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Re: [xmca] Body expression as sign.
Christine
Thank you for this lead.
I have downloaded the Gerry Hagberg article on Wittgensein's Aesthetics.
As you recommend Wittgenstein's notion of the aesthetic should be
considered alongside Zinchenko, Gadamer, Shotter, Merleau-Ponty, and
Vygotsky.
Thanks Christine for this lead
Larry
On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 4:00 AM, Christine Schweighart <
schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote:
> Larry,
> It might be timely to consider Wiitgenstein's notion of 'aesthetic' ( as
> you have followed Shotter's uses of his work in the past).
> A passage in an essay in the Stanford encyclopaedia sruck me quoted below
> from:
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-aesthetics/
>
> Hagberg, Garry, "Wittgenstein's Aesthetics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of
> Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/wittgenstein-aesthetics/
> >.
>
>
> The lectures referred to are occaisions where Wittgenstein expanded upon
> 'aesthetic', as in his writings he rarely did.
>
> "In using language, he says next in the lectures, in understanding each
> other—and in mastering a language initially—we do not start with a small
> set of words or a single word, but rather from specific occasions and
> activities. Our aesthetic engagements are occasions and activities of just
> this kind; thus aesthetics, as a field of conceptual inquiry, should start
> not from a presumption that the central task is to analyze the determinant
> properties that are named by aesthetic predicates, but rather with a
> full-blooded consideration of the *activities* of aesthetic life. 1.2
> Predicates and Rules
>
> But the adjectival form of many—not all—critical predicates quickly
> reinforces the “property-with-name” model, and against this Wittgenstein
> places examples from musical and poetical criticism, where we simply call
> attention to the rightness of a transition or to the precision or aptness
> of an image. And it is here that Wittgenstein reminds us that descriptions
> such as “stately”, “pompous”, or “melancholy” (where the latter is said of
> a Schubert piece) are like giving the work a face (Shiner 1978), or we
> could instead (or in further specification of such descriptions) use
> gestures.[2<
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-aesthetics/notes.html#2>
> ] In cases of re-construing a work (e.g. the meter of a poem) so that we
> understand its rhythm and structure anew, we make gestures, facial
> expressions, and non-descriptive-predicate based remarks, where aesthetic
> adjectives play a diminished role or no role at all. And we show our
> approval of a tailor's work not by describing the suit, but by wearing it.
> Occasions and activities are fundamental, descriptive language secondary."
> Christine
>
> On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 7:58 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Andy, Vera
> > I was not using Peirce's notion of symbol.
> > For Peirce the red and blue clyinder represents a barbershop as a symbol.
> > This is an ARBITRARY relationship, a sign relationship.
> >
> > In contrast, I am using Gadamer's notion of symbol [as articulated by
> Joel
> > Weinsheimer.]
> > Weinsheimer points out that Gadamer explored how "symbol", which use to
> > refer to appearance, reflection,and especially image, has has transformed
> > its meaning and become historically equivalent of the meaning of "sign"
> >
> > Gadamer is questioning the modern instrumental theory of language and the
> > sign system of reason. In moden discussions of language the concept of
> the
> > image (eikon) has been replaced by that of the sign (semeion or
> semainon).
> > Gadamer writes,
> > "This is not just a terminological change; it expresses an epoch-making
> > decision about thught concerning language... Wedged in between image and
> > sign, the being of language couldonly be reduced to the level of pure
> > sign." [Truth and Method, 413]
> >
> > Andy, Gadamer is exploring contrasting the relation of words *as*
> > signs, and distinguishing the alternative assumption relating words *as*
> > images [symbols in Gadamer's tradition].
> >
> > Derrida, and Eco, likewise assert that an image is not a sign.
> > Gadamer asks what are the consequences and implications of this
> antithesis
> > for the philosophy of language?
> > For Gadamer a sign is a tool. Conceived *as* a sign [tool] a word is an
> > instrument that the SUBJECT employs for its OWN ends.
> > Gadamer asks, is it sufficient to think of language *just* or *merely*
> as a
> > MEANS of communication?
> > In Weinsheimer's interpretation of Gadamer,
> >
> > "Gadamer may overemphasize the sameness, coincidence, continuity, and
> unity
> > of the word with what it words - that is, if he stresses the ways in
> which
> > words are like images and symbols - he does so by way of corrective, for
> > nobody disputes the arbitrariness of the sign.... it is necessary to
> > reexamine the premises of the idealism on which the contrary, semiotic
> > thesis are based.... Asserting that there is something of the image in
> the
> > word raises questions about how free from its concrete situation the
> > sign-making mind actually is. To phrase this in terms of the AESTHETIC
> > context from which Gadamer begins, once the symbol degenerates into sign,
> > it can no longer be distinguished from allegory. Understood as sign, the
> > symbol is independent of the symbolized, and in that respect allegorical.
