is the issue
>>            when we try
>>            to compare the standards of one cultural group to another?
>>
>>            I'll jump to Peter's post, because I totally appreciate
>>            what he has
>>            written there as well. I appreciate the idea of separating
>>            dialogical
>>            thinking from scientific ... but I also think of Vera
>>            John-Steiner's
>>            cognitive pluralism, and want to reaffirm all the other
>>            ways of
>>            thinking and experiencing the world through image, sound,
>>            diagram.
>>            These are sometimes more obvious to draw on in some Indigenous
>>            cultures, but the move also shifts the discussion from
>>            speech to
>>            writing, whether we are writing lines, or diagrams, or words.
>>
>>            I was looking back over my sad copy of Luria & Vygotsky
>>            (1992), the
>>            bottom of page 41 through pages 61 are interesting to this
>>            topic
>>            because they show how much Vygotsky struggled with the
>>            necessity of
>>            using the work of others and at the same time trying not
>>            to be bound
>>            by it. He relies on the work of Levy-Bruhl and takes up
>>            his language
>>            "so-called 'primitive peoples'" and then tries to
>>            problematize this a
>>            bit. "Primitive man, in the true sense of the term, does
>>            not exist
>>            anywhere at the present time," but then of course he
>>            continues to use
>>            this language. He argues against any biological type,
>>            discusses
>>            "objectively logical thinking" in relation to nature, and
>>            goes on to
>>            say .... hm, hm, okay, page 59, the focus is on the
>>            development of
>>            writing, and the transition from natural to cultural
>>            memory, and
>>            later the historical development of human memory. The
>>            ability of sign
>>            systems to enable an external form of memory, an external
>>            storage of
>>            memory.
>>
>>            What is different about people with access to the
>>            accumulation of
>>            cultural knowledge of any particular culture and people of
>>            that same
>>            culture who do not have access to this accumulated
>>            knowledge? In some
>>            cultures this may be scientific concepts, as defined by
>>            Vygotsky, in
>>            other cultures it may be ....?
>>
>>            But I keep returning to my post a bit ago, the quote there
>>            makes it
>>            clear that Vygotsky realizes that even after formal
>>            schooling, many
>>            people do not think with scientific concepts, and adults
>>            do not think
>>            with scientific concepts across all domains ... this has been
>>            supported by contemporary work, from Panofsky, John-Steiner, &
>>            Blackwell (1990) to Howard Gardner's work with Project Zero.
>>
>>            Vygotsky's goal of thinking in scientific concepts is
>>            actually not
>>            accessible to many people within our own cultures ....
>>
>>            Okay, have I completely gone overboard? :)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>             Hi Jennifer,
>>
>>            Yes, there has been interesting work recently proposing that
>>            indigenous cultures are using a distinct kind of
>>            reasoning. These guys:
>>
>>            Berkes, F., & Berkes, M. K. (2009). Ecological complexity,
>>            fuzzy
>>            logic, and holism in indigenous knowledge. Futures, 41(1),
>>            6-12.
>>            doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.**003
>>
>>            ...suggest that indigenous peoples have learned to deal with
>>            complexity, and to manage natural environments rather than
>>            master
>>            them; that what has been dismissed as animism is actually a
>>            sophisticated non-dualistic ontology; and that a holistic
>>            systems
>>            thinking is being used. I like several aspects of their
>>            analysis,
>>            not least that it explains the "simple number system" -
>>            one, two,
>>            many - that has been found in many indigenous cultures, as
>>            due to an
>>            approach in which people read and interpret signals from the
>>            environment rather than counting and measuring it.
>>
>>            And I agree with you that judgments of rationality are
>>            often violent
>>            impositions; all the judgments of people as 'primitive' are
>>            presumably of this kind. Presumably what we need are
>>            non-violent
>>            ways to look at difference.
>>
>>            As for dialectical logic, it take it that LSV believed
>>            that this was
>>            the form of rationality he was employing, and the
>>            ontogenesis of
>>            which he was describing. And that he considered it superior to
>>            formal logic, not an alternative.
>>
>>            Martin
>>
>>            On Jun 27, 2012, at 2:04 PM, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>             Hi Martin,
>>
>>             I am thinking about what you wrote,
>>
>>             "On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
>>            writing can be
>>            read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
>>            rationality
>>            will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
>>            followed
>>            his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
>>            radical
>>            conclusion to come to."
