Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

[David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>]

Speaking of mathematics! I wonder if Valerie is the same Valerie Farnsworth who did something on teaching algebra in elementary school about ten years ago? I wonder, because it seems to me (and to LSV) that the problem of teaching algebra to elementary school kids and primary foreign language learning are really intimately related.
 
Ah...but are they related to this thread? Well, it seems to me they are, but not really intimately. They are related because both refer to the establishment of something that feels inside, looks outside, and is almost by definition neither, by which I mean not consciousness but actually meta-consciousness, the consciousness of cognitive experience itself, which comes to us, and even to mathematicians, through language. 
 
I think I AGREE with Wolff-Michael, that the problems we are getting into are caused by two things:
 
a) an inability to get real, to get concrete, to say what is actually gained and lost by a given act of philosophical dualism. To me, saying "inside" and "outside" is a little like saying "top down" versus "bottom up" for reading skills. As we say in Korean, there isn't any "bung-eo" (carp) in a "bung-eo bbang" (a carp-shaped cake), and there really isn't any "up" in expressions like "tear up" or "give up" or even "bottom up". There isn't any "inside" to concepts like "internalization" or "interiorization" or "ingrowing" (which in the Minick translation is actually called "rooting"--just try to find some dualism in THAT word)!
 
b) the folks who got this right are all dead and probably all have last names ending in "-sky" or "-in" or "-ov". The only exception I can really think of is David Bakhurst, whose wonderful essay in Mind, Activity, and Consciousness (the book) has a beautiful description of why philosophical dualism keeps us up at night and how the dead Russians managed to avoid it.
 
In particular, I recommend Volosinov's "Discourse in Art and Discourse in Life", which is published as an appendix to his critical sketch of Freudianism. It's Moscow in May.There's a man sitting in a chair reading. There's a woman sitting in another chair. It starts to snow.
 
Man (in disgust): Well!
Woman (nods sympathetically)
 
There is absolutely no sense in which this can be understood an example of telementation, of a man somehow packaging a "Well" into a sonic envelope, then passing it through the ether, and having it unfolded and read and decoded (into what?) by the woman. Only dino-Saussureans could conceive of it that way. What is really going on is a cultural extension (reformulation, reorganization, restructuration) of a perfectly natural phenomenon. 
 
Snow in May means six more weeks of winter, and it has meant that for millions of years before there were men, women, and books in Moscow. The word "well!" simply points to something both people can see, establishes joint attention, and provides the preconditions for drawing the natural (if you will pardon the expression) human conclusion, namely despair.
 
Despair, but not dualism. Think of politeness phenomena. Last night I had dinner with my boss's son, who is now an exchange student at University of Washington. We were talking about why Korean has four single word appelations for older brothers and older sisters which vary with whether the speaker is male or female and whether the referent is male or female  ("hyeong", "oppa", "nuna", "oeni") but does not even distinguish between male and female younger siblings (both are just called "tongsaeng". 
 
Well (to coin a phrase), it's a politeness phenomenon. Younger siblings do NOT use their older siblings' given names (for the same reason that English speakers don't usually use their parent's given names). So they NEED these little titles, and the titles (like "Mom" and "Dad" have to mark for gender. But older siblings DO use their younger siblings's given names (just as parents use their children's in English); it expresses intimacy. So they don't need titles.
 
But the politeness and the intimacy are not "in" the title. It's like saying that if I wear black to a funeral, my clothes are in mourning. That's dualism. It's much truer to say that the words are "in" the politeness, the intimacy, and the grief, as long as we understand that there really ain't no "in" in the "in the". 
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education 

--- On Tue, 1/6/09, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
To: 
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Tuesday, January 6, 2009, 9:49 PM

But a mathematician can only "play around with" equations and so on,
because over the preceding centuries the formalisms she is using to structure
and communicate her thoughts have been subject to rigorous, detailed critique
according to exhaustively demanding criteria of logic. As soon as the
mathematician departs from the rules implied in the use of a given formalism,
the whole thing degenerates into nonsense. The same goes for philosophy and
psychology.

