RE: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

["Valerie Farnsworth" <Valerie.Farnsworth@manchester.ac.uk>]

This recent exchange (having had a rare few moments this morning to read a few xmca emails) provoked several thoughts that I would like to throw out there, see what folks think.

First, in response to the most recent response from Andy: Does the whole thing really degenerate into nonsense? I would think that some people could still make sense of this mathematician you conjecture. What I could see happening though is that the formalists may choose not to. What is implicit in your argument which I would accept is that formal rules and terms may allow for more efficient dialogue. However, they should not restrict our thinking to the point of not allowing us to consider other ways of expressing what we want to say. I see Michael’s suggestion of using concrete examples as one alterative to formal terms and abstract discussions. 

Second, I would suggest another alternative. If we follow with Bakhtin, perhaps words like ‘interiorisation’ and ‘reflection’ can be replaced by ‘internally persuasive’? This term allows for an agentive self who assesses how the world s/he is in is persuasive (or not). Dialogue which is not internally persuasive, as I choose to understand it, remains ‘authoritative’. This, I think, moves us away from setting up an external/internal situation and instead qualifies different aspects of the world and the person in world as ‘internally persuasive’ or ‘authoritative’ (and so on?). 

Third, Michael’s suggestion to focus on concrete things also converges for me with what I was just reading from Bruner in The Culture of Education about narratives of science and also concerns I have with certain assumptions regarding research. That is, what I interpret from Michael’s suggestion is that much of research is about telling a good story (something I’ve also heard from Etienne Wenger). This may cause some uproar among those wanting ‘objective measures’ of ‘what works,’ but given the complexity of human relations in cultural-historical contexts, can we really expect to ‘explain’ what we see happening to the point that the explanation can be tested in another context in order to be verified? Maybe this is possible to some extent in some contexts. But isn’t validity for most education research more like verifying stories? To quote Bruner: “stories are judged on the basis of their verisimilitude or ‘lifelikeness.’” (p. 122) If we accept this proposition, Michael’s suggestion of using concrete examples makes good sense, especially if verifiability is achieved “with respect to a specifiable world.’ (ibid). Perhaps then, "rigorous, detailed critique 
according to exhaustively demanding criteria of logic" is not as important as it is with mathematics, for example? Instead, research (and theorising) can be seen as a form of dialogue which people in the world assess for their likeness to the world as they live it – research can then be internally persuasive or authoritative for different people at different times…. This does not mean, however, that research and theory should not be developed with the help of formal terms!

My last point relates to an ESRC Seminar Series I’m planning here in the UK to which you are all invited. The idea is to shift the dialogue about research from being about 'what works' to 'how' questions and considering the ways sociocultural theories help us to do this. I’ll send a website link (a wiki) to the list when we’ve worked out the kinks.

Best wishes,
Valerie Farnsworth


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 07 January 2009 05:49
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

But a mathematician can only "play around with" equations 
and so on, because over the preceding centuries the 
formalisms she is using to structure and communicate her 
thoughts have been subject to rigorous, detailed critique 
according to exhaustively demanding criteria of logic. As 
soon as the mathematician departs from the rules implied in 
the use of a given formalism, the whole thing degenerates 
into nonsense. The same goes for philosophy and psychology.

