Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

[Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>]

Derek,

I'm glad you've joined the conversation. Derek has a very interesting paper
on his website which deals with the topic of 'interiorization.' He and I
have discussed the issue some off-forum. In this article he points out
something that I noted in my paper in MCA earlier this year, and that
Meshcheryakov notes too: that the "general genetic law" that is often cited
as the key Vygotskian concept actually contains two different uses of the
word "internal," and two distinct steps. One is (for example) the child
using a word to control their own actions which previously others have used
to control the child. This is movement from the social to the individual.
The other is when this speech to self (egocentric, as we well know) becomes
silent. This is the movement from the "extramental" to the "intramental."

Vygotsky actually says that the first is a movement toward what is "internal
psychologically" while the second is a movement towards what is "internal
physiologically." In *neither* case do we *need* to say that the speech
shifts to now go on "in the mind," though this seems to be the most popular
interpretation. 

Derek's alternative to the popular interpretation is the one he has just
sketched, that (if I understand it correctly) actions become more and more
abbreviated until they can no longer be seen by others. (Apologies, Derek,
if I've not done you justice.) *My* alternative is, I would argue, what
Vygotsky meant: when I can speak silently to myself the *physiology* of my
brain has changed. This would be to say that the functional brain systems
(as Leontiev calls them) responsible for vocalization become able to connect
*directly* to the functional systems responsible for action, without needing
any longer to pass through the articulatory and sensory apparatus of vocal
tract and ears. 

There remains the question of how I understand my own experience in the
latter case. It may be that I interpret what happens as me 'talking to
myself,' or of 'hearing voices.' Interpreting these voices as being "in the
mind" may seem common sense to us, but other epochs have and other cultures
do have other interpretations: the voices may be of gods, of ancestors.

(Interestingly, Julian Jaynes' notion of the "bicameral mind" is becoming
more respectable these days. This is the suggestion "that the human brain
once [around 3000 years ago] assumed a state known as a bicameral mind in
which cognitive functions are divided between one part of the brain which
appears to be 'speaking', and a second part which listens and obeys"
(Wikipedia), an epoch which marked the dawning of consciousness. And the
voices that schizophrenics "hear" are often reported to be "command
hallucinations." I've been trying to get hold of the work of Brian McVeigh,
a student of Jaynes).

Martin 




On 1/7/09 4:18 PM, "Derek Melser" <derek.melser@gmail.com> wrote:

> Martin, you ask whether there is a more active-connoting synonym of
> 'reflect'.
What about 'represent'? Rorty's book, Philosophy and the Mirror of
> Nature,
was about the representational theory of mind. The metaphor of
> innerness, of
people doing things inside their own heads, and the metaphor of
> thoughts
representing reality, are two different metaphors. But they go
> together very
well, as the longevity of traditional Western epistemology and
> the
funds-attracting power of modern cognitive science show.

But they are
> just metaphors, just fanciful construals, and so miles from the
truth. What is
> the truth? The truth is that people learn as children to, by
themselves,
> rehearse social activity (particularly teaching sessions of
various kinds,
> involving speech) in such a rapid, subtle and efficient way
that little or no
> overt movement (even facial expression) is visible. People
do these rapid
> minimal rehearsals all the time, as a means of readying
themselves for
> particular (often somewhat unfamiliar) actions. If there is
no instructor
> present, we have to, as it were, instruct ourselves how to
proceed. And the
> rapid rehearsal of an educative session (it is called
'thinking') usually does
> the trick. It readies us to go on.

What is fascinating is how and why people
> become addicted to those two
metaphors – the inner-agent or inner-arena one,
> and the
reflecting-or-representing-of-reality one – for describing
> the
rapid-rehearsal skill. Even such specialists as Vygotsky and Leontyev,
> who
understood very well the process and the stages by which the child
> learns
the rapid-rehearsal trick, fell victim anon to their pulling power,
> their
'propaganda' power, one might
> say.
Derek
http://www.derekmelser.org/


