Jay:
I believe this to be a great start to what I was thinking on the
issue.
eric
Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
11/28/2009 10:45 PM
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> cc:
Subject: Re: [xmca]
about emotions
So, would we begin with the simple contradiction: emotion is
society's
principal support? (vs. "nemesis"?)
Reasonable on the grounds that "fellow-feeling" or primary
sociality,
our empathic bond to our fellow humans, is what counters any
notion
that the "state of nature" is ONLY "red in tooth, claw, and
nail". We
do not begin from a war of all against all, but from family
ties, and
cultural extensions of kinship feelings to notional kin, and
loyalties
and identifications with larger groups and with lineages, clans,
moieties, age cohorts, initiation cohorts, totemic subgroups,
etc. etc.
Without fellow-feeling, no society. Can the same be said as
convincingly of reason? Do we imagine that social systems cohere
because we rationally recognize our advantage from them? And
that that
bond is strong enough to stand the test of conflict? That we
would
sacrifice our lives to defend others solely out of rational
calculation? I doubt it. It seems clearly that sociality is
rooted in
feeling.
Or, rather, in the unity and functional integration of kinds of
meaning making (e.g. to determine culturally who is in-group and
who
is out-group) and kinds of feeling (loyalty, love, and alas
their
opposites).
Emotions may be the nemesis of abstract and arbitrary, perhaps
even
ideologically suspect, social ties. The "rational" grounds of
the
capitalist nation-state, and its efforts to recruit loyalty
emotionally (songs, flags, rhetoric) seem rather easily
interrupted by
the emotions of anger and resentment and the feeling of
righteous
wrath against the oppressor, not just of myself, but also of
others,
that leads to revolution, or at least to throwing a brick or two.
So I hope I am being a bit dialectical here in seeing even the
sense
in which emotions ARE the nemesis of society as also and more
fundamentally being the same sense in which they ground the very
possibility of society.
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093
On Nov 28, 2009, at 7:48 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
Hello All:
I would like to point out that when I suggested that emotion
appeared to be
societies nemesis I did not bring in the dialectic but rather
used
the word
dichotomy. Dichotomy does bring out the notion of
either/or where
dialectic is rather a wholeness a both sidedness within the same
'gestalt' (for lack of a better word). I believe in the
dialectic and
would like someone to stage this aspect of emotions in the
form of the
dialectic. Does this make sense?
much thanks and turkey gravy
eric
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
cc:
bcc:
Subject: RE:
[xmca] about emotions
Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
11/28/2009 10:28 AM GMT
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity" <font
size=-1></font>
So, now, compare the two contexts
1926 - Fighting against general dualistic view in old psycholoy
"Apart from irs purely psychological barrenness, traitional
psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that
reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify
such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event
loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of
affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms
forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in
every point nourished and permeated by these
interdependences. NOT FOR A SINGLE MILLISECOND,
PSYCHOLOGY TO MEASURE THE EXACT DURATION OF MENTAL
PROCESSES, IS IT ISOLATED AND SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE
WORLD ANDA THE OTHER ORGANIC PROCESS. Who claimsand studies
the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own
mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal
construtctions instead of genuine reality."
1931-33 - Fighting against specific dualistic view in theory
of
emotions
Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a
feeling of
hunger, usually
considered in the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized
man, is
already a
fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of
James,
that the
simple
need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to
the
appearance
of a
symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And
conversely,
a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual
emotion, in
pious cannibals
bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely he
referred to the
group
of higher emotions. Consequently, THERE IS NO EMOTION THAT BY
NATURE
WOULD
BE
INDEPENDENT OF THE BODY AND NOT CONNECTED WITH IT.Thank you
for the
English
version. Where in English is "Psychology to measure" in
Russian is
"Psychologists"
The Spanish is more correct - I don´t know about other mistakes.
Achilles.
From: achilles_delari@hotmail.com
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: RE: [xmca] about emotions
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 10:04:36 +0000
Of course this view is a mistake, because this view do not consider
what he said after, that is that mind is not separate from
organism.>> He not only denying old psychology, he is making an
affirmation
againt
it. The same affirmation that I quote.
Achilles.