Andy

Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> Perhaps because all of this is so ABSTRACT. Why not look at concrete 
> people doing concrete things---even mathematicians do concrete things, 
> use a pen and doodle or chalk to write on the board. Get some tape and 
> talk about it, make sense of it, rather than talk about words, because 
> this just goes round and round and round, I am getting dizzy from all of 
> these words. Inherent in words is that they mark of the other, they 
> dichotomize, unless you do what you have in Bakhtin or CA, where you 
> cannot reduce to the individual thing /person, and you get dialogue, you 
> get inherent linkages.
> Michael
> 
> 
> On 6-Jan-09, at 8:49 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> 
> But Michael, as I understand it, Martin is asking us is there any 
> meaning to words like "reflection" and "interiorisation" if we are to 
> avoid "dichotomizing"?
> 
> Andy
> 
> Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> HI All,
>> I don't think that we should continue with dichotomizing the internal 
>> external. There are some others later ----I think I saw some stuff in 
>> JREEP but don't remember if it was Mikhailov-----You cannot separate 
>> inside from outside, and when you follow communication, there is 
>> always inside and outside. People don't orient to inside and outside, 
>> they are orienting and arranging worlds, and consciousness is a 
>> refracted/refracting parallel to the material world.
>> Jean Lave is showing us, as Chuck Goodwin, and all my work also, that 
>> people are acting in settings, and it makes very little sense to use 
>> the model of the little homunculus whispering into our ears what we 
>> should be doing. Acting always is IN the world and FOR the world. So 
>> Bakhtin has a better way of talking about the  issue when he says that 
>> the word is always bestraddling speaker and listeners, and to me, this 
>> is an inherent orientation to and for the world, and this means, that 
>> cognition never is solely on some inside, but, as action, always 
>> bestraddling both. No doubt, there is grey matter and it gets us to 
>> operate, but whatever there is matters little to the person, who, as 
>> Bakhtin says, is in the world as a person.
>> In all of this talk about the inside, I am missing the person in body 
>> and flesh, with emotions, with pain and elation, real people.
>> Let's get real people back into our analyses, not idealized shells of 
>> people.
>> Michael
>> On 6-Jan-09, at 5:07 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>> OK, to keep the ball rolling, what are we to make of the discussion 
>> around
>> page 310 of "interiorization," which Leontiev defines as "the gradual
>> conversion of external actions into internal, mental ones"?
>> On page 284 Leontiev has just praised Rubinstein for proposing that 
>> mind is
>> *in* activity. Now he says that mental activity is the *product* of
>> 'external' activity, and furthermore that mental activity is 'internal'
>> activity. This sounds very dualistic to me.
>> And here are my notes on page 311:
>> "But this is circular reasoning. Interiorisation is necessary, ANL 
>> tells us,
>> because accumulated human knowledge comes to the child as something
>> 'external.' These 'objects, verbal concepts, knowledge' have an 
>> 'immediate
>> physical aspect' that is 'not yet refracted through the prism of the
>> generalized experience of social practice.' But what happened to ANL's
>> recognition that the child acts on objects always with adult guidance, so
>> that the *immediate* contact *is* refracted through this prism (though 
>> I'd
>> like to avoid the refraction/reflection metaphors).
>> "And even if ANL were correct, why is any of this an explanation of why
>> interiorization is necessary? If (past) human activity is 'embodied' in
>> objects, that doesn't mean that I need mental actions to act with 
>> them. On
>> the contrary, the whole notion of 'embodiedness' began as an 
>> *alternative*
>> to idealist psychology.
>> "And 'reflection in the child's head [p. 311]'?!"
>> Someone give me a monist gloss of all this, please!
>> Martin
>> On 1/5/09 6:46 PM, "Haydi Zulfei" <haydizulfei@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Martin,
>>> Just one quote :
>>> [[Mind arises at a certain stage of the evolution of life not
>>> by chance out of necessity.i.e. naturally . But in what does
>>> the necessity of its origin consist? Clearly, if mind is not
>>> simply a purely subjective phenomenon, and not just an
>>> 'epiphenomenon' of objective processes, [but a property that
>>> has real importance in life] , the necessity of its origin
>>> is governed by the evolution of life itself . More complex
>>> conditions of life require an organism to have the capacity,
>>> to reflect objective reality in the form of the simplest sensa-
>>> tions. The psyche is not simply 'added' to the vital functions
>>> of organisms, but arises in the course of their development
>>> and provides the basis for a qualitatively new, higher form
>>> of life-life linked with mind, with a capacity to reflect real-
>>> ity.