Andy

Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> Perhaps because all of this is so ABSTRACT. Why not look at concrete
people doing concrete things---even mathematicians do concrete things, use a pen
and doodle or chalk to write on the board. Get some tape and talk about it, make
sense of it, rather than talk about words, because this just goes round and
round and round, I am getting dizzy from all of these words. Inherent in words
is that they mark of the other, they dichotomize, unless you do what you have in
Bakhtin or CA, where you cannot reduce to the individual thing /person, and you
get dialogue, you get inherent linkages.
> Michael
> 
> 
> On 6-Jan-09, at 8:49 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> 
> But Michael, as I understand it, Martin is asking us is there any meaning
to words like "reflection" and "interiorisation" if we are
to avoid "dichotomizing"?
> 
> Andy
> 
> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> HI All,
>> I don't think that we should continue with dichotomizing the
internal external. There are some others later ----I think I saw some stuff in
JREEP but don't remember if it was Mikhailov-----You cannot separate inside
from outside, and when you follow communication, there is always inside and
outside. People don't orient to inside and outside, they are orienting and
arranging worlds, and consciousness is a refracted/refracting parallel to the
material world.
>> Jean Lave is showing us, as Chuck Goodwin, and all my work also, that
people are acting in settings, and it makes very little sense to use the model
of the little homunculus whispering into our ears what we should be doing.
Acting always is IN the world and FOR the world. So Bakhtin has a better way of
talking about the  issue when he says that the word is always bestraddling
speaker and listeners, and to me, this is an inherent orientation to and for the
world, and this means, that cognition never is solely on some inside, but, as
action, always bestraddling both. No doubt, there is grey matter and it gets us
to operate, but whatever there is matters little to the person, who, as Bakhtin
says, is in the world as a person.
>> In all of this talk about the inside, I am missing the person in body
and flesh, with emotions, with pain and elation, real people.
>> Let's get real people back into our analyses, not idealized shells
of people.
>> Michael
>> On 6-Jan-09, at 5:07 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>> OK, to keep the ball rolling, what are we to make of the discussion
around
>> page 310 of "interiorization," which Leontiev defines as
"the gradual
>> conversion of external actions into internal, mental ones"?
>> On page 284 Leontiev has just praised Rubinstein for proposing that
mind is
>> *in* activity. Now he says that mental activity is the *product* of
>> 'external' activity, and furthermore that mental activity is
'internal'
>> activity. This sounds very dualistic to me.
>> And here are my notes on page 311:
>> "But this is circular reasoning. Interiorisation is necessary,
ANL tells us,
>> because accumulated human knowledge comes to the child as something
>> 'external.' These 'objects, verbal concepts,
knowledge' have an 'immediate
>> physical aspect' that is 'not yet refracted through the prism
of the
>> generalized experience of social practice.' But what happened to
ANL's
>> recognition that the child acts on objects always with adult guidance,
so
>> that the *immediate* contact *is* refracted through this prism (though
I'd
>> like to avoid the refraction/reflection metaphors).
>> "And even if ANL were correct, why is any of this an explanation
of why
>> interiorization is necessary? If (past) human activity is
'embodied' in
>> objects, that doesn't mean that I need mental actions to act with
them. On
>> the contrary, the whole notion of 'embodiedness' began as an
*alternative*
>> to idealist psychology.
>> "And 'reflection in the child's head [p.
311]'?!"
>> Someone give me a monist gloss of all this, please!
>> Martin
>> On 1/5/09 6:46 PM, "Haydi Zulfei"
<haydizulfei@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Martin,
>>> Just one quote :
>>> [[Mind arises at a certain stage of the evolution of life not
>>> by chance out of necessity.i.e. naturally . But in what does
>>> the necessity of its origin consist? Clearly, if mind is not
>>> simply a purely subjective phenomenon, and not just an
>>> 'epiphenomenon' of objective processes, [but a property
that
>>> has real importance in life] , the necessity of its origin
>>> is governed by the evolution of life itself . More complex
>>> conditions of life require an organism to have the capacity,
>>> to reflect objective reality in the form of the simplest sensa-
>>> tions. The psyche is not simply 'added' to the vital
functions
>>> of organisms, but arises in the course of their development
>>> and provides the basis for a qualitatively new, higher form
>>> of life-life linked with mind, with a capacity to reflect real-
>>> ity.
>>> This implies that in order to disclose the transition from
>>> living matter that still has no psyche to living matter that
>>> has one, we have to proceed not from internal subjective states
