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Re: [xmca] LSV on the preschool stage
You are correct in specifying this Martin: Not being an instructor of
developmental psychology I have a tendency of oversimplifying when I
discuss LSV's theories on development.
I agree with your initial assessment that LSV believes development first
comes from outside the child and that Piaget believes children have inate
thinking abilities that are strengthened as they develop.
Here is something that remains unanswered though: is the person of
retarded development of conceptual processing merely prolonged in the five
stages of development? As they age is it necessary for them to follow the
loosely threaded realm of LSV's developmental quilt or has the window
closed?
eric
From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: 10/14/2010 10:24 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] LSV on the preschool stage
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
Hi Eric,
My reading is that at each stage there is development of awareness and
deliberate control of a specific aspect of the child's relationship to the
world. The infant develops mastery of the Great-we, the toddler develops
mastery of a world of affordances, the preschooler is mastering the field
of meaning, the school-age child comes to master the 'inner field' of
their psychological functions, while the adolescent masters the field of
possibilities.
Martin
On Oct 14, 2010, at 10:29 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> The general law of development says that awareness and deliberate
control
> appear only during a very advanced stage in the development of a mental
> function, after it has been used and practiced unconsciously and
> spontaneously. In order to subject a function to intellectual and
> volitional control, we must first possess it (Vygotsky, 1999, pg. 168).
> This is just one more thought on Vygotsky's belief about the development
> of interiorization. That prior to deliberate control the developmental
> process of thinking occurs in fits and starts of speech. Paula's video
of
> the block experiement is a perfect example of this.
>
> eric
>
>
>
> From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: 10/14/2010 09:24 AM
> Subject: Re: [xmca] LSV on the preschool stage
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
> Martin:
>
> Extremely thought provoking post. I would agree whole-heartedly that
the
> three year old is not thinking (in the sense of how an adult comprehends
> thinking, however I do believe there to be the autist perceptions
> occurring) unless they are talking. I would even go so far as to say
even
>
> adults who are at a complex level are only thinking as they speak or in
> your case as you were writing the post. Would it be fair to say you now
> have a deeper understanding of how to teach developmental psychology as
a
> result of typing it?
>
> I agree with mike cole, there is a two way spiral that spreads
> understanding both outwards and inwards. Unfortunately that spiral may
be
>
> slippery and others will fall off or it may by course and cut too
deeply.
>
> eric
>
>
>
> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: 10/13/2010 04:35 PM
> Subject: [xmca] LSV on the preschool stage
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
>
> Teaching is always such a humbling experience. One has to explain things
> as clearly as possible, and in doing so it turns out that the subtle and
> sophisticated understanding one thought one had of the topic is riven by
> inconsistencies and filled with gaps (so to speak).
>
> This semester I am recasting my undergraduate course in developmental
> psychology to focus much more centrally on presenting a complete and
> coherent Vygotskian account of development. The topic this and last week
> was the preschool stage (3 to 7 years). V wrote about this stage in at
> least five places: several times in T&L (on self-directed speech, and on
> the formation of complexes), the chapter on the crisis at age 3 in the
> unpublished manuscript on child development, in at least 2 chapters of
> HDHMF, and in the paper on play. These texts span only a few years, but
> coordinating them is not a straightforward task, for me at least,
humbled
> as I now am.
>
> And then trying to relate them to Piaget's work is complex. Piaget
himself
>
> had two distinct ways of describing the limitations in preschoolers'
> cognition (though he was consistent in emphasizing its limitations). One
> was in terms of egocentrism, the second in terms of limitations in the
> child's capacity to form mental representations at this stage (they are
> static, focused on a single dimension, etc.). LSV knew about the first
of
> these, but didn't live long enough to encounter the second. So we have
to
> extrapolate from his critique of Piaget's early work in order to infer
> what he might have said about conservation tasks, for example.
