Re: [xmca] sensorymotor reguires gaps...?

[Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>]

There is a field of study that I have been tasked with studying called
General Semantics, and I think it has some interesting things to say about
boundaries and bodies, albeit indirectly.

General Semantics is a field that was founded by Alfred Korzybski in the
1930's and was a huge force in many academic arenas for a spell and then it
has increasingly been disappearing from academia since about the 1960's and
70's.

At the heart of GS is a non-substantialist epistemology. Following the
discoveries in Einsteinian and quantum physics of the earl 20th century, GS
emphasizes process over products. Korzybski often referred to his science
as non-Aristotelian (following Polish philosopher/logicians Nicolai A.
Vasiliev <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolai_A._Vasiliev> and Jan
Łukasiewicz <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_%C5%81ukasiewicz>) in that it
rejected the three basic premises of Aristotelian logic:
law of identity
law of non-contradiction
law of the excluded middle

The most important of these is Korzybski's rejection of the law of
identity. Korzybski's statement "the map is not the territory" and its
corrrelate, "the word is not the thing" demonstrate this, but so do his
many demonstrations in which he would hold up an object, e.g., an apple and
say, for example, "this is not an apple." The point here is that "apple"
only captures some of what "this" thing is - and that it is, in fact, also
more than those features that the intensionalized category "apple" picks
out. It is useful for some purposes, but less useful for other purposes.
The same can be said of "body." It is a concept that picks out certain
features of reality while also neglecting many others (and such concepts
can also "create" things that are not there, as illusions do).

With regard to the problem of bodies and boundaries, I think this approach
is helpful as a way of getting past thinking that one's body is a thing.
There is some truth there, but there is also some truth in the fact that
the body is a process. When looked at as a process, we begin to realize
that insides of the body are constantly in-corp-orating various things from
the outsides that are beyond its boundaries into it. We eat and drink,
breathe and absorb in many ways that demonstrate how the body's very
supposed "thingness" depends on its processual imbrication of the insides
with the outsides (and there is a largely parallel ex-corporation, commonly
called "elimination," that happens at the other end and in which what was
on the inside becomes the outside - but more difficult to discuss in polite
company).  If the insides of a body were a properly distinct "thing" from
outsides of the world around, the inside body would also be a properly
"dead" thing. And as a result, the boundaries between the insides of the
body and the outsides would soon disappear (the Romantic poets have much
more elegant ways of saying this than I do, maybe David Ke can cite some
favorites on rotting corpses as worm-feed?).

So, in a very concrete way, the boundaries between inside and outside are
achieved boundaries. They are boundaries that can be "seen" for particular
purposes (e.g. for a state to enact discipline by defining "subjects" as
such), but there are other ways of seeing things, other ways of drawing
boundaries that can make this particular boundary disappear.

I would add that CHAT seems to be doing work that is the metaphorical
equivalent of this point about the in-corp-oration of outsides into
insides. Only difference is that CHAT makes the argument in terms of "the
social" and "the psyche," as the outsides and insides that are commonly
being seen as having a border between. One of the main points then is to
describe the various process of in-corp-oration and the ways in which the
social and the psyche are shot through with one another and that it might
be better to not imagine a boundary between these. (and, of course, CHAT is
not alone in doing this).

I'd add that metaphors of cannibalism may be appropriate for the way in
which I am picking some, hopefully life-sustaining, pieces from the rotting
corpse of General Semantics. More to come, XMCA willing.