>>> This implies that in order to disclose the transition from
>>> living matter that still has no psyche to living matter that
>>> has one, we have to proceed not from internal subjective states
>>> by themselves, separated from the subject's vital activity,
>>> or from behaviour taken in isolation from mind, or
>>> merely as that through which mental states and processes
>>> are studied, but from the real unity of the subject's mind
>>> and activity, and to study their internal reciprocal connections
>>> and transformations.]]
>>> Here we read there was a time when the organism faced 
>>> *undifferentiated* flat
>>> environmet ; in his A,C,P ,  Leontiev also alludes to the idea of 
>>> environment
>>> once having been *objectless* for the organism , then at a higher 
>>> stage having
>>> faced *object-based differentiated* environment .
>>> If I'm right in my reading , first the rustling in the environment 
>>> triggers
>>> the frog to be led then to the food direct (insect) . This is when 
>>> Leontiev
>>> says need is not sufficient clue to activity ;  it must hit an object .
>>> The other problem with your *dualism* vs *monism* is explained as 
>>> follows :
>>> Leontiev says at one time in evolution , it's not been the case that the
>>> organism has been  able to see the thing once ; the image of that 
>>> thing twice
>>> . He has seen just one . Here we face the idea of the extension of 
>>> matter . In
>>> his book Lenin says quite clearly extension , time , place , 
>>> causality are
>>> intrinsic to the Matter . Monism says the superhuman existence is the
>>> extension of **matter** . These are not two but one and and the same 
>>> thing .
>>> Decartes , Hume , you well know had a different problem in view . They
>>> believed in so-called one  SOULED-body . Soul having been incarnated 
>>> , as Andy
>>> says , in the Air and detachable capable of leading independent life  
>>> This is
>>> Dualism . But when you believe in *Mind* being just a *property*  of 
>>> matter ,
>>> then philosophical dualism is eliminated . And here is again where I 
>>> could say
>>> when you initiate with *culture* as one agental transformative , we 
>>> object as
>>> you placing yourselves just midway ignoring *continuity* 
>>> disconnecting culture
>>> from its whereabout/origin .
>>> Best
>>> Haydi
>>>
>>> --- On Mon, 1/5/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Date: Monday, January 5, 2009, 2:51 PM
>>>
>>> 'Sad' because my sense is that if one wants to avoid dualism - crucial
>>> for
>>> Vygotsky - Lenin's writing about 'reflection' isn't the way to
>>> go. I don't
>>> know the details well, but from what I have read Lenin assumed a simple
>>> dualism in which mental representations 'reflect' the real world. The
>>> 'image' may be reversed, but still it is in a realm quite different
>>> from the
>>> real. (Bakhurst discusses Lenin's philosophy in *Consciousness and
>>> Revolution* if I remember correctly.)
>>>
>>> I recently read through *Problems of the Development of Mind*, which 
>>> Michael
>>> and Andy generously made available (it fell down my chimney early one
>>> morning) and was disappointed to discover how little Leontiev seems 
>>> to have
>>> avoided dualistic ways of thinking/writing. Here too the relation of 
>>> psyche
>>> to world is expressed in terms of 'reflection,' for example:
>>>
>>> "The transition to existence in the conditions of a complex
>>> environment formed as things is therefore expressed in or-
>>> ganisms' adaptation to it taking on a qualitatively new form
>>> associated with reflection of the properties of a material,
>>> objective reality of things" (44)
>>>
>>> The sense of reflection is not very clear in this excerpt, but the 
>>> term is
>>> used repeatedly in ways that generally suggest Leontiev sees the psyche
>>> forming subjective representations of an objective reality. Perhaps 
>>> this can
>>> be saved by drawing on Marx's use of 'widerspiegeln,' which as
>>> Michael
>>> points out avoids the connotations of mirroring. But at least it invites
>>> readings of CHAT which don't challenge the dualism in contemporary 
>>> western
>>> social science.
>>>
>>> By the way, although the repeated presentations of the same notions in
>>> Leontiev's book made me suspicious along the way, it wasn't until the
>>> very
>>> end that I discovered (from an endnote) that it is a compilation of 
>>> articles
>>> from very different dates. I'd recommend reading it in chronological 
>>> order
>>> to get a clearer sense of how his ideas developed. For instance, I 
>>> need to
>>> go back to see how his relative emphasis shifted between the child's
>>> encounter with objects, and adult guidance of this encounter. At 
>>> times the
>>> latter is not mentioned, at others it is added on ("by the way..."),
>>> and at
>>> times it is highlighted. But since the chapters are out of order, I 
>>> don't
>>> yet have a clear sense of the chronology of these shifts.
>>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>> On 1/4/09 11:50 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> The idea that always occurs to me about reflections is that in mirrors,
