Hi Jay
I want to take another stab at emotions from another discourse (not
relational psychoanalysi) but rather symbolic interactionism
(pragmatism)
and the contrasting approaches to emotion between George Herbert
Mead and
Charles Horton Cooley.
I've just finished reading a fascinating article by Glenn Jacobs
titled
"Influence and Canonical Supremacy: An Analysis of How George
Herbert Mead
Demoted Charles Horton Cooley in the Sociological Canon" published
in The
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Volume 45(2), pages
117-144 Spring,2009
Jacobs' article points out that the contrasting discursive styles of
Mead's
and Cooley's writings was instrumental in Mead being seen as the
founding
father of symbolic interactionism and Cooley becoming just a footnote.
Jacobs believes Cooley's writing was expressed in a literary
essayist style
while Mead's theories were articulated in a more social scientific
style of
discourse.
Following is an extended summary of some of Jacobs major points of the
consequences of these different styles or ways of knowing. Remember
these
scholars were writing at the turn of the last century into the
1920's so
their vocabulary may be dated but the themes they discuss seem very
contemporary.
Cooley conceived the social in a LITERARY sense, as a matter of
SHIFTING
PERSPECTIVES to understand social phenomena on three scalar levels
(micro=self) (meso=primary group) (macro=institutions) Society and the
individual are "simply collective and distributive aspects of the same
thing" the difference between them being "rather in our point of
view than
in the object we are looking at" (cooley, 1922) "SElf and society go
together, as phases of a common whole. For Cooley communication was
foundational as he states "public opinion is no mere aggregate of
separate
individual judgements, but an organization, a cooperative product of
communication and reciprocal influence." Its unity "is not one of
identity,
but of life and action" (Cooley 1909)
Jacobs points out the reason Cooley's ideas were not given the
status of
Mead's ideas were because he PLACED FEELING AT THE CENTER of social
processes and the formation of the self (in contrast to Mead's more
logocentric perspective which focused on the VERBAL gesture)
Cooley conceived of the intellectual process and the work of science
and
WRITING in a very different way than Mead. For Cooley human
intelligence is
DRAMATIC AND SCENARIC, meeting difficulties through the formulation
of fresh
lines of action. "It is, then, essentially a kind of foresight, a
mental
reaction that anticipates the operation of forces at work and is
prepared in
advance to adjust to them" Intelligence is "inseparably bound up with
communication and discussion" (Cooley, 1918) For Cooley
intelligence is
DRAMATIC in character and is required to forecast how they will
react to one
another and how the situation will work out. Cooley wrote "the
literary
drama, including fiction and whatever other forms have a dramatic
character,
may be regarded as INTELLIGENCE striving to interpret the social
process BY
ART." (1918)
However Cooley's analyzing social process as METAPHORICALLY weaving
the
process into a DRAMATURGICAL - SYMPATHETIC conception of the
operation of
intelligence in action was a discursive position that was not well
received
in the 1920's when positivist science models of social process were
gaining
status in academic departments. Mead's discursive style, laced with
the the
rhetoric of science dimissed Cooley's literary discursive style and
its
rhetorical expression as MERE SOCIAL COMMENTARY
As Jacobs points out if we interpret writing as behavior, we can also
interpret writing STYLE as a kind of cultural form and writers as BOTH
CREATORS AND INSTRUMENTS OF this cultural form. However style may
determine
the inclusion or exclusion of a writer within a disciplinary canon.
In a
sense as Jacob's article elaborates Cooley's open avowal of a
literary style
"could be interpreted as inviting the criticism of fellow social
scientists"
(p.132) who in the 1920'2 were staking out disciplinary discourses
which
privleged objective data analysis. Cooley's sociology, his writing
style,
and his intellectual self-concept derived in great measure from a
different
intellectual context which emraced the literary essay style. Jacob's
elaborates in his article how the essay TRADITION stresses the
CENTRALITY of
the CONVERSING subject, an autobiographical approach, and a DIALOGIC
or
INTERTEXTUAL focus on the importance of the impact of the reader and
other
texts on the writer and the written product. This reframe of the
writing
process points to recognition of STYLE AS PERSON (Jacobs, quoting
Green
p132) Green, in discussing Cooley's writing style points out that
for Cooley
"a text is an emergent organization of meanings, within which
nothing is
FIXED and where origin is absent" (Green, 1988,quoted in Jacobs, p.
