RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

["David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>]

Larry and Andy,

Thanks for kind words.

Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to address
your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question as
probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on the
basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings of
learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its own
new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?

Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e., individualist)
approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of learning
in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as crucial,
while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can answer
certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
effectively than the other questions. 

We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on the
promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle the
two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other times
that they are inherently dialectic.)

In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the first
choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by proponents,
gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns of
the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in this
post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.

The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us make
sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in such a
way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach puts
on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to be
coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of constructivist
and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.

Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been offered--it
is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In this
way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in concert
with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization. This
is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the world
of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.

For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It constructs
what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of practice.
Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
educational practice as relevant, they become just our private concern,
with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for learning,
it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways that
are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the purview of
professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres of
teaching.

This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.

David


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.

Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue 
over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres, is 
it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting 
different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over whether 
to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame being

lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who 
deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame 
around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism 
exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?

Andy

David H Kirshner wrote:
> Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
>
> Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the technology
> tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to deal
with
> the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
>
> I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
technologies
> being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors [for
> learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look at
> the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic tangle
> that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
> intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and new
> approaches based on technological developments should not obscure the
> kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
> school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by debate.
> As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
sociological
> rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
> sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
> because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
> intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
> influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
> instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
metaphor
> of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor which
> afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but with
much
> basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
intra
> paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
However,
> I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
> progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful to
view
> progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my work
in
> harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for the
> purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful to
> regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
debate
> (or at least attempting to). 
>
> A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
>
> How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
> multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory? 
>
> Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca without
> much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
> delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology in
the
> scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation by
> education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
> enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
another
> (e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either party.
>
> The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
simple
> to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
across
> varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
> promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take if
one
> desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A genres
> approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
> addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
> genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
> alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
> disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single paradigm
and
> deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
> education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
teaching"
> that somehow is to address learning in its various interpretations.
This
> is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll devote a
> couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
effects
> on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is systemic
> de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to be
> understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of a
> single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of
this
> branch of knowledge.
>
> I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
approach
> for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this
first
> step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas of
> holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
addresses
> learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
> language of genres just doesn't register for my students. Typically,
> when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
> Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated
into
> a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
approaches
> provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
> multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes these
> learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," "practicing
the
> concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never come
> to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating, these
> notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
>
> The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic discourse
> about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is the
> impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
> discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
> relative to the independently conceived notions of learning. Because
in
> the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously to
> address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead with
> generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
analyses
> attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes that
are
> meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
> principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
resources
> that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
>
> Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
> stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
> efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
educators,
> it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which sort(s)
> of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our discourse
> constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's no
> discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction of
> good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided about
what
> is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars). A
> discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues to
be
> separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the professional
> integrity of the field of teaching practice.
>
> Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
> learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as irrelevant. If
> Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
theory
> ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching practice
is
> articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current prominence
of
> "brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
thread--but
> also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning styles"
> research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical theory,
> values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or spiritual
> bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical discourse
in
> which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
universe
> of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
> marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than a
> professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
> theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning, nonetheless
> would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate the
> pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
> theoretical approaches.
>
> Genres: Why Not?
>
> One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it is
so
> obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
> diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
theorizations
> of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory would
> need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
> learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have
been
> adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago. 
>
> The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed against
> recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of psychology.
I
> propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
> because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be. 
>
> To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
> preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science consists of
> multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify the
> field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
never
> settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
> inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
through
> divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed phenomena
> become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot invalidate
the
> perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against others
by
> addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
> sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
> researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers just
> entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die, they
> just fade away.
>
> Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double lives.
> Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
> elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated the
> school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire. Claims
> are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as faits
> accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
> researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school. 
>
> One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or dishonest,
> but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What we
> have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
> discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
> preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The ironic
> result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is only
> one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a single
> perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena of
> learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
> accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
> psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
> paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
>
> But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
> preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
haven't
> pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a sociological
> perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
> Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first preoccupations
of
> Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific enterprise,
was
> investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
> psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early studies
> found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
> unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical (Aristotelian)
> theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
> mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical thought.
So,
> psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively dislodged
the
> existing foundations for educational practice. As a result, education
> attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and independent
> field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
psychology
> for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we have
> tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not construed
> psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
> approach.
>
> Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
>
> I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
psychological
> theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
> really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above, that
> "Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to argue
that
> paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights that
> bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with preparadigmatic
> science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to address
> concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
cognitivists
> exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have decided, on
> their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
encompass
> social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
> competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural psychology
> forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
> trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel with
> paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
> simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex and
> opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. And
then
> again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism and
> perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are formed
> as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
> competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a clear
and
> simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to inform a
> genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
theories
> that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
> learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
theory
> over contemporary forms.
>
> In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach for
> education that builds on insights from diverse psychological schools,
> I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning that I
> see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt around
> for psychological approaches that help to fill out that metaphorical
> interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective that
> psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for its
> basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
> Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
metaphor
> for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
> psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
"implicit
> learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
> learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian based
> radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change literature.
My
> "enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment draws
> partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
> although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic Vygotsky,
> along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, resisted
the
> complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
> coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) put
it:
> "Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual functioning on
> the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
static
> notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ... considers
> these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning as
> interacting moments in human action, rather than as static processes
> that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing social
> determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning is
> "proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how individual
> comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
national
> culture.)
>
> I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
marshaled
> within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
> psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of learning
> that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
partial
> accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
> discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
> dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as did
> Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes at
the
> neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such initiatives
> are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain viable,
and
> perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
> preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
> schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice. The
> psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that reality
> must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete agendas
> for learning that motivate education. 
>
> *I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with interdisciplinary
to
> signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
> theoretical frameworks. 
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>
> David
> Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
these
> models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological
ways
> of
> orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to conventionalize a
> cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative process
> that
> develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
Andy
> points to the historical processes that lead to a particular metaphor
> structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
> he suggests it is the current technologies being used and developed
> which
> transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates among
> scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"
metaphorical
> transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
> consciously
> engage with these transformative technological processes to influence
> the
> zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common sense
> folk
> psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading the
> way
> or charting where the technology has taken us?
> The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
> alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
common
> sense
>
> Larry
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
> <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
>
>   
>> Hi David,
>>
>> I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
>>     
> changed in
>   
>> very fundemental ways over the last ten years.  Phenomena like the
>>     
> Web,
>   
>> Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
>>     
> quickly.
>   
>>  Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea that the
>> computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the brain
>> (absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)  But
>>     
> I
>   
>> think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first
>>     
> amendment
>   
>> lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
Internet.
>>     
> You
>   
>> have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders making
>> Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is he has
>>     
> no
>   
>> idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind
boggling.
>>
>> I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists, etc,
>>     
> etc.
>   
>> arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the game
>>     
> are
>   
>> completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a
vocabulary
>>     
> to
>   
>> talk about yet.
>>
>> Michael
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
>> Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>
>>
>>
>> Larry,
>>
>> Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain studies
as
>>     
> a
>   
>> substitute for learning theory.
>>
>> 1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. For
>> instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, cognitive,
>> developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of learning in
>> fundamentally distinct ways.
>>
>> 2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment of
>> paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the others
>>     
> to
>   
>> unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
>> interests of the other schools while still preserving the essence of
>>     
> its
>   
>> own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit, but
>> periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's repudiation of
>> Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the flare up
>>     
> in
>   
>> the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company over
>> cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
learning.
>>
>> 3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
>> strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The cognitivists'
>> embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly: they
no
>> longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
processing
>> theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
>>     
> central
>   
>> technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
point
>> for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
>> Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
>> Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface features
>>     
> of
>   
>> dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the fact
>> that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is being
>> elaborated and developed by that community.
>>
>> 4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the likelihood of
>> diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
>>     
> renewed
>   
>> opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of the
>>     
> pack.
>   
>> ...should be lots of fun.
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>
>> Mike,
>>
>> The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor.  The image of a
>> steam
>> roller seems more accurate.  I mentioned earlier that the term ZPD is
>> now a
>> recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding].  However
>>     
> this
>   
>> alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a far
>>     
> more
>   
>> powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated with
>> these
>> explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to the
>> "heart"
>> of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. Brain
>> science as
>> an explanation of learning is becoming   the dominant narrative in
>> many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any "simplified'
>> articles
>> for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain metaphors
>>     
> that
>   
>> would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
introducing
>> dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who love
>> ideas
>> but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
>>
>> With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your practice in
>> schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".  This
>> evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
>>
>>  I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into the
>> debate in
>>  response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning but I
>> would
>> appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand out
to
>> start
>> a dialogue among school staffs.
>>
>> Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a "band
>>     
> wagon"
>   
>> but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
>> educators
>> may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a
transitory
>> phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.
>>
>> I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict the
>> neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to
sociocultural
>> concepts.
>>
>> One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
>> conference,
>> and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
>> influence
>> her.
>>
>> Larry
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
wrote:
>>
>>     
>>> The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
>>> Check it out at http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
>>> Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
>>> mike
>>> __________________________________________
>>> _____
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>       
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
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-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? 
<http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>

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