Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a history

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

And no one cc's Jan on all this??
mike

On Thu, Sep 1, 2011 at 3:06 PM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) <A.Bakker4@uu.nl> wrote:

> Nicely put, Larry!
> And perfectly in line with David Bakhurst's views on education as Bildung,
> helping students to develop autonomy (having reasons rather than being
> subject to causal effects; and developing knowledge not as something
> external but helping humans to be in charge, be free).
> Yes, Jan's paper on Vygotsky and Spinoza is certainly worth reading.
> And thanks for pointing to Theory & Psychology. Andy's paper on Gestalt is
> very interesting!
>
> Arthur
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on behalf
> of Larry Purss [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
> Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 4:25 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a history
>
> Thanks Arthur
>
> I want to also suggest looking at Jan's article "The Unity of Intellect and
> Will: Vygotsky and Spinoza" in the journal "Education Review" vol.56, June,
> 2004 pp113-120.
>
> Jan, in the article quotes Pippen:
> "One way of understanding a FREE life - 'your own life' - is to consider
> which of your past decisions you could truly be said to 'stand behind,'
> where that means being able to defend or JUSTIFY them when challenged, or
> even which you could claim to understand. 'Having reasons' in THIS sense
> for
> what you did, having something to say about 'why,' is a general condition
> for some event being considered an action of yours at all, and not having
> ANY reasons means it is very hard to understand ANY link between you and
> what conduct you engage in" [Pippen 2000]
>
> Jan is making the point that if we do not have reasons and judgements for
> our actions, we would therefore be SUBJECT to our actions rather than in
> control of them. As Pippen says, A better form of self-understanding might
> make it possible to say you led a life more 'your own' ". It is in this
> sense that Jan suggests Vygotsky sees education as a freedom-enhancing
> process. In Spinoza's terms, [as interpreted by Jan]
>
> "to know the reasons why I act is to be a cause of myself (causa sui)
> rather
> than be the subject of extraneous determinations. The responsibility of a
> scholar to interrogate and attempt to understand THE REASONS FOR a belief
> or
> perspective is developmental to both mind and free will" (p.116)
>
> Arthur, Jan bringing Spinoza into the conversation and his notion of free
> will [as both creative and constrained] is contrasted with our current
> common sense  folk psychology] notions of free will as being without
> constraints. Jan points out the particular notion of free will we
> operationalize has profound effects on the types of social arrangements in
> schools.  The reason for education as Jan is articulating Vygotsky's views
> is to learn to understand the reasons for holding particular beliefs and
> perspectives and rejecting others. Education is NOT the acquiring the
> KNOWLEDGE of these beliefs and perspectives but rather learning a PROCESS
> of
> reasoning to help us understand the reasons WHY we hold particular beliefs
> and perspectives. [This is the same theme as Wittgensein suggesting the fly
> in the fly bottle and "learning" a way out of the bottle]
>
> The development of "free will" [in Spinoza's and Vygotsky's terms - as
> articulated by Jan] is a very powerful "ethical stance" to take towards the
> purpose of education.  Charles Taylor's response to this particular ethical
> stance is to locate it in an even broader historical surrounding [horizon
> of
> understanding] that VALUES making assertoric judgements and reasons FOR our
> actions a particular historically formed "ethical stance"
> This in no way challenges the notion that todays purpose for education is
> to
> develop the skills of giving and asking for reasons in order to develop
> "free will" and become less constrained [subjected] to circumstances.
>
> I would only add that developing the skills of giving and asking for
> reasons
> not loose sight of Taylor's DISTINCTION that there is another central apect
> to speech acts - the disclosive - It is  the aspect of disclosive speech
> acts that John Shotter's project is articulating.
>
> The relational links between  "free will" and "reason" seems to be a
> fertile
> con-text to explore further.  However, the distinction between the
> assertoric and disclosive aspects of speech acts is also a key distinction
> in exploring "reasoning" as an intersubjective, dialogical process of
> dwelling in the world as a particular "way of life" which is INformed  from
> within a particular "ethical stance" [how we SHOULD or OUGHT to proceed
> when
> orienting to the world] .