> >
> >
> > Andy, 'm not in a positon to have a strong opinion on these matters, but
> it
> > does have some relevance to Vygotsky's notion of *aesthetic reaction*
> which
> > Zinchenko was discussing.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 8:42 PM, Vera John-Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Andy and Larry,
> > > I was just going to write a very similar note to Andy's. I believe that
> > the
> > > Peircian distinctions are very widely accepted,
> > >
> > > Vera
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On
> > > Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: Thursday, May 24, 2012 9:23 PM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Body expression as sign.
> > >
> > > Larry are you intending to use these terms as in Peirce's system?
> > > For Peirce "sign" is a global category including a wide array of
> > > relations between sign, interpretant and object.
> > > For Peirce a *symbol* has only a conventional relation to the object
> for
> > > the interpretant. It is an *icon* which relies on resemblance to the
> > > object, and an *index* on a material connection. But there are other
> > > theories of semiotics I guess.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> >
> http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce2.htm*
> > >
> > > *Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > Joseph, Jack, Rod and Christine
> > > >
> > > > I would like to explore the topic of *body expression AS signs* [the
> > > topic
> > > > of the thread]
> > > >
> > > > The term *signs* and how it links to two other terms *gesture* and
> > > *symbols*
> > > >
> > > > This is not to put in question the focus of this thread to open up
> and
> > > > explore questions of *energy* *movement* *emotion* and *attunement*.
> > The
> > > > overall general term *expression* and how expression is an *aesthetic
> > > > REACTION* [Vygotsky's term] or an *aesthetic RESPONSE* [Gadamer's
> term]
> > > > I seems to be central to our understanding bodily expression
> > > >
> > > > Within this general notion of expression my question is if the
> > following
> > > > statements are equivalent, different, or ambivalent?
> > > > * Body expression AS gesture
> > > > * Body expression AS sign
> > > > * Body expression as symbol
> > > >
> > > > My understanding of the relation of *signs* to what they signify is
> > that
> > > > the relation is ESSENTIALLY arbitrary. One sign can replace another
> > sign
> > > > and either sign can equally represent the signified.
> > > >
> > > > Symbols, by contrast have a relation of RESEMBLANCE to the signified.
> > We
> > > > cannot merely transfer one symbol to be replaced by another symbol
> > > > without this change radically changing the meaning.
> > > >
> > > > Both signs and symbols are implicated in conceptual understanding.
> > > >
> > > > Body expression as *gesture* moves into the realm of *showing* and
> > > > *perceiving* ACTUAL physical bodily movement. Some traditions assume
> > this
> > > > level of bodily expression is pre-conceptual. However other
> traditions
> > > > asumme bodily gesture is expressing cultural-historical
> > conventionalized
> > > > movements.
> > > >
> > > > My question is: When we are exploring aesthetic REACTION or aesthetic
> > > > RESPONSE to bodily *expression* [as a general term] are we
> > > *understanding*
> > > > this bodily expression at the level of gesture, symbol, or sign
> > > > expressions? Do the adjectives used to modify *expression* change the
> > > > meaning of our understanding of expression as a general term?
> > > >
> > > > Larry
> > > > On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Joseph Gilbert
> > > <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> Let us remember that spoken-word language is composed of sounds made
> > by
> > > >> the body, sounds that issue forth as expressions of emotions and
> that
> > > cause
> > > >> hearers bodies to assume patterns of motion analogous to those in
> the
> > > >> generators of the sounds. Thereby motion and emotion are transferred
> > > from
> > > >> originators to receivers. It is that sense of emotion, that we
> > > experience
> > > >> by our spoken words, that provides us with a sense of meaning. Our
> own
> > > >> emotion is the bottom line of our sense of meaning. Things have
> > meaning
> > > >> only in as much, and in how, they affect us. And our emotions are
> the
> > > way
> > > >> we experience effects. Our words deal in the currency of meaning -
> our
> > > >> emotions - , and they refer to things. Because of this dual nature,
> > > words
> > > -
> > > >> the very things that identify things - inform us of the meaning of
> our
> > > >> world simply by affecting our emotions with their sounds. Since we
> are
> > > >> normally preoccupied with the referential aspect of words, it is
> > > >> subconsciously that we experience their emotional effects.
> > > >>
> > > >> Joseph Gilbert
> > > >> ______________________________**____________
> > > >> _____
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> > > >>
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> > > >>
> > > >>
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> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1
> > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > > Book: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1608461459/
> > >
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