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Re: [xmca] dewey and perezhivanie
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- Subject: Re: [xmca] dewey and perezhivanie
- From: Larry Purss <email@example.com>
- Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2011 06:24:33 -0800
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The centrality of the Settlement Houses as actualizing Jane Addams "values"
and her philosphy seems to be a critical aspect of the emerging value
expressed in pragmatism.
Sharon Daloz Parks also has written on "forms of dependence"
She and Addams start from the premise that fundamentally we are social
Therefore DEPENDENCE is an integral dimension of life. Sharon expands her
notion of dependence to mean "being held by" or "being subject to" but it
also means "to hold". The nature of our holding and being held and how it
changes and develops over time is explored in her
"constructive-developmental" perspective. The nature of our holding and
being held change over time and this affects the ongoing in*formation of
Focusing on the cognitive aspect of meaning making gives access to how a
person thinks in his/her composing of meaning [she references Piaget]. What
Sharon adds in her extension of Piaget within the
"constructive-developmental theory" is turning our focus on the
in*formation of DEPENDENCE which gives us access to what a person feels or
their e*motion or movement.
Jane Addams and Sharon Parks are exploring the power of "settlements" and
"settlement HOUSES" as concrete spaces/places which are expressing meaning
making as in*formation as places to hold and be held developmentally.
On Sat, Nov 5, 2011 at 2:53 AM, Andy Blunden <email@example.com> wrote:
> Strange indeed. I am reading the version in "The Philosophy of John
> Dewey," but I found this PDF on the internet. It is identical except for
> the omission of some italicisation and two short paragraphs inserted on
> page 14. These two insertions are:
> "Appreciation requires knowledge; a distinct difference with Zen
> Buddhist notion of how the world should be experienced. (empty mind,
> without conception or knowledge.)"
> and "For Dewey, a connection with reality, the interactionb between
> doing and undergoing is key. Blind undergoing (what he calls
> passion) is not the an educative or aesthetic experience."
> Weird. These two passage are ungrammatical and non-US spelling and are not
> consistent with Dewey's ideas. I apologize for this. I check the first and
> last passages and then just ran my eyes over what was in between. Who would
> ever guess that two little paragraphs would be inserted in an historical
> document like this!? Please ignore them!
> Rod Parker-Rees wrote:
>> I noticed this on p.14 of Dewey's essay 'having an experience':
>> 'For Dewey, a connection with reality, the interaction between doing and
>> undergoing is key. Blind undergoing (what he calls passion) is not the an
>> (sic) educative or esthetic experience'.
>> I am not aware of Dewey habitually referring to himself in the third
>> person - is this an indication that the essay as presented here has been
>> edited by another?
>> All the best,
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.**ucsd.edu<email@example.com>]
>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> Sent: 05 November 2011 01:38
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] dewey and perezhivanie
>> Continuing the sharing of my experience in reading Dewey.
>> In 1934, Dewey published "Having an Experience." What he describes in
>> this essay is, in my opinion, as near to a description of perezhivanie as
>> you are going to get in the English language. For Dewey, "experience" is
>> close to "activity" except that in English "activity" carries a connotation
>> of objectivity and "experience" carries a connotation of subjectivity, but
>> Dewey insists his concept of experience is quite different to the concept
>> of experience found in British philosophy: it is "both doing and suffering"
>> and "both subjective and objective" and the emotional, practical and
>> intellectual are aspects which can be abstracted from experience by
>> reflection and discourse, but experience itself is all these things not a
>> combination of them.
>> Now, "an experience" as opposed to "experience" is an episode which has a
>> unity, and comes to a consummation. He discusses it in the context of
>> aesthetics (artistic production and aesthetic consumption are inseparable
>> in an experience), because "an experience" can only be represented by an
>> I'd be interested in hearing what others think of this essay. It is a
>> great read in my experience.
>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>> And her4e's Dewey on scientific and everyday concepts:
>>> "up to this point ... no distinction has been made between common
>>> sense and scientific enquiry. ... [In] common sense problems ...
