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Re: [xmca] Is the Ideal factual

Well Michael, I think I would be honoured to be grouped with those idealist philosophers of whom Marx aligned himself in Thesis 1 of Theses on Feuerbach: "the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism ..." or to which the Young Engels referred when he said "It will be our business to follow the course of his thinking and to shield the great man's grave from abuse. We are not afraid to fight." Or Johann Gottfried Herder who objected to Kant's universalism and laid the basis for cultural anthropology, describing thought as "working with symbols" and both rehabilitated Spinoza and critiqued him for a mechanical conception of nature, which was, he said "active." Or the "subjective idealist" Fichte, who invented the concept of Activity as a foundation for psychology or his ideealist disciple Hess who passed this on to Marx at the time he wrote "Theses on (the materialist) Feuerbach." I don't have a problem with being associated with these great figures.
No time here to go into ANL, but I don't equate "the subject" with "the inner" and nor do I limit social life to "production", except in the general sense which includes reproduction of the *social relations* of production, as Marx affirmed in the Grundrisse. "Collective consciousness" is an important concept of course. I presume you have not been converted to the psychology of Jung, in which case we are not talking about quite the same thing as "consciousness," "My relation to my environment," but probably "social consciousness," - "the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out." These are also of course perfectly objective, material processes, not the subject matter of psychology, which I was talking about. 

Andy




Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:

Hi,
I have been following this for a while and cannot but have the impression that you are part of the group of idealist philosophers Marx/Engels wrote about. You are talking about the ideal abstractly rather than looking at it in concrete sensuous activity. Here, you cannot split the double character of work, of the product, of man [Marx]: in activity (deyatel'nost', Tätigkeit) "The inner (the subject) affects the outer and changes itself in the process" (Leont'ev), and, Marx/Engels write "The person objectifies himself in production, the thing subjectifies itself in the person" (Grundrisse, p.89). 
Leont'ev gives a very good account of the relation between individual and collective consciousness, the former as concrete realization of the latter, the latter only existing in and through the former. Klaus Holzkamp further elaborates this relation.

In your discussion, you have been breaking out individual (constitutive) moments of activity and treated them as elements, much like others take the YE triangle and then break out the object, the subject, the division of labor, the tools...

This leads you into the merry-go-round of "intended meanings" (I wish we would abolish this word) and reiterations. . . .
:-)

Michael



On 2010-03-05, at 7:47 AM, Steve Gabosch wrote:

Very interesting response, Andy, thank you.  These are important methodological questions for activity theory, I think.  Let me focus on just one section of your message and ask for clarification.

You say:

1. "Matter" is the category of everything which exists outside of and independently of Consciousness.
2. Therefore what is "Matter" is relative to my individual consciousness,
3. and includes your consciousness and social entities.
4. "Ideal" refers to the *socially* determined properties of things.
5. They are also outside of *my* consciousness,
6. just as you are.

I basically agree with 1, but I am having trouble with 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  At this point, I am trying to clearly understand what you are saying.

On 2, are you defining "Matter" as that which is not apprehended by your individual consciousness?
On 3, are you saying that "Matter" includes consciousness possessed by others besides yourself?
On 4, I agree that the ideal is socially determined, but how does the precise phrase "socially determined" distinguish the ideal aspects of things from their material properties - for example, aren't the material properties of a collectively built thing such an airplane *socially* determined, just as are its ideal aspects?
On 5, are you saying that the "Ideal" lies outside your consciousness?
On 6, are you saying that I and all other people lie outside your consciousness?

Sorry for such a literal interpretation of your words - just trying to follow.  I am not saying that my interpretations are what you really mean, just that these are the literal meanings they appear to have to me.  Since I am not grasping your words clearly, I may be mangling your intended meanings.  Could you clarify?

- Steve



On Mar 5, 2010, at 5:57 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:


No. It is necessary to know the distinction between the two categories of course, but they do not make a mutually constituting pair like subject and object, terms which simply express the reification of the two sides of one and the same relationship or process.

"Material" is an adjective referring to "matter." "Matter" is the category of everything which exists outside of and independently of Consciousness. Therefore what is "Matter" is relative to my individual consciousness, and includes your consciousness and social entities.

"Ideal" refers to the *socially* determined properties of things. They are also outside of *my* consciousness, just as you are.

When I suffer a heart attack or get caught in flood waters, I know that even though there may be social causes (eg bad food, soil erosion), these are natural processes; there is nothing ideal about them.

