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Re: [xmca] emotions and general psychology

Thank you, Mabel, for so many well-placed grains for thought!
I will see about adding J. Turner to my growing list of readings, along with Scheff (whom I've read a little) and Cooley.
I was especially taken by your last comments about the emotional aspect of artifacts. Unlike Andy, I think, I want to frame feeling as something that is often, maybe always, distributed across a material substrate that includes more than an individual human body. Perhaps another person/body, perhaps an artifact, an environment or setting, etc.
You argue from the ideality of material artifacts, and that certainly seems clear in the case of made or built artifacts, which is what we are supposed to mean by this term. I think we also use it for natural or found objects, which acquire an ideality, a symbolic value, a use function for us when we pay some special kind of attention to them, when we pick them up and take them home, when we use them as a rough tool, when we frame them as an art object, when we study them as natural specimens, etc.
I think that it is very important to try to understand the ways in which there is an emotional-affective element in person-object interactions, and the ways in which it may make as much sense to talk about the affective aspects of the object as about those of the person. Much to think about here.
I am also totally in agreement that we must consider the historical dimension of feeling processes of all kinds, beginning with those that are our primary objects of study in our own research. 

JAY.


Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke

Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093






On Dec 1, 2009, at 1:02 AM, Mabel Encinas wrote:



Hi!
I have to take any tip of the thread to start posting otherwise, I will never be able to post. I have been writing something and trying to catch up. I know, though, that one cannot tug on the end of the string without having the entire skein unravel about my ears. So, I post some few ideas from here and there to start being in the discussion.
I consider that Vygotsky's way of dealing with emotions is quite consistent with the rest of his work (still, recognising that he had a process as well). However, as it has been pointed here, he does not finish his proposal. If we do not want to have a dychotomy, if the task is to create a general psychology, then how could/should we study emotions. Nowadays, still we have the same struggle in psychology: emotions have to do with the unconscious, or they have to do with cognition, or they have to do with the body functions. As it has been pointed out here, as well, all those apporaches can be reduced to two psychologies (The Crisis in Psychology, Collected works -CW- vol. 3), defined in philosophical terms, as materialist ('vulgar') and idealist psychologies (The Teachings about emotions, CW vol. 6), and again one of the biggest struggles is how to study them. Vygotsky gives an answer, and the answer could be taken only as the dream of a post-Rusian-Revolution psycholoists: in the light of applied psychology, and so, in the construction of the new society. However, this line I think can offer some points to think about the present, facing the problems you mention, Jay, and then understanding what is what psychology can offer to us today in the construction of the world (this implies a political agenda).
I think the issue of the dychotomies is in itself quite a big issue to deal with, and then there is the issue of how to move forward. Because one thing is to have the principle of 'rejecting dychotomies', the other thing is to start doing something practical with that premise, for example research. I supose you can see that I am breaking reality in two: one thing is 'to think', the other 'to apply'. However, I think that this practice of discussing is importants in the possible practices of researching. I supose, that this is the kind of problems one has to address at the end of research, if I could express what I say. I guess we cannot scape so easily the logics of certain dominant approaches. I guess as well that this is not by chance, because of the fact that consciousness in fact has a relative independence, and allows us to detach from the very present moment, and that is why it has a programmatic element that makes us so particular beings, and have history... Does this make sense?
