Re: [xmca] understanding understanding

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

The Wikipedia entry appears very well done. Certainly full of important
issues to "get straight" about in our entanglements.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art_as_Experience

mike

On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:26 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> I gotta go back and read Dewey to appreciate the full point here, Jay. Or
> at least wikipedia summary of "art and experience." :-)
> mike
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:22 PM, Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu> wrote:
>
>>
>> I think it's come up here before, but I'd remind us about Dewey's Art and
>> Experience, which was definitely making a move to try to redefine esthetic
>> experience in a less elitist way, to ground it in a universal aspect of
>> human experience, to merge the high-art experience and the craft-practice
>> experience, and generally I'd say to "democratize" esthetics.
>>
>> In response to some of what Greg wrote here recently, it also struck me
>> that perhaps there is something rather bourgeois about all this personal
>> identity and "I'm the kind of person who does, feels X" reflexivity.
>> Perhaps even a late modern cast to it. It seems to turn connoisseurship
>> into something a bit more decadent, self-centered, pre-occupied with the
>> ego, as opposed to the "ecstatic" tradition (as in ritual and festival,
>> Bakhtin's carnivalesque, Victor Turner's liminality/communitas,
>> Czikszentmihaly's flow), where the esthetic experience takes us "out of our
>> Selves", into the music, the work, the unreflective experience. I think
>> that tradition, however, is predicated more on active esthetic production
>> as the norm, rather than the more consumerist approach we have devolved
>> into under late capitalism.
>>
>> All this is probably further complicated by the different timescales of
>> esthetic experience. When you perform a piece of music, or a dance, the
>> timescale of action leaves no room for reflection. But when you compose a
>> piece of music, or choreograph a dance, it does. It is certainly a cliche
>> of modernism that the artist, in the downtime between bouts of production
>> or inspiration, turns inwards and broods about the Self. Artist as
>> narcissist. And now we have the art-consumer as narcissist. My idea of the
>> esthetic experience is that it blows us past the ego, blows "us" away, and
>> catalyzes a mode of Being prior to the ego-object divide.
>>
>> No?
>>
>> JAY.
>>
>>
>> Jay Lemke
>> Senior Research Scientist
>> Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition
>> Adjunct Full Professor, Department of Communication
>> University of California - San Diego
>> 9500 Gilman Drive
>> La Jolla, California 92093-0506
>>
>> New Website: www.jaylemke.com
>>
>> Professor (Adjunct status 2011-2012)
>> School of Education
>> University of Michigan
>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
>>
>> Professor Emeritus
>> City University of New York
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 31, 2012, at 8:42 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>
>> > Greg,
>> >
>> > I think it is Larry you should be thanking for posting the article on
>> Gadamer. But since you link back to questions I was asking about
>> self-as-subject and self-as-object, I'll send a quick response to your
>> message.
>> >
>> > As I recall, Bourdieu in Distinction was taking a shot at a bourgeois
>> aesthetics of detached, disinterested appreciation - which he diagnosed in
>> Kant's treatment of beauty, for example. So an ethics of immersion and
>> participation strikes me as a move forward, though I grant you there's
>> still a pretty big difference between being engrossed  in a painting in a
>> gallery and being engrossed in a sing-song while quaffing ale and munching
>> mutton.
>> >
>> > In both cases, though, there's a kind of appreciation in which rather
>> than there being a clear and distinct object of perception there is instead
>> a sense of moving through the object - if that is still the right word - of
>> a flow and movement as though through a landscape, across a terrain.
>> Various literary critics have said the same about the reading of a book.
>> >
>> > As you say, in general the self does not stand out in such an
>> experience. Would you say that self-as-object starts to appear largely in
>> occasions like that of your imaginary military man at the rally of the
>> Mothers? That seems to be in line with Vygotsky's account of self-awareness
>> manifesting as oppositionality in early childhood. But that's not so much
>> recognition as struggle. Which reading of Hegel would you wish to make?
