[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [xmca] The Missing Part

Is this part missing also in Col. Works edition?

2010/7/12, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>:
> This is the beginning of Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech that was not
> translated into English. I posted it once several years ago, and Anton
> thought it didn't add very much.
> I think it does: it structures the whole chapter, because it makes it clear
> that Freud, Levy-Bruhl, and Blondel share a common idealist basis as well as
> a common canonical stature.
> ≪Мы полагаем, . говорит он, . что настанет день, когда мысль ребенка по
> отношению к мысли нормального цивилизованного взрослого будет помещена в ту
> же плоскость, в какой находится ≪примитивное мышление≫, охарактеризованное
> Леви-Брюлем, или аутистическая и символическая мысль, описанная Фрейдом и
> его учениками, или ≪болезненное сознание≫, если только это понятие,
> введенное Блонделем, не сольется в один прекрасный день с предыдущим
> понятием≫ (1, с.408).1 Действительно, появление его первых работ по
> историческому значению
> этого факта для дальнейшего развития психологической мысли должно быть по
> справедливости сопоставлено и сравнено с датами выхода в свет ≪Les fonctions
> mentales dans les societes inferieures≫ Леви-Брюля, ≪Толкования сновидений≫
> Фрейда или ≪La conscience morbide≫ Блонделя. Больше того, между этими
> явлениями в различнейших областях научной психологии есть не только внешнее
> сходство, определяемое уровнем их исторического значения, но глубокое,
> кровное, внутреннее родство . связь по самой сути заключенных и воплощенных
> в них философских и
> психологических тенденций. Недаром сам Пиаже в огромной мере опирался в
> своих исследованиях и построениях на эти три
> работы и на их авторов.
> “It is therefore our belief", says (Piaget), "that the day will come when
> child thought will be placed on the same level in relation to adult, normal,
> and civilized thought as ‘primitive mentality’, as defined by Lévy-Bruhl, as
> autistic and symbolical thought as described by Freud and his disciples and
> as ‘morbid consciousness,’ assuming that this last concept, which we owe to
> M. Ch. Blondel, is not simply fused with the former.” (p. 201-202). In
> reality, the appearance of this first works, in regard to the historic
> importance as a fact for future reference in the development of
> psychological thought must be on the compared with the appearance of “Les
> fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures” of Levi- Bruhl, Freud’s
> “The interpretation of dreams’, or Blondel’s “La conscience morbide”. It is
> not simply that between these phenomena in the development of the field of
> scientific psychology there is a formal
> resemblance, determined by their level of historic importance, but that
> there is a deep, internal kinship, a connection in essence which is visible
> in their philosophical and psychological tendencies. Not without reason does
> Piaget himself base in enormous measure his own studies and constructions on
> these three works and on their authors.
> Last night I was re-reading Bleuler's criticisms of Freud in "Autistic
> Thinking" and I also came upon these words, which Vygotsky quotes
> approvingly.
> "Examining the more grown-up child, I also do not much observe that he
> would prefer the imaginary apple to the real. The imbecile and the savage
> are alike practitioners of Realpolitik and the latter, (exactly like us, who
> stand at the apex of cognitive ability) makes his autistic stupidities only
> in such cases when reason and experience prove insufficient: in his ideas
> about the universe, about the phenomena of nature, in his understanding of
> diseases and other blows of destiny, in adopting measures to shield himself
> from them, and in other relationships which are too complex for him.”
> It seems to me that here and elsewhere in this chapter Bleuler is arguing
> for, and Vygotsky is agreeing with, a position that is simultaneously
> universalist, relativist, and developmentalist. It is universalist in the
> sense that it argues for a universal human autistic response to areas of
> experience of which we are ignorant. It is relativist in the sense that it
> argues for the independence of an "autistic" response from rationality and
> an autonomous art and autonomous humanities based on that independence that
> is in no way subordinate to rationality. It is developmentalist in the sense
> that it argues for an autistic response which develops out of a narrow,
> immediately realistic (perception based?) reality function rather than vice
> versa (as in Freud, Janet, and Levy-Bruhl).
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list