Re: [xmca] A Good Class or a Good Show?

[David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>]

Yuan:
 
Thanks for a very rich and thought-provoking note. I too am Chinese, by marriage and by choice (in the same way that Obama chose to be black), and so I know all about dressing one's kids warmly and cooking well instead of offering cheap talk (whether praise or criticism). In fact, a lot of the criticism I get from my wife is along those lines: her most common criticisms about my hygiene are veiled concerns about my getting sick and her usual way of finding out if I am uncomfortable is to say "A dead pig doesn't know how hot the water is"). 
 
I have found that Chinese people and especially Koreans praise their PROFESSORS far more fulsomely than Westerners tend to, and at first, as a professor, I found this rather embarrassing. Thinking about it, I decided that the key factor underlying all of these differences is a much higher preference for sincerity. The problem is that when Western parents indulge in fulsome praise of a child, the child cannot help but suspect that the praise is INSINCERE, because they are often being praised for things that adults really do much better. 
 
My wife tells a very bitter story about how when she was growing up one of her mother's co-workers praised her for her knitting and asked her how to do it, so she proudly showed her how. She was then completely disgusted to find an almost fully knitted sweater on the woman's bunk in the workers' dormintory (it wa the early seventies and workers tended to live together), so she knew that the woman already knew how to knit and resolved never to trust praise from grown-ups again.
 
When my students send me presents and embarrassingly fulsome notes of praise, they are often genuinely referring to skills which I have and they do not have yet, and so I never ever feel that there is any insincerity in them. On the other hand, I just came back from the USA and was really struck by how little of the praise I heard for my wife's thesis work contained any genuine desire to acquire knowledge or the methodology contained therein and how hard it was to tell it from the pro forma sort as a result. My wife was actually much more attentive to the criticism; it seemed more concrete, more detailed, and either as cause or as result struck her as a lot more sincere.
 
One piece of knowledge and methodology that I genunely lack and genuinely would like to acquire is Jay's work on timescales; but I found it rather difficult to map them onto the four time scales of phylo-onto-microgenesis that sociocultural theory usually uses. On the other hand, I find the leap from onto- to micro- too large; I suspect that there is an intermediary timescale somewhere (and I KNOW there is one in text, we cannot simply treat a book and a sentence as the same level of organization). Sometimes I even wonder if THIS is the source of the problem we often have actually describing and operationalizing the link between learning and development. (This is elswhere referred to on this list as the zoped problem).
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

--- On Sun, 12/20/09, yuan lai <laiyuantaiwan@gmail.com> wrote:


From: yuan lai <laiyuantaiwan@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [xmca] A Good Class or a Good Show?
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, December 20, 2009, 6:27 PM


David, I think it's not so much the merits or demerits of an article as the
monthly discussion paper's role at xmca. I think of the discussion paper as
a piece to hold our shared attention, accessible to all and for all
interested to comment on, not about what could have been, as it, like all
research work, has its constraints, but, like a museum display, to make
visible our own different takes, yet another way to share (“I didn’t know
you also…”), to reaffirm, to envision “what could be”, etc. But how one
feels about something does matter (neutral feelings usually means less
speaking and acting), especially when there are other means to be members of
a community. On the other hand, the sponataneous tends to be irregular,
although not a problem at xmca. (I seem to be switching positions back and
forth)

I have been thinking how less praise is linked to collectivistic cultures. I
speak from personal experiences. I’m a Chinese and Chinese culture is
characterized as collectivistic. When I first came over to North America, as
an adult, I was struck by the amount of praise parents and teachers lavish
on children, as well as how much parents and adults talk to babies and
toddlers, among other things. Gradually, the unfamiliar becomes familiar. My
own experience of growing up at home, back in Taiwan, is that my parents did
not hug me and my siblings much at all (all my aunts and uncles did the
same, but my grandfather always hugged and kissed his grandchildren; I still
recall complaining to him about his beard). But children growing up in such
homes know that their parents love them because there are many ways to show
love. My mom loves me every time when she cooks the food I like; my dad
shows his love for me when he asks me to dress warmly. Chinese may get or
give less praise, but we know it IS praise when parents do not say anything
upon reading a report card of straight A’s. That’s a high school student put
it to me; she knew her parents were pleased. Good grades are expected and
both children and parents know. Overt praise among Chinese people, based on
my personal experience and immigrants in Canada that I have experienced at
that time, is not necessary because of shared expectations. I guess it would
be the same with behavior. Someone I know told a story, which happened many
years ago when she first arrived in New York from China. The host family
picked her up at the airport in the evening and asked her if she would like
something to eat before going to bed. She thanked her host and declined. She
was expecting a second offer and ready to accept that. But the second offer
never was made. Of course, the host family did not know the Chinese code for
being a host. That was some years ago when I talked to some other immigrant
Chinese about parental expectations. I don’t know the newer generation and
how much parenting practices has changed or not. I can’t judge fairly my own
parenting practices.