One important question that Vygotsky posed was how to understand both the continuity and the difference of humans and animals. To be honest, I am not interested in animal psychology. I think that the issue of 'continuity but difference' is an important reason for stuyding things historically. History is one important clue for understanding emotions. However, part of the problem that this entails are linked to Fodor's paradox. Michael Roth gently suggested that I studied Turner. Turner (it is J. Turner, for example in 'On the origins of human emotions. a sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect) has done quite an important and consistent work in the study of emotions. He is a very productive and talented scholar in the field. He has been interested in solving the issues of biology and history in relation to emotions. However, because he focuses on the premise, that the only way in which we can feel, let's call them, 'sublime' emotions is thanks to the fact that they were already hardwired when we came down the trees (otherwise we would have them appear? and Jay, you have pointed at this in a way in your recount on 'solidarity' feelings and the like). There is then something a-historical in this premise: emotions were hardwire once and forever, so, we should study the esential emotions that make us human. I think we could bring here, Vygotsky's criticism to James and Lange, because emotions depend and only depend on the body, then there seem to be no history. The question about dychotomies would be, why do we talk about dychotomy when we have such a plain explanation: we have a problem, and an answer, and it is unidirectional and 'transparent'. As I understand the issue of dychotomy is the fact that once one make such a big claim, lots of things are left aside. I remember, Andy, your discussion about the fact that we are brains. If we are brains, acording to the neurocientist you were quoting some few weeks ago, then when he is asked: "but what about ethics and society?". His answer, as far as I remember, was: "ah, that is another thing". This phenomenon of the appearance of "the other thing", is what we call dychotomy, isn't it? Two separated things, and one explanation.
The other side of the coin is studied by approaches based in social construction: emotions are built socially, so they are diverse, and it is impossible to encapsulate. We can study their history. Nowadays we have so many references to emotions in social science (some people call them the affective turn, so many turns we have!). The most important aspect of them is the historisation of emotions. Emotions are social and historically constructed. Personally, I study a paradigmatic author, Hochschild and his study of emotional labour. Emotions are socially constructed, they have to be study in context, they have a history. Individuals sell their emotions to institutions. Then we can study for example the emotions involved in particular practices. This side, in psychology, the historical one, has been studied in psychology. Vygotsky mentions this about Freud. He recognises Freud's enormous contribution, when he studied emotions in the history of individuals. Hochschild, among many, emphasizes the history of emotions. Is a sociocultural approach in coincidence with a socioconstructionist approach? I would think the answer is know. There is a difference between socioconstructionist or interactionist approaches with a sociocultural (or more concretely Vygotskian approach). This could be another thread of discussion. I am aware that this has been discussed here in the past, but it is still work in progress, I recon :)
I am not sure about how to think artefacts an emotions, but I guess, being consistent with the idea that artefacts are both, material and ideal, and if 'ideal' is not free of emotions (the neutrality is a view from positivistic approaches, in my understanding and one important element of those approaches is to eradicate all subjectivity, being emotions one of the most 'dangerous' subjective human features in the task of knowledge construction)... I was saying, if artefacts are both, material and ideal, and if 'ideal' can not be considered as separated from emotions, then artefacts involve emotions, even the emotions of being able to control a situation, but many others emotions at stake could be materialised, like the possibility of winning the market to a competitor or solving a family problem -and then linked to solidarity- and so on. However, the use of the artefact, is important, and emotions change. Driving the first engine car involved very different emotons than those involved in driving a car today; as it is different driving your first car, a car that is a bit broken, when you are in a trafic jam, while arguing with your partner, etc. I would not go by this track for the moment, though, but as this is the tip that I took to start posting, this is my little grain here, Andy. Also, I think a car is full of knowledge.
Some ideas to start being in. I will try to catch up with other ideas that have been expressed. 

Best wishes,
Mabel







Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2009 17:22:19 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
CC: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions

In trying to formulate this question, it occurred to me that
our tendency to place the emotional content of an artefact
squarely in the person using the artefact, not the artefact
itself is correct, and when we ascribe knowledge to an
artefact, we are wrong. A book is not full of knowledge;
knowledge, like emotion, only arises in the social context
of its use. "Public or propositional knowledge" has neither
emotional nor cognitive content. The knowledge/affect only
arises in a context of use. (It was not the 'individual' or
'social' I was on about, but the attribution to artefact or
human being.)

