Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

[Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>]

Andy,

As always it's taking me a while to translate from Hegelian to English!
Starting with point 2, it's by no means obvious that evolution requires
reference to teleology:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/>

...even with chameleons:

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080129125524.htm>

...so I'll stand by my assertion that the view that there is a teleology to
the universe remains at best a hypothesis. And when you say
"teleology...exists whether we or anyone else knows the end" are you
suggesting that knowing that teleology exists is enough for someone to say
that they know the "objective laws" of the universe? We certainly don't know
the ends, I would argue we are not at all certain that there is a teleology,
and furthermore I don't think we are clear on what basis we could validly
make such a claim.

Regarding your point 1, you seem to be saying that human knowledge is
objective (in the Hegelian sense, and perhaps for Ilyenkov too) because it
is (part of) knowledge of the absolute. But this seems to me to beg the
question - it *assumes* that there is an absolute of which our knowledge is
part.

The claim that there is a journey with a defined end, even if it is one we
don't know - no, *especially* if it one we don't know - seems dangerously
relativizing. If we destroy the environment, that's okay, because it's all
just part of the big plan. I don't need to take any action, because things
will work out in the long run.

But perhaps the more dangerous version is the claim that we *do* know the
ends of the journey. At least a few of us do, the enlightened ones. We have
true knowledge, we are the masters of history.

It's not that an appeal to teleology invokes a Divine Architect, but rather
that the appeal to teleology has the *same effect* as the appeal to a god
who guarantees that our knowledge "conforms" to the things themselves, and
who guarantees that our actions (but not the actions of those who we must
oppose, perhaps destroy) coincide with the grand plan. I see more clearly
now why Hegel's system as been called onto-theology.

