Re: [xmca] Space, neighbourhood, dwelling in, in*formation as notions with a "family resemblance"

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

That is a whole lot to take in, Christine, over even to hold still for
contemplation!

One underlying intuition that seemed to be consistent across your example
thinkers and ideas we that of fluidity, of living movement. This put me very
much in mind of
Vladimir P. Zinchenko. VPZ sites various russian scholars including Nicholas
Bernshtein, who come up with ideas such as "living movement." Bernshtein is
said to have likened living movement to a spiders web waving in the breeze.

there is an issue of journal of russian and east european psych coming out
with several of VPZ's ideas. I'll keep an eye out for it.

mike

PS- re fluidity, you get this kind of statement from Ingold:

an organism can be thought of as "a flow of material substance in a space
that is topologically fluid. I conclude that the organism (animal or human)
should be understood not as a bounded entity surrounded by an environment
but as an unbounded entanglement of lines in fluid space. (p. 64)

Is this a move back from digital models of organic life to analogue? Is it
needed to
give us a way to include emotions in our accounts of cognitive processes?


On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 8:27 AM, christine schweighart <
schweighartgate@hotmail.com> wrote:

>
> Hi Ivan,
>  I'm afraid that is a rather multi-faceted endeavour -   it would be 'more
> than passing interest' ( as Mike in  the to Swinburne 'design' thread
> orients to) - but here this hasn't yet been attempted in a thorough
> scholarly way with depth of engagement in the very diverse themes in CHAT
> traditions, and using an explication consistent with this form of biological
> perspective. ( An interest that  would refine using inclusional ontology, in
> reframing with reference to those traditions.)
>
> I can only share my own experience of sticking points where each finds
> issue with the others' discourse, at most, but it's difficult to 'pitch'.  I
> mentioned Maturana and I first tried to examine commonalities and areas
> where each adds to the other in a paper this summer - I can send an extract
> if you wish. I found that  these ideas were invited for examination amongst
> members of the systems community - however  a biological perspective to be
> difficult 'subject matter'  to attract or engage interest amongst  AT
> researchers ( another long story).  What Rayner's contribution offers to
> this is an ontology which is dynamic and relational.
>
> This current discussion through Tony's observation of   'shared experience'
> as  'experience in which
> the experience of others participates in the experience of any one, in the
> course of the experiencing.' Might have brought out a place for rethinking
> the somatic and has a lot to do with 'energy' as well as perception mediated
> through the nervous system. However the biological knowledge of this kind of
> catalysis in the body is over-shadowed by the neurological as if it was the
> only 'system' in the body - not contigous with others in dynamics that we
> have insufficient direct knowledge about .
> I liked Elinor Ochs petition at ISCAR as it acknowledged that we don't have
> a grasp of how to study the watershed of experience spanning this living
> dynamic.  ( Indexical meaning 'arcs' towards a place where meaning can begin
> to form' and that in actuality awareness of the living moment is
> never complete.
> Maturana's 'recursions' in languaging relies upon circular closure to work
> upon empirical experience against a linear
> flow ( such as our notion of time) , a relation which is problematic.
> Though he does see that the root of social orientation is emotional and love
> for others.  Recurrence has a spiraling
> rather than replicable circular form, each recurrence is revealed by a new
> capacity –or hidden inner form which affords new learning (which crafts
> meanings).
>
> I am also reminded of the intense discussion of 'concepts' and Jay Lemke's
> questions of the extent of  theoretical ground in CHAT  in concept
> formation, where some researchers have reached out to Schutz (Marianne
> Hedegaard for example). At Lancaster a distinction was made that whilst
> Schutz bases his work upon Husserl's distinction between a natural attitude
> of 'common sense' belief and the phenomenological attitude in which that
> belief is suspended, Husserl regarded the everyday world only as a
> preliminary to making the 'phenomenological reduction' [ to 'data of
> consciousness'],  it is the everyday 'lived in world' that is Schutz's main
> concern - ie more sociologist that phenomenologist wanting to analyse the
> 'nature of structures which are taken as given'. It is this attitude that is
> frustrated by 'incompleteness', as that which is prevailing 'in the moment'
> as living isn't purely rational, of course, it is embodied- the analytic
> separation of emotion and isolation towards considering rationality in
> concept formation is problematic. Imagination, as a phenomenon, goes beyond
> emotion though - and articulates through hope ( of course when I say this
> I'm drawing on a concept of hope, not the feeling in any living moment).
>
> Perhaps it's in this that  Bruce's comment about Lefebvre's terms  brings
> out a place for Alan Rayner's space as presence of 'receptivity' ?
> - to go back to the observation:-
>  ' the presence or absence of a social space - not necessarily physical
> proximity but a medium through which an acting collectivity can form.'
> and a quote from Alan Rayner's paper on  analysis using ideas of
> completeness which he drew from understanding boundaries in the study of
> fungii
>
>
> "The very idea of complete ‘whole units’ existing anywhere, at any scale in
> Nature as an energetically
> open, fluid system does not make sense. The fluidly variable connectivity
> of natural
>
> inclusionality arises from the coming together
> (contiguity/inter-connectivity), fusion (confluence/intra-connectivity) and
> dissociation
> (individuation/differentiation) of energetic paths, corridors or channels
> of included space in
> labyrinthine branching
> systems and networks"Where networks are not constituted as connected nodes,
> but are dynamic in a process of relational networking. Maturana's position
> was that we are 'social' through orientation  lead by emotion - our 'doing'
> arises through 'for others' first ( another rich strand in activity
> theoretical work).
>
> This messy complex ( that might seem quite ambiguous -  as these discourses
> are terms and terms apart)  is why I wanted to express an interest - but
> didn't have a sense of how to make a contribution that would make s
> difference!
> Christine.
>
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