>> >
>> > Martin
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mar 31, 2012, at 1:21 AM, Greg Thompson wrote:
>> >
>> >> Martin,
>> >> Thanks for pointing out this very nice (and relatively short!) piece.
>> >>
>> >> I wholly agree with Gadamer's position (as described by Grondin) and
>> find
>> >> it a very appealing approach with one major caveat. First the appealing
>> >> parts, and second the caveat.
>> >>
>> >> Gadamer's notion of the ability of art to "pull in" its audience
>> >> articulates very nicely with a Latourian notion of actants (see bottom
>> of
>> >> p. 44 for lovely language about being "engrossed" and "pulled in" -
>> "where
>> >> our whole being is at stake").
>> >>
>> >> And yes indeed, as Gadamer notes, the true experience of the play is
>> "being
>> >> drawn into" the opposite of which is "not taking part" (cf. Durkheim's
>> >> "anomie", but also consider Dewey's notions of the ideal balance
>> between
>> >> "goofing off" and "drudgery" that is further developed by Rathunde and
>> >> Cziksentmihalyi in the notion of "serious play").
>> >>
>> >> Also, a lovely idea about the "temporality" of the experience of art:
>> "The
>> >> play of art will never be conceptually grasped; we may only
>> participate in
>> >> it to the extent that we allow ourselves to be moved by its magic."
>> >>
>> >> Gadamer nicely points to the way in which a persons self is taken up
>> into
>> >> the act of experiencing the art. This is an important move. As is the
>> move
>> >> away from epistemology and the desire for control via knowing - without
>> >> much appreciation of the activity of knowing.
>> >>
>> >> Generally, I am in complete agreement with Gadamer's take, and I'm
>> >> particularly fond of the blending together of play in art, festival,
>> and
>> >> ritual. I would add that I think Goffman's notion of interaction ritual
>> >> (drawing on Durkheim's social ontology of subjectivity) accomplishes
>> >> perhaps all of the work that Gadamer (via Grondin) is doing in this
>> piece.
>> >>
>> >> But I can't help but be concerned about this deeply bourgeois notion of
>> >> "the aesthetic" (rightly picked apart by Bourdieu and others). I'd
>> rather
>> >> bring it back down to earth, and return to what we might call the art
>> of
>> >> everyday life, a somewhat "crasser" notion of what is at work in play
>> (and
>> >> art). (I think that Grondin addresses this concern, to some degree,
>> toward
>> >> the end of his essay, but "art" seems to remain as something that
>> everyone
>> >> "gets" in one way or another).
>> >>
>> >> Social psychologist Jon Haidt has done some interesting work on what
>> >> happens in the brain when one's hero (e.g., political hero, whether
>> Barack
>> >> Obama or George W. Bush) has been accused of doing something wrong, and
>> >> then one finds one's hero vindicated. What he finds is that the
>> "pleasure"
>> >> areas of the brain "light up" (i.e. are active) when the vindication
>> >> occurs. This is surely a banal insight - I discovered long ago the
>> notion
>> >> of a "feel good" thought - you know the thought that you are thinking
>> and
>> >> then manage to forget the content but remember the "feel" of it? And
>> poets
>> >> have been speaking of this for hundreds if not thousands of years.
>> >>
>> >> And this is a point that Levi-Strauss made long ago in his suggestion
>> that
>> >> we seek out structure, we desire it aesthetically. We seek patterns in
>> the
>> >> world and when we find them, we feel good. An aesthetic impulse. This
>> is,
>> >> perhaps, most effectively argued in The Sorcerer and His Magic where he
>> >> presents three cases in which the truth of the events becomes
>> secondary to
>> >> the meaningful structures by which they are interpreted. Better to
>> justify
>> >> the system of meaning and deny what "really" happened rather than
>> accept
>> >> what "really" happened and deny the reality of the structures of
>> meaning
>> >> that provide one with a life-world. This simple contradiction between
>> >> structure and event is at the core of what L-S was up to in his very
>> long
>> >> life. The contradiction happens whenever, as it inevitably will, the
>> events
>> >> of the world exceed the explanatory power of the structures of meaning
>> by
>> >> which we understand those events.