>
> Taylor is asking us to NOTICE this more inclusive historical con-text as we
> proceed together
>
> Larry
>
>
> Thu, Sep 1, 2011 at 4:02 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) <A.Bakker4@uu.nl> wrote:
>
> > Here is the online first version that I have of Jan Derry's paper (Jan is
> > female :-). Guess nothing wrong with emailing this one (not the published
> > one).
> >
> > Arthur
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >  Sent: dinsdag 30 augustus 2011 16:46
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
> history
> >
> > Arthur
> > Thanks for Deery's article.
> > On page 14 he writes about our "second nature" that operates withIN what
> > McDowell [drawing on Wilfred Sellars] called "the space of reasons". Then
> > Deery writes, in regard to this "space of reasons" that "our responses
> are
> > NECESSARILY normative"
> > It is this normative aspect of the space of reasons that Charles Taylor
> is
> > pointing to in his exploration of ETHICAL stances in the world.
> >
> > Also on page 7 of the article it points out that Wertsch draws on Taylors
> > distinction between the DESIGNATIVE [signifies reference TO the object or
> > TO
> > SAYING ABOUT the object] and the contrast with EXPRESSIVIST approaches to
> > meaning.  This parallels Taylors distinction between the
> > assertoric/disclosive aspects of speech acts.
> > Arthur, this in no way challenges what Deery and you are pointing to in
> > elaborating "a space of reasons". It only highlights Taylor's point that
> > the DESIGNATIVE [assertoric] METHOD of participating in speech acts must
> be
> > embedded withIN a "way of life" that points to a particular ETHICAL
> STANCE
> > that is expressed withIN a "way of life".  My understanding of Taylor is
> > that the "space of reasons" is a culturalhistorical METHOD of
> understanding
> > and knowledge that REQUIRES a "committment" [which is implicit within a
> > horizon of understanding].  As Martin Packer has pointed out, most of us
> > have accepted the "cost" of participating within this particular
> "reasoned"
> > way of life as we developed our "selves".  In Taylor's view we have made
> a
> > committment to a way of life.
> > To emphasize Taylor's key point, it is not reason he is questioning but
> > reason ALONE [as reductive]  His perspective suggests the
> > expressive/disclosive realm of speech acts should not be reduced to the
> > designative/assertoric space of reasons.  It is his opinion that  it is
> > useful to make a distinction between these aspects of speech acts.  It is
> > then key to link up or interweave these two distinct forms of utterances
> > [in
> > a way similar to weaving thinking and speech.  This is a very complex
> task
> > but would start by NOTICING 2 distinct realms of speec acts.
> > If one agrees with this perspective then Shotter, and Bahktin and others
> > exploring the disclosive/expressive [Taylor] realm may be asking us to
> > NOTICE another critical realm of speech acts.
> >
> > PS The latest journal "Theory & Psychology" has articles by Andy, John
> > Shotter, Ivana Markova [dialogical theory] and Eugene Matusov.
> > Thanks Arthur for the article. It is helping me differentiate multiple
> > notions of "reason" and how they get expressed.  I have also retreived
> > Deery's article exploring the links between Vygotsky and Spinoza that was
> > referenced in the bibliography of the article you circulated.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 2:50 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) <A.Bakker4@uu.nl
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > Andy,
> > >
> > > It was certainly not my intention to merge inference in the
> philosophical
> > > sense and statistical inference. In fact, in the paper, we tried to
> warn
> > the
> > > reader for possible confusion, but apparently not clear enough.
> > >
> > > I asked Jan Derry about how Brandom is influenced by Hegel. She wrote
> to
> > > me:
> > >
> > > "Brandom argues that Hegel developed a non-psychological conception of
> > the
> > > conceptual in the Phenomenology where conceptual content is articulated
> > by
> > > determinate negation. He sees himself as following this line in his own
> > work
> > > e.g. when the parrot says red it only reacts to the stimuli, the human
> > > utterance of red already entails not green, not blue etc. - the
> > inferential
> > > relations are prior to the designation. Of course, many Hegel scholars
> > > resist any argument that Brandom is following Hegel."