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 20:53:47 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
"Apart from irs purely psychological barrenness, traitional
psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that
reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify
such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event
loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of
affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms
forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in
every point nourished and permeated by these
interdependences. Not for a single millisecond, used by
psychology to measure the exact duration of mental
processes, is it isolated and separated from the rest of the
world and the other organic processes. Who claimsand studies
the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own
mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal
construtctions instead of genuine reality."
LSW CW v. 3, p. 152-3.
Reading this together with the preceding 3 sections, I take
it that "traditional psychology" means introspective, or
subjective psychology, and the view that introspection
provides direct access to a distinct part of reality (soul,
spiritual beings, something nonphysical, above matter).
Vygotsky is saying that this view is mistaken.
Andy
Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
Please Andy,
Please if you are with the text about Thonrdike,
The passage is in the part 2, paragraph 4th -
The paragraph immediately above has te following
reference (N. N. Langue, 1914, p 42)...
"The psyche and any its delicates and complex mechanisms,
is
inserted
in the general system of the human behavior, each one of its
manifestations
is totally impregnated by this mutual relation. Do not appears
isolated nor
separated from the rest of the world an from the process of
organism
even
a millesinum of a second, that is the time that psychologists
calculate to
the psychic process. Who sustains in their investigations the
contrary, will
be studying an unreal configuration of the own
intelligence,
chimeras
in
the place of facts, terminologicals constructs in the
places of
real
authentic
facts"....
He is discussing methodological problem of definition of the
psyche... Just
trying to posing about what king of things psychologist
want make
his
questions.
And stating that a psyche without orgnism is not a real
thing about
what
make questions... because if you ask for something that doesn't
exist, you
can find answers that can not exist too. Its what I
understand
about
that
formulation. And I guess that in "The teatching about
emotions" the
problem
is methodological too. Let me say, about the own conditions
to you
make a
good question related to emotions, at that time, and even
in our
time, I can
conclude...
I will see a manner to type the Russian, for any adictional
checking
about this
quoting. Because there are two problems:
1) How it was translated from Russian to Spanish.
2) How, of course, I translate from Spanish to English...
(this
very
worse, of course)
Thank you Andy. Again.
Sorry about my persistence.
Achilles.
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 18:57:19 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
Achilles, I am looking at the English version in LSV CW v.3.
I can't find the passage you quote, but I see on p. 155 that
Vygotsky puts "other somatic reactions that form the basis
of emotion" in the same category as "the first component of
an organism's perception of this environmental influence."
Personally, I don't think emotion has anything to do with
instinct or higher vs lower mental functions. We perceive
the reaction of our body and that affects our thinking and
our whole process of perception, just like our vision does.
Vygotsky compares it to inner speech actually. :)
Andy
Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
Andy,
I think that Vygotsky was trying to solve the problem of
dualism in theory of emotions. He worked with the principle
of "psychophysical unit" - the "main principle of Soviet
psychology"
in the words from Rubinshtein. The difference between
the cognitive and the instinctive is not because the cognitive
have not physiological conditions, but the complexity of that
conditions and it mediated character... Vygotsky said that
"the psyche do not appears isolated from the world or from
the process form organism neither for a 0,001 second"
(1926/1991>>>>>> - Prólogo a la versión russa del libro de E.
Thorndike
'Principios
de enseñanza basados a la psicología - this is the Volume I
of the Works in Russian and Spanish, I don't remeber the number
in English, because they do not follow the Russian numeration).
You can see that psyche are not isolated from the
organism and
not isolated from the world. In fact human beens are
constituted>>>>>> by the same substance that the world, we are
not an "Impire
inside
the impire" - but to be the same substance do not means
that we
are in the same way... the same "mode" - I Spinoza´s words.
Vygotsky fight against a dualistic approach to emotions.
And to
him James is an "involuntary disciple of Descartes"
because his
especial emphasis in cultural feelings as spiritual
process. Much
common even today.
I only don't uderstand why you say that there is a
problem that
I am trying to solve. If cognition have not material
support what
kind of substance is cognition? This is not a problem,
the
problem
is how to understand ideological, historical, conscious,
cultural,
constitution of human emotions in his/her whole
personality
without
repeat a dualistic approach. I understand this problem is
not
only
mine... this is a problem posed by Vygotsky himself. And
I only
agree that is good question... I don't if Damasio already
answer> that.
