Hello Larry, Michael and Andy, I am in a different time line to you and so
my collegiality is terminated for awhile. I however mull over the article
and chapters in Valsiner 2007 while scrambling the slopes of the swiss
alpes
and be in contact on Monday.
We are still missing some links to our conundrum as Michael and Andy
stated
... to solve
Have a nice weekend:)
Denise
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: 06 August 2010 18:27
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Denise and Michael and Andy and Mike
What a fasinating direction this conversation is going.
Michael, I may be on "quicksand" as I try to discuss abduction and Peirce
but bringing the "imagination" into the conversation is a central issue I
often reflect on. I am VERY interested in reading Valsiner's 2009 article
where he elaborates on abduction.
Michael I want to amplify a part of your statement:
"each individual must be completely open to development of a new
hypothesis
for solving a problem". It is your next sentence that is central:
"What Dewey added to this was the ideas that individuals really cant' do
this alone.... Abduction is best accomplished as a community process.
What I would like to add for emphasis is that the individual "being OPEN
to
development" is a developmental "achievement" and emerges within a
foundation of institutional societal spaces of openness which support and
encourage this "being open to development" I would like to add that the
societal situation [ACTUAL interchangeability of social positions] is a
PRECURSOR to more internalized "openness to development" Now with
increasingly COMPLEX and differentiated perspectives [and reflective
openness to alternative perspectives] there is an increasing capacity for
abduction [imaginal "what if " and "as if"] ANTICIPATION of possible
future
activity which must be COORDINATED WITH OTHERS to move beyond "fanciful
imagination" into "shared imagination" which is inspiring and able to move
self and other into activity [and change institutions]
Michael, a last point.
You mention that abduction can't be based on any PRE-CONCEIVED KNOWLEDGE.
The hermeneutical construct "horizon of understanding" [received
pre-conceived knowledge]] suggests that imaginal abduction is BASED or
grounded on a foundation of pre-conceived perspectives but in the process
of
reorganizing and coordinating and co-constituting "received"
pre-conceived
knowledge NEW PERSPECTIVES and concepts are GENERATED which are NOVEL and
may be transformative. Hermeneutics suggests we cannot stand outside our
"horizon of understanding" which is an ACTUAL REALITY and ACTUALLY
CONSTRAINS [but not absolutely determines] what can be abducted or
imagined. What I'm suggesting is that abduction and "imagination" are
fundamentally sociogenetic, ontogenetic, and microgenetic processes that
are
assembled SIMULTANEOUSLY. My point is that there is a "reality" that does
not collapse into either pole of internalized subjectivity or unchanging
determined objectivity. The process of "the imaginal" BECOMING "real" [as
a SHARED CO-CONSTITUTION] is the dynamic PROCEDURAL process that leads
toward "objectivity" [exists before the person is born and continues to
exist after the person dies]. This is a constructed "objectivity" of
"received" perspectives.
Perspective taking IS IMAGINAL and how the new perspective is "received"
within the community of inquiry and coordinated with other perspectives
determines if the new perspective becomes a "social representation" or
shared perspective [perspectival realism] that then exerts a constraining
and determining context on developing "self" construction.
Larry
On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 7:35 AM, Michael Glassman
<MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
Hi Denise,
First, thanks so much for all you effort. What great scholarly
colleagiality!!! I was in the process of writing a long response when I
got
the message with the paper on abduction. It might make my growing longer
message irrelevant. I'm not sure, because like Andy I'm still not sure
how
pseudo-concept is being define in this context, or in using Peirce and
the
Pragmatic tradition why the word concept is being bandied about at all.
The
history of the concept of abduction was interesting and I am more and
more
thinking that it serves as one of the pillars of the whole Pragmatic
tradition. It's my thinking, and this is purely abduction, that Peirce
landed on his mature view of abduction when he decided to develop the
philosophical ideas of Pragmatism with James. It fits so well with James
empiricist view of knowledge development - and Charles Sanders needed a
job
and James was his meal ticket. Of such things are brilliance born.