>
> First humbling experience: trying to reconcile the fact that
preschoolers
> seem to be not only aware of the distinction between appearance and
> reality but actively mastering it in their pretend play, while at the
same
>
> time they fail to distinguish between what a piece of playdoh really is
> and how it appears. Should we presume that the appearance/reality
> distinction slowly develops as consequence of playing (as Gaskins and
> Goncu once proposed)? Or are these phenoman related in some other way?
> Does anyone know of studies that have explored the timing of acquisition
> of these two (conservation and pretend play)? I h
>
> Second, my simple way of explaining LVS's view, and then contrasting it
> with Piaget's, has been to say that Piaget considered the preschooler's
> thought to be mental action on mental representations, and their speech
to
>
> be simply the expression of this thought, and consequently as
manifesting
> the same egocentric characteristics. LSV, on the other hand, proposed
that
>
> preschoolers think, at least at first, only when they talk. Talk only
goes
>
> completely 'inner' at the end of this stage. (There is simplification
> here, as I try to grapple with the fact that in some texts LSV wrote of
> preverbal thinking occurring as early as infancy, with the first use of
> tools, while in others he writes of thinking differentiating from
> perception and action only in the preschool stage. I'm not suggesting
> those two claims are mutually exclusive, but it does take a bit of work
to
>
> reconcile them.)
>
> This raises the question, how would children perform on the three
> mountains task, for example, if they were allowed, or encouraged, to
speak
>
> aloud in order to figure out the answer? ("The doll is over there, and
so
> while the green mountain is to my left, she must see it to her
right...").
>
> Anyone know of such a study? Anyone want to try such a study?The videos
I
> have just shown in class don't offer much opportunity for this, but if
LSV
>
> was correct, if the preschool child is not speaking, she is not
thinking.
>
> Third, speech goes inner twice, in two different ways. First, social
> speech becomes individual speech, as the preschooler talks to self aloud
> in order to solve problems and to direct their own activity. Second,
> speech becomes silent, 'in the mind' (and while this way of putting it
is
> probably an unavoidable part of our folk psychology it surely shouldn't
be
>
> considered a satisfactory part of a scientific psychology, IMHO). This
is
> the point, I told my students today, where the articulatory part of the
> brain has formed an internal, direct neurological connection with the
> receptive part of the brain. No longer does communication between these
> two require an external, indirect route via mouth and ears. One of the
> braver students asked me, is that just your idea or is it a fact? I seem
> to recall Luria writing along these very lines, but can anyone help me
out
>
> here? Anyone know of either classic neuropsychological studies of
'inner'
> speech, or modern MRI studies? What lights up when I talk to myself,
> either out loud or silently?
>
> Then, to go back to play. LSV describes pretend play as a
differentiation
> between the field of the visible and the field of meaning. The child
rips
> the word from one object, but only by applying it to another object,
which
>
> needn't resemble the first so much as be able to support a similar
> activity on the part of the child. A stick doesn't resemble a horse, but
> it can be named 'horse' because it can be placed between the legs and
> ridden. This, LSV writes, is the key to symbolic activity at this stage
> (chap 7 of HDHMF, as I recall). This is not yet an arbitrary
relationship
> of sign/signifier, but a motivated substitution within an imaginary
field.
>
> I take this to mean that the stick is not 'standing for' the horse;
> rather, the word 'horse' is standing for, picking out, the stick. I am
> sorely tempted to say that this means what we are dealing in prentend
play
>
> with is not reality=stick, appearance=horse, an object that appears to
be
> a horse within the play, but is really a stick. We have an object that
> appears to be a stick, but within the play is really a horse. I am
further
>
> tempted to wish that Andy had read Hegel's Phenomenology, because in
that
> book one of the stages of consciousness that is described is one in
which
> a distinction develops between appearance and reality. The distinction
is
> soon overturned, however, because it turns out to be unstable. Piaget
> stopped, but Hegel kept on trucking.
>
> In conclusion, any and all help and clarification of my jumbled thoughts
> would be greatly appreciated, not least by my students, who are dearly
> wishing that Prof. Packer could get stuff figured out before he tries to
> teach it. Sigh.
>
> Martin_______________________________________________
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