> > >
> > > See further Derry's paper on rationality, a draft is here;
> > > http://eprints.ioe.ac.uk/1138/1/Derry2008Abstract49.pdf
> > >
> > > You are right that an educational focus on inferences is not
> sufficient;
> > it
> > > is about the type of inferences. As you write, there are inferences
> from
> > > "the mean is 6" that are very boring, schoolish etc. What I should
> > perhaps
> > > have emphasized more is that we were after inferences that
> statisticians
> > and
> > > knowers of statistics make with airthmetic means, such as judging the
> > > difference between two groups - something that receives little
> attention
> > in
> > > middle school and which students are often not inclined to do. So we
> > > stimulated students to engage in more authentic problems in which they
> > can
> > > see the need to use the mean (and other statistical concepts) in
> fruitful
> > > ways and linked to contextual meaning. I don't see the dressage here!
> In
> > > fact, the standard approach of addressing all concepts and
> > representations
> > > one by one and testing them with some simple calculations is much more
> > > drill-and-practice.
> > >
> > > I agree that there is no judgement without concept and vice versa. But
> we
> > > noticed that if we stimualted students to make observations/judgements
> > that
> > > their concepts developed, whereas the prior focus on drilling
> > computations
> > > seemed to lead to inert knowledge, forgetting how they should be done.
> > >
> > > I do have one point of critique on Brandom's inferentialism, and that
> is
> > > what Bakhurst more eloquently articulates than I can (chapter 5 of his
> > > Formation of Reason book). It is Brandom's decision to reverse the
> order
> > of
> > > explanation; instead of the Descartian/representationalist route from
> > > representation to inference, he starts with inference in particular
> > > practices and methodologically explains how representations get their
> > > meaning. Like Bakhurst, I actually think (and my experience in
> classrooms
> > > supports this) that representation and ifnerence go hand in hand.
> > Brandom's
> > > methodological explanation of starting with inference can therefore not
> > be
> > > transferred to how learning develops in this extreme form, I think.
> But,
> > as
> > > an antidote to how many teachers and even some researchers seem to
> think
> > > about knowing and learning, I find Brandom's idea pretty useful.
> > >
> > > Arthur
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on
> > behalf
> > > of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net]
> > > Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2011 5:51 PM
> > >  To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
> > history
> > >
> > > Arthur,
> > >
> > > I have had a chance to read the paper you did with Jan Derry, but
> > > unfortunately Robert Brandom is still a closed book to me. I understood
> > > from friends that he was some kind of Hegelian, but I can't see this in
> > > your quotations. I may get the wrong end of the stick in my comments
> due
> > > to not knowing Brandom. Also, my positive response to the idea of
> > > Vygotsky as an "inferentialist" as opposed to a "representationalist"
> > > was probably premature, as in your paper "inference" is merged with
> > > "statistical inference." So I may be confused. Please excuse me if I
> get
> > > things mixed up.
> > >
> > > Firstly, I think I agree with the recommendations you are making to
> > > teachers of statistics. This is because a concept can only be grasped
> > > (and Vygotsky agrees) as a situation, or as a problem and its solution.
> > > I gather you propose confronting students with problems, and then
> > > offering them some statistical tools to use to solve the problem. This
> > > approach is of course straight out of the Vygotsky handbook. It also
> > > reflects a certain concept of concept ... but this is not what I gather
> > > an "inferentialist" concept of concept is according to Brandom (judging
> > > from your quotes only), and I can anticipate a line of argument basing
> > > itself on statistical inference which manages to reconcile empiricism
> to
> > > the obvious fact that human beings can reason. (It is an idea which is
> > > popular among the neuroscientists as well, being a variation on the
> idea
> > > of conditioned reflex.) If this is what Brandom argues, then my
> interest
> > > in him declines apace. I think Hegel and Vygotsky have a far superior
> > > approach. :)
> > >
> > > You quote Brandom as follows: "The concept _concept_ is not
> intelligible
> > > apart from the possibility of such application in judging. ...To grasp
> > > or understand (...) a concept is to have practical mastery over the
> > > inferences it is involved in  - to know, in the practical sense of
> being
> > > able to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a concept,
> > > and what follows from it."
> > >
> > > I really don't see the Big Leap Forward from "representationalism"
> here.
