Thanks for these Martin,
I haven't come across his books but will look out for them. I have,
however, read a wonderful book on a wide range of aspects of the hand, how
it came to be, how we use it (for making music, gesturing, puppetry,
prestidigitation and more) and how it sometimes trips us up:
The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the Brain, Language, and Human Culture, by
Frank Wilson (1998)
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Hand-Frank-R-Wilson/dp/0679740473/ref=tmm_pap_title_0
Beautifully written and packed with insights into the intimate connection
between doing and thinking.
All the best,
Rod
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: 17 October 2010 18:21
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery
Rod,
Are you familiar with David Sudnow's book "Ways of the Hand"? He describes
learning to play improvisatory jazz piano. It's a wonderful account of
coming to be familiar with the spaces of the keyboard, which are also the
spaces of the jazz repertoire.
Then he wrote another called "Talk's Body," where sitting in front of his
typewriter he described his experience from moment to moment.
(Googling, I find the first book was republished in 2001 as "A Revised
Account.")
Martin
On Oct 17, 2010, at 1:07 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote:
An updated version of the blind person and stick might be 'person and
internet connection' - as I sit tapping away at my keyboard now, how far
does my mind reach out into the world wide web?
All the best,
Rod
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of mike cole
Sent: 17 October 2010 17:05
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery
Rod-- Picking up on just "where the mind ends" question using the
blindperson-stick example. (The other remarks are really interesting, but
overloading messages doesn't seem an effective communicative move).
*You wrote: Going back to the earlier posts in this thread, I am still
intrigued by the question of where 'I' stop and where 'they' begin - how
much of what I like to think of as 'me' is 'all my own work' and how much
is
an artefact of the work of others.*
Isn't at the point where, phenomenologically and probably
physiologically,
there is a discoordination (difference) in action that is of sufficient
magnitude to disrupt the ongoing actions of ego to require
a re-mediation of functional systems of the brain (which are themselves
completed through the environment)? So long as there is perfect
coordination, there is transparency, "lack of consciousness" of a
self/other
gap which recruits energy to "minding the gap".
On Sun, Oct 17, 2010 at 6:13 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
I don't think I do want to eradicate any distinctions, Andy, but I am
interested in the shifting boundaries around what different people, at
different times refer to as 'mind'. I am increasingly unconvinced of the
primacy of conscious thought processes - the idea of the 'conscious
mind'
being the manager and governor of all mental processing. I am more and
more
persuaded of the view that consciousness is more like a dashboard, a
relatively trivial summary of important processes currently under way,
one
function of which may be (like language in Mithen's account) to make
'findings' available to a wide range of mental functions. On this
account,
mind is to a person a bit like what mythology is to a society, a shared
account of what has been found worth focusing attention on, which is a
product of experience but which also influences future activity.
I also agree with those who argue that 'reification' of mental processes
is
fraught with dangers - to make 'mind' into a noun leads to all sorts of
slipperinesses which might be avoided if we could think in terms of a
constantly shifting process of managing, processing and analysing
information.
I think it is also interesting that one of the hallmarks of skilled
action
is that it becomes increasingly automatic and invisible to conscious
introspection - thinking about what you are doing may be helpful in the
early stages of acquiring a skill but it can be counter-productive
later,
when you are dealing with much more complex combinations of processes.
Going back to the earlier posts in this thread, I am still intrigued by
the
question of where 'I' stop and where 'they' begin - how much of what I
like
to think of as 'me' is 'all my own work' and how much is an artefact of
the
work of others.
I appreciate your point, though, Andy, that the question of who/what is
the
actor if I am an artefact is more interesting than the question of
whether
or not we are artefacts. I think there will be different answers at
different scales. In some aspects of my work I could be seen as an
artefact
which is used by a university for the purposes of its activities. In
other
aspects what I do might form part of other big purposes and in yet
others it
may have little or no bearing on anyone other than me.
I think I am inclined to seek more distinctions rather than to eradicate
any which are still hanging in.
All the best,
Rod
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 17 October 2010 13:22
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery
Carol, when I first responded to Paula's puzzle by saying that the body
itself was an artefact, after being challenged by David, I said that I
had thought long and hard about it and was now convinced that the body
itself had to be taken as an artefact.
I am pleased that this claim now seems to have gained wide support on
xmca. But I had said I had "thought long and hard" about it, because
this claim itself poses some pretty profound philosophical problems
which I think you, Carol, picked up on, when you referred to the need to
steer clear of dualism. Nowadays people are very shy of dualism, and
rightly so. But avoiding dualism by saying "Everything is ..." is no
solution either. I suspect Rod is moving in that direction. He seems to
want to remove the danger of dualism by eradicating the distinction
between mind and matter, in some way that I can't quite get a handle on
yet.
Although "Activity" is generally taken as characteristic of all living
things (e.g. in JG Herder and in AN Leontyev) the "artefact mediated
actions" which are probably the central concept of CHAT, the action is
purposive and conscious, and differs essential from natural activity. I
am concerned that this idea is retained.