In the example of expectations understood between and among parties, I think
it is not so much “less praise” as to how praise is expressed, via body
language or because there is less perceived need (due to shared, tacit
understanding). But I’m not sure if “less praise” means “more criticism”,
which Gratier et al. seem to place on the same plane. Looking at personal
experiences on the speculated mechanism of “less praise”, I would think
that, if a parent frowns while reading a report card, it is an expression of
criticism and there shouldn’t be different patterns of occurrences. But then
again we are human and we probably let out our anger when shared
expectations aren’t met than to withhold praise, at least openly, when good
results come in. It appears that Gratier et al. refer to a different way of
conceptualizing praise and criticism. They write, “one element in the
‘collectivistic’ worldview is a dispreference for praise, which makes one
child stand out” (p. 297). This implies that praise or criticism is given in
public or at least there is an audience or potential audience. There is a
saying, a nail that sticks out gets pushed down (as opposed to “a squeaky
wheel gets oiled”). I can’t sort out what this means to me at the moment.
But my question is that, if praise makes one child stand out, wouldn’t
criticism also do? If so, we should expect to see less criticism in
collectivistic culture, but the authors expected it in the opposite
direction. I’m thinking why people in collectivistic societies might be
fearless of making their young stand out with criticism. The only thing I
could think of now is a Chinese tradition to name one’s children humbly so
as not to invoke anger from gods or something. But I think it is more a
tradition of the past and applies to private names family members used for
their youngsters. Most Chinese names I know are grand sounding! Like
“Beautiful flowers” or “Righteous Way.” There are some exceptions; One
neighbor of mine formally named her daughter “Dian Dian”, which means Dot
Dot. But that may suggest more fondness than fear of standing out.

For me, Jay's article, Across the Scales of Time: Artifacts, Activities, and
Meanings in Ecosocial Systems, inspires “what could be”. The parts of the
article on the adabatic and heterochrony principles are a bit difficult for
me (at first at least), but the rest is a treat! I was thinking of how it
would apply to young immigrant children in Gratier et al. and methodological
considerations as I read it. I like very much Jay’s view on page 288: “we
still tend to define our objects of study in such a way that a single
researcher could in principle come to understand them. This appears to be a
contradiction in the case of ecosocial systems. The longest timescale
processes that characterize such systems are almost certainly longer than a
human lifetime. We cannot study such a system from more than a few of the
many viewpoints within it, and we honestly do not expect all these views to
fit consistently together. We need at least a team to conduct such a study,
one as diverse or nearly so as the system under study, and along the same
dimensions of difference. And we need a self-sustaining institution that
will last long enough to observe major historical change in the system. ‘It
takes a village’ to study a village.”

(correction of phrases, errors, and misinterpretation is welcome) How to
study longer-term processes and patterns (longer than one lifetime) in
shorter-term processes? The individualism-collectivism is a framework
Gratier et al. use; topdown frameworks (perhaps having been developed from
bottom up) can be useful but, as lived through individuals with different
variations, they are evolving, albeit probably at snail pace in a vast land.
Jay's envisioning of a self-sustaining institution, perhaps global in nature
(a future plan for LCHC perhaps?), would help track longer- or shorter-term
processes across different timescales. As carriers of longer-term
processess, how would the Latino children in Gratier et al. interpret the
teacher’s, say, verbal or nonverbal signs of praise and criticism, intended
by the teacher or not? How would this interpretation relate to their own
perceptions and practices around their parents’ praise or criticism? How do
researchers invite children to reflect on what they have just experienced?
What emergent processes and patterns in the classrooms where different
worlds come into contact? As I think about these, I see that researchers in
the future would write with less finality of their interpretation (even when
interpretations of participants are incorporated) if they intend their work
to continue living, so to speak. Perhaps let the data speak for themselves
more. Perhaps more built-in design to allow the data to be compared with
research of similar nature in databanks for future researchers to mine the
data.