>>>> left
>>> and right are reversed.
>>>
>>> Sad? Or a reason to pause to think?
>>> Quien
>>>> Sabe?
>>>
>>> mike
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jan 4, 2009 at 7:43 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Why sad?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I know, but it would be sad
>>>> to discover that Vygotsky was drawing so
>>>>> heavily
>>>>> from Lenin.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On
>>>> 1/4/09 9:42 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  I might say
>>>> as an aside, that "reflection" whatever it is in
>>>>>> Russian, has a strong
>>>> place in Russian Marxism. This is
>>>>>> because Lenin made such a powerful
>>>> attack on his
>>>>>> philosophical enemies in "Materialism and
>>>> Empirio-Criticism"
>>>>>> written in 1908. Ilyenkov still defends this books in
>>>> the
>>>>>> mid-1970s, though almost all non-Russian Marxists would say
>>>>>> that
>>>> it is a terrible book and was written before Lenin had
>>>>>> studied Hegel, etc.
>>>> In M&EC Lenin makes reflection a central
>>>>>> category, a universal property of
>>>> matter, etc., and bitterly
>>>>>> attacks the use of semiotics of any
>>>> kind.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have an ambiguous attitude to M&EC myself. Apart from
>>>>>>
>>>> "sins of omission" perhaps, Lenin is right, but did he
>>>>>> really have to
>>>> shout it that loud? Well, in the historical
>>>>>> context of the wake of the
>>>> defeat of the 1905 Revolution,
>>>>>> probably he did. Did all Russian Marxists
>>>> for the next 100
>>>>>> years have to follow his lead? Probably not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I
>>>> note that in Dot Robbins' book on Vygotsky and Leontyev's
>>>>>> Semiotics etc.,
>>>> Dot defends the notion of reflection. The
>>>>>> situation, as I see it, is that
>>>> "reflection" has a strong
>>>>>> advantage and an equally strong disadvantage in
>>>> conveying a
>>>>>> materialist conception of sensuous perception.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On one
>>>> side it emphasises the objectivity of the
>>>>>> image-making - there is nothing
>>>> in the mirror, or if there
>>>>>> is, it is an imperfectionit which distorts the
>>>> image. On the
>>>>>> other side, mirror-imaging is an entirely passive process,
>>>> a
>>>>>> property of even non-living matter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Personally, I think
>>>> "reflection" belongs to Feuerbachian
>>>>>> materialism, not Marxism, but in
>>>> historical context, the
>>>>>> position of many Russians who use the concept,
>>>> is
>>>>>> understandable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's how I see it anyway,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ed Wall wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>       It appears the
>>>> root is more or less
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>                        отрaжáть
>>>> (отрaзить)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and, at least according to my dictionary, has the
>>>> sense of  reflecting
>>>>>>> or having an effect. However, my qualifications are
>>>> dated.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ed
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Jan 4, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Martin Packer
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  At the end of last year several of us were trying to figure
>>>> out whether
>>>>>>>> 'reflection' is a good term to translate the way
>>> Vygotsky
>>>> and leontiev
>>>>>>>> wrote
>>>>>>>> about 'mental' activity. Michael Roth pointed
>>>> out that the German word
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> Marx used was Widerspiegeln rather
>>>> than Reflektion (see below). I don't
>>>>>>>> think anyone identified the Russian
>>>> word that was used. I still haven't
>>>>>>>> found time to trace the word in
>>>> Vygotsky's texts, English and Russian.
>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>> an article by Charles
>>>> Tolman suggests that the Russian term was
>>>>>>>> 'otrazhenie.'  Online
>>>> translators don't like this word: can any Russian
>>>>>>>> speakers suggest how
>>>> it might be translated?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Reflection (German: Widerspiegelung;
>>>> Russian: otrazhenie)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Tolman, C.W. (1988). The basic vocabulary of
>>>> Activity Theory. Activity
>>>>>>>> Theory, 1, 14-20.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 10/25/08 12:40 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth"
>>> <mroth@uvic.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  Hi Martin,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Marx does indeed use the term
>>>> "widerspiegeln" in the sentence you
>>>>>>>>> cite.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Das Gehirn
>>>> der
>>>>>>>>> Privatproduzenten spiegelt diesen doppelten
>>>> gesellschaftlichen
>>>>>>>>> Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten nur wider in den
>>>> Formen, welche im