132)
From this literary standpoint Cooley would be a voice in the
wilderness of
positivist science discourse.
Both Mead and Cooley discuss "taking the role of the other" but Cooley
discribed this human capacity of taking the perspective of the other
as a
process of SYMPATHY, the FOUNDATIONAL element in his construction of
the
"looking glass self. For Cooley the self is founded on the human
species
RECEPTIVITY OF FEELING and the SYMPATHETIC CAPACITY to register or
perceive
the FEELINGS OF OTHERS toward oneself, which entails a REFLECTIVE
PROCESS
which results in SELF- FEELING Cooley's looking glass self integrates
FEELING into the process matrix of self-formation within the larger
context
of COMMUNICATION. For COOLEY person's are SENTIMENTALLY GROUNDED
SYMBOLS.
Sentiment and imagination are generated in the life of
communication, having
no separate existence except in OUR FORMS OF SPEECH (Cooley, 1922)
"The
thing that moves us to pride or shame, is not the mere mechanical
reflection
of ourselves, but an imputed SENTIMENT, the imagined judgement,
which is
quite ESSENTIAL.
Jay it seems to me this debate about the role of emotions, which was
debated
between Cooley and Mead seems quite current to our continuing
discussion.
What is fascinating to me is how talk od "sympathy" and "sentiment"
and
"feeling" and "emotion" are not given the same status and validation
in many
of the social science dicourses that they seem to merit.
Feminist discourse is another discursive tradition that has a lot to
say
about this topic.
Leaves me wondering and curious.
Larry
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jay Lemke" <jaylemke@umich.edu>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 28, 2009 8:45 PM
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
So, would we begin with the simple contradiction: emotion is society's
principal support? (vs. "nemesis"?)
Reasonable on the grounds that "fellow-feeling" or primary sociality,
our empathic bond to our fellow humans, is what counters any notion
that the "state of nature" is ONLY "red in tooth, claw, and nail". We
do not begin from a war of all against all, but from family ties, and
cultural extensions of kinship feelings to notional kin, and loyalties
and identifications with larger groups and with lineages, clans,
moieties, age cohorts, initiation cohorts, totemic subgroups, etc.
etc.
Without fellow-feeling, no society. Can the same be said as
convincingly of reason? Do we imagine that social systems cohere
because we rationally recognize our advantage from them? And that that
bond is strong enough to stand the test of conflict? That we would
sacrifice our lives to defend others solely out of rational
calculation? I doubt it. It seems clearly that sociality is rooted in
feeling.
Or, rather, in the unity and functional integration of kinds of
meaning making (e.g. to determine culturally who is in-group and who
is out-group) and kinds of feeling (loyalty, love, and alas their
opposites).
Emotions may be the nemesis of abstract and arbitrary, perhaps even
ideologically suspect, social ties. The "rational" grounds of the
capitalist nation-state, and its efforts to recruit loyalty
emotionally (songs, flags, rhetoric) seem rather easily interrupted by
the emotions of anger and resentment and the feeling of righteous
wrath against the oppressor, not just of myself, but also of others,
that leads to revolution, or at least to throwing a brick or two.
So I hope I am being a bit dialectical here in seeing even the sense
in which emotions ARE the nemesis of society as also and more
fundamentally being the same sense in which they ground the very
possibility of society.