Yuan

On Thu, Dec 17, 2009 at 10:25 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:

> Mike, I think that the answer (to the temporary lull in the discussion of
> the Gratier et al article) is of course all of the below: final exams, end
> of quarter, and a certain amount of delicacy over an article that at least
> some of us see as deeply problematic (see Jay's comments, especially).
>
> I often think it's more useful to bring whatever discussion we are
> currently having (e.g. bodies and artifacts, emotion and cognition) around
> to the article at hand rather than vice versa.
>
> Some of our most successful and fruitful discussions have (alas for me!)
> also been some of our most general.
>
> This is partly thanks to the very articulate and ardent philosophers on the
> list, but it's also because general means inclusive, transdisciplinary, a
> party to which every party's invited except the bouncer.
>
> Now it seems to me that the Gratier et al. article really does have a
> bearing on both the "bodies and artefacts" thread and the "emotion and
> cognition" one. As I already said, I think the "bodies and artefacts"
> connection is INTONATION and STRESS: this is the way that gesture really
> "goes underground" in language, and so I think that Gratier et al (and also
> Wolff-Michael Roth) are right to look at it in all its spectrographic
> splendor. But the level of detail we get that way has to somehow be
> harnessed to a more macrogenetic perspective to do much good.
>
> This time I have a comment on the "emotion and cognition" thread. In
> Chapter Two of Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky spends a LOT of time quoting
> Bleuler. I've just been reading Bleuler's book on autism in the library.
> Vygotsky likes him because of his rejection of the over-extended content of
> the autistic function (actually, as we shall see, an over-extended
> conception of the reality function)..
>
> We can see, even if Bleuler cannot, the beginnings of Hegelian triad
> describing the emergence of higher EMOTIONAL functions. The first,
> relatively unmediated response, to reality is an instance of the reality
> function, but it is based on perception and sensation. Here the James-Lange
> formula that we feel sad because we perceive ourselves crying or we feel
> frightened because we feel the sensations of our body running away from a
> bear may be a useful metaphor (except for the obvious homunculus problem it
> raises), or at least a catchy inversion of the individual subjectivist view
> of the genesis of affect.
>
> >From this primal, biological response a second, more fully psychological
> response is born. As Bleuler points out, it requires a relatively complex
> response, because it involves the recollection of sensation, and even
> turning away from the immediate sources of sensation. This is the autistic
> function proper, and it is not genetically primary. When this response
> becomes linked to itself, rather than to objective events, we get
> “irrealist” logic, the pleasure principle, the associative links of dreams
> which Vygotsky refuses to call “symbolic”.
>
> Finally, there is a third response, which is “realistic” in the sense that
> it is oriented towards an objective state of affairs existing between people
> rather than within them. Yet it is mediated, by recollection and reflection,
> and above all by language. Here is where we must look for higher affective
> functions, culturally mediated emotions, and conceptually based aesthetics.
>
> This third response is also where we need to look to find the basis of a
> Spinozan—a socialist—ethics; like the second response, it considers human
> pleasure and the satisfaction of desire to be a positive good. But like the
> first response, it is objective, in the sense that it is not individualistic
> but socially shared through and through. Bleuler, a biologically oriented
> psychologist, cannot get us this far. But Vygotsky can!
>
> When I read Gratier et al. I am impressed by how many of the descriptions
> of the Bridging Cultures Classroom contain descriptions of positive affect,
> and how many of the non-Bridging Cultures Classroom are rather negative.
>
> But of course a good class cannot simply be a chain of what Wolff-Michael
> calls emotionally positive valences; some such chains are going to be at the
> lowest level of physical response (e.g. the satisfaction of desire, such as
> when kids get treats in class) and a good many more are going to be at the
> level Bleuler is calling autistic; the chain of "one positive valence after
> another" that we often see as a substitute for plot in children's literature
> and a substitute for a script in kids' movies.
>
> So we need more than glowing descriptions in order to see what experienced
> teachers see at a glance: the difference between a good show and a good
> class! One of my grads is working on this right now; the idea is to test the
> positive valence of particular topics in a conversation by counting the
> number of times they get brought up voluntarily by one child and continued
> by others.
>
