I have been thinking about the recommendations in Pentii Hakkarainen and Milda Bredikyte's article [which I re-posted if others want to read the article but it was was missed when Mike posted it] On page 3 Pentii and Milda quote Vygotsky who wrote, The relationship of play TO development should be compared with that of teaching-learning TO development. Changes of NEEDS and consciousness of a more general kind lie behind the play. Play is the resource of development and it creates the ZPD. Action in the IMAGINARY FIELD, in the IMAGINED situation, building of VOLUNTARY INTENTION, the construction of life-plan, MOTIVES OF WILLING - all this emerges in play. Pentii and Milda cited this extract to emphasize that imitation is NOT the basis of Vygotsky's ZPD. For Vygotsky, [and Pentii and Milda] the question is how the ZPD "....is connected to the development of imagination, INTENTIONS, life-plans, MOTIVATION, and WILL. Traditionally these aspects of development are not discussed in the analysis of learning. If we take literally Vygotsky's advice we have problems in juxtaposing the relation between learning and development on the one hand and play and development on the other [p. 3 Pentti & Milda] >From these extracts, the concepts of "motivation" "will" "motives of will" "voluntary intention" and the term I often use "agentic capacity" are central concepts to understanding ZPD. [The concept of "imagination" is also central but that is for another conversation] Therefore I intend to elaborate the notion of "intentionality" by bringing in another author Andres A. Haye's who wrote an article: "Living Being and Speaking Being: Toward a Dialogical Approach to Intentionality" in the journal [Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42: p 157-163] Hayes suggests that confusion arises because the concept "intentionality" has multiple meanings, and in his article he elaborates on 3 distinct groups of meanings. 1) Intentionality as "will" - intention or motivation in action - A sense of intention as the inner tension driving behavior from the inside 2)Intentionality as "aboutness" - to concern an object - The fact that mental states or linquistic FORMS make REFERENCE TO some object. Intentionality is a specific property of mental and symbolic entities. These entities are CAUSALLY connected as REPRESENTATIONS following logical or psychological laws of association AS ABOUTNESS. 3)Intentionality as "meaning" - the understanding of an action or object as EXPRESSION of a point of view - For Hayes, meaning is NOT a theory of making reference TO an object but the act of TAKING A POSITION TOWARD OTHER PERSPECTIVES within a dialogical field of REPLIES. As Haye states, "I reserve the term 'meaning' for the position assumed or or the point made in each act WITHIN a chain of discursive acts, that is, of acts capable of being CONTESTED as false, bad, inconvenient, limited, shameful, aesthetically poor, unjust, etc. Intentionality as aboutness has to do with semantics, whereas intentionality as meaning is related to ideological (or evaluative) significance in SOCIAL action... Intentionality as meaning does NOT EXCLUDE representation or motivation. Rather, it seems to suppose both aboutness and will. However, self-motivation in action and symbolic representation are INSUFFICIENT to account for the dialogical nature of meaning, both considering the powers of will and representation alone, and considering them in combination....representation in discourse depends upon dialogical rather than merely semantic properties of language." (p.159) Hayes, in reflecting on the role of "propositions" in discourse says we never observe propositions, but rather we observe utterances. Utterances, for Hayes are more general than TALK or ORAL communication. but of discourse in general. Each utterance is a taking of a position of the SUBJECTIVE speaker, in which alternative positions are possible. [utterances are contestible] For Hayes a proposition is not contestable BECAUSE IT LACKS THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE. Hayes, citing Peirce, quotes "A PROPOSITION as I use that term, is a dicent symbol. A dicent is not an assertion, but a sign capable of being asserted." Hayes gives this example - noboby could REPLY to 'A is to B' without KNOWING whether the speaker is endorsing it negating it, making fun of it, asking about it, etcetera. Utterances are semiotic structures (whether propositions like 'A is B' or a single word like "uff") PLUS a subjective attitude in a particular discursive situation. Utterances are LINKED not by REASON of logical or syntactic relations but BY DIALOGICAL RELATIONS such as complicity, vindication, rivalry, support, indiffernce, and so on. Hayes states, "from the theoretical view of Voloshinov and Bakhtin, the speaking being is not a linquistic COMPOSER but an ideological CONTESTANT." (p.161) Meaning is the contestable position taken by a speaker in a given social situation. Returning to Pentii and Milda's elaboration on the need to expand our notion of the ZPD and give intentionality a cental place in our theories of development, Hayes article may add to the elaboration of our notions of ZPD as "containers" in which to develop intentionality [or agentic capacity] Larry
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NOVEMBER 29 HAKKARAINEN PENTI The ZPD in Play and Learning.pdf
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