>>> by themselves, separated from the subject's vital activity,
>>> or from behaviour taken in isolation from mind, or
>>> merely as that through which mental states and processes
>>> are studied, but from the real unity of the subject's mind
>>> and activity, and to study their internal reciprocal connections
>>> and transformations.]]
>>> Here we read there was a time when the organism faced
*undifferentiated* flat
>>> environmet ; in his A,C,P ,  Leontiev also alludes to the idea of
environment
>>> once having been *objectless* for the organism , then at a higher
stage having
>>> faced *object-based differentiated* environment .
>>> If I'm right in my reading , first the rustling in the
environment triggers
>>> the frog to be led then to the food direct (insect) . This is when
Leontiev
>>> says need is not sufficient clue to activity ;  it must hit an
object .
>>> The other problem with your *dualism* vs *monism* is explained as
follows :
>>> Leontiev says at one time in evolution , it's not been the
case that the
>>> organism has been  able to see the thing once ; the image of that
thing twice
>>> . He has seen just one . Here we face the idea of the extension of
matter . In
>>> his book Lenin says quite clearly extension , time , place ,
causality are
>>> intrinsic to the Matter . Monism says the superhuman existence is
the
>>> extension of **matter** . These are not two but one and and the
same thing .
>>> Decartes , Hume , you well know had a different problem in view .
They
>>> believed in so-called one  SOULED-body . Soul having been
incarnated , as Andy
>>> says , in the Air and detachable capable of leading independent
life  This is
>>> Dualism . But when you believe in *Mind* being just a *property* 
of matter ,
>>> then philosophical dualism is eliminated . And here is again where
I could say
>>> when you initiate with *culture* as one agental transformative ,
we object as
>>> you placing yourselves just midway ignoring *continuity*
disconnecting culture
>>> from its whereabout/origin .
>>> Best
>>> Haydi
>>> 
>>> --- On Mon, 1/5/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Date: Monday, January 5, 2009, 2:51 PM
>>> 
>>> 'Sad' because my sense is that if one wants to avoid
dualism - crucial
>>> for
>>> Vygotsky - Lenin's writing about 'reflection'
isn't the way to
>>> go. I don't
>>> know the details well, but from what I have read Lenin assumed a
simple
>>> dualism in which mental representations 'reflect' the real
world. The
>>> 'image' may be reversed, but still it is in a realm quite
different
>>> from the
>>> real. (Bakhurst discusses Lenin's philosophy in *Consciousness
and
>>> Revolution* if I remember correctly.)
>>> 
>>> I recently read through *Problems of the Development of Mind*,
which Michael
>>> and Andy generously made available (it fell down my chimney early
one
>>> morning) and was disappointed to discover how little Leontiev
seems to have
>>> avoided dualistic ways of thinking/writing. Here too the relation
of psyche
>>> to world is expressed in terms of 'reflection,' for
example:
>>> 
>>> "The transition to existence in the conditions of a complex
>>> environment formed as things is therefore expressed in or-
>>> ganisms' adaptation to it taking on a qualitatively new form
>>> associated with reflection of the properties of a material,
>>> objective reality of things" (44)
>>> 
>>> The sense of reflection is not very clear in this excerpt, but the
term is
>>> used repeatedly in ways that generally suggest Leontiev sees the
psyche
>>> forming subjective representations of an objective reality.
Perhaps this can
>>> be saved by drawing on Marx's use of 'widerspiegeln,'
which as
>>> Michael
>>> points out avoids the connotations of mirroring. But at least it
invites
>>> readings of CHAT which don't challenge the dualism in
contemporary western
>>> social science.
>>> 
>>> By the way, although the repeated presentations of the same
notions in
>>> Leontiev's book made me suspicious along the way, it
wasn't until the
>>> very
>>> end that I discovered (from an endnote) that it is a compilation
of articles
>>> from very different dates. I'd recommend reading it in
chronological order
>>> to get a clearer sense of how his ideas developed. For instance, I
need to
>>> go back to see how his relative emphasis shifted between the
child's
>>> encounter with objects, and adult guidance of this encounter. At
times the
>>> latter is not mentioned, at others it is added on ("by the
way..."),
>>> and at
>>> times it is highlighted. But since the chapters are out of order,
I don't
>>> yet have a clear sense of the chronology of these shifts.
>>> 
>>> Martin
>>> 
>>> On 1/4/09 11:50 PM, "Mike Cole"
<lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> The idea that always occurs to me about reflections is that in
mirrors,
>>>> left
>>> and right are reversed.
>>> 
>>> Sad? Or a reason to pause to think?
>>> Quien
>>>> Sabe?
>>> 
>>> mike
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Jan 4, 2009 at 7:43 PM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Why sad?
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> I know, but it would be sad
>>>> to discover that Vygotsky was drawing so
>>>>> heavily
