Re: [xmca] " other "

This is a really interesting post, Haydi. Plenty of food for thought,
as always. I have a question for you.

I especially liked the below concise and encompassing statement.

To your knowledge, what are the strongest statements to this effect by
Vygotsky and Leontiev - or Luria or Davydov, or anyone else, for that
matter?

> Origins of activity are not in the individual ; they are without .
> All L and LSV want to do is to take the pschye (#Wundt/Watson)--
> whether sign-mediated or activity-mediated--out of the individual
> and consider it as originated within the social relations arising
> from practical activity (ensemble of social relations ) .

Best,
- Steve

On Oct 27, 2008, at 5:16 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:

>
> Dear Mike,
> Excuse me for the delay ; My connections failed several times .

> The problem is that , according to Leontiev , * the phrase * is in
> fact * two phrases * :

> * origins of activity * and * in the individual * .

> Origins of activity are not in the individual ; they are without .
> All L and LSV want to do is to take the pschye (#Wundt/Watson)--
> whether sign-mediated or activity-mediated--out of the individual
> and consider it as originated within the social relations arising
> from practical activity (ensemble of social relations ) .

> -- Davydov is right with his use of *primordial* as referring to the
> *human communication* but two questions arise immediately :

> --a historical study goes much farther/further than the *human
> communication* stage of evolution; We have to know what had happened
> before that. L presents the development of the *Mind* presenting it
> as the product of the interactions of one active agent and one
> indispensable object even at the level of physico-chemical. Upon
> the evolutionary ladder one promotes to the rank of subject; the
> other to the rank of object. And object to this level is nature.

> --Now another question is posed: Did things change when man came
> into existence ? That is, did the goal of changing nature (object)
> give place to something else? I think L answers in the negative .
> Even now when physical activity and mental activity the more
> approach each other, the goal is still the same, to change nature --
> man himself parallel product of natural change. Man needs *other*
> just and ultimately to reach that goal even at the purest milieu of
> a theoretical research where at times seemingly-inspired discoveries
> are made. Morality, love, affect, feeling, etc., according to L
> refer to the process of the appearance of the *personal sense* again
> a product of the process of practical activity the cognizance and
> identification of which is one task of cognition . People like to
> think affects boil up automatically from the depths of being just to
> give form to knowledge and cognition or to instigate one activity or
> another. Here is where L stresses affects, needs, desires, feelings,
> incentives all must just emanating from their locations within the
> society/social relations come across and hit some social stimulus to
> convert into and become a motive so that an activity may form.

> --Now the answer to your second question is already made available.
> Rubinstein and Brushlinsky stress the external, acts, through the
> *internal* and L opposes this as referring to the same phenomenon of
> stimulus-response. He says *internals* as such also come from
> without (above). Then my response is it is a reference to the
> process of internalization . It would have been contradictary if we
> sought the *origins* within the *individual* . What comes then with
> birth is here not dealt with . Now in the present thread *strange
> situation*, the same debate is going on. The problem of the
> appearance of heaps, complexes, chains, external speech, ego-centric
> speech, internal speech, verbal thought, pure thought etc ., in
> short, the process of a learning activity? Being is not behind
> consciousness? What is then behind a word? a concept? To what end/
> goal a child has to establish relations with an adult or a more
> talented peer?
> Where does *ideality* come from and to what end is it manipulated/
> deployed?

> 2. Yes , I cannot oppose your full agreement . But what I think is
> finally we have to answer the question what is for what , which is
> for which ; Activity for others or others (the mentioned concepts)
> for activity ? Don't we need a classification in scientific
> investigation and is not *practice* the criterion of all truth and
> should not this kind of practice be systematic?

> With multidisciplinary approach I cannot oppose , either. First L
> stresses a phenomenon can be the subject of many disciplines ; and
> you better know one big lecture or paper at San Diego Conference was
> about the system theory approach ; this does not mean cybernetics
> can fully take on the commitments of a real psychological
> investigation ; it helps . And certainly you won't expect me to
> determine if an activity could be a *unit of analysis* though it
> seems to fit a *non-additive molar unit of life* . How to organize
> to do that for me is bound to this recognition first of all why is
> it yesterday they laughed at you for *idealism* now for
> *materialism* . V.Zinchenko has much to say in this respect , great
> great as he is . I will read your referenced article . thanks a lot .