Just musing.
-greg





On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 10:31 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Monica, David, and Mike
>
> I agree with Monica that our particular language practices of describing
> phenomena as "inside" and "outside" causes confusion because the
> relationship is constantly in flux. I also acknowledge my exploration of
> the intersubjective and dialogical is not adequately reflecting the "gap"
> between the sociocultural and the merely intersubjective.
> However, the specific topic I was attempting to grasp was the distinction
> Mike was proposing between the "image" and the "imaginal" and how this
> phenomena relates to "creative acts"
> Mike and Etienne's article explains thheir emphasis on this distinction
> when they wrote,
>
> Our emphasis will be on the process not the power or capacity understood as
> a faculty of image formation, which, we suggest can fruitfully be thought
> of as a dynamic process of "gap" filling FROM which emerge what we call
> "the world as experienced".
>
> They then write about the definition of imagination,
>
> "as a process of intergrating THE SELF and the world. The dictionary tells
> us that this topic has been relegated to philosophy. We hope to provide
> empirical evidence that helps us understand THIS integrating process in
> more detail, and a theoretical framework that helps us generalize our
> findigs in productive ways.
>
> It is the centrality of "fragmenting" processes as central to the dynamic
> process of "gap" filling that I find fascinating and mysterious.  The same
> dynamic process explained within the process of vision and saccadic eye
> movements [which negate as well as integrate] coming to "perceive" or
> re-cognize the world Mike and Etienne propose may be operating at other
> time scales.
>
> Therefore "image formation" [and image fragmentation] are BOTH necessary
> for perceptin. On a more speculative level , how central is "negation" for
> the process of "integration" at other time scales??  Also how are we to
> understand te dynamic process of forming images.  And finally,how do images
> formed "within the self" actualize as creative acts.
>
> Monica, these are questions that I understand Mike and Etenne are asking in
> their article. I also find these questions may have potential for
> understaning integrating the self and world.  I see these as BIG questions.
>
> Larry
>
> On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 9:23 PM, monica.hansen <
> monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:
>
> > David and Larry,
> > While acknowledging that there still so much to learn and understand in
> > this area, one way I find helpful to think about this is to stop thinking
> > of the "outside" and the "inside" of the individual as separate. The
> > "inside" of any individual developes WITHIN the mediating influence of
> all
> > that surrounds him/her. To be less concrete, actually, is a better
> > strategy. Instead of thinking of the individual as encapsulated and
> > separate, we must realize that our bodies, even though they are
> > recognizably discrete from our surroundings, extended into the world
> around
> > us by the expanse of our senses. For example, we can see quite a distance
> > away from our own body, but the visions we see become a part of what we
> > know. So too our culture extends into our ways of thinking, and our
> > thinking extends into our culture.
> >
> > Another obstacle in trying to think about how the senses are related to
> > processes of the mind is breaking up the affective and cognitive domains.
> > Domains of what? Personal development? They are certainly not separate in
> > the mind or the body just because we can name them separately on the
> > outside. It is like mapping the new world--coming in from the outside and
> > calling everything New England or New York. To say that logic exists in a
> > pure form in the mind is a bit ridiculous. Understanding how neurons
> > connect with other neurons helps me to understand that the development of
> > synapses and functional systems in the brain, each individual brain, is
> > very complicated history and much affected by environmental and cultural
> > experiences.
> >
> > Again, one other challenge is trying to choose a time to examine what is
> > "in" and what is "out" of the individual. The relationship is constantly
> in
> > flux. Or as some like to say "living" or "dynamic."
> >
> > Monica
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on
> behalf
> > of David Kellogg [vaughndogblack@yahoo.com]
> > Sent: Monday, January 30, 2012 3:44 PM
> > To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> >  Subject: Re: [xmca] sensorymotor reguires gaps...?
> >
> > Larry:
> >
> > I guess I think that the biggest gap we face is still in getting from the
> > social to the psychological. You know, as Bernstein says, "How does
> outside
> > become inside?"  To be more concrete (that is, more measurable), how does
> > discourse (that is, "Why do apples have seeds?" "Because seeds make
> > seedlings!") to grammar (that is, "Apples have seeds, which produce
> > seedlings, and these produce new apples!").
> >
> > I think Bakhtin doesn't do it. The reason is that Bakhtin really sees the
> > social as reducible to the interpersonal: to "Thou" and to "I". The gap
> > between the interpersonal and the fully social, and cultural (which must
> > include the choir invisible, the voices and contributions and aspirations
> > of countless dead generations) is far too great. Bakhtin fills the gap
> with
> > God, who enters the "Thou-I" relationship via Christ. That is cheating.
> >
> > I think that Vygotsky provides PART of an answer. On the face of it, his
> > answer is just as unsatisfactory as Bakhtin's: the "ingrowing" of
> > self-directed speech into verbalized thinking is simply another version
> of
> > "Thou" into "I", and the sociocultural is once again reduced to the
> > interpersonal. It is a very compelling description in the first year of
> > life (and in fact I think Scollon's book "Conversations With a One Year
> > Old", which show how the child manages to put together sentences by
> > participating in dialogue with adults and then eliding the adult, is a
> very
> > compelling demonstration. But it doesn't really include culture, history,
> > or social relations; it just gives us the interpersonal trappings
> thereof.
> >
> > But because Vygotsky understands that meanings develop, and that they
> > include the voices and contributions and aspirations of the choir
> > invisible, it is not cheating; it is an explanation which, although it is
> > not workable in its present form, might be worked out.I am using this
> > computer without any real knowledge or control over the way it works, and
> > it seems to me that the gap between the significations of the choir
> > invisible and the sense of the child is, if anything, even bigger. But
> like
> > other problems of evolution (e.g. the evolution of complex organs like
> eyes
> > which do not really offer any evolutionary advantage until they are
> > complete) it is now a problem to which I can imagine a possible solution.
> > And I think that this gap, between the sociocultural and the
> interpersonal,
> > between historical logogenesis and interpersonal logogenesis, is
> > essentially the problem that Halliday worked on, and to which he sketched
> > his solution.
> >
> > Let me give you a simple example. It will not explain the whole theory to
> > you, but it will illustrate the direction in which I am looking and why.
> A
> > couple of months ago I was trying to explain to my Korean teachers the
> > social freight of the following sentence of classroom English.
> >
> > T: Look at me!
> >
> > You can see that this is not something that would normally come to a
> > teacher's lips, even in a noisy classroom where kids are not paying
> > attention (the teacher would probably think of "Look here!" or "Listen
> up!"
> > or "Be quiet" or "May I have your attention please!"  first).
> >
> > But the question is why? The answer, which can be checked statistically,
> > is that English sentences do not normally end with "me". They often begin
> > with "I", but they only rarely end with "me".  The reason is that our
> > grammar tends to organize utterances a kind of bridge from speaker to
> > hearer, with the "starting point" of the speaker at one end and the bit
> > that is stressed and of interest and relevance to the hearer at the
> other.
> > "Look!" is what I want and "here" is the bit you need to attend to.
> > "Listen" is what I am getting you to do and "up" is the way you need to
> do
> > it. "May I have your attention" is the jumping off point for my hopes and
> > desires, my anxieties and aspirations, while "please" is the crumb that I
> > am casting your way in return.
> >
> > All of that sounds vague, but it is through vague principles like this
> > that we get statistical regularities and through statistical regularities
> > that we derive grammars. More concretely, it is through vague principles
> > like this that we can explain why the sentence "Look at me!" sounds
> faintly
> > CHILDISH, and even EGOCENTRIC. Children have just not yet grasped the
> > "tuisimus" (that is, the "thou-ism") of English grammar. Just as they
> have
> > not understood the principle of "other-centred action" (collaboration),
> > they have not really understood that speech has two real-world
> > metafunctions: the interpersonal, or other directed, and the ideational,
> > which is reflective and representative.
> >
> > So it isn't just a matter of using words that contain the voices of the
> > choir invisible, any more than it is a matter of using tools that were
> left
> > to us by our forefathers. There is a whole philosophy and ethics that the
> > child has to master before his speech can become a two-edged sword.
> > Fortunately, the child will take it in even more easily than mother's
> milk,
> > for it is the philosophy of the functions and systems of his or her own
> > tongue.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >
> >
> > --- On Mon, 1/30/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] sensorymotor reguires gaps...?
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Monday, January 30, 2012, 9:41 AM
> >
> >
> > David
> >
> > I wish I had more background in Halliday and the distinctions you make
> > in your statement of future directions. You are considering
> >
> > I think what I will do next term is to look very carefully at the three
> > pre-verbal "planes" that Vygotsky talks about: the affective-volitional
> > "feeling" plane, the plane of pre-verbl "thought", the plane of inner
> > speech. There are gaps between them, of course ("How do you feel?" vs.