>>>>>>>>> praktischen Verkehr, im Produktenaustausch erscheinen
>>>> - den
>>>>>>>>> gesellschaftlich
>>>>>>>>> nützlichen Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten
>>>> also in
>>>>>>>>> der Form, daß das Arbeitsprodukt nützlich sein muß,
>>> und zwar
>>>> für
>>>>>>>>> andre - den gesellschaftlichen Charakter der
>>> Gleichheit der
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> verschiedenartigen
>>>>>>>>> Arbeiten in der Form des gemeinsamen
>>>> Wertcharakters
>>>>>>>>> dieser materiell verschiednen Dinge, der
>>>> Arbeitsprodukte.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But the Duden, the reference work of
>>>> German language says that there
>>>>>>>>> are 2 different senses. One is
>>>> reflection as in a mirror, the other
>>>>>>>>> one that something brings to
>>>> expression. In this context, I do not
>>>>>>>>> see Marx draw on the mirror
>>>> idea.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For those who have trouble, perhaps the analogy with
>>>> mathematical
>>>>>>>>> functions. In German, what a mathematical function
>>> does
>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> "abbilden," which is, provide a projection
>>> of, or reflection,
>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> whatever. You have the word Bild, image, picture in
>>> the verb.
>>>> But
>>>>>>>>> when you look at functions, only y = f(x) = x, or -x
>>> gives you
>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> you would get in the mirror analogy. You get very
>>> different
>>>> things
>>>>>>>>> when you use different functions, log functions, etc.
>>> Then
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> relationship between the points on a line no longer is
>>> the same
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> the "image", that is, the target domain.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We sometimes
>>>> see the word "refraction" in the works of Russian
>>>>>>>>> psychologists, which
>>>> may be better than reflection. It allows you to
>>>>>>>>> think of looking at the
>>>> world through a kaleidoscope, and you get all
>>>>>>>>> sorts of things, none of
>>>> which look like "the real thing."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 25-Oct-08, at 9:01 AM,
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here's one example
>>>> from Marx, and several from Leontiev, if we can
>>>>>>>>> get into
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>> Russian too.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "The twofold social character of the labour of
>>> the
>>>> individual appears
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> him, when *reflected* in his brain, only
>>>> under those forms which are
>>>>>>>>> impressed upon that labour in every-day
>>>> practice by the exchange of
>>>>>>>>> products." Marx, Capital, Chapter 1,
>>>> section 4.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> " Activity is a non-additive unit of the
>>> corporeal,
>>>> material life of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> material subject. In the narrower sense,
>>>> i.e., on the psychological
>>>>>>>>> plane,
>>>>>>>>> it is a unit of life, mediated
>>>> by mental *reflection*, by an *image,*
>>>>>>>>> whose
>>>>>>>>> real function is to
>>>> orientate the subject in the objective world."
>>>>>>>>> Leontiev,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> Activity & Consciousness.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> " The circular nature of the processes
>>>> effecting the interaction of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> organism with the environment
>>>> has been generally acknowledged. But
>>>>>>>>> the main
>>>>>>>>> thing is not this
>>>> circular structure as such, but the fact that the
>>>>>>>>> mental
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> *reflection* of the objective world is not directly generated by the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> external influences themselves, but by the processes through which the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> subject comes into practical contact with the objective world, and
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> which
>>>>>>>>> therefore necessarily obey its independent properties,
>>>> connections,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> relations." ibid
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> " Thus,
>>>> individual consciousness as a specifically human form of the
>>>>>>>>> subjective
>>>> *reflection* of objective reality may be understood only
>>>>>>>>> as the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> product of those relations and mediacies that arise in the course of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> establishment and development of society." ibid
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>> -- 
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3
>>>> 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
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>>>> Blunden:
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