> > > How is this reflected in the concept of "mean"? Presumably when a
> > > student can recognise when a number such as 6 is the mean of 3, 6 and
> 9?
> > > and reason with it, eg the mean of x + y = the mean of x plus the mean
> > > of y. This is not how I think you are suggesting teachers teach
> > statistics.
> > >
> > > The quote from Vygotsky: "we must seek the psychological equivalent of
> > > the conceptnot in general representations  ... [but] in a system of
> > > judgments in which the concept is disclosed." NB "*disclosed*", i.e.,
> we
> > > can observe that a concept has been grasped when correct judgments are
> > > made based on the concept. But I think it is wrong to deduce from this
> > > that judgment is prior to concept in analysis, in structure or in
> > > learning. You can't make a judgment on a concept unless you know the
> > > concept. Agreed, learning the concept, in practice, transforms error
> > > into understanding. But this really proves nothing. Judgments get
> better
> > > as you get a better and better grasp of the concept. But what is the
> > > concept? The only sense I cana make of this is some kind of dressage.
> > >
> > > So I am a little bemused.
> > > Andy
> > >
> > >
> > > Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote:
> > > > Interesting discussion! Here is my penny on representationalism.
> > > >
> > > > Robert Brandom puts forward his inferentialism as an alternative to
> > > representationalism. Inferentialism in my view is a significant
> > development
> > > in contemporary philosophy, which places inference rather than
> > > representation at the heart of human knowing, and which also has
> > > implications for education. Brandom explains the meaning of
> > representations
> > > from people's participation in the game of giving and asking for
> reasons
> > > (inference).
> > > >
> > > > Brandom, R. B. (2000). Articulating reasons: An introduction to
> > > inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
> > > >
> > > > See also the recent book by David Bakhurst - The formation of reason
> -
> > on
> > > this topic. He argues that Brandom is perhaps too drastic in reversing
> > the
> > > order of explanation.
> > > >
> > > > With Jan Derry I have written a more educationally oriented paper on
> > > inferentialism as an alternative to representationalism (quite common
> in
> > > statistics education, e.g.):
> > > >
> > > > Bakker, A. & Derry, J. (2011). Lessons from inferentialism for
> > statistics
> > > education. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 13, 5-26.
> > > http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10986065.2011.538293
> > > >
> > > > I cite a small part from this article:
> > > > +++++
> > > > Representationalism refers to the position that representations are
> the
> > > basic theoretical construct of knowledge. In common with several
> > > philosophers (e.g., Dewey, Heidegger, Rorty,
> > > > Wittgenstein) and educators (e.g., Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992),
> Brandom
> > > (2000) takes issue with this approach noting the dominance of the
> > > representational paradigm since Descartes:
> > > >
> > > > Awareness was understood in representational terms. . . . Typically,
> > > specifically conceptual representations were taken to be just one kind
> of
> > > representation of which and by means of which we can be aware. (p. 7)
> > > >
> > > > Representationalism is based on the assumption that the use of
> concepts
> > > was explained by what they refer to (i.e., where conceptual content is
> > > primarily understood atomistically rather than relationally). Knowing
> > what
> > > individual concepts mean is then the basis for being able to make
> > sentences
> > > and claims, which in turn can be connected to make inferences. Assuming
> > that
> > > a definition of a concept fully conveys its meaning is a possible
> > > consequence of such a view.
> > > > Brandom reverses the representationalist order of explanation, which
> > > leads to an account that he refers to as inferentialism. Taking
> judgments
> > as
> > > the primary units of knowledge rather than representations, he reminds
> us
> > > that:
> > > >
> > > > One of [Kant's] cardinal innovations is the claim that the
> fundamental
> > > unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum graspable, is the judgment.
> > > Judgments are fundamental, since they are the minimal unit one can take
> > > responsibility for on the cognitive side, just as actions are the
> > > corresponding unit of responsibility on the practical side. . . .