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093
On Nov 28, 2009, at 7:48 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
Hello All:
I would like to point out that when I suggested that emotion
appeared to be
societies nemesis I did not bring in the dialectic but rather used
the word
dichotomy. Dichotomy does bring out the notion of either/or where
dialectic is rather a wholeness a both sidedness within the same
'gestalt' (for lack of a better word). I believe in the dialectic
and
would like someone to stage this aspect of emotions in the form of
the
dialectic. Does this make sense?
much thanks and turkey gravy
eric
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
cc:
bcc:
Subject: RE: [xmca] about emotions
Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>
Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
11/28/2009 10:28 AM GMT
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <font
size=-1></font>
So, now, compare the two contexts
1926 - Fighting against general dualistic view in old psycholoy
"Apart from irs purely psychological barrenness, traitional
psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that
reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify
such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event
loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of
affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms
forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in
every point nourished and permeated by these
interdependences. NOT FOR A SINGLE MILLISECOND,
PSYCHOLOGY TO MEASURE THE EXACT DURATION OF MENTAL
PROCESSES, IS IT ISOLATED AND SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE
WORLD ANDA THE OTHER ORGANIC PROCESS. Who claimsand studies
the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own
mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal
construtctions instead of genuine reality."
1931-33 - Fighting against specific dualistic view in theory of
emotions
Chabrier completely justifiably refers to the fact that a feeling of
hunger, usually
considered in the group of lower bodily feelings in civilized man, is
already a
fine feeling from the point of view of the nomenclature of James,
that the
simple
need of food can acquire a religious sense when it leads to the
appearance
of a
symbolic rite of mystical communication between man and God. And
conversely,
a religious feeling, usually considered as a purely spiritual
emotion, in
pious cannibals
bringing human sacrifices to the gods, can scarcely he referred to
the
group
of higher emotions. Consequently, THERE IS NO EMOTION THAT BY NATURE
WOULD
BE
INDEPENDENT OF THE BODY AND NOT CONNECTED WITH IT.Thank you for the
English
version. Where in English is "Psychology to measure" in Russian is
"Psychologists"
The Spanish is more correct - I don´t know about other mistakes.
Achilles.
From: achilles_delari@hotmail.com
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: RE: [xmca] about emotions
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 10:04:36 +0000
Of course this view is a mistake, because this view do not consider
what he said after, that is that mind is not separate from organism.
He not only denying old psychology, he is making an affirmation
againt
it. The same affirmation that I quote.
Achilles.
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 20:53:47 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
"Apart from irs purely psychological barrenness, traitional
psychology suffers from another flaw. The point is that
reality, as it obvious to anyone, does not at all justify
such a view of mind. On the contrary, every fact and event
loudly testifies to another and directly opposite state of
affairs: the mind with all its subtle and complex mechanisms
forms part of the general system of human behavior. It is in
every point nourished and permeated by these
interdependences. Not for a single millisecond, used by
psychology to measure the exact duration of mental
processes, is it isolated and separated from the rest of the
world and the other organic processes. Who claimsand studies
the opposite, studies the unreal constructions of his own
mind, chimeras instead of facts, scholastic, verbal
construtctions instead of genuine reality."
LSW CW v. 3, p. 152-3.
Reading this together with the preceding 3 sections, I take
it that "traditional psychology" means introspective, or
subjective psychology, and the view that introspection
provides direct access to a distinct part of reality (soul,
spiritual beings, something nonphysical, above matter).
Vygotsky is saying that this view is mistaken.
Andy
Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
Please Andy,
Please if you are with the text about Thonrdike,
The passage is in the part 2, paragraph 4th -
The paragraph immediately above has te following
reference (N. N. Langue, 1914, p 42)...
"The psyche and any its delicates and complex mechanisms, is
inserted
in the general system of the human behavior, each one of its
manifestations
is totally impregnated by this mutual relation. Do not appears
isolated nor
separated from the rest of the world an from the process of
organism
even
a millesinum of a second, that is the time that psychologists
calculate to
the psychic process. Who sustains in their investigations the
contrary, will
be studying an unreal configuration of the own intelligence,
chimeras
in
the place of facts, terminologicals constructs in the places of
real
authentic
facts"....
He is discussing methodological problem of definition of the
psyche... Just
trying to posing about what king of things psychologist want make
his
questions.
