Re: [xmca] Aristotle's PRACTICAL philosophy as providing historical perspective

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Christine

Your reflections on the possible distinctions between forms of reasoning
that Aristotle frames as poesis and praxis are also distinctions that I am
struggling with.  Your questioning if Lewin is searching for a predetermined
social *science* to formulate *general laws* rather than searching for the
praxis of *practical philosophy* is a question I'm curious if others on the
listserv struggle with.  Others with a deeper background in Lewin,
Aristotle, Gadamer, and others may be able to shed further light.

I'm also curious what others think about the notion of phronesis as
foregrounding or putting at the center *virtue* or the *moral good* as a
distinct form of reasoning.  Anna Stetsenko's notion of *transformative
activist stance* [activist implying agentive subjectivity] as a moment in
activity also engages with the *moral good*

I'm not sure how Gadamer's perspective links with the CHAT perspective, but
his *philosophical hermeneutics* foregrounds phronesis .  Quoted in Wilfred
Carr's article (p. 431) Gadamer writes,

The great merit of Aristotle was that he anticipated the IMPASSE of our
scientific culture by his description of the structure of practical reason
as distinct from theoretical knowledge and technical skill ... In a
scientific culture such as ours the fields of TECHNE are much more
expanded.  The crucial change is that practical wisdom can no longer be
promoted by personal contact and the mutual exchange of views....
Consequently the concept of PRAXIS which we developed in the last two
centuries is an awful DEFORMATION of what practice really is .... The debate
of the last century... degrades practical reason to technical control
(Gadamer, 1975, p.107)

Gadamer points out that our culture of science has a *prejudice against
prejudice*.  Gadamer points out we cannot not pre-judge [escape our
traditions or horizons of understanding]  However through dialogue and
engaging with our prejudices we can *fuse our horizons of understanding*
[develop shared prejudices].

I'm not sure where these notions of prejudice as inescapable fit into the
questions on methods/methodology but the *moral good* for Gadamer is at the
center of practical philosophy.

Larry
On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 8:37 AM, christine schweighart <
schweighartgate@hotmail.com> wrote:

>
> Dear Larry,
>  I find the poeisis praxis distinction very helpful, especially when
> orienting to participative research. Many of my difficulties have arisen
> from being required to specify research outcomes- to a level of detail where
> data categories and procedure of analysis are required beforehand - quite
> common in the practice of gaining approval for  PhD proposals etc, but
> problematic in participative research. If 'participative' is taken beyond
> what I might call a superficial degree, to a collaborative status where the
> design of enquiry reaches collaboration with depth of working  upon research
> themes together- the' praxis' values arise in the process, and guide the
> relevance of categories etc around an emerging shared sense of 'good'.
>
>  Lewin's 'search for laws' doesn't quite fit this praxis, it seems to me.
> Whilst not all participants might aspire to write research resumes, many do,
> and those that might not elaborate documented finding might still share a
> motive of improving social practices beyond their immediate work setting.
> Professional bodies have historically  been contexts for knowledge
> production beyond immediate work settings, however their 'good' in knowledge
> production and sharing is somewhat different to an academic one, often more
> self-serving,
>
>  In the paper contrasting Lewin ( for AR) the' experimental' ethos is one
> that contemporary AR has modified.
>
> "(c) the main aim of social research (as conceived by Lewin)
> is to formulate general laws about the dynamics of societal practices, with
> an eye to using these
> laws as part of planning interventions into societal practice."
>
> and principles  1 &2 of  figure 1
>
> " 1. Improvement of societal practices is a direct consideration and
> important orienting focus in forming research questions.
> 2. It is sometimes necessary to intervene into societal practices as part
> of
> gaining basic knowledge, which makes it impossible to maintain a
> separation of social science from social action."
>
> Principle 1 assumes an a priori research question - this is not open to
> collaborative orientation to a sense of form of  'good life' emerging in
> praxis.
> Yet in principle 2. an apparent contradiction of 'gaining basic knowledge'
> is open. What is 'basic knowledge' referring to here? It might be such that
> a meaning held in a 'research question' arises from such knowledge.
>
> How can 'general laws' be sought to understand dynamics of social practices
> and yet an openess be maintained , principles of a mode of enquiry not
> contrained by previous meanings of 'general laws'? In this it seems that the
> shift to 'methodology' (or epistemological mode) is to enable an open stance
> against 'theoretical incursions', in 'practical philosophy' fashion .
> However, whereas "practical philosophy was designed precisely to protect
> practice against unwarranted theoretical incursions (Carr refers us to
> Dunne, 1993) action research was DESIGNED  to provide research METHODOLOGY
> that would INTEGRATE theory and practice by drawing on theoretical
> knowledge
> FROM psychology, philosophy, sociology, and other fields of social science
> in order to test its EXPLANATORY power and practical usefulness.Action
> research that I have encountered fashions an approach to enquiry upon
> reflection rather than 'by design' and a purpose is for ameliorative action
> - not the provision of methodology ( the two are intertwined). Practical
> usefulness yes, but not an  explanatory  that becomes predictive of future
> form.
>
> Jack Whitehead uses this quote from Lyotard a lot to evoke an ethos of his
> educational action research:
>
>
>
> "A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the
> text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by
> pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a
> determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to the text or to
>  the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of art itself is
>  looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules
>  in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done." (Lyotard,
> p. 81, 1986)
>
>
>
> Lyotard, F. (1986) The Postmodern Condition: A report on Knowledge.
> Manchester; Manchester University Press.
>
>  Jack Whitehead's  living theory perspective is  represented in:
>
>
>
> Farren, M., Whitehead, J. & Bognar, B. (2011) Action Research in the
> Educational Workshop. Palo Alto; Academica Press.
>
> Christine
>
>
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