Andy

Jay Lemke wrote:

...
I had not thought about public or propositional knowledge having
inherent affect. I think it depends on how it is construed by the person who comes to take up this knowledge. But in a cultural context, we could certainly imagine that some sorts of knowledge could provoke predictable affective responses by many people. I certainly doubt that I am alone in 
feeling depressed by knowledge of the state and trends of the global
environment, endangered species, etc. Or knowledge of political and
social injustice, etc. Which can also provoke anger, etc.
But I do not think that emotion, feeling, or affect should be considered inherently aspects of strictly individual consciousness. Many emotions are shared and distributed, and indeed arise only in dyadic or larger social group interactions. There are certainly also collective feelings 
of many kinds (mob frenzy being the most famous, but also collective
religious mania/fervor and many others). As cognition is not purely
individual, so affect is not either.

JAY.



Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke

Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093






On Nov 30, 2009, at 9:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

...
Another thought: emotion is tied to (ontological, individual)
consciousness, isn't it? Or can we understand social knowledge, e.g., science, as having inherently emotional significance? I mean, we often 
talk as if knowledge in a book can be more or less true even before
someone reads it. But we don't say it is "excited" or "sad" rather
than "exciting" or "depressing"? And is this just a question or form, 
or is content affective in that way? "a depressing fact" etc.

andy

Jay Lemke wrote:
Insofar as meaning, and so culture, comes to infuse all our feelings 
(even pain, much less fear or love) they are all "higher". HOW
meaning/culture transforms the biological roots of feeling, and into 
what range of possibilities for feeling is what continues to
fascinate me.
So, in general, I'm in agreement with what you are saying.
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093
On Nov 30, 2009, at 10:22 AM, Larry Purss wrote:

To Eric, Jay Achillies, and Andy
Andy
I wanted to pick up a thread you wrote about there not being higher 
or lower emotions. It is just a reaction of the body responding.
I agree whatever we label emotions is just the body responding which then becomes reified in language (the map not the territory) However 
I wonder if one of the central ways the body picks up cues and
responds through learned habits, patterns, to the social matrix in 
particular ways is to monitor "attachment" (biological) and
"intersubjective"(psychological) needs for connection as primary to 
being human. This way of viewing communication as connection (and
disconnection and re-connection) seems to me a central and primary 
framework to "understand" (cognitive) the primacy of the
sociocultural contexts to the emergence of "self," "subjectivity," or "identity" (different discourses which seem to me to be pointing 
to the same horizon of understanding.
Larry

----- Original Message -----
From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
Date: Monday, November 30, 2009 8:01 am
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>


Jay:

I believe this to be a great start to what I was thinking on the
issue.
eric




Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
11/28/2009 10:45 PM
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"



To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> cc:

Subject: Re: [xmca]
about emotions


So, would we begin with the simple contradiction: emotion is
society's
principal support? (vs. "nemesis"?)

Reasonable on the grounds that "fellow-feeling" or primary
sociality,
our empathic bond to our fellow humans, is what counters any
notion
that the "state of nature" is ONLY "red in tooth, claw, and
nail". We
do not begin from a war of all against all, but from family
ties, and
cultural extensions of kinship feelings to notional kin, and
loyalties
and identifications with larger groups and with lineages, clans,
moieties, age cohorts, initiation cohorts, totemic subgroups,
etc. etc.

Without fellow-feeling, no society. Can the same be said as
convincingly of reason? Do we imagine that social systems cohere
because we rationally recognize our advantage from them? And
that that
bond is strong enough to stand the test of conflict? That we
would
sacrifice our lives to defend others solely out of rational
calculation? I doubt it. It seems clearly that sociality is
rooted in
feeling.

Or, rather, in the unity and functional integration of kinds of
meaning making (e.g. to determine culturally who is in-group and
who
is out-group) and kinds of feeling (loyalty, love, and alas
their
opposites).