I just think these are two distinct concepts. We have to generate some heat distinguishing between them because humans, like all animals, are born realists. We think *all* the properties of things exist independently of us both individually and socially. Until we learn otherwise, we mistake the ideal for material.

The point is that matter exists independently of ideals, but not the other way around. But subject-object is a relation which is not limited even to humans, but can be found in computers, human groups and amoeba as well, and like North/South, you can't have one without the other. The matter/consciousness distinction is a different one altogether, as is individual/social. Each relation has to be understood in its own right, I think.

Yes?
Andy



Steve Gabosch wrote:

Andy - what are your thoughts on the proposition, pertaining to the realm of human activity, that the ideal and material are dialectical oppositions - on par, for example, with the subject and object relationship?  Kind of a huge question to squeeze into a little sentence, but I am curious about your thoughts.
- Steve
On Mar 5, 2010, at 3:47 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

I'm sure we're on the same page, Steve.

Firstly, you can't really counterpose material and ideal as if they were mutually exclusive substances. You would find my message equally useful whether I wrote it on paper and posted it to you, told you over Skype or put it in electronic bits in an email. ... but I have to put the ideal in *some* material form. What you are saying is that certain material properties of the protractors (e.g. the "60" mark for an equilateral triangle, or if it was a set square, just the edge for a right angle) carry the necessary effect to someone who knows how to use it.

Secondly, the useful thing that C S Peirce added to Hegel was the different ways a thing may be a sign. If we want 90deg from a set square, it can be an index; but for 60deg from a protractor, we need a symbol. So the way material properties participate in the ideal properties varies from case to case.

Andy

Steve Gabosch wrote:

Andy, I have a question about what you say here about the ideal, using the example of a protractor.  I think you are saying that when we use a protractor to construct a right angle, we are realizing the *ideal* property of the *protractor* to control our activity.  That is what you mean, yes?  But isn't it just the opposite - aren't we using the *material* properties of the protractor to represent the *ideal* of a right angle?  When I come by your desk and ask if I can borrow your protractor, I am at that point appealing to its ideal aspects, which are expressed in conventional terms and words.  We both know what a "protractor" is.  If you ask "what are you going to use it for, Steve?" and I say "I need to draw a right angle," we are now discussing the *right angle* as an ideal object.  But when I go sit down at my desk to draw that right angle, the protractor now becomes a material tool with special material properties, which if I use skillfully enough, will help me t

ransform that ideal right angle into a new material object - a material sketch on paper that physically approximates the ideal of a right angle.  And so goes the intricate and dialectical relationship between ideality and materiality in human activity.  Are we on the same page on this - or am I looking at this from the wrong angle?

- Steve
On Mar 4, 2010, at 4:29 PM, mike cole wrote:

Neat discussion of ideal and material. Thanks all who contributed. Something
to
"re-admire" as Friere would have put it.
mike

On Thu, Mar 4, 2010 at 4:16 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:


No, when we use a protractor to construct a right angle, thus realizing the
ideal property of the property to control our activity, the ideal property
(of being a protractor) is realized. If someone else looks at the resulting
drawing and says (EG): "What a nice equilateral triangle," thus proving that
we also realized the required ideal in our drawing, the circle of
objectification - perception - objectification is complete.

Ideal and material are in a sense opposites, but they are not mutually
exclusive existences.


Andy

ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:


Hello Steve:

You have summed it up within the context of Marx's "Thesis on Feurebach"
and indeed I cannot refute what has been displayed within the sensuousness
of human activity.

Dualism aside however, there still remains the sensuousness of this
activity.  If I am to believe Marx's thesis than a 90 degree angle is never
truely 90 degrees because of it's finite aspect and therefore the concept of
the Ideal is unobtainable.

The logic of the Ideal is factual, yet the activity of the Ideal falls
short.
eric




Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
03/04/2010 09:24 AM
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"

    To:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
   cc:         Subject:        Re: [xmca] Is the Ideal factual


Eric, since I was re-reading some Ilyenkov on this very question just last
night, I will venture an answer.

I think that Ilyenkov would probably say "yes, the ideal is factual." Or
more precisely, I think he would say the ideal is an objective fact, an
objective factor, of human life.

Ilyenkov said the ideal was something that each individual is objectively
confronted with in the form of culture, language, artifacts, writing,
stories, works of art, institutions, beliefs, rules, laws, conventions, etc.
Humans are confronted by the ideal in the multitude of forms in which
ideality expresses itself in the course of human labor and activity.
Roughly speaking, the ideal, in this view, is the collection of socialized
meanings and representations that accompany material human activity and
labor.

