As for the ideality of spades:Plutarch wrote that Philip of Macedon said that Macedonians are so crude that they can't come up with anything other to call a trough, than calling it a trough. Erasmus mistranslated "trough" as "spade," hence the saying "to call a spade a spade." (Caring about his son Alexander, Philip hired that guy from Athens called Aristotle to be his tutor. Alexander had his father killed, they say, and as they say, "the rest is history."
(see Wikipedia for "call a spade a spade)As for the axe head and axe handle, Carnap and Saussure had different ways of handling this. Here's from pp. 283-284 of my article, Whitson, J. A. (2007). Education à la Silhouette: The need for semiotically-informed curriculum consciousness. Semiotica, 164(1/4), 235-329:
The important problem of understanding difference and identity was recognized and discussed explicitly by Hobbes (1839 : 132-138), Locke (1995 : Bk. 2 Ch. 27), and Carnap (1969: 250-254), as well as by Saussure. To help us see how Saussure differs from the more classical forms of positivism, it is fortuitous that Carnap actually used the same example as one used by Saussure: the problem of 'identity' as represented in the statement 'Today I came home on the same train as yesterday, namely, on the 6:12' (Carnap 1969: 252), or when 'we speak of the identity of two "8:25 p.m. Geneva-to-Paris" trains that leave at twenty-four hour intervals. We feel that it is the same train each day, yet every¬thing--the locomotive, coaches, personnel--is probably different' (Saussure 1959 [1907-1916]: 108).
Carnap offers two alternative ways of thinking about this: According to the first approach, we are ... not concerned with identity, but with various other relations which, however, are envisaged as identity (either linguistically or conceptually). According to the second approach, we are not here concerned with similarity (in this or that respect), but with identity in the strict sense, however, not with identity between the individual objects which occur here, but between objects on a higher level (classes or relation extensions), of which the objects are representatives. (Carnap 1969: 252)
For Saussure:... what makes the express is its hour of departure, its route, and in general every circumstance that sets it apart from other trains. Whenever the same conditions are fulfilled, the same entities are obtained. Still, the entities are not abstract since we cannot conceive of a ? train outside its material realization. (Saussure 1959 [1907-1916]: 109, emphasis added)
For Saussure, the 8:25 to Paris is 'the same entity' from one day to the next, even if the equipment and personnel are all not the same, by virtue of everything that sets the 8:25 to Paris apart from all the other trains?in other words, its identity within the structured system of different schedules for all the different trains and routes. For Saussure, the 8:25 is a positive entity, with the positive self-identity of its daily instantiations arising from what they have in common with each other, which is essentially and distinctively nothing other than their negative differences from all the other trains.
For Carnap, we can also speak of the 6:12 train home every day as having positive identity, in the strict sense, with the understanding that the identity pertains to the 6:12 as a class, which is represented by its daily instantiations; in this case, the class or 'higher-level object' for which 'identity holds in the strict sense' consists of 'the arrangement to have a daily train at 6:12 P.M., as a class of train runs' (Carnap 1969: 253). Here, the 6:12 is again a positive entity, but with its positive self-identity established on the basis of the positive characteristics that it possesses as a class. Carnap's alternative?interpreting the statement as one that is actually 'not concerned with identity, but with various other relations'?adds further emphasis to his insistence on observing the 'strict sense' of identity as such.