> We initially thought we would use this technique just to find out who the
> kids wanted to talk about: did they want to talk about the characters in the
> textbook, or about their teacher an their classmates? Surprisingly, they
> often chose the textbook characters, and they were particularly interested
> in...the TEACHER character. In their chat about real people, they also
> prefer the teacher as a topic. Perhaps this is part of OUR culture, though!
>
> While writing this, though, a problem occurred to me. The topics that get
> the most "hits" and which run the longest in classroom conversations really
> represent two rather contradictory things: the ability to stimulate
> interventions from the most voluble participants, and the ability to
> generalize to the interests of the greatest possible number. On xmca, of
> course, that means topics of a certain generality and abstractness. In our
> classroom data, though, that tends to mean the teacher.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
> --- On Sun, 12/13/09, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Sunday, December 13, 2009, 8:38 AM
>
>
> My apologies for posting the les treilles paper twice. it did not show on
> my
> screen. As "recompense" here is a review of a book that
> promotes the idea of "bio-cultural co-constructivism" without mention of
> Vygotsky anywhere. Perhaps, as a result, it leads some of its adherents
> into
> some (in my opinion) inappropriate reduction of culture to "the
> environment," thereby opening up a very old, very stinky, can of worms.
>
> Question: Many people on XMCA voted to discuss the
> "Tacit Communicative Style and Cultural Attunement in Classroom
> Interaction"<
> http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a915635308
> >article,
> but very few have followed David's lead in discussing it directly.
> Is it because of final exam time on both a quarter and semester system in
> the US? Or voting as a prelude to spectatorship? Where are those voters?
>
> mike
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2009 at 7:20 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > The book description came through, Larry. Attached is the most recent
> > Fonagy article i could find that appeared general. His work looks very
> > interesting, thanks. I have not read it yet, but that fact that Gergeley
> is
> > a co-author indicates that issues of intentionality are involved and I am
> > very curious to see if the effects you talk about are connected with
> changes
> > at 9months. First guess, it would fit with Tomasello and Vygotsky, but if
> it
> > fits with Trevarthan and primary intersubjectivity it will be a suprise.
> > We'll see.
> >
> > A brief paper on this topic I wrote for an audience for whom the idea
> that
> > culture mediates human activity was a novelty, and that there is a two
> way
> > relation between "natural" and "cultural" is also attached.
> >
> > thanks a lot for the pointer.
> > mike
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Dec 12, 2009 at 10:10 PM, Larry Purss <lpurss@shaw.ca> wrote:
> >
> >> Vera
> >> I sent an attachment through CHAT but I don't think it went through.
> >> Fonagy and three other authors wrote the book "Affect regulation,
> >> Mentalization, and the Development of the Self.
> >> It is an extension of Bowlby's and Winnicott's approach (He works at the
> >> same Tavistock institute in London) and its interweaving with his
> >> understanding of Hegel and intersubjectivity theory.
> >> The summary of infant studies from a relational framework is excellent.
> >> Some of the "clinical" approaches in the second half of the book may be
> >> critqued.
> >> Also I wonder how feminist scholars may critique the focus on "mothers"?
> >>
> >> However the detail (though sometimes overwhelming) is systematically
> >> presented and builds a coherent perspective on the centrality of
> relational
> >> processes to the development of subjectivity.
> >> Larry
> >>
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: Vera Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>
> >> Date: Saturday, December 12, 2009 8:04 pm
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >> > Hi Larry,
> >> > I would be interested in a link to Fonagy's recent publications.
> >> > I am
> >> > related to him and am doubly curious about his work.
> >> > Thanks, Vera
> >> > ----- Original Message -----
> >> > From: "Larry Purss" <lpurss@shaw.ca>
> >> > To: <ablunden@mira.net>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> >> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> > Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2009 8:51 PM
> >> > Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Andy
> >> >
> >> > I believe the reason we are cautious about brain research is it
> >> > usually
> >> > implies "biology" as foundational to being human.  The
> >> > reason I mention
> >> > Fonagy and others exploring the foundational premises of infant
> >> > development
> >> > is they are starting from intersubjectivity as prior to
> >> > subjectivity and it
> >> > is only within relational contexts that a sense of subjectivity
> >> > arises or