Martin 

On 1/23/09 11:07 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> OK, as I read you, Martin, so we are on to different issues
> here: (1) can knowledge which is relative be nonetheless
> objective. And you also raise in relation to the Hegel
> quote: (2) the problem of the objectivity of teleology.
>
> (1) As I read Hegel and Marx and ... knowledge is objective
> inasmuch as it is integral to forms of practice which are
> objective, i.e., practical. That knowledge is always
> incomplete (and in that narrow sense "subjective"), in the
> process of change and development, along with human
> practices, is also true. To make sense of this I know of no
> other source other than Hegel: everything is relative (i.e.,
> just one step along a journey, within which there are also
> many routes) but the whole (i.e., the journey itself) is
> absolute. I.e., at any given moment, human knowledge is only
> as adequate as our practices at that time and place, but the
> entire journey, the whole development of all human knowledge
> in all its forms over all time, is absolute. So every
> relative knowledge partakes to a degree in the absolute. Yes?
> 
> (2) On teleology: teleology is objective and exists whether
> we or anyone else knows the end or not. There is a prejudice
> among natural scientists to claim that only mechanism is
> objective, and falsely claim that teleology invokes a Divine
> Architect. But try to explain how it comes about that
> cameleons can change colour according to their surroundings
> without invoking teleology and having recourse only to cause
> and effect. It can't be done. Nonetheless, we know that the
> category of teleology in natural selection is not absolute
> and produces the clumsy feathers of the peacock. But do we
> respond by saying that evolution is wrong? No, we just
> refine the definition of the teleological process. Exactly
> what we do when we find that a mechanism proves to be an
> inadequate representation. Yes?
> 
> Andy
> 
> Martin Packer wrote:
>> Andy,
>> 
>> It certainly all hinges on what Ilyenkov means by "objectively-true," for
>> sure. I still haven't yet got much beyond page 1, but jumping forward a bit:
>> 
>> "These laws [I assume he's talking about dialectical logic] are understood
>> as the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the
>> natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. They
>> are reflected in the consciousness of mankind and verified by thousands of
>> years of human practice." (p. 15)
>> 
>> But hang on, have we humans *really* identified the "objective laws... of
>> the material world"? Let me juxtapose two excepts from your last message
>> (!):
>> 
>>>> This is the point: humans change the world, but only
>>>> according to its own nature.
>> 
>>> In a similar way. the
>>> passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves
>>> and their purposes in accordance with their natural
>>> destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus
>>> they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."
>> 
>> But Andy, it's one thing to say that we have to know a bit about the world
>> to get tasks accomplished in it. It's another thing entirely to say that our
>> tasks themselves are following some grand plan. Certainly, if there is a
>> "natural destination" to the universe, and humans are part of that universe,
>> then I suppose we are headed in that direction too. But surely you will
>> agree with me that we do not *know* that there is such a natural direction.
>> At best this is a hypothesis. It would be circular logic to say that we know
>> that nature follows a dialectical law, because it is part of that law that
>> our knowledge is objective. I'm very reluctant to say that we have already
>> figured out the laws of the universe, especially when it is claimed that one
>> of the consequences of these laws is that human cognition forms an
>> objectively-true reflection of them. That would be to place ourselves at the
>> end of history, wouldn't it? And Marx never made such a claim, to my
>> knowledge. 
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> On 1/23/09 9:27 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> 
>>> Are you counterposing "objectively-true image" with "exact
>>> picture of the world", Martin?
>>> 
>>> Andy
>>> 
>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>> Andy, thanks for adding to the height of my reading pile!  :)
>>>> 
>>>> Until I complete the assignment (at least partly) I will merely juxtapose
>>>> here two quotations whose contrast gives me pause for thought. The first
>>>> from the first page of the book by Ilyenkov you've provided:
>>>> 
>>>> "And only materialist dialectics (dialectical materialism), only the
>>>> organic
>>>> unity of dialectics with materialism arms the cognition of man with the
>>>> means and ability to construct an objectively-true image of the surrounding
>>>> world, the means and ability to reconstruct this world in accordance with
>>>> the objective tendencies and lawful nature of its own development."
>>>> 
>>>> The second from Carlos Marx himself:
>>>> 
>>>> "The formulation on [in? MP] thought of an exact picture of the
>>>> world-system
>>>> in which we live is impossible for us, and will always remain impossible.
>>>> If
>>>> at any time in the evolution of mankind such a final, conclusive system of
>>>> the interconnections within the world... were brought to completion, this
>>>> would mean that human knowledge had reached its limit, and, from the moment
>>>> when society had been brought into accord with that system, further
>>>> historical evolution would be cut short-which would be an absurd idea, pure
>>>> nonsense" (A Handbook of Marxism, 1935, p. 234)
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 1/23/09 5:56 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Martin,  I have converted to PDF Ilyenkov's book defending
>>>>> Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism":
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positivism.pdf
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think you can agree that if such a renowned Hegel
>>>>> interpreter as Ilyenkov can defend "reflection" and Lenin's
>>>>> book, then there has to be something in it. The above is
>>>>> much shorter and easier to read than Lenin's book, BTW.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Sidney Hook is far from alone in the sentiments he
>>>>> expresses. But you have to take Lenin and Engels and the