>> >>
>> >> What I think L-S was missing was a notion of recognition. That is to
>> say,
>> >> that it is not aesthetic impulse alone but rather that it is an
>> impulse to
>> >> be consummated in a way that 1) asserts the agency of the self (and a
>> >> particular kind, an agency in social worlds) and 2) asserts the value
>> of
>> >> the self. So when "the facts" cause us to challenge the system of
>> meaning
>> >> that gives our self meaning and through which we attain powerful forms
>> of
>> >> social agency, it is better to deny the facts rather than become
>> >> meaningless, or worse without a system withing which to know how to
>> act. In
>> >> either case, un-ruled, anomic. When we hear the exculpatory evidence of
>> >> Barack O'Bama or George Bush, it is not just that a view of the world
>> has
>> >> been confirmed. Rather, it is that *we* ourselves (as "Democrats" or
>> >> "Republicans") have been confirmed! The aesthetic impulse by itself
>> would
>> >> do little if it weren't for a self that breathes life into it and
>> which it
>> >> breathes life into.
>> >>
>> >> This is where I think Gadamer falls short as well. Gadamer is right to
>> >> point out that there is an experience of the event that is prior to
>> >> objectifications of the event and of the self (a kind of "absorption"
>> >> (samadhi?) into the interaction/activity/play/festival/ritual). This
>> >> phenomenological moment of pre-objectified (apparent) immediacy is
>> right
>> >> on. It is true that one can be pulled into such moments and this
>> "pulling
>> >> in" is a critical feature of human life (Goffman speaks of
>> "engrossables"
>> >> and of "involvement" in interaction). But there is also an object that
>> >> matters in the event. We could speak of numerous play/festival/ritual
>> >> events that wouldn't have these engrossing effects on participants
>> >> precisely because of the nature of the object qua "self" that is
>> entering
>> >> into the event (aka the "subject").
>> >>
>> >> I once saw a lovely talk by an anthropologist who was speaking of the
>> >> collective effervescence in a rally for the Mothers of the Plaza de
>> Mayo in
>> >> Argentina and is in protest of the military men who are considered to
>> be
>> >> responsible for the disappearance of their children. Every year there
>> is a
>> >> major gathering that takes on a festival like quality. At the lead-up
>> to
>> >> the main event, the whole crowd jumps up and down shouting (in
>> Spanish) "if
>> >> you're not jumping, you're a military man [i.e. the bad guys]." The
>> >> anthropologist and the audience of anthropologists (at the University
>> of
>> >> Chicago) all insisted that this collective effervescence was all
>> >> encompassing and that everyone present was pulled into the moment of
>> >> jumping up and down (and the anthropologist presenting had some
>> wonderful
>> >> video of the event in which it did indeed seem that everyone was
>> jumping up
>> >> and down). But I couldn't help but ask "what if you are a military man?
>> >> Would you be jumping just the same? or would you be cursing these
>> "heathen"
>> >> who are (perhaps to your mind) acting like animals?"
>> >>
>> >> Sure, the self-as-object may not be objectified in this moment, for
>> there
>> >> is an immediacy to the experience - we (apparently) perceive the world
>> "as
>> >> it is," not "as it is *to us*." So, in responding to Gadamer, there is
>> no
>> >> need to go back to an overly objectified notion of the self as
>> subject. But
>> >> at the same time, that the self-as-subject is consequential in the
>> ordering
>> >> of experience, and in making the experience of absorption "immediately"
>> >> available in the first place, this is something that should not be
>> left out
>> >> lest we imagine that the bourgeois experience of walking into an art
>> >> gallery and being "taken in" by the art is an experience that is
>> somehow
>> >> universal.
