Re: [xmca] Types of Generalization: concepts and pseudoconcepts

[Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu>]

A small follow-up, having now read at least Andy's comments on  
Davydov, if not the Davydov itself.

I would agree very broadly with what Andy says, and highlight one  
point and note one that is perhaps underemphasized.

Maybe it's because of Davydov's view,  but it seems clear to me that  
LSV emphasizes very strongly and consistently the key role of verbal  
language, and so we ought really want to know more about exactly how  
the ways in which children and early adolescents use verbal languages  
changes as they come to mediate their activity more along the lines we  
might call acting-with-true-concepts.

What struck me as very important, that Andy emphasizes (and Davydov  
also?) is that the development of true concepts depends on their use  
in social institutions. This limits the relevance of artificial- 
concept experimental studies in ways that would not be apparent in a  
more purely cognitive science paradigm (or old fashioned empirical- 
concept ideology), because the similarity to natural true concepts is  
only logical-formal, and not also social-institutional. A lot of my  
own students tend to get this wrong, because they identify the social  
with the interpersonal, such that there is still a similarity (in the  
micro-social milieu of the experiment itself as a social activity).  
But not at the macro-social institutional level.

And here perhaps is also a clue to my query about how the modes of  
mediation differ across the historical cases (Foucault), the cross- 
cultural cases (Levi-Straus), the post-modern cases (Wittgenstein,  
Latour), and even the everyday true concept vs. formal scientific- 
mathematical true concept cases. The difference arises in and from the  
institutional differences. Could we perhaps combine LSV's insights  
into how this works in the developmental case (changes in the social  
positioning of the child/adolescent), L-S on the functioning of mytho- 
symbolic mediated activiity in rituals and social structuration  
processes, F on changes in the historical institutions (medieval-early  
modern), and L on heterogeneity of mediation in relation to  
heterogeneity of actant networks? to understand better how this  
institutional context and its processes play out?

I left out Wittgenstein, but he may help with an intermediate scale,  
not the large social institutions, but the game-like activities of  
which they are composed.

I'll be looking at Davydov to see what he offers in these terms.

JAY.


Jay Lemke
Professor (Adjunct)
Educational Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
www.umich.edu/~jaylemke





On Sep 11, 2009, at 5:51 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

> I have prepared a response to Davydov's book, but it is 4,000 words,  
> so I have attached it in a Word document. But here is a synopsis.
>
> Davydov claims that in his analysis of the Sakharov experiments,  
> Vygotsky fails to demonstrate any real distinction between a true  
> concept and an abstract general notion (what is usually and  
> mistakenly taken for a concept in non-Marxist thought).
>
> I claim that he has a point, but Vygotsky is guilty only of some  
> unclarity and inconsistency in his language, and makes the  
> distinction very clear. And Davydov should pay more attention to  
> what Vygotsky says about the relationship.
>
> Davydov works with a mistaken contrast between scientific concepts  
> and the general notions derived from everyday life. Scientific  
> concepts are by no means the only type of true concepts and everyday  
> life is full of concepts.
>
> Nonetheless, Davydov has a point. It is evident that Sakharov, the  
> author of the orignal, oft-cited report evidently is guilty exactly  
> as charged by Davydov. And no-one seems to have noticed!
>
> Although Paula and Carol are consistent and correct in everything  
> they say in their paper, they err on one occasion only when they  
> cite Kozulin citing Hanfmann. It is as if people equate logical use  
> of generalized empirical notions with conceptual thought, never in  
> their own words, but only by means of citing someone else's words.
>
> I think this is the legacy of a lack of clarity in Vygotsky's  
> brilliance.
>
> 4,000 words attached. And apologies for not entering the discussion  
> of Paula and Carol's paper earlier, but I was not clear in my own  
> mind on these problems, and Davydov helped me get clear. Better late  
> than never!
>
> Andy
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/davydov/generalization/
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/concept-really-concept.htm
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/comment/sakharov.htm
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
>
> <concept-really- 
> concept.doc>_______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

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