> > "What do you think?", predication vs. nonpredication). But there is also
> > some overlapping: they are manifestly three different ways of looking at
> > the same speech act.
> >
> > I sometimes think (feel? see?) that Halliday's interpersonal metafunction
> > is mostly FEELING (because in a conversation we are reacting most
> directly
> > to MOOD rather than to transitivity or to theme). The ideational
> > metafunction is mostly THINKING (because in a conversation this is where
> we
> > put together an actual representation we want to convey, and because
> > transitivity, the choice of a verb and its choice of our arguments, is
> > where that seems to happen in the clause).
> >
> > And that means that inner speech is really where the ideational and the
> > interpersonal have to be related in the form of a predication, which in
> > Halliday is really called the predicator. The predicator is where theme
> > becomes rheme, where old information becomes new, and where the "me" part
> > of an utterance passes into the "you" part. It's the  "is" in "This is
> > Jinho" and the "runs" in "Jinho runs". (But it is also the "mind" in
> "Mind
> > the gap!")
> > The last phrase the PREDICTOR is where theme becomes rheme, where old
> > information becomes NEW [Mike's creative acts??] and where the "me" part
> of
> > an utterance passes into the "you" part.  I read this as Bahktin's notion
> > of communication being half yours and half mine. Understanding and
> > RESPONSE.
> >
> > Just a further response on the "affective-volitional" pre-verbal plane.
> > Ruth Miltenburg & Elly Singer in a 1999 article are exploring Vygotsky's
> > notion of the affective-volitional plane as a tool for working with
> > traumatized survivors of child abuse. Human Development 1999 volume 42,
> > pages 1-17]
> >
> > On page 5 Miltenburg & Singe  give their definition of affect as
> following
> > Adler and Vygotsky's premise that the subjective feeling of deficiency is
> > the motor that drives us to learn to develop and to create through
> > compensation. Compensation can lead to supercompensation which is a
> > "positive" feature.  Vygotsky, in exploring lower functions [biological]
> > believed these functions were less susceptible to upbringing because
> > determined biologically.
> >
> > Vygotsky adopts Spinoza's definition of affect as "that which increases
> or
> > decreases our body's ability to ACT, and as that which forces thought to
> > move in a specific direction."  Miltenburg & Singer amplify this basic
> > insight by adding
> >
> > "Affective and intellectual processes form a unity, but during
> development
> > the relation between them changes.  In the early stages of development,
> the
> > affect and will are identical.  For the young child, the meaning of the
> > situation and his or her will are determined entirely by the power of
> > affective incentive, there is a one-sided dependence of thought on
> > feeling.. But with the development of the higher mental functions, the
> > child is able to regulate his or her emotions and can be affected by the
> > will to achieve a goal and to realize MORAL VALUES.  The child can
> > voluntarily PAY ATTENTION or disregard a situational incentive and can
> act
> > on purpose. The chief purposes of thought are:
> > to define lifestyle and behavior, to change our actions, to direct them,
> > and to free them from the power of concrete circumstance. The inability
> in
> > older children and adults to shape and direct their own thoughts and
> > actions voluntarily causes distress and leads to affective problems.
> > According to Vygotsky, underdevelopment of the higher psychological
> > functions in 'difficult children' is the chief cause of 'primitive
> > reactions' or 'simple uninhibited manifestations of the chain of powerful
> > affective reactions' that are normal in the earlier stages of
> development.
> > Vygotsky theorized that the transition from the lowest (natural) to the
> > highest (ETHICAL) affective formations is DIRECTLY tied to changes in the
> > relationship between affect and intellect"
> >
> > David, this is a good place to stop to let others respond to this
> > definition of affect and the particular model of the relation of affect
> and
> > intellect and the GAPS [distanciation] assumed to be foundational for
> this
> > developmental process.  The gaps in the sensory motor conscious IMAGES
> > within sense data and the gaps within affect and intellect may be
> > qualitatively different but what do you think of Mike's point that you
> can
> > use the sensorymotor notion of gaps as an analogy of consciousness and
> > self-consciousness??
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 1:38 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > Bill, Larry, Mike, Andy...
> > >
> > > Larry is generous in many ways--but one of them is his editing. Notice
> > > what he did with what I wrote:
> > >
> > > "(Language) can do this (break up sensorimotor unity) because it is
> > > introducing into
> > > the reflex arc exactly what the motor theory of consciousness takes
> away:
> > > volition, which is derived, paradoxically, from socio-cultural
> necessity.
> > > The problem is that treating a response to a word as being similar to a
> > > response to a noise, as Dewey does, does exactly the same thing."
> > >
> > > At this point Larry covers for my incoherence with a discrete ellipsis.
