[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] concepts
- To: firstname.lastname@example.org, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] concepts
- From: mike cole <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2011 23:58:54 -0700
- Delivered-to: email@example.com
- Dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:reply-to:in-reply-to:references :from:date:message-id:subject:to:content-type; bh=mPaiToYo1THK4VYkWcuW3lsHaj993DCUsT2M1HuStEw=; b=Q97nDSEukpYmY4fwQUWoajfNpgZCMvV5ZJZfXQxy2hUiOGPjLZRPOEqepwvriS3z8v sZ6e21e4mtr/BwHDz4YasXYG1yo0GCrfk8cEBaM9DlBdJIiDTMf/2cl3fUnqrDSinunG KHUM8GYdjmYhgiA0JKGxEoDbRPjnMkchVMWCQ=
- Domainkey-signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:reply-to:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:content-type; b=w+X3IS08ij5ZTyx0aADCSkZY9Lbry1aIfLNBEHKIzqacGni8LO2W1AFU7hmvMlgq6G /6VNHU4zpIgjXUc5oVORXy7NPBq59U2u6sj0QJI4L5R3o3V5VFs1l+EUv1KjTXl28D8F DtkQ3+u9Jg6fA/7/E2ezdvP68V/H+h26eI5r0=
- In-reply-to: <4DACDEE4.firstname.lastname@example.org>
- List-archive: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca>
- List-help: <mailto:email@example.com?subject=help>
- List-id: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca.weber.ucsd.edu>
- List-post: <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>
- List-subscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:email@example.com?subject=subscribe>
- List-unsubscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org?subject=unsubscribe>
- References: <BANLkTikpY1eFfEgcnxdrN2Giu8ZaLTLbdQ@mail.gmail.com> <4DACDEE4.email@example.com>
- Reply-to: firstname.lastname@example.org, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com>
- Sender: firstname.lastname@example.org
We are headed out for an excursion this morning.
I will email you when i get back, by which time you may be awake.
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 6:01 PM, Andy Blunden <email@example.com> wrote:
> Huw, I think any scientific theory should aspire to be philosophically
> rigorous. Philosophial rigour though is not something that depends on
> results as "scientific" rigour does. For example, is we use the concept of
> "activity" in our scientific work as a relation between the mental and the
> physical for example, then we need to be aware that this introduces a
> dichotomy which is ultimately unsustainable. On the other hand, it is almost
> impossible to talk about, let alone explain, Activity without referring to
> "states of mind" and so on. This is the difficult distinction between
> communicative action and concepts.
> On concepts: It is true that a concept **can** be conceived of within a
> matrix of similarity and differences, but I think that is a view which
> really misses what a concept is and fails to capture the full breadth of
> meaning of the word. It has the effect of replacing the study of a concept
> with the study of "features" ultimately leading to an arbitrary decision on
> what counts as an "irreducible" "chunk" or "feature". I think there is a
> difference between problems of recognition or categorisation, on one hand,
> and conceptulisation on the other. Concepts actually always have fuzzy
> boundaries, and focus on boundary problems often misses the essence.
> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> Distinguishing a scientific theory from a philosophical one, we can, I
>> believe, state that the sum of the within-paradigm conceptions combined
>> the means of measuring (creating) phenomena provide the working definition
>> of the conception of the subject. This conception is still, in theory,
>> comparable to other conceptions of the phenomena (e.g. a cognitive model
>> compared with a cybernetic model), this seems to introduce a certain
>> relativity to the term 'fundamental concept', so I'm not sure I agree with
>> "I can't define it in terms of anything else", as opposed to "It would
>> me a long time to define it".
>> Part of the interest here is in the semantics of the term 'concept'. To
>> conceptualize something implies that you can conceptualize something else
>> something similar, implying that all concepts (or conceptions) can be
>> conceived of as residing within a matrix of commonalities and
>> (which was my starting point).
>>> I think that for science, it is important to know what the concept of the
>>> subject matter is, even if we can communicate adequately without that
>> That seems perfectly reasonable and necessary.
>> For me, another slightly confusing aspect of the term 'fundamental
>> in the context of philosophy is that it suggests Idealism which may, or
>> not, be your cup of tea.
>> xmca mailing list
> xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list