[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign"
First there were other argumentations .
Second : to your question : Consciousness itself .
Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then we have two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is that itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect ideals be buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well known , indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is also defunct .
I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you show me a palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's representational , secondary , derived .
--- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
From: Andy Blunden <email@example.com>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign"
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM
Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the modality in which it is embodied" and then say "language is not material." Of course, anything "aside from" its materiality is immaterial. Show me a representational system which is *not* "embiodied."
Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Dear Andy
> Language itself aside from the modality in which it is formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is ideal for the folowing reasons : 1. We have read on many occasions that it's a formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs as something catogirically distinct from the material which is quite quite true , why is it you could accept a formant of this something categorically distinct from *material* could be all the way *material* . This is just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a doubling of *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same way real talers as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) . Real talers or money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy , substantial ; yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that they are representations for something *esle* . The talerness of the talers and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking body to be recognized as such . Aside from the social
thought/Cs , the whole things become just use values , valueless , lacking any exchange value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second
> condition Lenin mentions either . As of language , the ink , the carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied does not make it *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* , *plastics* of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting content here -- of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates Lincoln , now Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain the same all the time . This latter part you name categorically *material* to this day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock consists of many many parts , that is , many corporals , materials , use values ; but all these should be organized in such a way to represent something else , time measurement . The palpability or the visuality of the clock should not take us where we could say it's something material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce fits this . When you take the ideality of the language away from it , the whole sentence/text/book becomes ink
> spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect . Your example of *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the gist quite easily ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the stone so that a language becomes eligible for the readers . What remains as some markings or signs no longer have any materiality ; the remaining stone frame does not have anything to do with the language carved in it . This is also true with the braille texture . It's the organization/ordinance of the texture which is a language not the stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen lipreading each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact , have a telepathy version of language ; you're this way exchanging your mentalities with no materiality at hand . The computer is modality for your vision not for the language you are using . And lastly , because a word is a sign , something for something else , in itself ! just a yelling or a marking denoting
nothing as referring to the objects of the world which you so philosophically / inexaustively are defending !
> --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <email@example.com> wrote:
> From: Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign"
> To: "Haydi Zulfei" <email@example.com>
> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM
> Language is a material representational system, Haydi.
> Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air), text (markings on a surface or optical projections on a screen or carved in stone) or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental telepathy version of language that I know of.
> Why do you think the written and spoken word is not material?
> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational system which is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system which is not material.
> xmca mailing list
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list