A few days ago Steve made passing reference to an article that
apparently Tony had drawn his attention to, titled "Heil
Heidegger."
I Googled and found that it is a recent article in the
Chronicle of
Higher Education.
<http://www.chroniclecareers.com/article/Heil-Heidegger-/
48806/>
The focus of the article is Heidegger's links with and
support of
the Nazis, and its principal recommendations are that we
should stop
paying attention to Heidegger, stop translating and
publishing his
writing, and "mock him to the hilt."
I feel I should comment on this, since I have occasionally
drawn on
Heidegger's work in these discussions. I certainly have no
intention
of apologizing for Heidegger, who seems to have been a very
nasty
person, who was responsible for some deplorable actions. I do
want
to question, however, the proposal that because of these
facts we
all would be better off ignoring his writing.
I was introduced to Heidegger by a Jewish professor of
philosophy
who shared his last name (coincidentally as far as I know)
with one
of the best-known victims of antisemitism. At that time less
was
known about Heidegger's Narzism, but by no means nothing, and I
recall discussion in the classroom of the issue. I came to
feel that
the last thing one should try to do is separate the man's
work from
his life. Perhaps if he had been working on some obscure area
of
symbolic logic, say, that would have been possible, but
Heidegger
had written a philosophy of human existence, and this would
seem to
*demand* that there be consistency between what he wrote and
how he
lived. Indeed, perhaps it would be important to study the man's
writings to try to understand where he went wrong; at what
point in
his analysis of human being did Heidegger open the door to the
possibility of fascism? I think in fact that it is in
Division II of
Being and Time, where Heidegger is describing what he called
'authentic Dasein,' which amounts to a way that a person
relates to
time, specifically to the certainty of their own death, that
the
mistake is made and the door is opened to evil.
Carlin Romano, the author of the article, doesn't seem to know
Heidegger's work very well. Dasein ("being there," i.e. being-
in-
the-world) is not a "cultural world," nor do "Daseins
intersect," as
he puts it. (But I suppose that he is mocking Heidegger.) And
that
brings me to my other reason for recommending that we
continue to
read Heidegger, his politics and (lack of) ethics
notwithstanding.
It is that his analysis throws light on issues that have been
raised
in this group, and were important to LSV and others. I am
sure it
seems odd to link a Nazi philosopher to a socialist
psychologist,
but I am hardly the first to see connections. Lucien Goldmann
wrote
"Lukacs and Heidegger," a book in which he acknowledged the
incongruity but argued that there are "fundamental bonds"
between
the two men's work, that at the beginning of the 20th century
"on
the basis of a new problematic first represented by Lukacs,
and then
later on by Heidegger, the contemporary situation was slowly
created. I would add that this perspective will also enable
us to
display a whole range of elements common to both
philosophers, which
are not very visible at first sight, but which nevertheless
constitute the common basis on which undeniable antagonisms are
elaborated" (p. 1).
What is this common basis? It is that of overcoming the
separation
between subject and object in traditional thought, overcoming
subject/object dualism, by recognizing the role of history in
individual and collective human life, and rethinking the
relation
between theory and practice. As Michael wrote, Heidegger
reexamined
the traditional philosophical distinction between an object (a
being) and what it *is* (its Being), and rejected both
idealism and
essentialism to argue that what an object is (and not just
what it
'means') is defined by the human social practices in which it
is
involved, and in which people encounter it. These practices, of
course, change over historical time, so the conditions for an
object
to 'be' are practical, social, and historical. And since people
define themselves in terms of the objects they work with, the
basis
of human being is practical, social, and historical too.
I continue to believe that this new kind of ontological
analysis,
visible according to Goldmann in the work of both Lukacs and
Heidegger, influenced in both cases by Hegel, is centrally
important. If we can learn from studying Heidegger how to
acknowledge these cultural conditions without falling into a
valorization of the folk, without dissolving individuals in the
collective (a failing of the Left just as much as the Right),
then
we will have gained, not lost, by reading his texts.
Martin