>>>>> Russian CHAT people *as a whole* and this criticism (which I
>>>>> sympathise with) of the notion of "reflection" as "passive"
>>>>> is, as you have remarked yourself, constantly contradicted
>>>>> by the "change the world" notes constantly and discordantly
>>>>> accompanying every mention of "reflection."
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is the point: humans change the world, but only
>>>>> according to its own nature. The aeroplane actually obeys
>>>>> the laws of nature as it flies across the sky. Hegel has a
>>>>> great bit on this:
>>>>> 
>>>>> "So also when someone starts building a house, his decision
>>>>> to do so is freely made. But all the elements must help. And
>>>>> yet the house is being built to protect man against the
>>>>> elements. Hence the elements are here used against
>>>>> themselves. But the general law of nature is not disturbed
>>>>> thereby. The building of a house is, in the first instance,
>>>>> a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as
>>>>> means, the several substances required for the work ­ iron,
>>>>> wood, stones. The elements are used in preparing this
>>>>> material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire,
>>>>> water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc.
>>>>> The result is that the wind, which has helped to build the
>>>>> house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of
>>>>> rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire, so far
>>>>> as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey
>>>>> the law of gravity and press downwards so that the high
>>>>> walls are held up. Thus the elements are made use of in
>>>>> accordance with their nature and cooperate for a product by
>>>>> which they become constrained. In a similar way. the
>>>>> passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves
>>>>> and their purposes in accordance with their natural
>>>>> destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus
>>>>> they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction.htm
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> 
>>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>> At risk of actually killing the horse I'm flogging, I want to return one
>>>>>> more time to the debate over 'reflection.' Mike asked me why I would be
>>>>>> sad
>>>>>> to hear that Vygotsky was significantly influenced by Lenin. I've been
>>>>>> reading some of the work in the 1920s and 30s by Sidney Hook, on the
>>>>>> topic
>>>>>> of Marx and Hegel. I'm copying below a fairly long excerpt in which Hook
>>>>>> takes to task both Engels and Lenin (in 'Materialism and
>>>>>> Empirio-Criticism,'
>>>>>> at least) for viewing ideas as "reflections" of reality - exactly in the
>>>>>> sense of mirror images or copies. That Lenin did this was the sense I
>>>>>> have
>>>>>> got from reading other comments on Lenin, though I haven't read Lenin
>>>>>> myself.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The problem, as Hook points out, is that the reflection view treats
>>>>>> thinking
>>>>>> as a passive process, that solipsism and skepticism cannot be avoided,
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> in this view knowledge cannot be creative, and consequently knowledge of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> world cannot change the world. This, as he notes, is a long way from
>>>>>> Marx.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The excerpt is from:
>>>>>> Hook, S. (1928). The Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. II. The
>>>>>> Journal
>>>>>> of Philosophy, 25(6), 141-155.
>>>>>> [ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014691 ]
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "He [Engels] presents the "dialectic" as the method which
>>>>>> corrects the limited and ossified character of classificatory thinking
>>>>>> and claims that it enables one to avoid the predicament of English
>>>>>> empiricism which is peculiarly addicted to this way of thinking.
>>>>>> But Engels failed to understand the real weakness of English
>>>>>> empiricism. Otherwise he would have realized that his uncritical
>>>>>> reference to ideas as reflections, pictures, or images (Abbilder,
>>>>>> Spiegelbilder) of things made him fall into an epistemological trap
>>>>>> whose mazes lead into the cul-de-sacs of solipsism and nominalism-
>>>>>> the very positions he was anxious to avoid. Since sensations, accord-
>>>>>> ing to Engels, gave immediate knowledge, the organizing activity of
>>>>>> thought becomes purely ancillary to classifying and relating sensa-
>>>>>> tions. Practice and experiment, which he later says must serve as
>>>>>> the criteria of truth, are introduced by a double inconsistency. For
>>>>>> if our sensations are copies, we can never know anything of the
>>>>>> originals or even know that there are any, while if sensations give
>>>>>> immediate knowledge there is no sense in trying to check up upon
>>>>>> them by experiments which only give other sensations, just as im-
>>>>>> mediate. The disastrous consequences of the belief in the cognitive
>>>>>> character of sensations comes to light in Lenin's fanatical insistence
>>>>>> upon accepting every word of Engels literally. According to Lenin,
>>>>>> sensation is "a copy, photograph, and reflection of a reality existing
>>>>>> independently of it." He takes Plekhanov to task for regarding
>>>>>> sensations as "signs" or "symbols" of what things are, instead of
>>>>>> adhering to the crude formula, "(sensations) are copies, photo-
>>>>>> graphs, images, mirror-reflections of things" (p. 195). He adds
>>>>>> further on, "the idea that knowledge can 'create' forms and change
>>>>>> the primeval chaos into order, is an idealist notion. The world is
>>>>>> a uniform world of matter in motion, and our cognition, being the
>>>>>> highest product of nature, is in a position only to reflect this law."
>>>>>> But if knowledge only "reflects" the laws of the world, how can it
>>>>>> change the world? A mirror or a lake reflects the natural scene,
>>>>>> but neither knows nor changes it. This is, indeed, a far cry from
>>>>>> the functional and experimental theory expressed in Marx's gloss
>>>>>> on Feurbach and strange words from one who believed that by "mass
>>>>>> action" and the creation of new machines and forms of distribution,
>>>>>> a better social system will be evolved." (p. 149-150)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
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