On Mon, 28 Sep 2009 ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
Speaking of the material aspect of language and comparing spades to statues I just can't resist the following politically incorrect joke: Sven came into some money and so he hired a contractor to build a new house. As he is going over the plans with the contractor he tells the man that in every room he wants an "Hallo Statue". The contractor looks at him confused and asks, "Sven what is an Hallo Statue?" Sven says, "You know, it rings, you pick it up and say "Hallo Statue?" From the land of scandinavian immigrants eric Steve Gabosch <email@example.com> Sent by: firstname.lastname@example.org 09/26/2009 06:33 PM Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com> cc: Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" Martin - I agree with you and Mike Cole that all artifacts, including spades and axes, (and even their parts), insofar as humans are actively engaged with them in some way, are ideal, as well as material. I think of "ideality" as the meaning or social significance of things. (Am reading your notes on The Concept of the Ideal ...) Hi Haydi! Your mentioning of axes reminds me of an amusing joke that is also a nice illustration of how I think Ilyenkov views ideality. It has been told on xmca before. A young man is meeting his fiance's father, who is showing him around the farmhouse and boasting about an axe hung up above the fireplace. "That axe has been in the family for generations!" he exclaimed. "It is the very ax that chopped down the trees that this house was made from. And that axe has chopped the wood for all the fires ever burned in this fireplace. We are very proud of that axe! And it is such a fine axe, that the axe handle has only been replaced three times, and the axe head, only twice!" - Steve - Steve On Sep 26, 2009, at 3:02 PM, Martin Packer wrote:Haydi, I think your view, that a spade is not ideal but a statue is, is close to the view that Steve and Andy have. I beg to differ, but I respect the difference. I'm curious to learn about the new translation of Crisis. Who is working on the translation, and into what language? There are some passages towards the end that are very puzzling in English. Martin On Sep 26, 2009, at 2:54 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:Martin Thank you ! I managed to withdraw from the discussion and now you are late in kindness ! though very appreciable . To speak out , when two giants go hand in hand with their discussions as though privately , others willing to take part even with a poor knowledge have the right to object . This becomes very complicated when the adressed giant takes no heed . Yes English is not my native language and most of the time I'm silent . That's plea for disregard ? As of the spade , it's not the case that I don't know anything of what you explained . Sometime somebody told me on the skype an axe taken as its separate parts is material but taken as assembled and as some tool to cut trees is ideal . On the other hand , I've read from Ilyenko when one round of activity in which the ideal is the driving force is finished , we have just the product as ideality dead , an object like other objects . Now the ideal is embodied ; it was up to this moment in the process of the activity , not in the head according to Ilyenko . Dubrovsky has another story . The image of a building not yet built ideal but erected dwelt in , material . I have the right to say a spade is not a thing for something else but a statue is . Where is the difference ? How can it be justified ? These are things you also deal with at times to no end . Why is it they get problematic when discussed by us ? To your ever friendly gestures Thanks again Haydi --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: From: Martin Packer <email@example.com> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 5:09 PM Haydi, I apologize for not responding directly to your messages. As you noted, your English raises some barriers for me. For example, you seem to say here that we never say a spade is ideal. But this isn't true, is it? Mike has written about the way artifacts embody the activities in which they are used, are formed to support particular activities, and in this (Ilyenkovian) sense are certainly ideal. Does this imply then that all material things are ideal? Andy will disagree with me (he already did, back when we were discussing Ilyenkov's analysis of ideality), but I would say yes, that insofar as material things are caught up in human social practices, they are also ideal. (Actually I would prefer to use a somewhat different vocabulary than Ilyenkov does, but I'm in general agreement with what he seems to be saying.) And of course, as an individual I can only encounter things as they are caught up in such practices. To forge a link to Tony's post from Pierce, I think also proposes that humans are ideal, or to be more precise become ideal in ontogenesis. Rather like saying a human is a sign. But that's a big topic. Martin On Sep 26, 2009, at 12:56 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:. Martin brought strong evidence from Marx indicating *real talers* as Gods are just in the common imagination of man , thus ideal , you see , real talers , real money papers , ideal , but we never say a spade is ideal , exchange value of a commodity ideal , use value of the same commodity material as corporeal , ask why ?? you say ideals always material things ? You don't remember your repeated resort to the definition of ideals as reflections of the objects of the world onto the mind ? If the ideality plane is a reflection of the materiality plane , then where is the difference ? Two groups of material things ? What and what ? or are all material things , ideal altogether ? Material things with *social significance* , ideal ? Any other significances with material things as you put emphasis on *social* ? Excuse me , Andy ! I know something of spatial temporal causal properties of matter , thing in itself ; at some other time you will be kind to make me familiar with the ideal properties of material things . Thanks a lot . Then dear Martin has other adressees besides me . Well . OK . That's very good . Enough for me now , thank you ! Friendly yours Haydi --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <email@example.com> wrote: From: Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" To: Cc: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <email@example.com> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 