> > Applying a
> > > concept is to be understood in terms of making a claim or expressing a
> > > belief. The concept concept is not intelligible apart from the
> > possibility
> > > of such application in judging. (Brandom, 2000, pp. 159-160, emphases
> in
> > the
> > > original)
> > > >
> > > > This entails giving priority to inference in accounts of what it is
> to
> > > grasp a concept:
> > > > To grasp or understand (. . .) a concept is to have practical mastery
> > > over the inferences it is involved in-to know, in the practical sense
> of
> > > being able to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a
> > concept,
> > > and what it follows from. (Brandom, 2000, p. 48) This clarifies his
> > > definition of concepts as "broadly inferential norms that implicitly
> > govern
> > > practices of giving and asking for reasons" (Brandom, 2009, p. 120).
> Any
> > > inference leading to a claim is made within such a normative context.
> > > >
> > > > Claims both serve as and stand in need of reasons or justifications.
> > They
> > > have the contents they have in part in virtue of the role they play in
> a
> > > network of inferences. (Brandom, 2000, p. 162)
> > > > ++++
> > > > We also cite Vygotsky on this issue:
> > > >
> > > > We must seek the psychological equivalent of the concept not in
> general
> > > representations, . . . not even in concrete verbal images that replace
> > the
> > > general representations-we must seek it in a system of judgments in
> which
> > > the concept is disclosed. (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 55)
> > > >
> > > > and think Vygotsky can be interpreted from an inferentialist rather
> > than
> > > a representationalist perspective.
> > > >  See further
> > > > Derry, J. (2008). Abstract rationality in education: From Vygotsky to
> > > Brandom. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 27, 49-62.
> > > >
> > > > Arthur
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > > > Sent: dinsdag 16 augustus 2011 3:36
> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Representationalism, as a way of knowing, has a
> > > history
> > > >
> > > > Tony,
> > > >
> > > > The point that Karen Barad is making is that there is a long
> historical
> > > line
> > > > of viewing the world through a particular set of lenses.
> > > > Representationalism and its basic metaphysical premises that
> > "entities",
> > > > "things", "relata", PRE-EXIST phenomena and it is through the
> > > INTER-activity
> > > > of pre-existing "atoms" that relationships form.  Karen's
> > INTRA-activity
> > > > perspective argues the opposite position, that phenomena pre-exist
> the
> > > > agential "cutting" or scientific "scissors" that are applied to
> > > phenomena.
> > > > WithIN this phenomenal intra-activity of cutting fuzzy boundaries
> > emerge
> > > and
> > > > BECOME more distinct and "structured" within the phenomena.  Karen
> > always
> > > > puts in scare quotes terms such as "components" "parts"  and other
> > terms
> > > > that attempt to explain "things" withIN phenomena.  From her
> > perspective
> > > > "relata" or "entties" do not exist prior to intra-activity but are
> > > emerging
> > > > aspects OF this situated intra-activity.
> > > >
> > > > Her perspective emerges from an elaboration of Neils Bohrs work in
> > > > theoretical physics. Karen received her doctorate in theoretical
> > physics
> > > and
> > > > then moved into philosophy. I'm going to quote a key section of her
> > > article.
> > > >
> > > > "Bohr rejects the atomistic metaphysics that takes "things" as
> > > ontologically
> > > > basic entities. For Bohr, things do not have inherently determinate
> > > > meanings. Bohr also calls into question the related  Cartesian belief
> > in
> > > the
> > > > inherent distinction between subject and object, and knower and
> > known....
> > > It
> > > > [Bohr's epistemological framework] rejects the presupposition that
> > > language
> > > > and measurement perform mediating functions.  Language does not
> > represent
> > > > states of affairs, and measurements do not represent
> > > measurement-independent
> > > > states of being."
