Re: [xmca] In Defense of Imprecision

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

So it seems in David/Ketherine's example, Carol.
But it could work in the opposite direction couldn't it?
Note that all of David's items are cognitive and the title of Nelson's book
is about cognitive development. I think this perfectly normal and
understandable
restriction/framing is probably relevant to the issue of how we narrow
interpretations of words/theories/assertions to create at least the illusion
of understanding.
mike

On Sun, Feb 15, 2009 at 11:12 PM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>wrote:

> From: Carol
>
> David
> In addition to your range of  skills/concepts the child has (and they seem
> to be valid)  is there also another factor, and that is the need for
> solidarity and "sameness". Obviously we infer that because the child
> cannot;
> but that's what you did in your analysis.
>
> (This of course only lasts for some time, until the child wishes that she
> could be like *others *who are stronger, prettier, etc.) I think we call
> that teenagehood  :-}
>
>
>
>
> 2009/2/16 David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
>
> > Consider this data from a maternal diary study (Callanan and Oakes 1992:
> > 221-222) cited in Nelson, Language in Cognitive Development, p. 255:
> >
> > Child: Why does Daddy, James (big brother) and me have blue eyes and you
> > have green eyes?
> > (Parent tells child that she got her eyes from Daddy. Child says
> goodnight
> > and leaves the room. Child re-emerges about five minutes later to
> continue
> > the conversation.)
> > Child: I like Pee Wee Herman and I have blue yes. Daddy likes Pee Wee
> > Herman and he has blue eyes. James likes Pee Wee Herman and he has blue
> > eyes. If you liked Pee Wee Herman you could get blue eyes too.
> > (Parent suggests that it might take more than liking Pee Wee Herman.
> > Comments in the diary: "I realized that she didn't understand me so I
> > explained that God gave me this color and they couldn't be changed.")
> > Child: Could you try to like Pee Wee Herman so we could see if your eyes
> > turn blue?
> > (Parent says "I said I would think about it but if my eyes stayed green
> it
> > was OK.")
> >
> > Now, Nelson's rather severe comment is that "(a)lthough this example
> > indicates creative causal thinking, it violates in the most extreme way
> the
> > boundary between basic biological and symbolic cultural domains, and does
> > not suggest the possession of systematically organized, causally related
> > knowledge in either domain."
> >
> > Of course it's really impossible to evaluate whether the example suggests
> > that or not, because it's hard to say how serious the child is. But
> here's
> > what it really DOES suggest, whether the child is serious or not.
> >
> > The child is capable of
> > a) reflection,
> > b) induction,
> > c) generalization,
> > d) a critical attitude towards magical explanations (e.g. God) and
> > e) a scientific procedure for testing hypotheses.
> >
> > All of those things are really considerably MORE important to the
> creation
> > of scientific concepts than the supposed boundary between basic
> biological
> > and symbolic cultural domains, which are easily violated in much more
> > extreme ways (e.g. tooth fillings, colored contact lenses, cosmetic
> > surgery). In fact, taken together, these things constitute the very
> source
> > of organized, causally related knowledge in both domains.
> >
> > Actually, I think that the imprecision of word-meaning is related. The
> > reason why word meaning is THE unit of analysis that Vygotsky posits for
> > human consciousness is precisely that it is imprecise; it must be and it
> is
> > accompanied with negotiation procedures for reflection, induction,
> > generalization, critical appropriation, hypothesis formation and
> hypothesis
> > testing, all of which happen in and through normal conversation. In Jay's
> > terminology, word meaning is meta-stable rather than stable.
> >
> > What is true for word meaning is even more true of grammar. Chinese,
> which
> > is one of the "few" languages (according to Nelson) to lack a tense
> system,
> > happens to be historically the most developed and differentiated one as
> well
> > (because the early invention of a non-phonologically based writing system
> > held it together when other languages simply flew apart).
> >
> > After all, development might NOT mean purity; it might mean variety. So
> > tense, like reported speech, is a very imprecise instrument that easily
> > atrophies and withers away. You can easily see examples of this happening
> > logogenetically whenever somebody tries to tell a long story with lots of
> > tense changes and embedded dialogue, even in a young, still developing
> > language like English. But that's okay; imprecision is really just an
> > imprecise term for meta-stability.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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> >
>
>
>
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