>>> the symbols employed are those which have been determined in the
>>> habitual culture of a group. They form a system, but the system is
>>> practical rather than intellectual. ...In scientific inquiry, then,
>>> meanings are related to one another on the ground of their character
>>> /as / meanings, freed from direct reference to the concerns of a
>>> limited group.... meanings are determined on the ground of their
>>> reltations as meanings to one another, /relations/ become the object
>>> of inquiry and qualities are relegated to a secondary status" (235-6)
>>> Nice eh?
>>> Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>> This is a really illustrative quote from Dewey for sure. I see the
>>>> quote actually having two emphases (which would fit into his whole
>>>> transactional worldview). The first, which I think you latch on it, seems
>>>> to be that is order for any idea to have meaning it must be attached to
>>>> some symbol that in some way can be recognized by the observer. You can't
>>>> go inside of the head of any individual, you can only see what is there in
>>>> plain view. This I think was Dewey's attempt to overcome dualism by
>>>> suggesting mind meets object in the situation itself, and that is the only
>>>> thing we can comprehend, and it is dangerous to go further.
>>>> The second issue brough up by this quote, which I really struggle
>>>> with, is if the meaning of the symbol is so tied to the situation doesn't
>>>> that mean that the meaning is going to change as the situation changes. If
>>>> there any such thing then as an artifact which maintains meaning across
>>>> situaitons. If not, then isn't the concept of mediation secondary to the
>>>> concept of experience. A lot of people argued with Dewey on this
>>>> (Santayana comes to mind, and I wonder if Vygotsky might have as well) -
>>>> but it is a difficult conundrum.
>>>> From: firstname.lastname@example.org on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>> Sent: Thu 10/27/2011 10:12 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Cultural memory dewey
>>>> At long last I am reading John Dewey seriously, and I am really
>>>> entralled and bowled over.
>>>> His conception of "experience" is wonderful. I need time to digest it
>>>> before attempting to describe it, but this concept is the heart of the
>>>> matter. It is truly a type of Activity Theory. Just now I am reading "The
>>>> Pattern of Enquiry." For Dewey, knowledge is a part of the situation (not
>>>> something outside the world, in the head. knowledge changes the world). He
>>>> is talking about how ideas (concepts) originateHi from situations which
>>>> become problems (and when known clearly become at first suggestions and
>>>> then solutions). Get this:
>>>> "Because suggestions and ideas are of that which is not present in
>>>> given existence, the meanings which they involve must be embodied in
>>>> some symbol. Without some kind of symbol no idea; a meaning that is
>>>> completely disembodied can not be entertained or used. Since an
>>>> existence (which /is/ an existence) is the support and vehicle of a
>>>> meaning and is a symbol instead of a merely physical existence only
>>>> in this respect, embodied meanings or ideas are capable of objective
>>>> survey and development. To "look at an idea" is not a mere literary
>>>> figure of speech."
>>>> In the context of his conception of Experience this really rounds it
>>>> And this guy is writing in the 1890s!
>>>> Tony Whitson wrote:
>>>>> Song, as you describe, is indisputably material -- but it is not a
>>>>> physical thing in the same sense as a flute or a song sheet. It seems to me
>>>>> you make your position unnecessarily vulnerable by treating materiality as
>>>>> more a matter of physicality than it needs to be (cf.
>>>>> the baseball examples).
>>>>> The Talmud example brings to mind Plato's objections to recording &
>>>>> transmission via writing (a bit ironic, no?, from the transcriber of
>>>>> Socrates' dialogues), which I would never have attended to but for Derrida,
>>>>> in D's treatment of the traditional prioritization of speech over writing.
>>>>> D's argument for "grammatology" is that speech itself is fundamentally a
>>>>> kind of "writing" first; but in a sense that I would say is material, but
>>>>> not necessarily physical.
>>>> xmca mailing list
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
> *Andy Blunden*
> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
> xmca mailing list
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