2:01 PM Haydi, please help me limit the number of questions under discussion on this thread at one time, or we will never resolve anything. Yes, a complication with my responding to you was that in trying to support my position against Martin's position, you made (in my opinion) the opposite error. So it was hard to say to you: "No, language is material," and to Martin: "No, consciousness is not matter" and make sense. Let's just look at your claim. You say that language is a system of ideals. Quite correct. But ideals are always material things. When we cognize ideals (i.e., material things with social significance) then not only the material properties, but also the ideal properties of things are reflected in our consciousness. But Martin was right: all systems of representation are material, including language. I was just saying that in his own terms, he was being tautological. But Martin explained: he was addressing himself to people who believed in non-material systems of representation. So of course, you objected. Andy Haydi Zulfei wrote:Andy 1. Quite true Andy . Yes , putting some , few , a , two , whatever into the heart of an assertion of *every* , *all* is mere tautology which I shyingly / ashamedly believe Martin is committing not just once but several times . 2. I suppose here you could point out to Martin that he could be taken to be right only if he thought of a materialistic monism and I wonder why you didn't . Yes , materialistic Monism opposes strongly the Cartesian dualistic understanding of matter/mind , body/soul either belonging to a quite unfamiliar separate world/ domain . If we reject the Cartesian dualism , it's not plea for others to argue we negate our belief in two distinct but related philosophically categorical domains of materiality/ideality , a thing versus concept of a thing , etc. Once I said while we ourselves are creations of the outdide--matter-- .... , does that mean my consciousness which is real and exists , is matter ? or even material in the sense of palpable , corporeal , stuffy ? No for sure . I added that some philosophers argue Cs is material in the sense of it being an attribute of matter and even this does not evade the categorical distinction . 3. This time , pardon , tautology on your side . It's Martin who should ask you to show him a representational system which is not *material* because he asserts materiality with *every* ... . But when I gave you *language* and some other *systems* as some representational systems being ideal reasoning upon them , it was dear Martin who should have broken the silence , entered the discussion and come up with likely refutations . I already had sided with you . 4. Again I wonder why you who so scholarly argue for the quite legitimate philosophical categorical distinction of the mind/ matter , are ready to accept language is material ; and how can you separate thus language domain from the Cs , mind , intellect , ideality , subjectivity domain ? Then Martin will be quite right to think of all these as being material . I'm now reading Dubrovsky's *The Nature of the Ideal* . Maybe it's a borderline category but I'm sure it's philosophical , too . No time to search now . It's a familiar controversy here . I side with the external ideals as being representations of the internal ideals rather than being genuinely material as other world corporeal objects . We have suffered lots of confusion with this *doubling* of materiality . I suppose we have to put them in contrast to each other , otherwise there will remain unsolved problems . Take the best of the bees and the worst of the architects or the *real* talersofMarx along with Gods as examples of ideals -- my previous posts .5. You do know language came into being because of collective labour . And please have another look at V's last two paragraphs of T&S . And please think of what a syntax of a thought might be with children . And please consider yourself reviewing the lecture you're going to deliver *in* your mind before putting it in its sound/acoustic version . And historical genesis as well . Now may you , in your turn , tell me what kind of existence a consciousness has for which you are seeking an appropriate definition ? I wonder if sleep will reign ! Friendly Yours Haydi --- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<firstname.lastname@example.org>/* wrote: From: Andy Blunden <email@example.com> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" To: Cc: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 11:54 AM Haydi, I firmly believe that there is no value in flying on to 101 questions if the very first one remains unsolved. Going to your third: the problem under discussion was this: Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that *everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement that these representational systems were material was a "motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology. So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not* material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that everything is material. You then said that you could name a representational system which was not material, namely, language. I responded to you that language was always material, and you now say "no, language is an non-material entity which is "put into a body." I suspect that you are relying on the concept of the 'ideal' which is a social category, not an opposite to "material." Let's just deal with this. I don't accept that there is a language which is non-material which can then be "put into" a body. Can you explain to me what kind of existence language has before it is put into material. I won't try to anticipate your answer, but I wonder if this will lead us back to our original problem: consciousness. Andy Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Andy > First there were other argumentations . > Second : to your question : Consciousness itself . > Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then we have two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is that itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect ideals be buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well known , indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is also defunct . > I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you show me a palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's representational , secondary , derived . Haydi > > --- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<email@example.com <http://firstname.lastname@example.org/*wrote: > > > From: Andy Blunden <email@example.com <http://firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material > quality of the man-sign" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"<email@example.com<http://firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM > > Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the modality in > which it is embodied" and then say "language is not material." Of > course, anything "aside from" its materiality is immaterial. Show me > a representational system which is *not* "embiodied." > > Andy > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Dear Andy > > Language itself aside from the modality in which it is > formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is ideal for the > folowing reasons : 1. We have read on many occasions that it's a > formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs as something > catogirically distinct from the material which is quite quite true , > why is it you could accept a formant of this something categorically > distinct from *material* could be all the way *material* . This is > just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a doubling of > *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same way real talers > as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) . Real talers or > money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy , substantial ; > yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that they are > representations for something *esle* . The talerness of the talers > and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking body to be > recognized as such . Aside from the social thought/ Cs , the whole > things become just use values , valueless , lacking any exchange > value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second > > condition Lenin mentions either . As of language , the ink , the > carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied does not make it > *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* , *plastics* > of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting content here -- > of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates Lincoln , now > Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain the same all the > time . This latter part you name categorically *material* to this > day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock consists of many > many parts , that is , many corporals , materials , use values ; > but all these should be organized in such a way to represent > something else , time measurement . The palpability or the visuality > of the clock should not take us where we could say it's something > material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce fits this . > When you take the ideality of the language away from it , the whole > sentence/text/book becomes ink > > spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect . Your example of > *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the gist quite easily > ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the stone so that > a language becomes eligible for the readers . What remains as some > markings or signs no longer have any materiality ; the remaining > stone frame does not have anything to do with the language carved in > it . This is also true with the braille texture . It's the > organization/ordinance of the texture which is a language not the > stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen lipreading > each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact , have a > telepathy version of language ; you're this way exchanging your > mentalities with no materiality at hand . The computer is modality > for your vision not for the language you are using . And lastly , > because a word is a sign , something for something else , in itself > ! just a yelling or a marking denoting nothing as referring to the > objects of the world which you so philosophically / inexaustively > are defending ! > > Best > > Haydi > > --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <email@example.com <http://firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://email@example.com: > > > > > > From: Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org <http://email@example.com> <http://firstname.lastname@example.org> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material > quality of the man-sign" > > To: "Haydi Zulfei" <email@example.com <http://firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://email@example.com> > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM > > > > > > Language is a material representational system, Haydi. > > > > Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air), text (markings > on a surface or optical projections on a screen or carved in stone) > or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental telepathy version > of language that I know of. > > > > Why do you think the written and spoken word is not material? > > > > Andy > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational system which > is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system which is not > material. > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > xmca mailing list > > firstname.lastname@example.org <http://email@example.com> <http://firstname.lastname@example.org> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > -- >------------------------------------------------------------------------> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, > Ilyenkov $20 ea > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > email@example.com <http://firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://email@example.com> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org <http://email@example.com://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca--------------------------------------------------------------------------Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list email@example.com http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list email@example.com http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list email@example.com http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Tony Whitson UD School of Education NEWARK DE 19716 email@example.com _______________________________ "those who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story everywhere" -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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