And stating that a psyche without orgnism is not a real thing
about
what
make questions... because if you ask for something that doesn't
exist, you
can find answers that can not exist too. Its what I understand
about
that
formulation. And I guess that in "The teatching about emotions"
the
problem
is methodological too. Let me say, about the own conditions to you
make a
good question related to emotions, at that time, and even in our
time, I can
conclude...
I will see a manner to type the Russian, for any adictional
checking
about this
quoting. Because there are two problems:
1) How it was translated from Russian to Spanish.
2) How, of course, I translate from Spanish to English... (this
very
worse, of course)
Thank you Andy. Again.
Sorry about my persistence.
Achilles.
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 18:57:19 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
Achilles, I am looking at the English version in LSV CW v.3.
I can't find the passage you quote, but I see on p. 155 that
Vygotsky puts "other somatic reactions that form the basis
of emotion" in the same category as "the first component of
an organism's perception of this environmental influence."
Personally, I don't think emotion has anything to do with
instinct or higher vs lower mental functions. We perceive
the reaction of our body and that affects our thinking and
our whole process of perception, just like our vision does.
Vygotsky compares it to inner speech actually. :)
Andy
Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
Andy,
I think that Vygotsky was trying to solve the problem of
dualism in theory of emotions. He worked with the principle
of "psychophysical unit" - the "main principle of Soviet
psychology"
in the words from Rubinshtein. The difference between
the cognitive and the instinctive is not because the cognitive
have not physiological conditions, but the complexity of that
conditions and it mediated character... Vygotsky said that
"the psyche do not appears isolated from the world or from
the process form organism neither for a 0,001 second" (1926/1991
- Prólogo a la versión russa del libro de E. Thorndike
'Principios
de enseñanza basados a la psicología - this is the Volume I
of the Works in Russian and Spanish, I don't remeber the number
in English, because they do not follow the Russian numeration).
You can see that psyche are not isolated from the organism and
not isolated from the world. In fact human beens are constituted
by the same substance that the world, we are not an "Impire
inside
the impire" - but to be the same substance do not means that we
are in the same way... the same "mode" - I Spinoza´s words.
Vygotsky fight against a dualistic approach to emotions. And to
him James is an "involuntary disciple of Descartes" because his
especial emphasis in cultural feelings as spiritual process.
Much
common even today.
I only don't uderstand why you say that there is a problem that
I am trying to solve. If cognition have not material support
what
kind of substance is cognition? This is not a problem, the
problem
is how to understand ideological, historical, conscious,
cultural,
constitution of human emotions in his/her whole personality
without
repeat a dualistic approach. I understand this problem is not
only
mine... this is a problem posed by Vygotsky himself. And I only
agree that is good question... I don't if Damasio already answer
that.
Can you tell me who did?
Achilles.
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 17:56:10 +1100
From: ablunden@mira.net
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
But you still need a distinction between a physiological
reaction and a cognitive disposition, don't you, Achilles?
What is the specific problem you are trying to solve?
Andy
Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
Jay,
Thank you very much.
Something near to this distinction between feelings and
emotions
was posed by William James too, according Vygotsky, but James
saw this distinction in terms that these social dimension of
affective
world, the higher feelings, have almost nothing related to
biological,
physiological, material, body, conditions. And Vygotsky
criticizes
this like a way of dualistic thinking - this dualism can be
understood
as based in ideological motivations too: "the human is not an
animal,
nor a material been, but a divine been, in his higher,
superior
feelings..."
A distinction between feelings and emotions is present in
Damasio
too
in neurofunctional terms... But Vygotsky proposed the
question of
a systemic inter-relationship in that the lower can turns
higher,
and
vice versa... I don't know what we can thing about this... In
this
case, distinction between feelings and emotions are useful,
but
if
we want to understand the entire human been, his/her whole
personality,
the integration and inter-functional relations between
feelings
and
emotions turns relevant too, In my point of view.
Best wishes.
Achilles.
