Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I think the connections you make are great, Denise.

Is there any chance of producing a pdf of the pages of Jaan's book that you
reference? Many people do not have it.

Markova is always interesting.

I am going out of town shortly for 10 days or would do it here.

mike

On Thu, Aug 5, 2010 at 12:53 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch>wrote:

> Dear Larry and others,
>
> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if so
> let
> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of
> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that
> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to changes
> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p.
> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
>
> Denise
>
> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
> developmental question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences
> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and
> "higher"
> functions]?'
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Larry Purss
> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>
> Hi Leif and Katerina
>
> Leif,
> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" and I
> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement"
> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
> others.  I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick.  It
> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused on
> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
>
> Katerina,
> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I
> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
> interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's interpretation of
> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on Mike &
> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and
> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the developmental
> question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize experience
> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher"
> functions]?
>
> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
> Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental processes got
> organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562)  Metaphor organizes experience at the
> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of
> "mind"
> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
> However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL process of
> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the
> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear teleological
> dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
> situations of development are  symbolic [and metaphorical]?  As Glick
> points
> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However
> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize experience.
> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process where
> a
> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
> societal
> microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous "leading
> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
> development [age determined] but rather on the particular social situation
> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate with
> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development.
> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes
> into
> the background]  If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools
> and
> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED, identity
> and concept development would be altered.
> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the possibility
> of creating institutional structures which promote the "interchangeability
> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces
> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the creation
> of
> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of positions
> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity"
> where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing  OTHERS
> RESPONDING to their recognition.  This affiliative activity is formative of
> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept
> development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The reason
> I
> appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social
> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
> perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this "ideal" of
> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as
> the
> participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured
> and
> "grown" [cultured]
>
> Larry
>
> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi <kplakits@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",
> which
> > is been considered as a constructivist argument?
> > Katerina Plakitsi
> > Assistant Professor of Science Education
> > Department of Early Childhood Education
> > School of Education
> > University of Ioannina
> > 45110
> > Greece
> > tel.: +302651005771 office
> > fax: +302651005842
> > tel.: +6972898463 mobile
> > e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
> > http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
> > http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
> > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr
> > http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
> >
> > --------------------------------------------------
> > From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> >
> > Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >
> > Hi Martin
> >>
> >> This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
> >> infants
> >> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is a
> >> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
> >> conversations
> >> on this listserve.
> >> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal
> >> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy
> for
> >> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely
> on
> >> this particular topic.
> >>
> >> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further
> >> articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models in a
> >> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the Review
> >> of
> >> Philosophy and Psychology?
> >>
> >> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
> >> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis.
> >> However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
> >> engaging
> >> with others" become transformed in the transition to
> >> TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental
> >> functions.]
> >>
> >> Larry
> >>
> >> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> Begin forwarded message:
> >>>
> >>> > From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> >>> > Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> >>> > To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> >>> > Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
> >>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>> >
> >>> > Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Guest Editors:
> >>> >
> >>> > Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
> >>> >
> >>> > Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
> >>> >
> >>> > Victoria Southgate, University of London
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >           CALL FOR PAPERS
> >>> >
> >>> >           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities
> >>> > for
> >>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of
> such
> >>> abilities is that they involve “theory of mind” or “mindreading”: the
> >>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds
> >>> (i.e.,
> >>> to have concepts of “belief,” “desire,” etc.) and the contents of such
> >>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the
> >>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
> >>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
> >>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
> >>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
> >>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to any
> >>> sort
> >>> of mindreading.
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
> >>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
> variety
> >>> of
> >>> nonverbal tasks — e.g., the “violation of expectation” paradigm and
> >>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more
> >>> active
> >>> responses —suggest that young infants can understand others’ goals,
> >>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
> >>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age
> are
> >>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before they
> >>> are
> >>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 years
> >>> of
> >>> age.
> >>> >
> >>> > This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to
> >>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> approaches
> >>> to
> >>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
> >>> theoretical
> >>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how
> they
> >>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from
> >>> human
> >>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include
> >>> but
> >>> are not limited to:
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
> >>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be
> >>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
> >>> >
> >>> > -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
> >>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that they
> >>> must
> >>> be operating with a “theory of mind” or the equivalent?
> >>> >
> >>> > -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly
> >>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early
> social
> >>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?
> >>> >
> >>> > -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to play
> in
> >>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
> >>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
> >>> representational
> >>> and non-representational approaches?
> >>> >
> >>> > -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
> >>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Invited contributors
> >>> >
> >>> > -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
> >>> >
> >>> > -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
> >>> >
> >>> > -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Important dates
> >>> >
> >>> > -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
> >>> >
> >>> > -       Target publication date: July 2011
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > How to submit
> >>> >
> >>> > Prospective authors should register at:
> >>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
> >>> “Social
> >>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives” as an article type to submit a
> >>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
> Submissions
> >>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's website:
> >>> http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest
> >>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
> v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > About the journal
> >>> >
> >>> > The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
> >>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer
> and
> >>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science.
> >>> The
> >>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
> >>> mutual
> >>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
> >>> interdisciplinary
> >>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind,
> >>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
> >>> >
> >>> >  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
> research
> >>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It
> >>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
> >>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Editorial board
> >>> >
> >>> > Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
> Roberto
> >>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> >>> > Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn;
> Ned
> >>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard Breheny,
> >>> UCL;
> >>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; Vittorio
> >>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; Ray
> >>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
> >>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; Christopher
> >>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
> >>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian
> >>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;
> Barry
> >>> C.
> >>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia;
> >>> Timothy
> >>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > Dr. Victoria Southgate
> >>> > Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> >>> > Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> >>> > Henry Wellcome Building
> >>> > Birkbeck, University of London
> >>> > Malet Street
> >>> > London, WC1E 7HX.
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
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> >>
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