I have been thinking more and more that Dewey and to a lesser extent Mead
were influenced by abduction (Mead being less interested in the
educational
strategies for which abduction is well suited). I am coming to see
Dewey's
(sometimes misunderstood) democratic classroom as an attempt to set up an
educational system that promotes abductive processes. Abduction is an
act
-
it is an observation of a new problem and an attempt to find a hypothesis
for solving that problem (the first step in Dewey's later Logic). I
think
Pizaaro and Valsiner make a slight misinterpretation in their article (or
perhaps I am misreading them), but I think it is important. I think when
Peirce talks about abduction being the least valuable it is not in terms
of
absolute value (Peirce would never talk in terms of absolutes) but a
relational value. For James and Pragmatism in general the only thing
that
could allow the individual (or the society) to move on is a solution that
is
proven through empirical means - and because abduction comes before
experiment it cannot offer the types of evidence that allows individuals
to
adopt a solution.
But getting back to Dewey, I think in his democratic classroom he saw
abduction as both the key point in the process and the most difficult.
That
is because abduction can't be based on any pre-conceived knowledge or
even
prior problem solving. Each individual must be completely open to
development of a new hypothesis for solving a problem. What Dewey added
to
this was the idea that individuals really can't do this alone, it is
something that is accomplished by doing not thinking (which is why
concepts
have no place). Abduction is best accomplished as a community process.
Michael
________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
Sent: Fri 8/6/2010 10:00 AM
To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
HI Andy... need to read this article and reread the part in 2007 and
will
come back:)
Denise
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 06 August 2010 15:55
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
What do you make of this, Denise? yourself.
Andy
Denise Newnham wrote:
> Dear Michael,
>
>
>
> I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly
stipulated
in
> the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and
text
>
>
>
> Denise
>
> Dear Denise,
>
>
>
> Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce
cand
> abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
>
> But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what
later
> (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS
AND
> SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the
highest
> level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity
> of
> meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
>
> Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into
> field-type
> sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
>
>
>
> Jaan
>
>
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
> Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
>
>
> Hi Denise,
>
>
>
> I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
> pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am
currently
> under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis
generation
> - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.
So
> I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
> definition, might play in all this.
>
>
>
> Michael
>
>
>
> _____
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
> Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
> Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book
'The
> guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
> development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon,
> &
R.
> Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
models
> of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
>
> I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the
> closest
> example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts
> in
> human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
> mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones),
yet
> by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis
> is
> actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
pseudo-concepts
> (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities)
are
> the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The
claim
> would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
> described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction
> (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense
(along
> the lines of Pierce).
>
> I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that
there
> was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not
heard
> or read this debate.
>
> Denise
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
> Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
> Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> development hierarchy.
>
> Andy
>
> Denise Newnham wrote:
>> Dear Larry and others,
>>
>> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if
so
> let
>> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think
of
>> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states
>> that
>> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
>> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
> changes
>> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p.
>> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
>> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
>> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
>> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
>>
>> Denise
>>
>> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
>> developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic
experiences
>> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
>> experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"
and
>> "higher"
>> functions]?'
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
>> Behalf Of Larry Purss
>> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>
>> Hi Leif and Katerina
>>
>> Leif,
>> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment"
and
I
>> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of
"engagement"
>> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
>> others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and
>> Glick.
> It
>> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
>> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also
focused
> on
>> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
>>
>> Katerina,
>> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally
>> I
>> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
>> interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation of
>> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on
Mike
> &
>> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development,
and
>> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
>> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These
>> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
developmental
>> question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get
>> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> experience
>> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and
"higher"
>> functions]?
>>
>> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
>> Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes
>> got
>> organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
>> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience
>> at
> the
>> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of
> "mind"
>> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
>> However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL process
of
>> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at
the
>> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
>> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
>> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
>> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
>> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear
teleological
>> dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
>> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
>> situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As Glick
> points
>> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
>> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562)
However
>> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
> experience.
>> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
where
> a
>> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An
>> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
>> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
>> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
>> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
>> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
> societal
>> microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous "leading
>> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
>> development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
situation
>> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate
> with
>> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of
>> development.
>> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
>> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which
>> recedes
> into
>> the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured
schools
> and
>> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
> identity
>> and concept development would be altered.
>> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
> possibility
>> of creating institutional structures which promote the
"interchangeability
>> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social
>> spaces
>> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the
creation
> of
>> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
> positions
>> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic
>> capacity"
>> where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
> OTHERS
>> RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is
formative
> of
>> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also
>> "concept
>> development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
reason
> I
>> appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are
>> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of
>> social
>> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
>> perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal" of
>> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical
as
> the
>> participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social
>> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is
nurtured
> and
>> "grown" [cultured]
>>
>> Larry
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
>>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",
> which
>>> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
>>> Katerina Plakitsi
>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education
>>> Department of Early Childhood Education
>>> School of Education
>>> University of Ioannina
>>> 45110
>>> Greece
>>> tel.: +302651005771 office
>>> fax: +302651005842
>>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
>>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
>>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> <
http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
>>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------
>>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue
>>> on
>>>
>>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>>
>>> Hi Martin
>>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of young
>>>> infants
>>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons]
is
a
>>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
>>>> conversations
>>>> on this listserve.
>>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person
societal
>>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have
>>>> sympathy
> for
>>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more
widely
> on
>>>> this particular topic.
>>>>
>>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for
further
>>>> articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various models
in
a
>>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
Review
>>>> of
>>>> Philosophy and Psychology?
>>>>
>>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
>>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
microgenesis.
>>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various models of "infants
>>>> engaging
>>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
>>>> TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher"
>>>> mental
>>>> functions.]
>>>>
>>>> Larry
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
>>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
>>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
>>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
>>>>>> Mindreading,
>>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Guest Editors:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> CALL FOR PAPERS
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable
capacities
>>>>>> for
>>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account
>>>>> of
>> such
>>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading":
the
>>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific
kinds
>>>>> (i.e.,
>>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of
such
>>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question
the
>>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
>>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
>>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
>>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
>>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to
any
>>>>> sort
>>>>> of mindreading.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately
>>>>>> accommodate
>>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
> variety
>>>>> of
>>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and
>>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving
more
>>>>> active
>>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals,
>>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
>>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of
age
>> are
>>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before
they
>>>>> are
>>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
years
>>>>> of
>>>>> age.
>>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims
to
>>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> approaches
>>>>> to
>>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
>>>>> theoretical
>>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and
>>>>> how
>> they
>>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that
from
>>>>> human
>>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed
include
>>>>> but
>>>>> are not limited to:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
>>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must
be
>>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
>>>>>> - Normally developing children become able to attribute
>>>>>> false
>>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that
they
>>>>> must
>>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
>>>>>> - What does mental attribution minimally involve? What
exactly
>>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early
>> social
>>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the
other?
>>>>>> - What exact roles are mental representations thought to
>>>>>> play
in
>>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might
>>>>> be
>>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
>>>>> representational
>>>>> and non-representational approaches?
>>>>>> - How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
>>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Invited contributors
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Important dates
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Target publication date: July 2011
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How to submit
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
>>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
>>>>> "Social
>>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to
submit
a
>>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
>> Submissions
>>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
website:
>>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email the
>>>>> guest
>>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
> v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
>>>>>>
>>>>>> About the journal
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
>>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by
Springer
>> and
>>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
science.
>>>>> The
>>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics
>>>>> of
>>>>> mutual
>>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
>>>>> interdisciplinary
>>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the
mind,
>>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
>>>>>> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
>> research
>>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance.
It
>>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from
leading
>>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Editorial board
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
Roberto
>>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
>>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri,
>>>>>> Penn;
>> Ned
>>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
Breheny,
>>>>> UCL;
>>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
Vittorio
>>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire;
Ray
>>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers;
>>>>> Diego
>>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
Christopher
>>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
>>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers;
Brian
>>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;
> Barry
>>>>> C.
>>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi,
>>>>> Columbia;
>>>>> Timothy
>>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
>>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
>>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
>>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
>>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
>>>>>> Malet Street
>>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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