> > > But what I meant was that by comparing the response to a word to the
> > > response to any other kind of noise, we also take away volition; that
> is,
> > > we take away the crucial distinction that in order to interpret a word
> > as a
> > > word, we must impute volition to another person.
> > >
> > > I've taken the liberty of adding ellipsis and a question mark to
> Larry's
> > > subject line. To me, the ellipsis and the question mark suggest "...for
> > > what?" It seems to me that speech requires very different gaps, both
> > > intermentally and intra-mentally, than the kind of gap we require when
> we
> > > are walking down a narrow street and we are wondering whether to
> > interpret
> > > the sound behind us as an approaching automobile or a truck.
> > >
> > > I'm not disputing the idea that in general sensorimotor activity
> requires
> > > gaps. But I am disputing the idea that sensorimotor activity is a good
> > way
> > > of describing the way in which we hear and respond to a word, an
> > utterance,
> > > a turn of talk in a conversation, or a posting on xmca.
> > >
> > > Next term, by popular request, I get to go back to my old school, Seoul
> > > National Universiy of Education, to teach a class in classroom
> discourse
> > > once a week. I too have a gap to fill; it is the great gap between
> > teaching
> > > Thinking and Speech on the one hand, and teaching ways of looking at
> and
> > > thinking about classroom discouse to elementary school teachers.
> > >
> > > One way to handle this gap is to treat Thinking and Speech as a
> > > progressive attempt, increasingly successful as we approach Chapter
> > > Seven, to overcome the idea that language is just a stimulus or a
> signal
> > or
> > > a perception like any other one: something that children attend to the
> > same
> > > way they would attend to any other loud noise in a classroom.
> > >
> > > Usually, Bill, what I do is to teach my teachers to think of language
> in
> > > terms of Hallidayan metafunctions (this is called the ideational, the
> > > textual, and the interpersonal, but we end up calling it the WHAT, the
> > HOW
> > > and the WHO of an utterance).
> > >
> > > These metafunctions do map, fairly well, onto the three main
> intonations
> > > and the three main grammatical forms that teachers use when they are
> > > keeping their teaching talk canonical (that is, when they are NOT being
> > > indirect, using a question to give information, using a statement to
> > make a
> > > request, or using a command to check integration (these are Jay Lemke's
> > > categories).
> > >
> > > We use commands ("Look!" "Listen!") to get attention, which is a key
> > > interpersonal metafunction. We use statements ("This is Jinho.") to
> give
> > > informaton, which is the core of ideation. And we use questions ("Who
> is
> > > this?") to check integration of information and understanding, and so
> on.
> > >
> > > Of course, we also use commands to check integration ("Tell me
> > about...").
> > > We use statements to get attention ("I want you all to be quiet"). And
> we
> > > use questions to give information all the time! But when we do it
> > creates a
> > > certain gap between the intonation and the actual sense of what we are
> > > saying (which is why "May I have your attention please!" hardly ever
> > > actually sounds like a question.
> > >
> > > I always have a problem when we reach Chapter Seven, and Vygotsky
> brings
> > > in Paulhan's distinction between sense and signification. It seems to
> me
> > > that this distinction is too much liike the sensorimotor approach to
> > > language: "sense" is simply the sum total of all the "ideas" produced
> by
> > a
> > > stimulus-word. "Signification" is the most stable, socially agreed,
> > > contractually canonical of these senses. We are back to the reflex arc
> > > interpretation of the word.
> > >
> > > The reflex arc really is both bitty and dualist. As Dewey points out,
> it
> > > divides each act of attending into a one-hundred percent material
> > stimulus,
> > > a one hundred percent mental idea, and a purely EXTERNAL synthesis of
> the
> > > two, the active response which is both mental idea and material
> reaction.
> > > And "sense" and "signification" fall too neatly into the "mental idea"
> to
> > > be much use in understanding Chapter Seven .(It works better if I
> > interpret
> > > "sense" as "theme" and "signification" as dictionary denotation, but
> > > still....)
> > >
> > > I think what I will do next term is to look very carefully at the
> > > three pre-verbal "planes" that Vygotsky talks about: the
> > > affective-volitional "feeling" plane, the plane of pre-verbl "thought",
> > the
> > > plane of inner speech. There are gaps between them, of course ("How do
> > you
> > > feel?" vs. "What do you think?", predication vs. nonpredication). But
> > there
> > > is also some overlapping: they are manifestly three different ways of
> > > looking at the same speech act.
> > >
> > > I sometimes think (feel? see?) that Halliday's interpersonal
> metafunction
> > > is mostly FEELING (because in a conversation we are reacting most
> > directly
> > > to MOOD rather than to transitivity or to theme). The ideational
> > > metafunction is mostly THINKING (because in a conversation this is
> where
> > we
> > > put together an actual representation we want to convey, and because