Emotions may be the nemesis of abstract and arbitrary, perhaps
even
ideologically suspect, social ties. The "rational" grounds of
the
capitalist nation-state, and its efforts to recruit loyalty
emotionally (songs, flags, rhetoric) seem rather easily
interrupted by
the emotions of anger and resentment and the feeling of
righteous
wrath against the oppressor, not just of myself, but also of
others,
that leads to revolution, or at least to throwing a brick or two. 

So I hope I am being a bit dialectical here in seeing even the
sense
in which emotions ARE the nemesis of society as also and more
fundamentally being the same sense in which they ground the very
possibility of society.

JAY.


Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke

Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093






On Nov 28, 2009, at 7:48 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:


Hello All:

I would like to point out that when I suggested that emotion
appeared to be
societies nemesis I did not bring in the dialectic but rather

used

the word
dichotomy. Dichotomy does bring out the notion of

either/or where
dialectic is rather a wholeness a both sidedness within the same 
'gestalt' (for lack of a better word). I believe in the

dialectic and

would like someone to stage this aspect of emotions in the

form of the

dialectic. Does this make sense?

much thanks and turkey gravy
eric



To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

cc:
bcc:
Subject: RE:

[xmca] about emotions

Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
11/28/2009 10:28 AM GMT
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture,

Activity" <font

size=-1></font>





















So, now, compare the two contexts

1926 - Fighting against general dualistic view in old psycholoy

"Apart from irs purely psychological barrenness, traitional
psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that
reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify
such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event
loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of
affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms
forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in
every point nourished and permeated by these
interdependences. NOT FOR A SINGLE MILLISECOND,
PSYCHOLOGY TO MEASURE THE EXACT DURATION OF MENTAL
PROCESSES, IS IT ISOLATED AND SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE
WORLD ANDA THE OTHER ORGANIC PROCESS. Who claimsand studies
the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own
mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal
construtctions instead of genuine reality."


1931-33 - Fighting against specific dualistic view in theory

of

emotions
Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a

feeling of

hunger, usually
considered in the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized

man, is

already a
fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of

James,

that the
simple
need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to

the

appearance
of a
symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And 
conversely,
a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual
emotion, in
pious cannibals
bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely he

referred to the

group
of higher emotions. Consequently, THERE IS NO EMOTION THAT BY

NATURE

WOULD
BE
INDEPENDENT OF THE BODY AND NOT CONNECTED WITH IT.Thank you

for the

English
version. Where in English is "Psychology to measure" in

Russian is

"Psychologists"
The Spanish is more correct - I don´t know about other mistakes. 

Achilles.


From: achilles_delari@hotmail.com
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: RE: [xmca] about emotions
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 10:04:36 +0000
Of course this view is a mistake, because this view do not consider 
what he said after, that is that mind is not separate from

organism.>> He not only denying old psychology, he is making an
affirmation

againt
it. The same affirmation that I quote.

Achilles.



Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 20:53:47 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions

"Apart from irs purely psychological barrenness, traitional
psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that
reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify
such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event
loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of
affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms
forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in
every point nourished and permeated by these
interdependences. Not for a single millisecond, used by
psychology to measure the exact duration of mental
processes, is it isolated and separated from the rest of the
world and the other organic processes. Who claimsand studies
the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own
mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal
construtctions instead of genuine reality."

LSW CW v. 3, p. 152-3.

Reading this together with the preceding 3 sections, I take
it that "traditional psychology" means introspective, or
subjective psychology, and the view that introspection
provides direct access to a distinct part of reality (soul,
spiritual beings, something nonphysical, above matter).
Vygotsky is saying that this view is mistaken.

Andy

Achilles Delari Junior wrote:

Please Andy,

Please if you are with the text about Thonrdike,
The passage is in the part 2, paragraph 4th -
The paragraph immediately above has te following
reference (N. N. Langue, 1914, p 42)...