2009/1/8 David Kellogg
> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>

> Speaking of mathematics! I wonder if Valerie is
> the same Valerie Farnsworth
> who did something on teaching algebra in
> elementary school about ten years
> ago? I wonder, because it seems to me (and
> to LSV) that the problem of
> teaching algebra to elementary school kids and
> primary foreign language
> learning are really intimately related.
>
>
> Ah...but are they related to this thread? Well, it seems to me they are,
> but
> not really intimately. They are related because both refer to the
>
> establishment of something that feels inside, looks outside, and is almost
>
> by definition neither, by which I mean not consciousness but actually
>
> meta-consciousness, the consciousness of cognitive experience itself, which
>
> comes to us, and even to mathematicians, through language.
>
> I think I AGREE
> with Wolff-Michael, that the problems we are getting into
> are caused by two
> things:
>
> a) an inability to get real, to get concrete, to say what is
> actually
> gained and lost by a given act of philosophical dualism. To me,
> saying
> "inside" and "outside" is a little like saying "top down" versus
> "bottom up"
> for reading skills. As we say in Korean, there isn't any
> "bung-eo" (carp) in
> a "bung-eo bbang" (a carp-shaped cake), and there really
> isn't any "up" in
> expressions like "tear up" or "give up" or even "bottom
> up". There isn't any
> "inside" to concepts like "internalization" or
> "interiorization" or
> "ingrowing" (which in the Minick translation is
> actually called
> "rooting"--just try to find some dualism in THAT word)!
>
>
> b) the folks who got this right are all dead and probably all have last
>
> names ending in "-sky" or "-in" or "-ov". The only exception I can really>
> think of is David Bakhurst, whose wonderful essay in Mind, Activity, and
>
> Consciousness (the book) has a beautiful description of why philosophical>
> dualism keeps us up at night and how the dead Russians managed to avoid
> it.
>
> In particular, I recommend Volosinov's "Discourse in Art and Discourse
> in
> Life", which is published as an appendix to his critical sketch of
>
> Freudianism. It's Moscow in May.There's a man sitting in a chair reading.>
> There's a woman sitting in another chair. It starts to snow.
>
> Man (in
> disgust): Well!
> Woman (nods sympathetically)
>
> There is absolutely no
> sense in which this can be understood an example of
> telementation, of a man
> somehow packaging a "Well" into a sonic envelope,
> then passing it through
> the ether, and having it unfolded and read and
> decoded (into what?) by the
> woman. Only dino-Saussureans could conceive of
> it that way. What is really
> going on is a cultural extension (reformulation,
> reorganization,
> restructuration) of a perfectly natural phenomenon.
>
> Snow in May means six
> more weeks of winter, and it has meant that for
> millions of years before
> there were men, women, and books in Moscow. The
> word "well!" simply points
> to something both people can see, establishes
> joint attention, and provides
> the preconditions for drawing the natural (if
> you will pardon the
> expression) human conclusion, namely despair.
>
> Despair, but not dualism.
> Think of politeness phenomena. Last night I had
> dinner with my boss's son,
> who is now an exchange student at University of
> Washington. We were talking
> about why Korean has four single word
> appelations for older brothers and
> older sisters which vary with whether the
> speaker is male or female and
> whether the referent is male or female
>  ("hyeong", "oppa", "nuna", "oeni")
> but does not even distinguish between
> male and female younger siblings (both
> are just called "tongsaeng".
>
> Well (to coin a phrase), it's a politeness
> phenomenon. Younger siblings do
> NOT use their older siblings' given names
> (for the same reason that English
> speakers don't usually use their parent's
> given names). So they NEED these
> little titles, and the titles (like "Mom"
> and "Dad" have to mark for gender.
> But older siblings DO use their younger
> siblings's given names (just as
> parents use their children's in English); it
> expresses intimacy. So they
> don't need titles.
>
> But the politeness and
> the intimacy are not "in" the title. It's like
> saying that if I wear black
> to a funeral, my clothes are in mourning. That's
> dualism. It's much truer to
> say that the words are "in" the politeness, the
> intimacy, and the grief, as
> long as we understand that there really ain't no
> "in" in the "in the".
>
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> --- On Tue, 1/6/09,
> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> From: Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
>
> To:
> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date:
> Tuesday, January 6, 2009, 9:49 PM
>
> But a mathematician can only "play
> around with" equations and so on,
> because over the preceding centuries the
> formalisms she is using to
> structure
> and communicate her thoughts have
> been subject to rigorous, detailed
> critique
> according to exhaustively
> demanding criteria of logic. As soon as the
> mathematician departs from the
> rules implied in the use of a given
> formalism,
> the whole thing degenerates
> into nonsense. The same goes for philosophy and
> psychology.
>
> Andy
>
>
> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> > Perhaps because all of this is so ABSTRACT. Why
> not look at concrete
> people doing concrete things---even mathematicians do
> concrete things, use
> a pen
> and doodle or chalk to write on the board. Get
> some tape and talk about it,
> make
> sense of it, rather than talk about
> words, because this just goes round and
> round and round, I am getting dizzy
> from all of these words. Inherent in
> words
> is that they mark of the other,
> they dichotomize, unless you do what you
> have in
> Bakhtin or CA, where you
> cannot reduce to the individual thing /person, and
> you
> get dialogue, you
> get inherent linkages.
> > Michael
> >
> >
> > On 6-Jan-09, at 8:49 PM, Andy
> Blunden wrote:
> >
> > But Michael, as I understand it, Martin is asking us is
> there any meaning
> to words like "reflection" and "interiorisation" if we
> are
> to avoid "dichotomizing"?
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Wolff-Michael Roth
> wrote:
> >> HI All,
> >> I don't think that we should continue with
> dichotomizing the
> internal external. There are some others later ----I think
> I saw some stuff
> in
> JREEP but don't remember if it was Mikhailov-----You
> cannot separate inside
> from outside, and when you follow communication,
> there is always inside and
> outside. People don't orient to inside and
> outside, they are orienting and
> arranging worlds, and consciousness is a
> refracted/refracting parallel to
> the
> material world.
> >> Jean Lave is
> showing us, as Chuck Goodwin, and all my work also, that
> people are acting
> in settings, and it makes very little sense to use the
> model
> of the little
> homunculus whispering into our ears what we should be doing.
> Acting always
> is IN the world and FOR the world. So Bakhtin has a better
> way of
> talking
> about the  issue when he says that the word is always bestraddling
> speaker
> and listeners, and to me, this is an inherent orientation to and
> for the
>
> world, and this means, that cognition never is solely on some inside, but,
>
> as
> action, always bestraddling both. No doubt, there is grey matter and it
>
> gets us
> to operate, but whatever there is matters little to the person, who,
> as
> Bakhtin
> says, is in the world as a person.
> >> In all of this talk
> about the inside, I am missing the person in body
> and flesh, with emotions,
> with pain and elation, real people.
> >> Let's get real people back into our
> analyses, not idealized shells
> of people.
> >> Michael
> >> On 6-Jan-09, at
> 5:07 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >> OK, to keep the ball rolling, what are we
> to make of the discussion
> around
> >> page 310 of "interiorization," which
> Leontiev defines as
> "the gradual
> >> conversion of external actions into
> internal, mental ones"?
> >> On page 284 Leontiev has just praised Rubinstein
> for proposing that
> mind is
> >> *in* activity. Now he says that mental
> activity is the *product* of
> >> 'external' activity, and furthermore that
> mental activity is
> 'internal'
> >> activity. This sounds very dualistic to
> me.
> >> And here are my notes on page 311:
> >> "But this is circular
> reasoning. Interiorisation is necessary,
> ANL tells us,
> >> because
> accumulated human knowledge comes to the child as something
> >> 'external.'
> These 'objects, verbal concepts,
> knowledge' have an 'immediate
> >> physical
> aspect' that is 'not yet refracted through the prism
> of the
> >> generalized
> experience of social practice.' But what happened to
> ANL's
> >> recognition
> that the child acts on objects always with adult guidance,
> so
> >> that the
> *immediate* contact *is* refracted through this prism (though
> I'd
> >> like
> to avoid the refraction/reflection metaphors).
> >> "And even if ANL were
> correct, why is any of this an explanation
> of why
> >> interiorization is
> necessary? If (past) human activity is
> 'embodied' in
> >> objects, that
> doesn't mean that I need mental actions to act with
> them. On
> >> the