From: jaylemke@umich.edu
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 19:28:26 -0800
CC:
I am certainly one of those people interested in emotion, or
feeling,
or affect, or whatever we choose to make of the phenomenon.
The topic seems to have historically accumulated a lot of
ideological
baggage. And while its expression may be more sophisticated
today than
in times past, there doesn't seem to be that much less of it
(as
for
example in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy review
noted
by
someone earlier).
Emotion tends to be seen as bad in our philosophical
tradition.
As the
enemy of reason, the motor of self-deception, etc. It links
us
to the
animals, to our "baser" nature, etc. A bit of this in the
pagan
tradition, a lot of it in christian asceticism, and tons of
it
in
Enlightenment rationalism and its successors.
Emotions are also associated with the unreliable feminine
vs..
the cool
and collected masculine, with the passions of the mob vs. the
thoughtful elite, with peasants, workers, and children, and
pretty
much every social category whose oppression needs some
legitimation.
Indeed one of the near universal legitimations of elite
power is
"we
know what's good for you", not just because of what we know,
but
because you can't be trusted to see your own best interests
through
the haze of your emotions.
Useful as this is to elite interests, it combines further
with
the
cult of individualism to make emotions a purely individual,
mental,
subjective matter. Non-material, non-social, non-cultural,
and
universal (the easier to apply the stigma of emotionality to
non-
European cultures). It is rather hard to crawl out of this
pit
of mud.
As I've been trying to do for the last year or two. There
would
be too
much to say for a short post on this list, but here are a few
basic
suggestions:
Feeling is a broad enough category to get back to the
phenomenology of
affect/emotion, whereas "emotion" is too narrowly defined
within
the
tradition of animal-like and universal.
There are a LOT of different feelings, and that is more
important than
efforts to identify some small number of basic emotions.
Many feelings are associated with evaluative judgments and
this
may be
a key link to re-unify affective and cognitive.
Feelings do differ significantly across cultures, and are
part
of a
larger system of meanings-and-feelings specific to a
community.
You can't make meanings across any longer term process of
reasoning
without feelings and evaluative judgments.
It is likely that feelings have histories, both in cultures
and
in
individuals.
Feelings are often reliable guides to survival, to adaptive
action,
and to finding ways to meet our needs.
Feelings are just as situated and distributed as are
cognitions.
And
just as active and actively made and produced.
In short -- pretty much everything in our dominant tradition
about
emotions and feelings is exactly wrong -- and for the worst
possible
ideological-political reasons, I believe.
JAY.
Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
Visiting Scholar
Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
University of California -- San Diego
La Jolla, CA
USA 92093
On Nov 26, 2009, at 8:08 AM, mike cole wrote:
With so much interest in achieving an integrated
understanding
of
emotion,
cognition, and development, Achilles, your focus on this
topic
is a
helpful
reminder of its continued importance.
Seems like one of those many areas in psychological research
where
we cannot
keep from murdering to dissect.
mike
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_________________________________________________________________
Novo site do Windows Live: Novidades, dicas dos produtos e
muito
mais. Conheça!
http://www.windowslive.com.br/?ocid=WindowsLive09_MSN_Hotmail_Tagline_out09_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_________________________________________________________________
Agora a pressa é amiga da perfeição. Chegou o Windows 7.
Conheça!
http://www.microsoft.com/brasil/windows7/default.html?WT.mc_id=1539_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_________________________________________________________________
Novo site do Windows Live: Novidades, dicas dos produtos e muito
mais. Conheça!
http://www.windowslive.com.br/?ocid=WindowsLive09_MSN_Hotmail_Tagline_out09_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_________________________________________________________________
Novo site do Windows Live: Novidades, dicas dos produtos e muito
mais..
Conheça!
http://www.windowslive.com.br/?ocid=WindowsLive09_MSN_Hotmail_Tagline_out09_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_________________________________________________________________
Você já ama o Messenger? Conheça ainda mais sobre ele no Novo site de
Windows Live.
http://www.windowslive.com.br/?ocid=WindowsLive09_MSN_Hotmail_Tagline_out09_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca