Re: [xmca] Abduction, Creativity and Imagination

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Denise

Your wonderful articles from Valsiner, and now Paavola, along with
Vygotsky's chapter on Imagination [and Dewey's chapter 1 in "Art &
Experience"] is a wealth of new connections and a topic which I believe is
CENTRAL to understanding human sciences.  You mention your work is mostly
with adults.  I work with 12 year olds who I believe are getting a cultural
message that "play" as central to development [and recognition
of "imagination" as central] must no longer be central at their age and it
is time for learning "received" knowledge in order to aquire the tools to
become "productive members of society.  I want to emphasize that I agree
that acquiring received knowledge IS CENTRAL [within schools],  BUT I
question the loss of vitality that I "perceive" [or project???] as childhood
is left behind and life gets "serious".  I question why imagination  has to
become so "interiorized" and "private" at this developmental time period.
Is it an INVARIANT STAGE of development or a cultural artifact that locates
"imagination" as private.
In my work as a counsellor, when I'm successful in creating "shared spaces"
where 12 year olds can OPENLY delight in each others fanciful imaginal
thoughts, INTERCHANGEABILITY of social positions [listener and speaker]
becomes fluid and dynamic with a blurring of private and public imaginal
sharing of perspectives.  This procedural process CREATES novel spaces where
imagination [ones most private reveries] have an opening to become shared
and co-constituted.  The vulnerability and risk involved in sharing ones
most interiorized fanciful reveries with other 12 year old peers is an
experience that most 12 year old students in school settings [where the
focus and institutional structure supports passing on received knowledge]
have left behind on the playground.

It is my perception of institutions, such as schools, which value received
scientific knowledge as central to development which needs to be
critiqued. The institutional de-valuing of "shared" imagination [creativity
and coordination of perspectives] within our particular HISTORICAL  school
structures may be constraining the recognition of imagination as continuing
to be foundational beyond childhood. The topic of ABDUCTION within the
pragmatic tradition and the expansion of this line of inquiry by authors
such as Paavola seems to hold a lot of potential [which may become
actualized] for re-visioning the place of the imagination in the learning
sciences.  Playworlds, such as the 5th dimension, are a specific example of
this potential.

 Denise, your contribution to this conversation and the articles you have
posted are a gold mine of new perspectives which need coordinating in shared
[imaginal & actual] space.

Michael you mentioned that you have been doing a lot of reflection on this
topic.  I also am fascinated with the dialectical process of how abduction
coordinates with deduction and induction and the pragmatist IDEAL  of this
process proceeding within a community of inquiry. I'm planning on reading
the Valsiner, Vygotsky, and Paavola articles to become more conversant with
these topics.  This topic preoccupied Peirce for a reason.  I don't believe
abduction is any more or less central as a form of inference than deduction
or induction.  However, I do intuitively sense, in school settings that
abduction is sometimes viewed as less central to reflection and therefore
may need to be foregrounded in developmental accounts to re-establish a more
equal balance.

Larry


On Mon, Aug 9, 2010 at 6:19 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> wrote:

> Dear Michael, Andy, Larry and Mike
>
>
>
> I have sent you the chapter 6 from Valsiner culture in minds and societies
> which you should have received by now.
>
>
>
>  There was one thing that came to my mind during the weekend is that
> Vygotsky is referring to children's concept formation from the embryo
> forward. I think that there is a big gap between what we know of children
> and the thinking process of adults. My work is at the moment largely with
> adults.
>
>
>
> I do enjoy Peirce's abduction as that moment of creativity (agree with
> Michael) and his way of expressing it . This then would be the locus of
> change. As the next step would be experimentation (stabilization) and
> adaptation/modification.
>
>
>
>
>
> Denise
>
>
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> Sent: 09 August 2010 14:04
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [xmca] Abduction, Creativity and Imagination
>
>
>
> Hi Larry and All,
>
>
>
> I wonder if it might be worthwhile making a differentiation between
> creativity and imagination.  Creativity it seems to be is more active and
> can be observed, is process oriented, and is, or can be directly related to
> problem solving.  Imagination is maybe more inside the head and less
> directly related to problem solving.  I sort of think of John Lennon's song
> Imagine and the old song "Just my Imagination."  Well anyway, maybe
> abduction is more related to creativity than imagination.
>
>
>
> Michael
>
>
>
>
>
>  _____
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss
> Sent: Sun 8/8/2010 9:45 AM
> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
> Hi Mike and Denise and Michael [and others engaged in this expanding
> conversation]
>
> Mike, this topic's multi-voicedness has definitely gone ballistic and I've
> been sent into orbit. However, without coordinates I'm confused about which
> constellation I'm circling. Hard to get my bearings when moving at warp
> speed.
>
> I struggle with reading and understanding Peirce, but I do recognize the
> depth and profound intuitive insights which he generates from a lifetime of
> reflecting.
>
> Valsiner's "translation" of Peirce's concept "abduction" as ABSOLUTELY
> FOUNDATIONAL to the other generative functions of "inferencing" [deduction
> and induction] articulates the ABSOLUTE CENTRALITY OF IMAGINATION as
> implicated in the formation of mind, "self" "culture" "history".
>
> Your mentioning the influence of prior discussions about LSV and
> imagination
> [and playworlds] led me back to a CHAT discussion in 2006 on these topics.
> In that thread you were discussing John Dewey's Chapter 1 of "Art &
> Experience"
>
> Within that thread on Dewey the topic of "learning by expanding" was being
> discussed and you posted the following quote from Dewey.
>
> "... if life continues and in continuing it expands there is an overcoming
> of factors of opposition and conflict; there is a transformation of them
> into different aspects of a higher powered and more SIGNIFICANT life. The
> marvel of organic, of vital, adaptation through expansion (instead of by
> contraction and passive accomodation) actually takes place. Here in germ
> are
> balance and harmony attained through rhythm.  Equilibrium comes about not
> mechanically and inertly but out of and because of tension." (p.13)
>
> Mike, I decided to repost this quote you previously posted to express the
> centrality of this theme of abduction and imagination for Peirce, Dewey,
> and
> Mead.
>  Michael mentioned the central value of instrumental pragmatism was in the
> empirical putting into practice abductive processes.  However as I read
> Valsiner's translation of Peirce I want to suggest that instrumental
> pragmatism is GROUNDED IN IMAGINATION [abduction] and without imagination
> there is no LEARNING BY EXPANDING.
>
> I believe Mead's contribution to pragmatism was his focus on expanding SELF
> formation and developing the "agentic capacity" to ACTUALIZE imaginal
> expansions within a community of dialogical inquiry.  What Mead brings to
> the conversation is a focus on "intersubjectivity" and SHARED imagination
> as the ground of emerging subjectivity.  The terms "perspective-taking" and
> "social acts" and "SIGNIFICANT [shared] SYMBOLS" are key concepts in his
> emphasis on learning by EXPANDING.  Coordinating multiple perspectives is
> the procedural process of abduction [as I understand abduction from
> Valsiner's translation]
>
> Denise,
> I want to once more thank you for Valsiner's article which I hope EXPANDS
> our learning in our playworld.  When I asked for other readings contrasting
> "mind reading" and "non-mind reading" theories I had no idea of the orbit I
> would be sent into.
>
> Larry
>
> This
>
>
>
> On Sat, Aug 7, 2010 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Thanks Denis
> > This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in
> > every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion.
> > multi-voicedness goes ballistic!!
> >
> > Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the
> abduction/
> > imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not
> connect
> > the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV
> > and
> > imagination).
> >
> > Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting.
> > mike
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Dear Michael,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly
> stipulated
> > > in
> > > the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and
> text
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Denise
> > >
> > > Dear Denise,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce
> > cand
> > > abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
> > >
> > > But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what
> later
> > > (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS
> > AND
> > > SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the
> > highest
> > > level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity
> of
> > > meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
> > >
> > > Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into
> field-type
> > > sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Jaan
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On
> > > Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> > > Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Denise,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
> > > pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction.  I am
> > > currently
> > > under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis
> > generation
> > > - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.
> >  So
> > > I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
> > > definition, might play in all this.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Michael
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >  _____
> > >
> > >  From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
> > > Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> > > To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > >
> > > Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book
> > 'The
> > > guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
> > > development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon,
> &
> > R.
> > > Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
> > > models
> > > of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
> > >
> > > I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the
> closest
> > > example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts
> in
> > > human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
> > > mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones),
> > yet
> > > by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis
> is
> > > actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
> > pseudo-concepts
> > > (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities)
> > are
> > > the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The
> claim
> > > would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
> > > described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction
> > > (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense
> > (along
> > > the lines of Pierce).
> > >
> > > I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that
> > there
> > > was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not
> > heard
> > > or read this debate.
> > >
> > > Denise
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On
> > > Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > >
> > > Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> > > 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> > > incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
> > > Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> > > development hierarchy.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > Denise Newnham wrote:
> > > > Dear Larry and others,
> > > >
> > > > I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if
> > so
> > > let
> > > > me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think
> > of
> > > > Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states
> that
> > > > pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
> > > > developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
> > > changes
> > > > or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001,
> p.
> > > > 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
> > > > intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
> > > > dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
> > > > Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
> > > >
> > > > Denise
> > > >
> > > > 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
> > > > developmental question of how  socially situated microgenetic
> > experiences
> > > > get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> > > > experience across situations [and organize the relation of the
> "lower"
> > > and
> > > > "higher"
> > > > functions]?'
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > On
> > > > Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > > > Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue
> on
> > > > Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > > >
> > > > Hi Leif and Katerina
> > > >
> > > > Leif,
> > > > I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment"
> > and
> > > I
> > > > agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of
> > "engagement"
> > > > that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
> > > > others.  I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and
> Glick.
> > > It
> > > > is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles
> on
> > > > Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also
> > focused
> > > on
> > > > "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
> > > >
> > > > Katerina,
> > > > I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally
> I
> > > > accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
> > > > interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's interpretation
> of
> > > > Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on
> > Mike
> > > &
> > > > Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development,
> > and
> > > > also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions
> of
> > > > social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
> > > > reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
> > developmental
> > > > question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
> > > > "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> > > experience
> > > > across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and
> > "higher"
> > > > functions]?
> > > >
> > > > Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
> > > > Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental processes
> got
> > > > organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
> > > > perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562)  Metaphor organizes experience
> at
> > > the
> > > > 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of
> > > "mind"
> > > > [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
> > > > However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL
> process
> > of
> > > > linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at
> > the
> > > > sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
> > > > Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia,
> and
> > > > others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity
> for
> > > > organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be
> more
> > > > reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear
> > teleological
> > > > dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
> > > > perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
> > > > situations of development are  symbolic [and metaphorical]?  As Glick
> > > points
> > > > out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
> > > > differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562)
> > However
> > > > these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
> > > experience.
> > > > The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
> > > where
> > > a
> > > > specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
> > > > alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
> > > > activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
> > > > example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
> > > > specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
> > > > ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
> > > societal
> > > > microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous
> "leading
> > > > activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
> > > > development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
> > > situation
> > > > of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts
> correlate
> > > with
> > > > particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of
> development.
> > > > Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
> > > > socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which
> recedes
> > > into
> > > > the background]  If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured
> > schools
> > > and
> > > > affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
> > > identity
> > > > and concept development would be altered.
> > > > My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
> > > possibility
> > > > of creating institutional structures which promote the
> > > "interchangeability
> > > > of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social
> spaces
> > > > which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the
> > creation
> > > of
> > > > the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
> > > positions
> > > > is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic
> capacity"
> > > > where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
> > > OTHERS
> > > > RESPONDING to their recognition.  This affiliative activity is
> > formative
> > > of
> > > > particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also
> "concept
> > > > development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
> > > reason
> > > I
> > > > appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
> > > > there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of
> social
> > > > positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
> > > > perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this "ideal"
> of
> > > > actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical
> > as
> > > the
> > > > participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
> > > > spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is
> > nurtured
> > > and
> > > > "grown" [cultured]
> > > >
> > > > Larry
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> > > <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",
> > > which
> > > >> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
> > > >> Katerina Plakitsi
> > > >> Assistant Professor of Science Education
> > > >> Department of Early Childhood Education
> > > >> School of Education
> > > >> University of Ioannina
> > > >> 45110
> > > >> Greece
> > > >> tel.: +302651005771 office
> > > >> fax: +302651005842
> > > >> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
> > > >> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
> > > >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
> > > >> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
> > > >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> > > >> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
> > > >>
> > > >> --------------------------------------------------
> > > >> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > >> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
> > > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue
> on
> > > >>
> > > >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > > >>
> > > >> Hi Martin
> > > >>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
> > > >>> infants