> >> > emerges. They are using brain research to support this
> >> > relational paradigm.
> >> > Larry
> >> >
> >> > ----- Original Message -----
> >> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> > Date: Saturday, December 12, 2009 7:28 pm
> >> > Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> >> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> >
> >> > > Larry,
> >> > >
> >> > > In my first forrays into this discussion on emotion, I found
> >> > > myself introducing talk of physiological observations in a
> >> > > way I would never have thought of doing in relation to
> >> > > cognition. After reading about the 300 years of reflections
> >> > > on the physiology of emotion in Vygotsky's article, I was
> >> > > left asking myself: why? Why do I think it is important to
> >> > > investigate the physiology of emotion, while I hold such a
> >> > > low opinion of the place of physiological investigations in
> >> > > understanding the normal process of cognition.
> >> > >
> >> > > Consciousness is the outcome of the intersection of two
> >> > > objective processes: human physiology and human behaviour.
> >> > > This is equally true of both emotion and cognition.
> >> > >
> >> > > While the marketing, military and medial industries are
> >> > > spending billions of dollars on neurological investigations,
> >> > > I would think that CHAT people would be interested in
> >> > > questions like the role of emotion in learning, behaviour,
> >> > > addicition, the formation of social bonds, and so on,
> >> > > investigating such questions with dual stimulation type
> >> > > experiments, with artifacts that are more or less affect-laden.
> >> > >
> >> > > Andy
> >> > >
> >> > > Larry Purss wrote:
> >> > > > Mike
> >> > > > Your comment that this leaves us only at the starting gate of
> >> > > understanding how bodies can be "written on"  points to the
> >> > > research and reflection on the relation of changes in the brain
> >> > > mediated by culture.
> >> > > > One area of research that is exploring how the brain is
> >> > > changed via mediation is intersubjective infant developmental
> >> > > studies that are mapping physiological changes in one person's
> >> > > brain that "mirrors" similar  physiological brain
> >> > > changes  being generated during the activity of the
> >> > > other  person.  Fonagy is doing research in this area
> >> > > and has written a detailed summary of the research in this area.
> >> > > His term for this intersubjective process is "mentalization".
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Larry
> >> > > >
> >> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> >> > > > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> >> > > > Date: Saturday, December 12, 2009 12:19 pm
> >> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> >> > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> > > >
> >> > > >> I do not have all this sorted out by a long shot, but my own
> >> > > way
> >> > > >> of thinking
> >> > > >> about the issue is that humans are hybrids, really complex
> >> > > >> one's. Their
> >> > > >> brains have LITERALLY been shaped by prior genrations of
> >> > > >> mediation of
> >> > > >> activity through material artifacts, their brains (and often
> >> > > >> other parts of
> >> > > >> the bodies) cannot operate normally without inclusion of
> >> > > >> artifacts, they can
> >> > > >> be "written on" as jay points out.
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >> The problem is that this leaves us only at the starting gate
> >> > > for
> >> > > >> furtherdevelopment of this point of view. I found that
> >> > > >> experimental study I sent
> >> > > >> around sort of interest in this regard, even though it
> >> > > provides
> >> > > >> such sketchy
> >> > > >> detail and assumes so much about its cultural content and
> >> > > >> organization. The
> >> > > >> developmental implications, which in our current discussion
> >> > > >> would mean, the
> >> > > >> organization of hybridity during ontogeny, which in turn has
> >> > > >> implicationsfor the cognition/emotion
> >> > > >> discussion.
> >> > > >> mike
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >> On Wed, Dec 9, 2009 at 5:36 PM, Jay Lemke
> >> > > >> <jaylemke@umich.edu> wrote:
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >>> One of the ways I have found useful to think about the body
> >> > > in
> >> > > >> relation to
> >> > > >>> semiotic mediation is to see the body as, among other
> >> > > things,
> >> > > >> a semiotic
> >> > > >>> artifact.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> What I mean by semiotic artifact is a material object or
> >> > > >> substrate that can
> >> > > >>> be written on and read from, much like a printed page or an
> >> > > >> architectural> drawing. Written on, in the general semiotic
> >> > > >> sense, not necessarily in
> >> > > >>> words, but in signs of some kind: meaningful features that
> >> > > can
> >> > > >> be "read" or
> >> > > >>> made sense of by people (or nonhumans, but that's another
> >> > > >> story) in that our
> >> > > >>> meaning-mediated world, and our actions that respond to
