Andy,
So when we think about evolution as a general process, in broad terms, we
can characterize it as natural variation plus natural selection. Even as
adaptation, which has a nicely teleological ring to it.
But when we study the changes over a period of time of a specific species we
have to take into account the particular context and setting, changing
climate, the shifts in other species that provide food or predation,
migration, accidents, disease, and so on. All this requires a level of
specificity for which broad concepts like adaptation are too blunt a tool.
I put it this way because I have been reading an article by Lois Wacquant
that contrasts three different models that Marx employed: the mechanical
base-superstructure model, the organismic totality model, and the
dialectical model. Wacquant argues that these effectively provided Marx with
different analytic lenses with which to conduct different analytic tasks.
The first, the base-superstucture model, was taken, to the exclusion of the
others, as the basis for "scientific socialism," but Wacquant argues that
for his more detailed studies of specific historical events Marx used a
combination of the dialectical and organismic models. In these, any notion
that an economic base drives or determines societal change is replaced by
more subtle and nuanced accounts in which human agency plays a central role.
Wacquant concludes that for Marx history had no agency other than human
agency.
Along the way he notes an interesting contrast between Marx and Hegel. Both
employed organismic metaphors, writing of totalities and wholes. For Hegel,
though, society was a smoothly integrated organism, as Andy's recent quote
seems to illustrate. When Marx wrote about society as an organism, in
contrast, it was generally as one at odds with itself: distressed, diseased,
mutating, or pregnant (yes, I know the latter is undoubtedly a prefeminist,
male point of view).
And of course Vygostky used the latter metaphors frequently in Crisis. It
would be fascinating to study Vygotsky's texts to see if he too was using
different models for different analytic tasks. A great dissertation topic!
Wacquant, L. J. D. (1985). Heuristic models in Marxian theory. Social
Forces, 64(1), 17-45.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2578970>
Martin
On 1/24/09 8:12 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
We are getting to understand each other here at least! :)
You say: "we explain the color changes of the chameleon (and
the survival of such creatures) in terms of the purposes
they serve."
That's teleology, reference to purpose.
Then you say: "But we can't explain the *evolution* of those
characteristics, their appearance in, at first, a few
mutated individuals, in terms of any function or purpose."
But you certainly can't explain it mechanically. (EG 1
1:07am on 17 June 5067 BC, an electron jumped out of its
orbit in a chameleon at 130degN45degW and caused x mutation
and as a result that chameleon ...) You can only explain
natural selection by the notion of a change which is "a
functional advantage for survival of the gene line" in some
way. That means teleology (the purpose is survival of the
gene line), and no Great Architect is required. You cannot
explain natural selection without reference to what the
Standford encyclopedia charmingly called "backwards
causation", i.e., survival of the gene line, the end causes
the beginning, but cancel the notion of causation here and
simply accept that ends can't cause beginnings, it's called
teleology not mechanism. Darwin of course never knew about
the mechanism; only that progeny resemble their parents.
Natural variation is admittedly non teleological (it *has*
to be for natural selection to work) but "natural selection"
is (by definition) teleological.
I think Hegel probably had British political economy in mind
when he wrote that bit about passions.
Andy
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