> contrary, the whole notion of 'embodiedness' began as an
> *alternative*
> >>
> to idealist psychology.
> >> "And 'reflection in the child's head [p.
>
> 311]'?!"
> >> Someone give me a monist gloss of all this, please!
> >>
> Martin
> >> On 1/5/09 6:46 PM, "Haydi Zulfei"
> <haydizulfei@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Martin,
> >>> Just one quote :
> >>> [[Mind arises at a
> certain stage of the evolution of life not
> >>> by chance out of
> necessity.i.e. naturally . But in what does
> >>> the necessity of its origin
> consist? Clearly, if mind is not
> >>> simply a purely subjective phenomenon,
> and not just an
> >>> 'epiphenomenon' of objective processes, [but a
> property
> that
> >>> has real importance in life] , the necessity of its
> origin
> >>> is governed by the evolution of life itself . More complex
> >>>
> conditions of life require an organism to have the capacity,
> >>> to reflect
> objective reality in the form of the simplest sensa-
> >>> tions. The psyche
> is not simply 'added' to the vital
> functions
> >>> of organisms, but arises
> in the course of their development
> >>> and provides the basis for a
> qualitatively new, higher form
> >>> of life-life linked with mind, with a
> capacity to reflect real-
> >>> ity.
> >>> This implies that in order to
> disclose the transition from
> >>> living matter that still has no psyche to
> living matter that
> >>> has one, we have to proceed not from internal
> subjective states
> >>> by themselves, separated from the subject's vital
> activity,
> >>> or from behaviour taken in isolation from mind, or
> >>>
> merely as that through which mental states and processes
> >>> are studied,
> but from the real unity of the subject's mind
> >>> and activity, and to study
> their internal reciprocal connections
> >>> and transformations.]]
> >>> Here
> we read there was a time when the organism faced
> *undifferentiated* flat
>
> >>> environmet ; in his A,C,P ,  Leontiev also alludes to the idea of
>
> environment
> >>> once having been *objectless* for the organism , then at a
> higher
> stage having
> >>> faced *object-based differentiated* environment
> .
> >>> If I'm right in my reading , first the rustling in the
> environment
> triggers
> >>> the frog to be led then to the food direct (insect) . This is
> when
> Leontiev
> >>> says need is not sufficient clue to activity ;  it must
> hit an
> object .
> >>> The other problem with your *dualism* vs *monism* is
> explained as
> follows :
> >>> Leontiev says at one time in evolution , it's
> not been the
> case that the
> >>> organism has been  able to see the thing
> once ; the image of that
> thing twice
> >>> . He has seen just one . Here we
> face the idea of the extension of
> matter . In
> >>> his book Lenin says
> quite clearly extension , time , place ,
> causality are
> >>> intrinsic to
> the Matter . Monism says the superhuman existence is
> the
> >>> extension of
> **matter** . These are not two but one and and the
> same thing .
> >>>
> Decartes , Hume , you well know had a different problem in view .
> They
> >>>
> believed in so-called one  SOULED-body . Soul having been
> incarnated , as
> Andy
> >>> says , in the Air and detachable capable of leading independent
>
> life  This is
> >>> Dualism . But when you believe in *Mind* being just a
> *property*
> of matter ,
> >>> then philosophical dualism is eliminated . And
> here is again where
> I could say
> >>> when you initiate with *culture* as
> one agental transformative ,
> we object as
> >>> you placing yourselves just
> midway ignoring *continuity*
> disconnecting culture
> >>> from its
> whereabout/origin .
> >>> Best
> >>> Haydi
> >>>
> >>> --- On Mon, 1/5/09,
> Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> From: Martin Packer
> <packer@duq.edu>
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange
> Situation
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Date: Monday, January 5, 2009, 2:51 PM
> >>>
> >>>
> 'Sad' because my sense is that if one wants to avoid
> dualism - crucial
> >>>
> for
> >>> Vygotsky - Lenin's writing about 'reflection'
> isn't the way to
>
> >>> go. I don't
> >>> know the details well, but from what I have read Lenin
> assumed a
> simple
> >>> dualism in which mental representations 'reflect' the
> real
> world. The
> >>> 'image' may be reversed, but still it is in a realm
> quite
> different
> >>> from the
> >>> real. (Bakhurst discusses Lenin's
> philosophy in *Consciousness
> and
> >>> Revolution* if I remember
> correctly.)
> >>>
> >>> I recently read through *Problems of the Development
> of Mind*,
> which Michael
> >>> and Andy generously made available (it fell
> down my chimney early
> one