Andy
Carol Macdonald wrote:
Andy
For somebody as dim as me, I think I got it a bit. As our minds
developed
a range of communicative functions, they started to take on tool-like
functions, like embedded (2nd order) problem solving, and minding other
people's business in a constructive sense.
If I know you Andy, this is not what you are worried about, but
something
much more esoteric :-)
Carol
On 17 October 2010 11:40, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
"so our *minds* are artefacts"? I don't get that, Rod.
andy
Rod Parker-Rees wrote:
There may be a connection between this thread and the 'LSV on the
preschool stage' thread where Martin Packer referred to the arcuate
fasciculus, the dense bundle of axon connections between Broca's area
(speech production) and Wernicke's area (processing of speech).
I believe Steven Mithen has argued that speech may have acted as a
mediating link between other areas of mental activity which had
previously
developed and functioned much more independently. Once we were able
to
hear
ourselves talking about aspects of our lives we were better able to
distribute information around our brains (Mithen gives examples such
as
combining ideas about tool use and ideas about relationships with
people to
allow us to conceive of using people as tools, or combining knowledge
about
natural history with knowledge about people to develop shamanic
beliefs
and
practices).
If we go along with this then we could argue that social interaction
(first mimetic and later mediated by speech) has shaped the
development
of
our minds both phylogenetically and ontogenetically so our minds are
artefacts, shaped by our participation in social/cultural practices.
If, as I think evidence suggests (sorry to be so vague) the arcuate
fasciculus is a relatively late development, this would suggest that
externalised (interpersonal) communication predated internal
consciousness
and that language provided us with the means to become aware not only
of
what others say to us (and we to them) but also of what we 'say' to
ourselves - so the Great-We proceeds the individual consciousness.
Julian
Jaynes argued that it is only relatively recently that we have fully
accepted 'our' thoughts as being 'ours' rather than the voices of
spirits or
other 'outside' beings. Perhaps we are now beginning to return to a
recognition that 'our' thoughts may not be as much 'our own' as we
once
believed, using the lovely image which was offered earlier, the
words,
values, beliefs and principles which help to define who we are come
to
us
pre-owned or pre-occupied, like footprints in the sand.
The history of attitudes to childhood also charts the swings from
celebration of the 'artificiality' of a civilised adult (when
children
are
seen as primal, savage and rather unpleasant) to celebration of all
that is
natural and unspoiled (when children are all innocence and
loveliness).
I
think many people today would prefer to believe that they 'just
happened'
rather than accept that they have been fabricated (the mantra of all
reality
TV participants is 'I just want to be myself').
There is another thread to be followed in charting the unfortunate
shift
in the meaning of 'tool' to the point where it can now be used as a
term of
abuse!
All the best,
Rod
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: 16 October 2010 20:03
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Tom Toolery
Andy, Lucas, Carol...
It seems to me we're using the term 'artifact' in two related but
distinguishable ways. First, to say that something is a product of
human
activity, rathe than solely natural processes. Second, to say that
something
mediates human activity.
I think a plausible case can be made that the human body is an
artifact
in
both senses. The NYTimes article I sent recently illustrates that
past
cultural activity has shaped the form and functioning of the human
body
today. Lactose tolerance, which sadly I lack, was a mutation that
conveyed
advantage to those carrying it once farming and milking of cattle
became
widespread, and so it became increasingly common. Those of you who
today
drink milk and eat cheese have bodies are the products of our
ancestors'
activities in the milk shed.
But, second, the human body can surely mediate human activity, as
Marx
described clearly. When I sell my labor power I am contributing my
body
as a
mediator between capital and commodity. A less sobering example would
be the
developmental stage of the Great-We, when the infant needs and uses
the
bodies of adults to get anything accomplished. The first gestures and
holophrastic utterances are calls for others to act on the infant's
behalf,
doing what his or her own body is not yet capable of.
Martin
On Oct 16, 2010, at 5:27 AM, Lucas Bietti wrote:
Andy,
Thanks for the remark and my apologies if I was not clear enough. I
understand
your point about the historicity and cultural and social
trajectories
of
artifacts and I agree on that. What I was suggesting was that
gesturing
could be
an activity in which the body would act as an artifact without
counting
on
external devices -if we claim that *the body is an artifact*. I was
wondering
how the mind-body unity and necessary interanimations would be
operating
in
dreaming?
Lucas
On October 16, 2010 at 4:51 AM Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
wrote:
Lucas,
I think the distributed mind idea emphasises certain aspects of
human
life, namely the involvement of *other people* in the production of
artefacts and participation in institutions and other forms of
social
practice. But it should be remembered that an artefact is typically
the
product of *other people* working in institutions; as Hegel said:
"the
tool is the norm of labour." So both ideas are making the same
claim
but
with slightly different emphasis.
But when you say "if we believe that the body is crucial for
perception
and cognition, ..." surely this is not up for debate? And yet you
seem
to be suggesting that the body might not be needed for cognition
and
consequently, the body might not be an artefact. I'm really lost
here.