"The psyche and any its delicates and complex mechanisms,

is

inserted
in the general system of the human behavior, each one of its

manifestations
is totally impregnated by this mutual relation. Do not appears 
isolated nor

separated from the rest of the world an from the process of
organism

even
a millesinum of a second, that is the time that psychologists 
calculate to
the psychic process. Who sustains in their investigations the 
contrary, will

be studying an unreal configuration of the own

intelligence,

chimeras

in

the place of facts, terminologicals constructs in the

places of

real

authentic

facts"....

He is discussing methodological problem of definition of the

psyche... Just

trying to posing about what king of things psychologist

want make

his

questions.

And stating that a psyche without orgnism is not a real

thing about

what
make questions... because if you ask for something that doesn't 
exist, you

can find answers that can not exist too. Its what I

understand

about

that

formulation. And I guess that in "The teatching about

emotions" the

problem

is methodological too. Let me say, about the own conditions

to you

make a

good question related to emotions, at that time, and even

in our

time, I can

conclude...

I will see a manner to type the Russian, for any adictional
checking

about this

quoting. Because there are two problems:

1) How it was translated from Russian to Spanish.
2) How, of course, I translate from Spanish to English...

(this

very

worse, of course)


Thank you Andy. Again.
Sorry about my persistence.

Achilles.




Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 18:57:19 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
Achilles, I am looking at the English version in LSV CW v. 3. I can't find the passage you quote, but I see on p. 155 that 
Vygotsky puts "other somatic reactions that form the basis
of emotion" in the same category as "the first component of
an organism's perception of this environmental influence."

Personally, I don't think emotion has anything to do with
instinct or higher vs lower mental functions. We perceive
the reaction of our body and that affects our thinking and
our whole process of perception, just like our vision does.
Vygotsky compares it to inner speech actually. :)

Andy

Achilles Delari Junior wrote:

Andy,

I think that Vygotsky was trying to solve the problem of
dualism in theory of emotions. He worked with the principle 
of "psychophysical unit" - the "main principle of Soviet

psychology"

in the words from Rubinshtein. The difference between
the cognitive and the instinctive is not because the cognitive have not physiological conditions, but the complexity of that 
conditions and it mediated character... Vygotsky said that
"the psyche do not appears isolated from the world or from
the process form organism neither for a 0,001 second"

(1926/1991>>>>>> - Prólogo a la versión russa del libro de E.
Thorndike

'Principios
de enseñanza basados a la psicología - this is the Volume I of the Works in Russian and Spanish, I don't remeber the number in English, because they do not follow the Russian numeration). 
You can see that psyche are not isolated from the

organism and

not isolated from the world. In fact human beens are

constituted>>>>>> by the same substance that the world, we are
not an "Impire

inside
the impire" - but to be the same substance do not means

that we
are in the same way... the same "mode" - I Spinoza´s words. 
Vygotsky fight against a dualistic approach to emotions.

And to

him James is an "involuntary disciple of Descartes"

because his

especial emphasis in cultural feelings as spiritual

process. Much

common even today.

I only don't uderstand why you say that there is a

problem that

I am trying to solve. If cognition have not material

support what

kind of substance is cognition? This is not a problem,

the

problem
is how to understand ideological, historical, conscious,
cultural,
constitution of human emotions in his/her whole

personality

without
repeat a dualistic approach. I understand this problem is

not

only
mine... this is a problem posed by Vygotsky himself. And

I only

agree that is good question... I don't if Damasio already

answer> that.

Can you tell me who did?

Achilles.


Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 17:56:10 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions

But you still need a distinction between a physiological
reaction and a cognitive disposition, don't you, Achilles? 

What is the specific problem you are trying to solve?

Andy

Achilles Delari Junior wrote:

Jay,

Thank you very much.

Something near to this distinction between feelings and
emotions
was posed by William James too, according Vygotsky, but James 
saw this distinction in terms that these social

dimension of

affective
world, the higher feelings, have almost nothing related to 
biological,

physiological, material, body, conditions. And Vygotsky

criticizes

this like a way of dualistic thinking - this dualism

can be

understood

as based in ideological motivations too: "the human is

not an

animal,

nor a material been, but a divine been, in his higher,

superior> feelings..."