> >>> morning) and was disappointed to discover
> how little Leontiev
> seems to have
> >>> avoided dualistic ways of
> thinking/writing. Here too the relation
> of psyche
> >>> to world is
> expressed in terms of 'reflection,' for
> example:
> >>>
> >>> "The transition
> to existence in the conditions of a complex
> >>> environment formed as things
> is therefore expressed in or-
> >>> ganisms' adaptation to it taking on a
> qualitatively new form
> >>> associated with reflection of the properties of a
> material,
> >>> objective reality of things" (44)
> >>>
> >>> The sense of
> reflection is not very clear in this excerpt, but the
> term is
> >>> used
> repeatedly in ways that generally suggest Leontiev sees the
> psyche
> >>>
> forming subjective representations of an objective reality.
> Perhaps this
> can
> >>> be saved by drawing on Marx's use of 'widerspiegeln,'
> which as
>
> >>> Michael
> >>> points out avoids the connotations of mirroring. But at
> least it
> invites
> >>> readings of CHAT which don't challenge the dualism
> in
> contemporary western
> >>> social science.
> >>>
> >>> By the way,
> although the repeated presentations of the same
> notions in
> >>> Leontiev's
> book made me suspicious along the way, it
> wasn't until the
> >>> very
> >>>
> end that I discovered (from an endnote) that it is a compilation
> of
> articles
> >>> from very different dates. I'd recommend reading it in
>
> chronological order
> >>> to get a clearer sense of how his ideas developed.
> For instance, I
> need to
> >>> go back to see how his relative emphasis
> shifted between the
> child's
> >>> encounter with objects, and adult guidance
> of this encounter. At
> times the
> >>> latter is not mentioned, at others it
> is added on ("by the
> way..."),
> >>> and at
> >>> times it is highlighted.
> But since the chapters are out of order,
> I don't
> >>> yet have a clear
> sense of the chronology of these shifts.
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>> On
> 1/4/09 11:50 PM, "Mike Cole"
> <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> The
> idea that always occurs to me about reflections is that in
> mirrors,
> >>>>
> left
> >>> and right are reversed.
> >>>
> >>> Sad? Or a reason to pause to
> think?
> >>> Quien
> >>>> Sabe?
> >>>
> >>> mike
> >>>
> >>> On Sun, Jan 4,
> 2009 at 7:43 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> Why sad?
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> I know, but
> it would be sad
> >>>> to discover that Vygotsky was drawing so
> >>>>>
> heavily
> >>>>> from Lenin.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On
> >>>> 1/4/09 9:42 PM,
> "Andy Blunden"
> <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>  I might say
>
> >>>> as an aside, that "reflection" whatever it is in
> >>>>>> Russian, has a
> strong
> >>>> place in Russian Marxism. This is
> >>>>>> because Lenin made
> such a powerful
> >>>> attack on his
> >>>>>> philosophical enemies in
> "Materialism and
> >>>> Empirio-Criticism"
> >>>>>> written in 1908. Ilyenkov
> still defends this books in
> >>>> the
> >>>>>> mid-1970s, though almost all
> non-Russian Marxists
> would say
> >>>>>> that
> >>>> it is a terrible book
> and was written before Lenin had
> >>>>>> studied Hegel, etc.
> >>>> In M&EC
> Lenin makes reflection a central
> >>>>>> category, a universal property of
>
> >>>> matter, etc., and bitterly
> >>>>>> attacks the use of semiotics of any
>
> >>>> kind.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I have an ambiguous attitude to M&EC myself.
> Apart
> from
> >>>>>>
> >>>> "sins of omission" perhaps, Lenin is right, but
> did
> he
> >>>>>> really have to
> >>>> shout it that loud? Well, in the
> historical
> >>>>>> context of the wake of the
> >>>> defeat of the 1905
> Revolution,
> >>>>>> probably he did. Did all Russian Marxists
> >>>> for the
> next 100
> >>>>>> years have to follow his lead? Probably not.
> >>>>>>
>
> >>>>>> I
> >>>> note that in Dot Robbins' book on Vygotsky and
> Leontyev's
>
> >>>>>> Semiotics etc.,
> >>>> Dot defends the notion of reflection. The
>
> >>>>>> situation, as I see it, is that
> >>>> "reflection" has a strong
>
> >>>>>> advantage and an equally strong disadvantage in
> >>>> conveying a
>
> >>>>>> materialist conception of sensuous perception.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On
> one
> >>>> side it emphasises the objectivity of the
> >>>>>> image-making -
> there is nothing
> >>>> in the mirror, or if there
> >>>>>> is, it is an
> imperfectionit which distorts the
> >>>> image. On the
> >>>>>> other side,
> mirror-imaging is an entirely passive
> process,
> >>>> a
> >>>>>> property of
> even non-living matter.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Personally, I think