> > > >>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons]
> > is
> > > a
> > > >>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
> > > >>> conversations
> > > >>> on this listserve.
> > > >>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person
> > societal
> > > >>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have
> sympathy
> > > for
> > > >>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more
> > widely
> > > on
> > > >>> this particular topic.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for
> > further
> > > >>> articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models
> > in
> > > a
> > > >>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
> > > Review
> > > >>> of
> > > >>> Philosophy and Psychology?
> > > >>>
> > > >>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity
> for
> > > >>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
> > > microgenesis.
> > > >>> However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
> > > >>> engaging
> > > >>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
> > > >>> TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher"
> mental
> > > >>> functions.]
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Larry
> > > >>>
> > > >>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> > wrote:
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Begin forwarded message:
> > > >>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> > > >>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> > > >>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> > > >>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> Mindreading,
> > > >>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > > >>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Guest Editors:
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>           CALL FOR PAPERS
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable
> > capacities
> > > >>>>> for
> > > >>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account
> of
> > > > such
> > > >>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading":
> > the
> > > >>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific
> > kinds
> > > >>>> (i.e.,
> > > >>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of
> > such
> > > >>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question
> > the
> > > >>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
> > > >>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
> > > >>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
> > > >>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
> > > >>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate
> to
> > > any
> > > >>>> sort
> > > >>>> of mindreading.
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately
> accommodate
> > > >>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
> > > variety
> > > >>>> of
> > > >>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm
> and
> > > >>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving
> > more
> > > >>>> active
> > > >>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others'
> goals,
> > > >>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps
> most
> > > >>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of
> > age
> > > > are
> > > >>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before
> > > they
> > > >>>> are
> > > >>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
> > > years
> > > >>>> of
> > > >>>> age.
> > > >>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> aims
> > to
> > > >>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> > > approaches
> > > >>>> to
> > > >>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
> > > >>>> theoretical
> > > >>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and
> how
> > > > they
> > > >>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that
> > from
> > > >>>> human
> > > >>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed
> > include
> > > >>>> but
> > > >>>> are not limited to:
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
> > > >>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they
> must
> > be
> > > >>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at
> all?
> > > >>>>> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute
> false
> > > >>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that
> > > they
> > > >>>> must
> > > >>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
> > > >>>>> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What
> > exactly
> > > >>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early
> > > > social
> > > >>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the
> > other?
> > > >>>>> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to
> play
> > > in
> > > >>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might
> be
> > > >>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
> > > >>>> representational
> > > >>>> and non-representational approaches?
> > > >>>>> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
> > > >>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Invited contributors
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Important dates
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> -       Target publication date: July 2011
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> How to submit
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
> > > >>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and
> select
> > > >>>> "Social
> > > >>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to
> > submit
> > > a
> > > >>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
> > > > Submissions
> > > >>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
> > > website:
> > > >>>> http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the
> > guest
> > > >>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
> > > v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> About the journal
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
> > > >>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by
> > Springer
> > > > and
> > > >>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
> > > science.
> > > >>>> The
> > > >>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics
> of
> > > >>>> mutual
> > > >>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
> > > >>>> interdisciplinary
> > > >>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the
> > mind,
> > > >>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
> > > >>>>>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
> > > > research
> > > >>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical
> relevance.
> > It
> > > >>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from
> > leading
> > > >>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Editorial board
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
> > > Roberto
> > > >>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> > > >>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri,
> Penn;
> > > > Ned
> > > >>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
> > > Breheny,
> > > >>>> UCL;
> > > >>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
> > > Vittorio
> > > >>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto,
> Hertfordshire;
> > > Ray
> > > >>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers;
> Diego
> > > >>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
> > > Christopher
> > > >>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
> > > >>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers;
> > Brian
> > > >>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;
> > > Barry
> > > >>>> C.
> > > >>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi,
> Columbia;
> > > >>>> Timothy
> > > >>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> > > >>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> > > >>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> > > >>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
> > > >>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
> > > >>>>> Malet Street
> > > >>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
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> > > >>>
> > > >>> _______________________________________________
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> > > >>
> > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/<http://home.mira.net/~andy/>
> <http://home.mira.net/~andy/%3Chttp:/home.mira.net/~andy/> >
> > >
> > > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> > >
> > >
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