> >> > that world
> >> > > >>> (including by trying to change or re-create it or just
> >> > > imagine
> >> > > >> it in some
> >> > > >>> new way), are affected by our encounter with the features of
> >> > > >> the semiotic
> >> > > >>> object, according to some community interpretive practices,
> >> > > >> with our own
> >> > > >>> individual variations on them.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> At a very obvious level, bodies can be dressed up in signs:
> >> > > >> hair styles,
> >> > > >>> tans, cosmetics. And this can be taken to a more
> >> > > "artifactual"
> >> > > >> form with
> >> > > >>> dress, or a more physiological form with, say, body-
> >> > > building.
> >> > > >> From tattoos
> >> > > >>> to ripped abs is a small shift when we are thinking about
> >> > > the
> >> > > >> body as a
> >> > > >>> writable/readable object. If we want to get still more
> >> > > >> physiological, and
> >> > > >>> think not only about reading other people's bodies, but
> >> > > >> reading our own,
> >> > > >>> then the proprioceptive feelings we sense within out bodies
> >> > > >> can be
> >> > > >>> considered signs as well, whether exhilaration or nausea,
> >> > > >> strength or
> >> > > >>> weakness, etc. The meaning of these feelings is certainly
> >> > > culturally>>> mediated. They are physiological phenomena, but
> >> > > they are also
> >> > > >> meaningful> cultural phenomena, with value judgements
> >> > > attached,
> >> > > >> with intertexts in
> >> > > >>> literature, etc.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> And we can deliberately write to our most physiological
> >> > > >> states, e.g. with
> >> > > >>> drugs, to produce feelings that have cultural meanings and
> >> > > >> values for us,
> >> > > >>> whether of calm or elation, energy or hallucination. And to
> >> > > a
> >> > > >> considerable> extent, our modifications of our body
> >> > > physiology
> >> > > >> can be "read" by others,
> >> > > >>> just as can our made physiques, tattoos, or hair styles.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> So I would say that the body mediates our sense of the world
> >> > > >> and ourselves
> >> > > >>> and other people in at least two ways: directly through
> >> > > >> physiology, as with
> >> > > >>> hormonal responses, sensory modalities of perception, bodily
> >> > > >> affordances and
> >> > > >>> dis-affordances ("handicaps" for example), etc. AND also in
> >> > > >> these other,
> >> > > >>> clearly semiotic and cultural ways, as a semiotic artifact,
> >> > > as
> >> > > >> well as with
> >> > > >>> the cultural overlays of meaning that lie over and color the
> >> > > >> meanings and
> >> > > >>> responses to all the direct physiological mediations.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> I do not, however, know what being wooden on a rainy day
> >> > > feels
> >> > > >> like to a
> >> > > >>> chair.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> JAY.
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> Jay Lemke
> >> > > >>> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> >> > > >>> Educational Studies
> >> > > >>> University of Michigan
> >> > > >>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> >> > > >>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke <http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke> <
> http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke> <
> >> http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> Visiting Scholar
> >> > > >>> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> >> > > >>> University of California -- San Diego
> >> > > >>> La Jolla, CA
> >> > > >>> USA 92093
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>> On Dec 7, 2009, at 4:14 AM, Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >>>> Ok. You have a point. Then, lets start thinking from an
> >> > > >> embodied approach
> >> > > >>>> :)
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>> Let's accept that the body is an artifact. What is then the
> >> > > >> difference>> between a chair and the body. Both are yes,
> >> > > >> "products of human art", as you
> >> > > >>>> express it. However, only in the process (practice) there
> >> > > >> seem to be a
> >> > > >>>> difference. Both are material and ideal (the body is not
> >> > > >> separated from the
> >> > > >>>> mind; the chair, this one here that I feel is made of cloth
> >> > > >> and a cushioned
> >> > > >>>> material, plastic, metal, and involves the ideal that a
> >> > > >> designer and workers
> >> > > >>>> in a factory transformed so people could seat on). What is
> >> > > >> the difference?
> >> > > >>>> Mabel
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>  Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2009 22:53:40 +1100
> >> > > >>>>> From: ablunden@mira.net
> >> > > >>>>> To: liliamabel@hotmail.com
> >> > > >>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>> Well, the body is the body is the body. The reason the
> >> > > >>>>> question arises for me is when we make generalisations in