> > > transitivity, the choice of a verb and its choice of our arguments, is
> > > where that seems to happen in the clause).
> > >
> > > And that means that inner speech is really where the ideational and the
> > > interpersonal have to be related in the form of a predication, which in
> > > Halliday is really called the predicator. The predicator is where
> > > theme becomes rheme, where old information becomes new, and where the
> > "me"
> > > part of an utterance passes into the "you" part. It's the  "is" in
> "This
> > is
> > > Jinho" and the "runs" in "Jinho runs". (But it is also the "mind" in
> > "Mind
> > > the gap!")
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >
> > >
> > > --- On Wed, 1/25/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > Subject: [xmca] sensorymotor reguires gaps
> > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Date: Wednesday, January 25, 2012, 7:18 AM
> > >
> > >
> > > David and Mike
> > > I decided to open up a new thread to repond to David by returning to
> your
> > > article developing the centrality of gap formation for the imaginal
> > >
> > > David. you wrote,
> > >
> > > Here's what I think. Dewey's attack on the reflex arc was an attack on
> > its
> > > bittiness and its dualism only, not on its inapplicability to language.
> > He
> > > thought the idea that the reflex arc has a clear beginning in
> sensation,
> > a
> > > clear middle in thinking, and a clear end in action was wrong. He saw
> the
> > > mind as sensorimotor unity (hence the motor theory of consciousness,
> and
> > > functional psychology).  Sensorimotor unity is not a good theory of
> > > language. For one thing, it's not a social theory or a cultural theory;
> > > it's purely individual and physiological. Actually, LSV and ARL point
> out
> > > (Chapter Three of Tool and Sign) that language has the effect of
> BREAKING
> > > UP this sensorimotor unity! It can do this because it is introducing
> into
> > > the reflex arc exactly what the motor theory of consciousness takes
> away:
> > > volition, which is derived, paradoxically, from socio-cultural
> necessity.
> > > The problem is that treating a response to a word as being similar to a
> > > response to a noise, as Dewey does, does exactly the same thing. Worse,
> > it
> > > creates a view of language
> > >
> > > As I read this passage a gap openned in my thinking and a few random
> > > thought poured into the gap.
> > >
> > > After reading Mike's article on the "fragmenting" and gap forming
> > processes
> > > at the micro micro level as a process which opens up space and distance
> > for
> > > IMAGINATION  my thoughts have been alighting on notions of "negating"
> or
> > > "negativity" at the heart of consciousness at all heterochronic and
> > > heterospatially "ways" of orienting to the world.
> > > Your example of language fragmenting the sensory motor in order for
> > > volition is also creating a GAP for imagination.
> > >
> > > Merleau-Ponty's suggesting that perceiving is the body  "grasping the
> > > world" at optimal DISTANCES. In an art gallery moving clser or further
> > from
> > > a painting to perceive its Imaginal meaning.
> > >
> > > Aposhia [NEGATING consciousness] where the eyes perceive, and the
> visual
> > > part of the brain registers the sensory input BUT there is no CONSCIOUS
> > > re-solving thes inputs into images. [go to PBS broadcasting and see the
> > > discussion on aposhia on Monday's ongoing series on the brain]  This
> > > dysfunction is known as "negating awareness". The person "sees" and
> > > "registers" the sensory motor data, and the visualmotor areas of the
> > brain
> > > light up but NO conscious awareness.
> > >
> > > Bahktin's notion that the VITAL aspect of understanding" is the
> RESPONSE
> > of
> > > the other. Without the response  which ACTUALIZES and re-solves
> > > understanding there is no understanding. In other words between the
> > > understanding and the response a gap opens in which imagination
> emerges.
> > >
> > > The notion of volition as distancing from the object [a gap forming]
> > within
> > > which imagination arises within the gap and the reflectively
> > > phenomenologically emerging moves into the world as creative acts.
> > >
> > > Mike, as you can TELL :-)) [see / understand]  your article has the
> > > POTENTIAL to bear multiplel fruitful dialogical understandings &
> > responses
> > > which have the potential to "re=solve" situations in our ongoing
> dwelling
> > > in the world
> > >
> > > The question still to be pondered within this notion of imaginal
> volition
> > > is how much of this imaginal process is under the control of the
> > sovereign
> > > self and how much is a dance of understanding & RESPONSE  BETWEEN
> > persons.
> > > The answer to THAT question brings us back to moral questions of
> > particular
> > > "stances" or "dispositions" or character or personality as we give more
> > or
> > > less priority to "identity" or "difference" [alterity]  Patchen's book
> > > "Bound BY Recognition" as Greg points out offers an alternative Western
> > > perspective which goes back to Greek philosophy.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On
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-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar
Department of Communication
University of California, San Diego
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