> >>>>
> "reflection" belongs to Feuerbachian
> >>>>>> materialism, not Marxism, but
> in
> >>>> historical context, the
> >>>>>> position of many Russians who use
> the concept,
> >>>> is
> >>>>>> understandable.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> That's how I
> see it anyway,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>> Andy
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Ed Wall
> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>       It appears the
>
> >>>> root is more or less
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> отрaжáть
> >>>> (отрaзить)
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> and, at least
> according to my dictionary, has the
> >>>> sense of  reflecting
> >>>>>>> or
> having an effect. However, my qualifications
> are
> >>>> dated.
> >>>>>>>
>
> >>>>>>> Ed
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Jan 4, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Martin Packer
>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>  At the end of last year several of us were
> trying
> to figure
> >>>> out whether
> >>>>>>>> 'reflection' is a good term
> to
> translate the way
> >>> Vygotsky
> >>>> and leontiev
> >>>>>>>> wrote
>
> >>>>>>>> about 'mental' activity. Michael Roth
> pointed
> >>>> out that the
> German word
> >>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>> Marx used was Widerspiegeln rather
>
> >>>> than Reflektion (see below). I don't
> >>>>>>>> think anyone identified
> the Russian
> >>>> word that was used. I still haven't
> >>>>>>>> found time
> to trace the word in
> >>>> Vygotsky's texts, English and Russian.
> >>>>>>>>
> But
> >>>>>>>> an article by Charles
> >>>> Tolman suggests that the Russian
> term was
> >>>>>>>> 'otrazhenie.'  Online
> >>>> translators don't like this
> word: can any Russian
> >>>>>>>> speakers suggest how
> >>>> it might be
> translated?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Reflection (German: Widerspiegelung;
> >>>>
> Russian: otrazhenie)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Tolman, C.W. (1988). The basic
> vocabulary of
> >>>> Activity Theory. Activity
> >>>>>>>> Theory, 1, 14-20.
>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On 10/25/08 12:40 PM,
> "Wolff-Michael
> Roth"
> >>> <mroth@uvic.ca>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
>
> >>>>>>>>  Hi Martin,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Marx does indeed use the term
>
> >>>> "widerspiegeln" in the sentence you
> >>>>>>>>> cite.
> >>>>>>>>>
>
> >>>>>>>>> Das Gehirn
> >>>> der
> >>>>>>>>> Privatproduzenten spiegelt
> diesen
> doppelten
> >>>> gesellschaftlichen
> >>>>>>>>> Charakter ihrer
> Privatarbeiten nur wider
> in den
> >>>> Formen, welche im
> >>>>>>>>>
> praktischen Verkehr, im Produktenaustausch
> erscheinen
> >>>> - den
>
> >>>>>>>>> gesellschaftlich
> >>>>>>>>> nützlichen Charakter ihrer
> Privatarbeiten
> >>>> also in
> >>>>>>>>> der Form, daß das Arbeitsprodukt
>
> nützlich sein muß,
> >>> und zwar
> >>>> für
> >>>>>>>>> andre - den
> gesellschaftlichen Charakter
> der
> >>> Gleichheit der
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> verschiedenartigen
> >>>>>>>>> Arbeiten in der Form des gemeinsamen
> >>>>
> Wertcharakters
> >>>>>>>>> dieser materiell verschiednen Dinge, der
> >>>>
> Arbeitsprodukte.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> But the Duden, the
> reference work of
> >>>> German language says that there
> >>>>>>>>> are 2
> different senses. One is
> >>>> reflection as in a mirror, the other
>
> >>>>>>>>> one that something brings to
> >>>> expression. In this context, I
> do not
> >>>>>>>>> see Marx draw on the mirror
> >>>> idea.
> >>>>>>>>>
>
> >>>>>>>>> For those who have trouble, perhaps the
> analogy with
> >>>>
> mathematical
> >>>>>>>>> functions. In German, what a mathematical
>
> function
> >>> does
> >>>> is
> >>>>>>>>> "abbilden," which is, provide a
>
> projection
> >>> of, or reflection,
> >>>> or
> >>>>>>>>> whatever. You have
> the word Bild, image,
> picture in
> >>> the verb.
> >>>> But
> >>>>>>>>> when
> you look at functions, only y = f(x)
> = x, or -x
> >>> gives you
> >>>>
> what
> >>>>>>>>> you would get in the mirror analogy. You
> get very
> >>>
> different
> >>>> things
> >>>>>>>>> when you use different functions, log
>
> functions, etc.
> >>> Then
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> relationship between the
> points on a line
> no longer is
> >>> the same
> >>>> in
> >>>>>>>>> the
> "image", that is, the target
> domain.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> We sometimes
>
> >>>> see the word "refraction" in the works of Russian
> >>>>>>>>>
> psychologists, which