This is the basis of the common CHAT metaphor that artifacts "contain"
both materiality and ideality, although Ilyenkov would emphasize that the
ideal aspect emerges only in the actual human activity process itself, and
not at all "in" any material artifact (as Mike also explains in Cultural
Psychology).

The simplest 'rough and dirty' description I know of for ideality is to
equate it with meaning and contrast it with materiality.  Looking at it this
way, we can say that meaning and meaning-making are objective facts of human
life.  Hence, the ideal is an objective fact of human life, just as is the
material.

As for the importance of the concept of the ideal, Ilyenkov emphasizes
that one of the great challenges for philosophy, and many aspects of social
science, is learning how to distinguish between the ideal and the material,
which are often conflated in everyday life and in many academic approaches.

Ilyenkov further explained that the basis of idealism (ideal-'ism' as a
philosophy) is actually a *correct* recognition of the ideal as being
something objective, as being a fact of human life.  For example, Ilyenkov
explains how the ideal, as an objective fact or condition of human
existence, was understood by Plato, Hegel, and other great idealist
thinkers.

But on such questions, dualism soon intervenes, and we come to a well-
trodden fork in the ideological road.  Dualism holds that the ideal
originates from and is probably composed in some way of some kind of
non-material, non-natural substance such as God or Spirit.  Dualists tend to
believe that the universe is fundamentally composed of two kinds of
unrelated, non-mediating substances (although this paradigm causes them
constant problems when they try to explain how humans can act on the world
and themselves as they do).  Idealist-dualists thus tend to argue that the
ideal is in some way connected to something non- human or extra-human, even
though they can only assert its existence on "faith".  (And they will also
try to cleverly argue that any non- dualist point of view must ultimately,
in the same way, be *equally* based on faith!  Sound familiar?)

The cultural-historical activity research tradition, in contrast to
dualism, at least in the thread Ilyenkov reflects, tends to take a
monist-activity approach to the ideal, viewing the origin and composition of
the ideal in terms of it being an objective product of, and playing a
necessary part in, human activity.  Hence, the ideal is not only "factual,"
but is a completely (and uniquely) human creation.

I am curious on what you make of this "concept of the ideal," Eric. What
are your thoughts?

- Steve






On Mar 4, 2010, at 6:34 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:

Hi Andy:

I geuss now I am even more confused than before.

FOrget the faith part.  Could you please provide a good starting point
for
Ilyenkov's Ideal, I know that this has been addressed in the past but I
still don't have a firm grasp of it.

thank you
eric




Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
03/04/2010 06:48 AM
Please respond to ablunden; Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity"


  To:
  cc:     "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
  Subject:        Re: [xmca] Is the Ideal factual


I didn't express myself clearly then, Eric. I simply meant
to list a number of concepts which (1) Are taught in a
formal setting, (2) Are true concepts, and (3) Are not
scientific. That's all. For my point, the question of Faith
doesn't come into it. Relgious concepts, for example, must
be understood in order to understand the literature, law,
etc, of religious activity, for which there is no need to
"believe" it.

Andy

ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:


Hello Andy:
I was referring to your comment that the holy trinity is taught as being
factual.  IHave always viewed the holy trinity as a faith-based system


and


not "factual".  Part of Spinoza'a difficulty with church members was his
logicical use of spiritual matters.  Although not a christian and


therefore


not involved in the matters of the holy trinity it is still a sticky


wicket


when faith and fact cross paths.

So within this context I was looking for insight into the factual


contents


of Ilyenkov's Ideal.

thank you,
eric

To:              "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"


<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>


cc:
bcc:
Subject:    [xmca] Is the Ideal factual
Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
03/03/2010 10:10 AM ZE11
Please respond to ablunden          <font size=-1></font>




















Eric,
I am happy to respond, but could you contextualise your
question a little? Do you mean Ideals in general, or some
particular Ideal? I am curious, too.

Andy

ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:


I am curious Andy, do you believe the Ideal to be factual or is it


based
on faith?

eric


*Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>*
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu

03/02/2010 06:17 AM
Please respond to ablunden; Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity"


  To:        Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
  cc:        "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"


<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>


  Subject:        Re: [xmca] new national curriculum in Australia




I really don't know the answer to this, Rod. I am just
exploring,  but in that spirit ...

All teachers and probably all children like it best when the
kids are just doing what they like doing, and of course they
acquire competency and confidence if they learn like this.
That's all nice and cosy. Ever since some time in the 1960s
it has been near impossible to teach any other way (in many
countries) in any case, because teachers can no longer
exercise fearful authority or even respect ...