>>
>>             I was first thinking about different standards of
>>            rationality as
>>            noted in the quote below, between formal and dialectical
>>            logic.
>>            Both are tied to "Western" countries, through dialectical
>>            thinking
>>            can also be tied to "Eastern" countries, so maybe the
>>            issue is one
>>            of "industrialized" countries?
>>
>>             "A child who has mastered the higher forms of thinking, a
>>            child
>>            who has mastered concepts, does not part with the more
>>            elementary
>>            forms of thinking. In quantitative terms, these more
>>            elementary
>>            forms continue to predominate in many domains of
>>            experience for a
>>            long time. As we noted earlier, even adults often fail to
>>            think in
>>            concepts. S When applied to the domain of life experience,
>>            even the
>>            concepts of the adult and adolescent frequently fail to
>>            rise higher
>>            than the level of the pseudoconcept. They may possess all the
>>            features of the concepts from the perspective of formal
>>            logic, but
>>            from the perspective of dialectical logic they are nothing
>>            more
>>            than general representations, nothing more than complexes."
>>            (emphasis added, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 160)
>>
>>
>>             >
>>
>>
>>             But the issue in your quote has surfaced several times as
>>            well in
>>            my work with Indigenous students and scholars, and we have
>>            ended in
>>            the place noted in your quote above. Particular examples
>>            include
>>            the complexity and unity of some Indigenous cosmological
>>            systems,
>>            their symbolic representation through the medicine wheel, for
>>            example, and the narratives, signs, gestures, practices,
>>            writings
>>            that accompany these cosmological systems.
>>
>>             Can this be considered another cultural form of
>>            rationality (seems
>>            dialectical in a sense as well ...)?
>>
>>             I know this is different from the question you posed in
>>            the follow
>>            up email, but isn't "demonstrably weaker" a matter of
>>            cultural,
>>            historical, political, economic positioning ... assessed by a
>>            particular dominant group at a particular time on the basis of
>>            their own potentially culturally irrelevant assessments?
>>
>>             Is part of your question also asking for a standard that
>>            exists
>>            outside of culture?
>>
>>             Just thoughts here ... jen
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>             Hi Peter,
>>
>>             I am glad to see you join in the discussion, since I know
>>            you've
>>            done interesting research on inner speech.
>>
>>             I am certainly willing to grant that patterns of social
>>            interaction will become patterns of self-regulation and
>>            thereby
>>            parts of patterns of individual thinking. It also makes
>>            sense to
>>            me, and in my opinion LSV clearly states the view, that
>>            the higher
>>            psychological processes are cultural processes. I think he
>>            goes so
>>            far as to say that reasoning is cultural.
>>
>>
>>             >>
>>
>>
>>             But, importantly, that is not the same as saying that
>>            reasoning
>>            *varies* across cultures. We *all* live in culture, and
>>            one can
>>            say that reasoning is cultural and still maintain that
>>            reasoning
>>            is universal. Are we willing to take another step, and suggest
>>            that in specific cultures the ways that people reason will be
>>            different, because the specific conventions of each
>>            culture are
>>            involved? That is a big step to take, because the rules of
>>            logic,
>>            to pick what is usually taken to be one component of
>>            reasoning,
>>            are usually considered to hold regardless of local
>>            conventions.
>>
>>             One way to take this step, of course, is to say that
>>            people in
>>            cultures reason in different ways but then to add an
>>            evaluative
>>            dimension. Those people in that culture reason differently
>>            from
>>            the way we do, but that is because their reasoning is less
>>            adequate than ours. They are more childlike, more primitive.
>>            *This* move has often been made, and I can find many
>>            passages in
>>            LSV's texts where he seems to be saying basically this.
>>            That's not
>>            a move I find interesting or appealing, and it's not what I am
>>            proposing.
>>
>>             On the contrary, it seems to me that much of LSV's
>>            writing can be
>>            read as pointing to the conclusion that *standards* of
>>            rationality
>>            will vary from one culture another. But I don't think he
>>            followed
>>            his own pointers, and, as I've said above, it is a pretty
>>            radical
>>            conclusion to come to.