A distinction between feelings and emotions is present

in

Damasio

too

in neurofunctional terms... But Vygotsky proposed the
question of
a systemic inter-relationship in that the lower can

turns

higher,

and

vice versa... I don't know what we can thing about

this... In

this

case, distinction between feelings and emotions are

useful, but

if
we want to understand the entire human been, his/her whole 
personality,

the integration and inter-functional relations between

feelings> and

emotions turns relevant too, In my point of view.

Best wishes.
Achilles.



From: jaylemke@umich.edu
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 19:28:26 -0800
CC:

I am certainly one of those people interested in

emotion, or

feeling,
or affect, or whatever we choose to make of the phenomenon.
The topic seems to have historically accumulated a lot of 
ideological
baggage. And while its expression may be more sophisticated 
today than

in times past, there doesn't seem to be that much less

of it

(as

for

example in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

review

noted

by

someone earlier).

Emotion tends to be seen as bad in our philosophical
tradition.

As the

enemy of reason, the motor of self-deception, etc. It

links us

to the

animals, to our "baser" nature, etc. A bit of this in

the

pagan
tradition, a lot of it in christian asceticism, and

tons of it

in

Enlightenment rationalism and its successors.

Emotions are also associated with the unreliable

feminine vs..

the cool

and collected masculine, with the passions of the mob

vs. the

thoughtful elite, with peasants, workers, and

children, and

pretty

much every social category whose oppression needs some

legitimation.

Indeed one of the near universal legitimations of

elite

power is

"we

know what's good for you", not just because of what we

know,

but
because you can't be trusted to see your own best interests 
through

the haze of your emotions.

Useful as this is to elite interests, it combines

further with

the
cult of individualism to make emotions a purely individual, 
mental,

subjective matter. Non-material, non-social, non-

cultural, and

universal (the easier to apply the stigma of

emotionality to

non-

European cultures). It is rather hard to crawl out of

this pit

of mud.


As I've been trying to do for the last year or two.

There

would

be too

much to say for a short post on this list, but here

are a few

basic

suggestions:

Feeling is a broad enough category to get back to the

phenomenology of

affect/emotion, whereas "emotion" is too narrowly

defined

within

the

tradition of animal-like and universal.

There are a LOT of different feelings, and that is more

important than
efforts to identify some small number of basic emotions. 

Many feelings are associated with evaluative judgments

and

this

may be

a key link to re-unify affective and cognitive.

Feelings do differ significantly across cultures, and

are part

of a

larger system of meanings-and-feelings specific to a
community.
You can't make meanings across any longer term process of 
reasoning

without feelings and evaluative judgments.

It is likely that feelings have histories, both in

cultures

and

in

individuals.
Feelings are often reliable guides to survival, to adaptive 
action,

and to finding ways to meet our needs.

Feelings are just as situated and distributed as are
cognitions.

And

just as active and actively made and produced.
In short -- pretty much everything in our dominant tradition 
about
emotions and feelings is exactly wrong -- and for the worst 
possible

ideological-political reasons, I believe.

JAY.


Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke

Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093






On Nov 26, 2009, at 8:08 AM, mike cole wrote:


With so much interest in achieving an integrated
understanding

of

emotion,
cognition, and development, Achilles, your focus on

this

topic

is a

helpful
reminder of its continued importance.

Seems like one of those many areas in psychological

research> where

we cannot
keep from murdering to dissect.
mike
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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---------------------------------------------------------------

---------

Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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Novo site do Windows Live: Novidades, dicas dos produtos e muito 
mais. Conheça!
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--


---------------------------------------------------------------

---------

Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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Novo site do Windows Live: Novidades, dicas dos produtos e

muito

mais..

Conheça!
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Você já ama o Messenger? Conheça ainda mais sobre ele no Novo

site de

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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov 
$20 ea

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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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