Can you tell me who did?
Achilles.
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 17:56:10 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
But you still need a distinction between a physiological
reaction and a cognitive disposition, don't you, Achilles?
What is the specific problem you are trying to solve?
Andy
Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
Jay,
Thank you very much.
Something near to this distinction between feelings and
emotions
was posed by William James too, according Vygotsky, but James
saw this distinction in terms that these social
dimension of
affective
world, the higher feelings, have almost nothing related to
biological,
physiological, material, body, conditions. And Vygotsky
criticizes
this like a way of dualistic thinking - this dualism
can be
understood
as based in ideological motivations too: "the human is
not an
animal,
nor a material been, but a divine been, in his higher,
superior> feelings..."
A distinction between feelings and emotions is present
in
Damasio
too
in neurofunctional terms... But Vygotsky proposed the
question of
a systemic inter-relationship in that the lower can
turns
higher,
and
vice versa... I don't know what we can thing about
this... In
this
case, distinction between feelings and emotions are
useful, but
if
we want to understand the entire human been, his/her whole
personality,
the integration and inter-functional relations between
feelings> and
emotions turns relevant too, In my point of view.
Best wishes.
Achilles.
From: jaylemke@umich.edu
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 19:28:26 -0800
CC:
I am certainly one of those people interested in
emotion, or
feeling,
or affect, or whatever we choose to make of the phenomenon.
The topic seems to have historically accumulated a lot of
ideological
baggage. And while its expression may be more sophisticated
today than
in times past, there doesn't seem to be that much less
of it
(as
for
example in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
review
noted
by
someone earlier).
Emotion tends to be seen as bad in our philosophical
tradition.
As the
enemy of reason, the motor of self-deception, etc. It
links us
to the
animals, to our "baser" nature, etc. A bit of this in
the
pagan
tradition, a lot of it in christian asceticism, and
tons of it
in
Enlightenment rationalism and its successors.
Emotions are also associated with the unreliable
feminine vs..
the cool
and collected masculine, with the passions of the mob
vs. the
thoughtful elite, with peasants, workers, and
children, and
pretty
much every social category whose oppression needs some
legitimation.
Indeed one of the near universal legitimations of
elite
power is
"we
know what's good for you", not just because of what we
know,
but
because you can't be trusted to see your own best interests
through
the haze of your emotions.
Useful as this is to elite interests, it combines
further with
the
cult of individualism to make emotions a purely individual,
mental,
subjective matter. Non-material, non-social, non-
cultural, and
universal (the easier to apply the stigma of
emotionality to
non-
European cultures). It is rather hard to crawl out of
this pit
of mud.
As I've been trying to do for the last year or two.
There
would
be too
much to say for a short post on this list, but here
are a few
basic
suggestions:
Feeling is a broad enough category to get back to the
phenomenology of
affect/emotion, whereas "emotion" is too narrowly
defined
within
the
tradition of animal-like and universal.
There are a LOT of different feelings, and that is more
important than
efforts to identify some small number of basic emotions.
Many feelings are associated with evaluative judgments
and
this
may be
a key link to re-unify affective and cognitive.
Feelings do differ significantly across cultures, and
are part
of a
larger system of meanings-and-feelings specific to a
community.
You can't make meanings across any longer term process of
reasoning
without feelings and evaluative judgments.
It is likely that feelings have histories, both in
cultures
and
in
individuals.
Feelings are often reliable guides to survival, to adaptive
action,
and to finding ways to meet our needs.
Feelings are just as situated and distributed as are
cognitions.
And
just as active and actively made and produced.
In short -- pretty much everything in our dominant tradition
about
emotions and feelings is exactly wrong -- and for the worst
possible
ideological-political reasons, I believe.
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093
On Nov 26, 2009, at 8:08 AM, mike cole wrote:
With so much interest in achieving an integrated
understanding
of
emotion,
cognition, and development, Achilles, your focus on
this
topic
is a
helpful
reminder of its continued importance.
Seems like one of those many areas in psychological
research> where
we cannot
keep from murdering to dissect.
mike
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