>> >>
>> >> All I'm saying here is that it would seem to me that the
>> subject-as-object
>> >> matters, more than a little, in the moment of absorption.
>> >>
>> >> Maybe Gadamer has built this somewhere into his structures of meaning
>> and
>> >> perhaps I missed it (maybe it was even in the aforementioned text).
>> Happy
>> >> to have someone set the record straight.
>> >>
>> >> Best,
>> >> -greg
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 10:43 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Martin,
>> >>> thanks for this link to the International Journal for Dialogical
>> Sciences.
>> >>> In the same spirit of exploring the notion of *understanding
>> understanding*
>> >>> I'm sending a link to a scholar [Jean Grondin] who has engaged deeply
>> with
>> >>> Gadamer's writings.  It is only an 8 page document but introduces
>> Gadamer's
>> >>> ideas in a seriously playful *way*
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> http://mapageweb.umontreal.ca/grondinj/pdf/play_festival_ritual_gadam.pdf
>> >>>
>> >>> The article is a fascinating interpretation of the centrality of play,
>> >>> festival, and ritual in our ways of becoming human.
>> >>>
>> >>> Larry
>> >>>
>> >>> PS Greg,
>> >>> The article also engages with the modern sense of self as preoccupied
>> with
>> >>> self-control
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:35 AM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> Hi Larry,
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Seems that this may be a helpful resource: The International Journal
>> for
>> >>>> Dialogical Science.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <http://ijds.lemoyne.edu/>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Martin
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Mar 25, 2012, at 9:55 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> Martin,
>> >>>>> thank you for your last clarification on Reddy's notions of the
>> >>> relation
>> >>>> of
>> >>>>> 2nd person and 3rd person "ways of knowing".  Further on this topic
>> of
>> >>>>> "ways of knowing" I want to share a provocative quote from Joel
>> >>>> Weinsheimer
>> >>>>> in his book *Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory*.  He is
>> >>>>> exploring Gadamer's notion that theory and validity do NOT *contain*
>> >>>>> understanding. This quote also may contribute to the discussion of
>> >>>>> technology.  Martin, I also remember you recommending that we read
>> >>>> Hayden
>> >>>>> White's insights. In the spirit of understanding understanding,
>> Joel
>> >>> is
>> >>>>> attempting to highlight Gadamer's distinction between *theory* &
>> >>>>> *philosophy*
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Greg,
>> >>>>> I'm also sharing this quote because of the theme you were exploring
>> >>> about
>> >>>>> *the will to power* and the notion of *owning* that seems to be an
>> >>>>> archetypal theme.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy concludes that what is universal to
>> >>>>> interpretation, if there is anythng universal at all, is not a
>> canon of
>> >>>>> interpretive REGULATIONS.....
>> >>>>> It is, after all, primarily in industry, or more generally in
>> >>> technology,
>> >>>>> that theories find practical applications.  Even if students of
>> >>>> literature
>> >>>>> are repulsed by the notion of an interpretation industry, many still
>> >>>>> cherish the notion that the IDEAL interpretation is that which is
>> the
>> >>>>> product of and is legitimated by applied theory and this suggests
>> that
>> >>>>> interpretation ideally consists of CONTROLLED production, of
>> >>> subjectively
>> >>>>> REGULATED creation.  Insofar as the ery purpose of literary or any
>> >>> other
>> >>>>> theory is to GOVERN practice, Gadamer is quite right to state, '
>> Modern
>> >>>>> theory is a tool of construction by means of which we gather
>> >>> experiences
>> >>>> in
>> >>>>> a unified way and make it possible to dominate them'.  Offering
>> >>> dominion
>> >>>>> over literary experience, interpretation CONTROLLED by applied
>> theory
>> >>> is
>> >>>> a
>> >>>>> function of the WILL TO POWER". [page 30]
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Larry
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> "
>> >>>>> __________________________________________
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>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> >> Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar
>> >> Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition
>> >> Department of Communication
>> >> University of California, San Diego
>> >> http://ucsd.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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