> >>>> may be better than reflection. It allows you to
>
> >>>>>>>>> think of looking at the
> >>>> world through a kaleidoscope, and you
> get all
> >>>>>>>>> sorts of things, none of
> >>>> which look like "the real
> thing."
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> Michael
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On 25-Oct-08, at 9:01 AM,
> >>>>
> Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Michael,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> Here's one example
> >>>> from Marx, and several from Leontiev, if we can
>
> >>>>>>>>> get into
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>> Russian too.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> "The twofold social character of the
> labour of
> >>> the
> >>>> individual
> appears
> >>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>> him, when *reflected* in his brain, only
>
> >>>> under those forms which are
> >>>>>>>>> impressed upon that labour in
> every-day
> >>>> practice by the exchange of
> >>>>>>>>> products." Marx,
> Capital, Chapter 1,
> >>>> section 4.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> " Activity is a
> non-additive unit of
> the
> >>> corporeal,
> >>>> material life of
>
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> material subject. In the narrower sense,
> >>>>
> i.e., on the psychological
> >>>>>>>>> plane,
> >>>>>>>>> it is a unit of
> life, mediated
> >>>> by mental *reflection*, by an *image,*
> >>>>>>>>>
> whose
> >>>>>>>>> real function is to
> >>>> orientate the subject in the
> objective world."
> >>>>>>>>> Leontiev,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> Activity &
> Consciousness.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> " The circular nature of the
>
> processes
> >>>> effecting the interaction of
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>
> organism with the environment
> >>>> has been generally acknowledged. But
>
> >>>>>>>>> the main
> >>>>>>>>> thing is not this
> >>>> circular structure as
> such, but the fact that the
> >>>>>>>>> mental
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> *reflection*
> of the objective world is not directly generated
> by the
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> external influences themselves, but by the processes through
> which the
>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> subject comes into practical contact with the objective
> world,
> and
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> which
> >>>>>>>>> therefore necessarily obey
> its independent
> properties,
> >>>> connections,
> >>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>
> relations." ibid
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> " Thus,
> >>>> individual
> consciousness as a specifically human form of the
> >>>>>>>>> subjective
>
> >>>> *reflection* of objective reality may be understood only
> >>>>>>>>> as
> the
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> product of those relations and mediacies that arise in
> the
> course of
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> establishment and
> development of
> society." ibid
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>> Martin
>
> >>>>>>>>>
> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>> xmca
>
> >>>> mailing list
> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing
>
> >>>> list
> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing
> list
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>> xmca mailing
> list
> >>>>>>>
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>
>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> xmca
> mailing list
> >>>>>
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >>>>
> >>>> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
> >>>
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3
> >>>> 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>
> >>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy
> >>>> Blunden:
> >>>>
> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
>
> >>>>
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
>
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca
> mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>
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> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>>
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> >>
> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
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> >
>
> -- 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ 
> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
>
>
>
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> 
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