> >> > > >>>>> which things like person, artefact, consciousness, concept,
> >> > > >>>>> action, and so on, figure, where does the body fit in? My
> >> > > >>>>> response was that even though it is obviously unique in many
> >> > > >>>>> ways, it falls into the same category as artefacts.
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>> My questions to you are: what harm is done? why is anything
> >> > > >>>>> ignored? And, what is the body if it is not a material
> >> > > >>>>> product of human art, used by human beings?
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>> Andy
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>> Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>> Is this way being fruitful? That is why I do not like to
> >> > > >> consider the
> >> > > >>>>>> body as an artifact. Did not cognitive pscyhology do
> >> > > that?
> >> > > >> (Bruner, Acts
> >> > > >>>>>> of Meaning). Then intentions and all the teleological
> >> > > >> aspects are so
> >> > > >>>>>> much ignored...
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>> Mabel
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>  Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2009 20:21:09 +1100
> >> > > >>>>>>> From: ablunden@mira.net
> >> > > >>>>>>> To: liliamabel@hotmail.com
> >> > > >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] bodies and artifacts
> >> > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>> Sure. But the body has been constructed like a living
> >> > > >>>>>>> machine - the various artefacts that you use
> >> > (especially but
> >> > > >>>>>>> not only language and images) are "internalized" in some
> >> > > >>>>>>> way. So one (external) artefact is replaced by another
> >> > > >>>>>>> (internal) artefact. Yes?
> >> > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>> Andy
> >> > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>> Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >> > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>>> However, sometimes practices do not involve other artefact
> >> > > >>>>>>>> than the body (some practices are directed to the
> >> > > body),
> >> > > >> and that was
> >> > > >>>>>>>> why I was talking about the limit of thinking about the
> >> > > >> body as
> >> > > >>>>>>>> artefact... is that a limit? That is why I mentioned
> >> > > the
> >> > > >> body as "the
> >> > > >>>>>>>> raw material". I was thinking for example practices
> >> > > >> linked to
> >> > > >>>>>>> meditation
> >> > > >>>>>>> and the like, for example, among many others.
> >> > > >>>>>>>> Mabel
> >> > > >>>>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------
> >> > --
> >> > > --
> >> > > >> ------------
> >> > > >>>>>> Keep your friends updated— even when you’re not signed in.
> >> > > >>>>>> <
> >> > > >>>>>>
> >> > > http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-
> >> > > >> it-in-action/social-network-
> >> > > >> basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_5:092010
> >> > > >>>>> --
> >> > > >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------
> >> > --
> >> > > --
> >> > > >> -----------
> >> > > >>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> >> > > >>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> >> > > >>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > _________________________________________________________________>
> >>>>
> >> Windows Live Hotmail: Your friends can get your Facebook
> >> > > >> updates, right
> >> > > >>>> from Hotmail®.
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-
> >> > > >> it-in-action/social-network-
> >> > > >> basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-
> >> > >
> >> > xm:SI_SB_4:092009_______________________________________________>>>>
> >> xmca
> >> > > mailing list
> >> > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>>>
> >> > > >>> _______________________________________________
> >> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> >> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> > > >>>
> >> > > >> _______________________________________________
> >> > > >> xmca mailing list
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> >> > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xm
> >> > > > _______________________________________________
> >> > > > xmca mailing list
> >> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> > > >
> >> > >
> >> > > --
> >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------
> >> > --
> >> > > -------
> >> > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> >> > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> >> > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> >> > >
> >> > > _______________________________________________
> >> > > xmca mailing list
> >> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> > >
> >> > _______________________________________________
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> >> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > xmca mailing list
> >> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >
> >
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