>>
>>             Martin
>>
>>             On Jun 27, 2012, at 9:33 AM, Peter Feigenbaum wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>             Martin--
>>
>>             If you grant that interpersonal speech communication is
>>            essentially a cultural invention, and that private and inner
>>            speech--as derivatives of interpersonal speech
>>            communication--are
>>            also cultural inventions, then Vygotsky's assertions about
>>            inner
>>            speech as a tool that adults use voluntarily to conduct and
>>            direct such crucial psychological activities as analyzing,
>>            reflecting, conceptualizing, regulating, monitoring,
>>            simulating,
>>            rehearsing (actually, some of these activities were not
>>            specifically asserted by Vygotsky, but instead have been
>>            discovered in experiments with private speech) would imply
>>            that
>>            these "higher mental processes" are themselves cultural
>>            products.
>>            Even if the *contents* of inner speech thinking happen to
>>            bear no
>>            discernible cultural imprint, the process of production
>>            nonetheless does.
>>
>>             Of course, you may not agree that interpersonal speech
>>            communication is a cultural invention. But if you do go along
>>            with the idea that every speech community follows (albeit
>>            implicitly) their own particular conventions or customs for:
>>            assigning specific speech sounds to specific meanings (i.e.,
>>            inventing words); organizing words into sequences (i.e.,
>>            inventing grammar--Chomsky's claims not withstanding); and
>>            sequencing utterances in conversation according to rules of
>>            appropriateness (i.e., inventing rules that regulate "what
>>            kinds
>>            of things to say, in what message forms, to what kinds of
>>            people,
>>            in what kinds of situations", according to the cross-cultural
>>            work of E. O. Frake), then reasoning based on the use of
>>            speech
>>            must be cultural as well.
>>
>>
>>              >>>
>>
>>
>>              My guess is that you are looking for evidence that cultures
>>            reason differently. While there may be evidence for such a
>>            claim,
>>            I only want to point out that the tools for reasoning are
>>            themselves manufactured by human culture.
>>
>>             Peter
>>
>>             Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
>>             Associate Director of Institutional Research
>>             Fordham University
>>             Thebaud Hall-202
>>             Bronx, NY 10458
>>
>>             Phone: (718) 817-2243 <tel:%28718%29%20817-2243>
>>             Fax: (718) 817-3203 <tel:%28718%29%20817-3203>
>>             e-mail: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
>>            <mailto:pfeigenbaum@fordham.**edu <pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu>>
>>
>>
>>
>>             From:        Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
>>            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> <packer@duq.edu
>>            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
>>
>>             To:        "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>            <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>            <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>
>>
>>             Date:        06/26/2012 05:06 PM
>>             Subject:        [xmca] Culture & Rationality
>>             Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>            <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>             Thank you for the suggestions that people have made about
>>            evidence that supports the claim that culture is
>>            constitutive of
>>            psychological functions. Keep sending them in, please! Now
>>            I want
>>            to introduce a new, but related, thread. A few days ago I gave
>>            Peter a hard time because he wrote that "higher mental
>>            processes
>>            are those specific to a culture, and thus those that embody
>>            cultural concepts so that they guide activity."
>>
>>
>>              >>>
>>
>>
>>              I responded that I don't think that LSV ever wrote this
>>            - his
>>            view seems to me to have been that it is scientific
>>            concepts that
>>            make possible the higher psychological functions (through
>>            at time
>>            he seems to suggest the opposite).
>>
>>             My questions now are these:
>>
>>             1. Am I wrong? Did LSV suggest that higher mental
>>            processes are
>>            specific to a culture and based on cultural concepts?
>>
>>             2. If LSV didn't suggest this, who has? Not counting
>>            Peter!  :)
>>
>>             3. Do we have empirical evidence to support such a
>>            suggestion?
>>            It seems to me to boil down, or add up, to the claim that
>>            human
>>            rationality, human reasoning, varies culturally. (Except who
>>            knows what rationality is? - it turns out that the Stanford
>>            Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not have an entry for
>>            Rationality; apparently they are still making up their minds.)
>>
>>             that's all, folks
>>
>>             Martin
>>
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>>             --
>>             ______________________________
>>
>>             Jennifer A. Vadeboncoeur, Ph.D.
>>             Associate Professor
>>             The University of British Columbia
>>             Faculty of Education
>>             2125 Main Mall
>>             Library Block 272B
>>             Vancouver BC V6T-1Z4
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>>            --
>>            ------------------------------
>>
>>            *Andy Blunden*
>>            Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>            Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
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>>
>>            Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
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>>    --     ------------------------------**------------------------------*
>> *------------
>>
>>
>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>    Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>    Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/*
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> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> ------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
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