>>>>> from Lenin.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On
>>>> 1/4/09 9:42 PM, "Andy Blunden"
<ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>  I might say
>>>> as an aside, that "reflection" whatever it is in
>>>>>> Russian, has a strong
>>>> place in Russian Marxism. This is
>>>>>> because Lenin made such a powerful
>>>> attack on his
>>>>>> philosophical enemies in "Materialism and
>>>> Empirio-Criticism"
>>>>>> written in 1908. Ilyenkov still defends this books in
>>>> the
>>>>>> mid-1970s, though almost all non-Russian Marxists
would say
>>>>>> that
>>>> it is a terrible book and was written before Lenin had
>>>>>> studied Hegel, etc.
>>>> In M&EC Lenin makes reflection a central
>>>>>> category, a universal property of
>>>> matter, etc., and bitterly
>>>>>> attacks the use of semiotics of any
>>>> kind.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have an ambiguous attitude to M&EC myself. Apart
from
>>>>>> 
>>>> "sins of omission" perhaps, Lenin is right, but did
he
>>>>>> really have to
>>>> shout it that loud? Well, in the historical
>>>>>> context of the wake of the
>>>> defeat of the 1905 Revolution,
>>>>>> probably he did. Did all Russian Marxists
>>>> for the next 100
>>>>>> years have to follow his lead? Probably not.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I
>>>> note that in Dot Robbins' book on Vygotsky and
Leontyev's
>>>>>> Semiotics etc.,
>>>> Dot defends the notion of reflection. The
>>>>>> situation, as I see it, is that
>>>> "reflection" has a strong
>>>>>> advantage and an equally strong disadvantage in
>>>> conveying a
>>>>>> materialist conception of sensuous perception.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On one
>>>> side it emphasises the objectivity of the
>>>>>> image-making - there is nothing
>>>> in the mirror, or if there
>>>>>> is, it is an imperfectionit which distorts the
>>>> image. On the
>>>>>> other side, mirror-imaging is an entirely passive
process,
>>>> a
>>>>>> property of even non-living matter.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Personally, I think
>>>> "reflection" belongs to Feuerbachian
>>>>>> materialism, not Marxism, but in
>>>> historical context, the
>>>>>> position of many Russians who use the concept,
>>>> is
>>>>>> understandable.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> That's how I see it anyway,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>> Andy
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Ed Wall wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>       It appears the
>>>> root is more or less
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>                        отрaжáть
>>>> (отрaзить)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> and, at least according to my dictionary, has the
>>>> sense of  reflecting
>>>>>>> or having an effect. However, my qualifications
are
>>>> dated.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Ed
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Jan 4, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Martin Packer
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  At the end of last year several of us were trying
to figure
>>>> out whether
>>>>>>>> 'reflection' is a good term to
translate the way
>>> Vygotsky
>>>> and leontiev
>>>>>>>> wrote
>>>>>>>> about 'mental' activity. Michael Roth
pointed
>>>> out that the German word
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> Marx used was Widerspiegeln rather
>>>> than Reflektion (see below). I don't
>>>>>>>> think anyone identified the Russian
>>>> word that was used. I still haven't
>>>>>>>> found time to trace the word in
>>>> Vygotsky's texts, English and Russian.
>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>> an article by Charles
>>>> Tolman suggests that the Russian term was
>>>>>>>> 'otrazhenie.'  Online
>>>> translators don't like this word: can any Russian
>>>>>>>> speakers suggest how
>>>> it might be translated?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Reflection (German: Widerspiegelung;
>>>> Russian: otrazhenie)
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Tolman, C.W. (1988). The basic vocabulary of
>>>> Activity Theory. Activity
>>>>>>>> Theory, 1, 14-20.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 10/25/08 12:40 PM, "Wolff-Michael
Roth"
>>> <mroth@uvic.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  Hi Martin,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Marx does indeed use the term
>>>> "widerspiegeln" in the sentence you
>>>>>>>>> cite.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Das Gehirn
>>>> der
>>>>>>>>> Privatproduzenten spiegelt diesen
doppelten
>>>> gesellschaftlichen
>>>>>>>>> Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten nur wider
in den
>>>> Formen, welche im
>>>>>>>>> praktischen Verkehr, im Produktenaustausch
erscheinen
>>>> - den
>>>>>>>>> gesellschaftlich
>>>>>>>>> nützlichen Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten
>>>> also in
>>>>>>>>> der Form, daß das Arbeitsprodukt
nützlich sein muß,
>>> und zwar
>>>> für
>>>>>>>>> andre - den gesellschaftlichen Charakter
der
>>> Gleichheit der
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> verschiedenartigen
