Re: [xmca] Vygotsky vs. Bakhtin (or, The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural Redux)

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

The way you phrase the contrast, Anna, it is almost as if you were
identifying vertical (LSV) and horizontal (MB) dimensions of development. Is
that like socio-cultural "vs" cultural-historical?

When you write that for LSV  real life moments "and relations with
othersrepresent simultaneously the substance of the developing
individual and the
shaping and formatting tools (mediation) of the developmental process," the
inter-relations highlighted in Bakhtin, seem there, but "backgrounded."
Reciprocally, Bakhtin, in other ways, (chronotopes come mind) acknowledges
the cultural historical.

Do you see these views as complementary or conflicting?
mike
On Sun, Sep 5, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <ana@zmajcenter.org>wrote:

> Dear David,
>
> The two quotes and stand points that you write about, the perspectives of
> Bakhtin  and Vygotsky do not have the same focus.  Bakhtin and Vygotsky, I
> would say, have two different frames of mind -- their concerns are
> different. It is not that they are not looking at the seemingly the same
> phenomenon, but they are looking at it with different concerns and for
> different reasons.
>
> It is ironical, that Vygotsky, who brought to our attention the social in
> the individual, was actually concerned with the birth, growth and the
> development of one's understanding and experiencing (perezhivanie) the world
> through personal transformation of concepts, attitudes and sensibilities
> ("transformation of water into wine") -- so he ultimately was concerned
> about the epistemological issues. What was remarkable is that he realized
> that the real life moment (social-cultural-historical - structural qualities
> of the environment) and the relationships with others -- represent
> simultaneously the substance of the developing individual and the shaping
> and formatting tools (mediation) of the developmental process. But still
> Vygotsky's main concern was the individual development (and through it the
> raise toward the absolute (god?)) toward more powerful forms of
> comprehension (not only cognitive, but in all its aspects).
>
> On the other hand, I see Bakhtin as being concerned with human
> relationships, their quality and their impact on the people who relate --
> their ontological substance in terms of life and death, power and
> subordination, love and hate, honoring and despising, leading and
> following... He was concerned about conditions for a person to grow in the
> relationships in which s/he is fair and just and is being treated fairly and
> justly. And he was concerned with various implications of these
> relationships, expectations, fears and hopes on how one perceives the world
> and her/himself. So I would say that for Bakhtin - the epistemological was
> in the service of the prevailing concern with human existence (ontological)
> and that the measure of development was not in the complexity of one's
> concepts, but in the complexity and morality of one's relationships and
> deeds (postupak) toward others.
>
> So if for Vygotsky it was important to study all that is part of the
> process by which one finds the Truth, for Bakhtin, truth is a means of
> creating your voice, which  can only be achieved by penetrating and being
> penetrated by the voices of the others -- i.e. entering into passionate and
> compassionate relationships and as he says finding yourself in them
> (returning to yourself).
>
> And in that light -- you can see that the concern with the ultimate
> enlightenment and the raise toward knowledge, and by implication toward the
> Truth -- can be "objectivized" (i.e. universal, decontextualized, and
> scientific) and stripped off of "value statements", i.e. made "godless".
> And, also one can see that the concern with with the deeply relational
> understanding of the other and the empathy in human interaction, can be
> motivated by a very religious drive to find human virtue (as a spiritual
> category) -- where knowledge and the clarity of concepts are measured not by
> their structural and systemic properties, but by their ethical value
> (Bakhtin's "postupok") in creating and shaping relationships.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Ana
>
>
>
> __________________________
> Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane
> Assistant Professor of Education
> Chestnut Hill College
> e-mails:  Marjanovic-ShaneA@chc.edu
>                 ana@zmajcenter.org
>                 anamshane@gmail.com
> Phone:    267-334-2905 (cell)
>
>
>
>
> On Sep 4, 2010, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>
> > I've often puzzled over the paradox that the ostensible believer Bakhtin
> appears to deny the very possibility of the abstract absolute, while the
> ostensibly unbelieving Vygotsky clearly affirms it in his "measure of
> generality" and his work on concept formation, and above all in his
> "Psychology of Art" and on creativity.
> >
> > Bakhtin appears to think that existence is an endless but ultimately
> godless carnival, with the low and high constantly changing places. If God
> exists, it is largely thanks to the devil, to whom he must be very closely
> related, if not on intimate terms. On the other hand, the genuinely godless
> Jew Vygotsky thinks that Jacob's ladder was a great spiral staircase, and
> man is always headed for the Crown of Glory (that is, the concept) no matter
> how often he seems to turn in circles.
> >
> > It's almost as if Bakhtin believes that the mere impossiblity of God does
> nothing to lessen his reality in the Son of Man, while Vygotsky believes
> that the mere possibility of God in the mind of man suggests that he must be
> overthrown, abolished, and supplanted by the sons of men.
> >
> > See if you can figure out who this is:
> >
> > "The life situation of a suffering human being that is really experienced
> from within may prompt me to perform an ethical action, such as providing
> assistance, consolation or cognitive reflection. But in any event my
> projection of myself into him must be followed by a return into myself, a
> return to my own place outside the suffering person, for only form this
> place can the material derived from my projecting myself into the other be
> rendered meaningful ethically, cognitively, or esthetically. If this return
> into myself did not actually take place, the pathological phenomenon of
> experiencing another's suffering as one's own would result--an infection
> with another's suffering, and nothing more."
> >
> > And this?
> >
> > “Art would have a dull and ungrateful task if its only purpose were to
> infect one or many persons with feelings. If this were so, its significance
> would be very small, because there would be only a quantitative expansion
> and no qualitative expansion beyond an individual’s feeling The miracle of
> art would then by like the break miracle of the Gospel, when five barley
> loaves and two small fishes fed thousands of people, all of whom ate and
> were satisfied, and a dozen baskets were filled with the remaining food.
> This miracle is only quantitative: thousands were fed and were satisfied,
> but each of them ate only fish and bread. But was this not their daily diet
> at home, without any miracles? (…) The miracle of art reminds us much more
> of another miracle in the Gospel, the transformation of water into wine.
> Indeed, art’s true nature is that of transubstantiation, something that
> transcends ordinary feelings; for the fear, pain, or excitement caused by
> > art includes something above and beyond its normal, conventional
> content.”
> >
> > Both are attacking the Tolstoyan idea that art is a kind of disease,
> spreading emotion like a one of the plagues that Moses and Aaron visited
> upon the Pharoah. Both believe, as Brecht did, that art requires an
> objectifying move; that the tennis ball in play can never understand the
> laws of motion, and man in the grip of passion cannot really make sense of
> emotion either. (This, for me, was Spinoza's really great contribution,
> Andy!)
> >
> > But for one the going out and the coming back is quite enough; God goes
> out to man in the form of Christ and returns to himself in order to bestow
> perfect forgiveness. For the other, on the other hand, the whole thing must
> be turned on its head: instead of the sociocultural emerging from the sum
> total of the interpersonal, the interpersonal may only truly be made sense
> of as a microcosm of the sociocultural.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >
> >
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