But how does one grasp the Holy Trinity, or Saggitarian
personalities, Iconic representation or Nonalgebraic
equations, ... or any of these concepts which belong to
systems of activity and concepts which are foreign to the
day to day life of children?

And if children just quietly accept the Holy Trinity without
noticing that it is a concept based on Original Sin and the
sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, which is not really
factual ... is this a good thing?

Is there anything to learn at school? Or can we all just
absorb everything we need to know without really trying? Are
we all natural born masters?

I have in mind the material Chapter 5 of "Thinking and
Speech." Vygotsky seems to think that learning concepts
which are foreign to a child's day-to-day life is a
completely different process from what happens when a child
generalising from their own experience. It is only when the
two processes meet that genuine understanding is possible.
But if we shy away from teaching concepts, what is the result?



Andy

Rod Parker-Rees wrote:


I would be opposed to JUST teaching the rules of mathematics or art


(using the 'right' colours) AS rules before children have had a chance
to do some groundwork on building up spontaneous concepts through
immersion in a cultural environment in which people do the things that
people do with maths and art.


I think John Holt once argued that if we taught children to talk in


the same way that we teach them to read we would have many more


elective
mutes and children with speech delays. I am not thinking so much about

the later stages of education but I think it is pretty clear that in


the
early years children benefit more from adults who follow and expand on

their attention than from those who try to switch their attention to
desirable, high value learning (like teachers who have to turn every
form of play towards counting, naming shapes and colours etc.).


Children
are taught from very early on to associate learning with WORK - with
all
the affective baggage that goes with that. I often hear students saying

how wonderful it is when children are learning 'without even knowing
that they are learning', partly because sneaking stuff in under the
radar is seen as a way of bypassing the 'work = boring and difficult'
associations which children are assumed to have developed.


I do think there is a time and a place for teaching but I am not


convinced that children always experience their teaching at appropriate
times or in appropriate places!


All the best,

Rod

________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On


Behalf Of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net]


Sent: 02 March 2010 09:42
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] new national curriculum in Australia

So on that basis, Rod, you would also be opposed to the
teaching of mathematics, and for that matter, art, unless
the child was planning a career in a genuinely relevant
profession, such as maths teacher or art teacher. :)

Andy

Rod Parker-Rees wrote:


I think there is a big affective difference between the way we


learn

first languages (or multiple mother, father and grandmother tongues)
and
the way we learn studied languages. I was taught French all through

school but learned Italian by spending the best part of a year in Italy
and i am conscious of differences in HOW I know each of these languages
(and English). I have more of a feel for whether or not something


sounds
right in Italian but I know I know a lot more about the workings of

French grammar.


I wonder how useful it is to teach grammar, as a formal system of
rules, to children who are still picking up on the 'feel' of their

language. I still think that reading well written prose is probably the
best way to develop this feel (picking up a set of 'intuitive' patterns
about 'the done thing' or 'what people do, as a rule') but of course
this helps to develop a 'gut feeling' about the grammar of WRITTEN
language - we also need plenty of exposure to different styles of


spoken
language so that we can develop sensitivities to what works when and

with whom (I never had much time for those primary schools which
insisted that children must only be exposed to one, 'correct' way of
forming letters - one font - for fear of confusing them!).


The time for learning about conventional rules AS rules may be when
we start to ask questions about why some people say it this way and

some
say it that way. We know from studies of language acquisition that a

huge amount of time can be wasted on trying to condition children to
follow a rule which they have not yet noticed.


All the best,

Rod

________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On


Behalf Of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net]
Sent: 02 March 2010 02:21

To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [xmca] new national curriculum in Australia

Our immensely incompetent Labor Government yesterday
announced their new national curriculum for schools
(formerly this was a state responsibility).

It features the teaching of history from the very beginning,
including indigenous history (this is an unambiguous good)
and emphasises the 3 Rs, including grammar. No curriculum
has been set yet in Geography and other subjects.




http://www.theage.com.au/national/education/a-sound-beginning-20100301-pdlv.html


Helen raised with me off-line this problem of reintroducing

the teaching of grammar: who is going to educate the
educators? Anyone under 55 today did not learn grammar at
school or until they did a foreign language, when they
learnt the grammar of the other language. (Grammar means
"Which icon do I click now?")

What do xmca-ers think about teaching grammar? (I am in favour.)

Also, many progressive educators here are opposed to
curricula in toto: education should be about learning not
content. Do xmca-ers agree?

Given the disastrous implementation of policies by this
government over the past 2 years, I fear for our education
system. What do people think?

Andy



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