>>>>>>>>> Arbeiten in der Form des gemeinsamen
>>>> Wertcharakters
>>>>>>>>> dieser materiell verschiednen Dinge, der
>>>> Arbeitsprodukte.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> But the Duden, the reference work of
>>>> German language says that there
>>>>>>>>> are 2 different senses. One is
>>>> reflection as in a mirror, the other
>>>>>>>>> one that something brings to
>>>> expression. In this context, I do not
>>>>>>>>> see Marx draw on the mirror
>>>> idea.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> For those who have trouble, perhaps the
analogy with
>>>> mathematical
>>>>>>>>> functions. In German, what a mathematical
function
>>> does
>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> "abbilden," which is, provide a
projection
>>> of, or reflection,
>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> whatever. You have the word Bild, image,
picture in
>>> the verb.
>>>> But
>>>>>>>>> when you look at functions, only y = f(x)
= x, or -x
>>> gives you
>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> you would get in the mirror analogy. You
get very
>>> different
>>>> things
>>>>>>>>> when you use different functions, log
functions, etc.
>>> Then
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> relationship between the points on a line
no longer is
>>> the same
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> the "image", that is, the target
domain.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> We sometimes
>>>> see the word "refraction" in the works of Russian
>>>>>>>>> psychologists, which
>>>> may be better than reflection. It allows you to
>>>>>>>>> think of looking at the
>>>> world through a kaleidoscope, and you get all
>>>>>>>>> sorts of things, none of
>>>> which look like "the real thing."
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On 25-Oct-08, at 9:01 AM,
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Michael,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Here's one example
>>>> from Marx, and several from Leontiev, if we can
>>>>>>>>> get into
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>> Russian too.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> "The twofold social character of the
labour of
>>> the
>>>> individual appears
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> him, when *reflected* in his brain, only
>>>> under those forms which are
>>>>>>>>> impressed upon that labour in every-day
>>>> practice by the exchange of
>>>>>>>>> products." Marx, Capital, Chapter 1,
>>>> section 4.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> " Activity is a non-additive unit of
the
>>> corporeal,
>>>> material life of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> material subject. In the narrower sense,
>>>> i.e., on the psychological
>>>>>>>>> plane,
>>>>>>>>> it is a unit of life, mediated
>>>> by mental *reflection*, by an *image,*
>>>>>>>>> whose
>>>>>>>>> real function is to
>>>> orientate the subject in the objective world."
>>>>>>>>> Leontiev,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> Activity & Consciousness.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> " The circular nature of the
processes
>>>> effecting the interaction of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> organism with the environment
>>>> has been generally acknowledged. But
>>>>>>>>> the main
>>>>>>>>> thing is not this
>>>> circular structure as such, but the fact that the
>>>>>>>>> mental
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> *reflection* of the objective world is not directly generated
by the
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> external influences themselves, but by the processes through
which the
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> subject comes into practical contact with the objective world,
and
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> which
>>>>>>>>> therefore necessarily obey its independent
properties,
>>>> connections,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> relations." ibid
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> " Thus,
>>>> individual consciousness as a specifically human form of the
>>>>>>>>> subjective
>>>> *reflection* of objective reality may be understood only
>>>>>>>>> as the
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> product of those relations and mediacies that arise in the
course of
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> establishment and development of
society." ibid
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca
>>>> mailing list
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>>>>>>>>> 
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>>>>>>>>> 
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>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
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>>>> -- 
>>>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>> 
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3
>>>> 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy
>>>> Blunden:
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>>>> 
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