> > > >
> > > > For Bohr the uncertainty principle is not a matter of "uncertainty"
> at
> > > all
> > > > but rather of INDETERMINANCY of phenomena.  For Bohr THEORETICAL
> > CONCEPTS
> > > > [e.g., "position" and "momentum"] are NOT ideational in character but
> > > rather
> > > > are SPECIFIC PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS which are not inherent attributes
> of
> > > > independently existing objects.  Any measurement of "position" must
> use
> > a
> > > > RIGID apparatus [such as a ruler] and the "position" is NOT
> attributed
> > to
> > > > the abstract independently existing "object" but rather is a property
> > of
> > > the
> > > > PHENOMENON - the inseparability of "observed object" and "agencies of
> > > > observation".  This relational phenomena BETWEEN the apparatuses of
> > > > production and the phenomena produced is a process of "agential
> > > > intra-action"
> > > >
> > > > Karen then states,
> > > >
> > > > "Therefore, according to Bohr, the PRIMARY epistemological unit is
> NOT
> > > > independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but
> rather
> > > > PHENOMENA.  On my agential realist elaboration, [of Bohr's
> uncertainty
> > > > principle] phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological
> > > inseparability
> > > > of "observer" and "observed"; rather, PHENOMENA ARE THE ONTOLOGICAL
> > > > INSEPARABILITY OF AGENTIALLY INTRA-ACTING "COMPONENTS" That is,
> > phenomena
> > > > are ontologically primitive relations - relations without
> pre-existing
> > > > relata."
> > > >
> > > > >From Karen's perspective  there is always a mutual ontological
> > > dependence of
> > > > "relata" withIN the relation. Phenomena is the ontological primitive.
> > > Relata
> > > > only exist withIN phenomena as a result of specific intra-actions.
> >  There
> > > is
> > > > only relata-withIN-relations.
> > > >
> > > > To make this perspective concrete Karen gives this example.  When
> light
> > > > passes through a two-slit diffraction apparatus the light forms a
> > > wavelike
> > > > diffraction pattern.  BUT light also exhibits PARTICLElike
> > > characteristics
> > > > called PHOTONS.  The apparatus can be modified to allow only one slit
> > and
> > > > THIS modification allows a DETERMINATION of a given photon's position
> > as
> > > > particles only go through a single slit at a time.  However in this
> > > > intra-activity the wavelike diffraction pattern is destroyed.  Bohr
> > > explains
> > > > this wave-particle paradox as follows: "the objective referent is not
> > > some
> > > > abstract independently existing entity but rather the PHENOMENON of
> > light
> > > > intra-acting with the apparatus. The FIRST apparatus gives
> DETERMINATE
> > > > MEANING to the notion of "wave". The second apparatus gives
> DETERMINATE
> > > > MEANING to the notion of "particle"  The notions of "wave" and
> > "particle"
> > > do
> > > > NOT refer to inherent characteristics of an object that PRECEDES its
> > > > intra-action. THERE ARE NO SUCH INDEPENDENTLY EXISTING OBJECTS WITH
> > > INHERENT
> > > > CHARACTERISTICS.  As Karen emphasizes, the two DIFFERENT APPARATUSES
> > > effect
> > > > DIFFERENT CUTS [measures]. That is draw different distinctions
> > > delineating
> > > > the "measured object" FROM the "measuring instrument".  In other
> words
> > > Karen
> > > > believes the two phenomena DIFFER in their local MATERIAL resolutions
> > OF
> > > the
> > > > inherent ontological INDETERMINANCY withIN phenomena.
> > > >
> > > > Tony, this is certainly a shift of "perspective" but one that is
> "grist
> > > for
> > > > the mill"  It does emphasize phenomena as inherently relational and
> > > objects
> > > > [relata] as derivative.  Not sure where this fits into CHAT or
> > > > phenomenology. John Shotter has diffracted Karen Barad's perspective
> > > THROUGH
> > > > his elaboration of speech acts from a perspective that diffracts
> > Bakhtin.
> > > > He also brings in Merleau-Ponty's perspectives.  Tim Ingold's
> articles
> > > also
> > > > point in this direction.  Certainly challenges the
> representationalist
> > > > epistemology/ontology.
> > > >
> > > > Larry
> > > > On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 8:59 AM, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> I think what Larry says is right about the Cartesian legacy, but I
> > think
> > > >> the legacy in the Anglophone world might owe as much to Hobbes and
> > > Locke. I
> > > >> see all three as sources of the common legacy of modernism.