:)
Andy
Lucas Bietti wrote:
Carol and Andy,
As far as I know, the point of the extended mind/distributed
cognition
approach
is the idea that in many cases cognitive processes are
extended/distributed
across social and material environments. So in writing both the
pencil
and
paper
are acting as mediating interfaces enabling us to perform certain
cognitive
tasks (e.g. basic math operations) that, otherwise, we would not
be
able to
perform.
Extended and distributed approaches to the mind don't consider the
body
as
an
artifact. The basis for the these approaches is that cognitive
processes are
embodied and situated in concrete activities. That's why cognitive
and
sensory-motor interanimations are part of the same mind-body
unity.
Gesturing
can be thought as a cognitive-embodied activity in which the body
acts
as an
artifact to represent and convey meaning. In gesturing the
mediating
interface
is the space. However, if we believe that the body is crucial for
perception
and
cognition, in my view, there would be no reason to claim that the
body
is an
artifact -or I missed something of the discussion.
Lucas
On October 16, 2010 at 3:13 AM Carol Macdonald <
carolmacdon@gmail.com>
wrote:
Andy
In a small and trembling voice, 'cos we don't want to get into
dualisms
here--surely artefacts mediate with other artefacts--the pencil
mediates
writing? I don't feel I am in the right league to answer this
questions,
but
I think we are pushed back to this position.
Carol
On 16 October 2010 08:33, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
wrote:
Understood, and an interesting example it was too. I was just
trying
to
get
back to Paula's interesting question which started the thread.
Jenna got a thread going on the blind person's cane, where that
part
of
the
mind which is in artefacts become completely subsumed into the
body,
from
a
psychological point of view. Paula then pointed out that from a
psychological point of view we can take parts of our body to be
tools.
So the question is raised: psychologically speaking, where is
the
border
line between body and things?
Lucas added the idea of "distributed cognition" so that the
activity
of
other people is seen also to be a part of mind.
But, and I think this is an challenging one: if the human body
is
an
artefact, what is it mediating between?
Andy
Carol Macdonald wrote:
Actually Andy
I thought I was giving an historically interesting example.
Maybe
it's
because we have 350 000+ people a year dying from AIDS that
health
is so
high in our national consciousness. So excuse the example: you
are
lucky
you
didn't get an historical account of HIV/AIDS!!
Raising children is also interesting across the cultures in our
country.
But
I have work to do so must stop here.
Carol
On 16 October 2010 02:44, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
wrote:
We shouldn't take this "the body is an artefact" down an
entirely
negative
line of course, Carol.
Every parent will tell you the efforts that went into raising
their
own
darling children.
Andy
Carol Macdonald wrote:
TB is very interesting historically in the way we have
responded
to it.
Firstly, you got ill from it and died from it, like the poet
Keats.
Then
people were isolated in sanatoria and given drugs and then
they
recovered.
And now, you are infectious until you start taking your
medication, and
then
if you faithfully take it, then you get better. And most
recently,
you
are
likely to get TB as an opportunistic infection when you are
HIV+,
and
it's
harder to shake off because your immune system is
compromised.
Recently my niece had a group of friends round for supper and
then
was
diagnosed with TB the following day. She had to inform
everybody,
and
they
had to be checked, but within 48 hours, when she was on
medicine,
she
didn't
have to tell/warn anybody. Astonishing for someone who
regularly
swims
5km
before breakfast!! If she had been Keats, her symptoms would
have
been
more
than a slight cough at night.
carol
On 15 October 2010 14:42, Leif Strandberg <
leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com
wrote:
and TB
Is Karin Johanisson (Prof in Medical History, Univ of
Uppsala,
Sweden)
translated...
her books are really interesting
Leif
15 okt 2010 kl. 14.26 skrev Martin Packer:
Lactose intolerance - just one example of cultural
continuation
of
biological evolution...
Martin
.
<Wade 2010 Human Culture, an Evolutionary Force.pdf>
On Oct 15, 2010, at 5:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
I am intrigued Rod. You conclude from this interesting
story
that
the
body is not ("may not be") an artefact, but "virtual maps"
within
the
brain
are? I presume because these neural structures are
"constructed,"
whereas
other parts of the body are not?
What do you mean?
Andy
Rod Parker-Rees wrote:
In 'The body has a mind of its own' by Sandra Blakeslee
and
Matthew
Blakeslee (2007 Random House), there is a chapter which
begins
with
an
account of research by Dr Atsushi Iriki and colleagues in
Japan.
This
research involved training monkeys to use rakes as tools
to
retrieve
food
and then using arrays of microelectrodes implanted in
their
skulls
to
study
the visual receptive fields of visual-tactile cells in
the
posterior
parietal cortex of the monkeys. What Iriki found was that
these
visual-tactile cells, which usually responded to
information
only
in
a
region within the monkeys' arms length, began to respond
to
more
distant
information (within arm+rake's length) but ONLY when the
monky
was
using the
rake as a tool - when the mankey was passively holding
the
tool the
response
drew back to its normal range. The chapter goes on to
describe
studies
in
virtual reality in which participants learn to control
avatars
which
have
strikingly different physiology - e.g. a lobster -
controlled
by a
complex
code of combined body movements which is never shared
with
participants,