> > > >>
> > > >> Descartes is more rationalist while Hobbes and Locke are more
> > > empiricist,
> > > >> but representationalism is what's common to them all.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> On Sun, 14 Aug 2011, Larry Purss wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>   Hi Martin
> > > >>
> > > >>> The other post had 18 entries so thought I would begin a new post.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Karen Barad, in 2003, wrote an article, "Posthumanist
> Performativity:
> > > >>> Toward
> > > >>> an nderstanding of how Matter Comes to Matter" in the journal
> >  "Signs:
> > > >>> Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2003, Vol.28, no. 3 pp.
> > > 801-831"
> > > >>>
> > > >>> She has a provocative quote that speaks to Vygotsky's historical
> > > >>> methodology
> > > >>> or way of seeing.  She is pointing to the fact that both scientific
> > > >>> realism
> > > >>> and social constructivism share common ground in how they view
> > > scientific
> > > >>> knowledge IS the multiple representational forms which MEDIATE our
> > > access
> > > >>> to
> > > >>> the material world.  Where they differ is on the question of
> > referent.
> > > >>> Whether scientific knowledge represents things in the world as they
> > > really
> > > >>> are or "objects" that are the PRODUCTS of social activities, but
> > Karen
> > > >>> points out BOTH groups subscribe to representationalism.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Karen points out,
> > > >>> "Representationalism is so deeply entrenched withIN Western culture
> > > that
> > > >>> it
> > > >>> has taken on a common sense appeal.  It seems inescapable, if not
> > > >>> downright
> > > >>> natural. But representationalism (like "nature itself," not merly
> our
> > > >>> representations of it!) HAS A HISTORY" [p. 806]
> > > >>>
> > > >>> She references Ian Hacking who traced this notion of knowledge back
> > to
> > > >>> Ancient Greece and the Democritean dream of atoms and the void that
> > > >>> posited
> > > >>> a gap between representations and represented and the concept of
> > > >>> "appearance" makes its first appearance.  Karen's perspective is
> that
> > > the
> > > >>> problem of realism in philosophy is a PRODUCT of THIS atomistic
> > > worldview.
> > > >>> And from this moment in history the consequence of this product
> isthe
> > > >>> DIVISION between "internal" and "external" that breaks the line of
> > the
> > > >>> knowing subject.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Joseph Rouse is quoted in Karen's article. He states,
> > > >>>
> > > >>> "The presumption that we can know what we mean, or what our verbal
> > > >>> performances say, more readily than we can know the objects those
> > > sayings
> > > >>> are about is a Cartesian legacy, a LINQUISTIC variation on
> Descartes'
> > > >>> insistence that we have a direct and privileged access to the
> > contents
> > > of
> > > >>> our thoughts that we lack towards the "external" world."
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Karen summarizes this section of her article by saying,
> > > >>>
> > > >>> "In other words, the ASYMMETRICAL FAITH in our access to
> > > representations
> > > >>> over things is a contingent fact of HISTORY and not a logical
> > > necessity;
> > > >>> that is, it is simply a Cartesian habit of mind. It takes a healthy
> > > >>> skepticism toward Cartesian doubt to begin to be able to see an
> > > >>> alternative"
> > > >>> (p. 807)
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Karen ends with a concrete example of this perspective which she
> > > borrows
> > > >>> from Foucault. In sixteenth century Europe, language was not
> thought
> > of
> > > as
> > > >>> a
> > > >>> MEDIUM; rather, it was simply "one of the figurations of the
> world".
> > > >>> (Foucault, 1970, p.56).  Today the notion of "con-figurations" or
> > > >>> gestalten
> > > >>> point in the same direction of a shift away from representative
> > notions
> > > of
> > > >>> knowledge formation.  This shift allows us to use our "scissors"
> > > >>> differently
> > > >>> as we make "agential CUTS" in coming to dwell in the world.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Larry
> > > >>> ______________________________**____________
> > > >>> _____
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> Tony Whitson
> > > >> UD School of Education
> > > >> NEWARK  DE  19716
> > > >>
> > > >> twhitson@udel.edu
> > > >> ______________________________**_
> > > >>
> > > >> "those who fail to reread
> > > >>  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > > >>                  -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
> > > >> ______________________________**____________
> > > >> _____
> > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > > __________________________________________
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> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > Joint Editor MCA:
> > > http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g932564744
> > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857
> > > MIA: http://www.marxists.org
> > >
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