> Correct me please ; I know there are many shortcomings .

> Best
> Haydi
>
> P.S. Out of my previous lengthy quotes :
> [Such separation of thought from practical activity takes place
> historically, however, not through itself and not only through the
> force of its own logic of development, but is engendered by a
> division of labor that results in mental activity and practical,
> material activity being assigned to different people. When private
> ownership of means of production develops and society is
> differentiated into antagonistic social classes, the activity of
> thought is tom from physical work and contrasted with practical
> activity.]
> [Moreover, words, the language signs, are not simply replacements
> for things, their conditional substitutes. Behind philological
> meanings is hidden social practice, activity transformed and
> crystallized in them; only in the process of this activity is
> objective reality revealed to man.]
> [Neither does a conscious reflection of the world spring up in the
> individual as a result of a direct projection on his brain of the
> ideas and concepts worked out by preceding generations. His
> consciousness too is a product of his activity in an object world.]
> [Thus, the objective existence of human activity itself (Marx says
> industry, explaining that up to this time work - that is, industry -
> was the whole of human activity) appears as “human psychology
> appearing sensually before us ”]
> [Thus, this discovery of Marx, radical for psychological theory,
> consists in the idea that consciousness is not a manifestation of
> some kind of mystical capability of the human brain to generate a
> “light of consciousness” under the influence of things impinging on
> it - stimuli - but a product of those special - that is, social -
> relations into which people enter and which are realized only by
> means of their brains, their organs of feeling, and their organs of
> action.]
> [Marxism especially emphasizes the primordial tie of thought with
> practical activity. “The production of ideas,” we read in German
> Ideology, “originally was directly incorporated into material
> activity and into material contacts of people *in the language of
> real life*--my emphasis--.]
> [Engels expressed this in a more general way he wrote, “A more real
> and closer basis for human thought appears to be the way man changes
> nature, and not nature alone as such. ...” ]
> [In addition, the expression in language of what is initially an
> external object form of cognitive activity formulates a condition
> that allows a subsequent carrying out of its separate processes on
> the plane of speech alone. Inasmuch as speech loses its
> communicative function here and fulfills only a function of
> cognition, then its pronouncing, sound facet is gradually reduced
> and corresponding processes take on all the more a character of
> internal processes carried out for themselves “in the mind.”]
> [Such separation of thought from practical activity takes place
> historically, however, not through itself and not only through the
> force of its own logic of development, but is engendered by a
> division of labor that results in mental activity and practical,
> material activity being assigned to different people. When private
> ownership of means of production develops and society is
> differentiated into antagonistic social classes, the activity of
> thought is tom from physical work and contrasted with practical
> activity.]
>
>
> --- On Sat, 10/25/08, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] " other "
> To: haydizulfei@yahoo.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >
> Date: Saturday, October 25, 2008, 8:56 PM
>
>
> Haydi--
>
> Two questions:
> 1) How are we to interpret the phrase, "origins of activity in the
> individual"? Is this a reference to the process/products of
> internalization?
>
> 2) I fully agree with VVD that "Consequently, activity,
> communication, dialogue, and semiotic-symbolic
> systems need to be studied together. Second, such study requires a
> multidisciplinary approach, the combined efforts of various
> specialists." And of course, we need to study
> phylogeny, culural history, and microgenesis to understand ontogeny,
> the development of consciousness, etc.
>
> How do we organize to do that??
> mike
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 21, 2008 at 2:09 PM, Haydi Zulfei
> <haydizulfei@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Dear Steve,
> As to " other " and therefrom to " communication " , " culturology "
> etc. , there have been and are very many who transcend it up to a
> point of non-transgression . I'm , like you , just interested in
> figuring out what the priority and precedence is . The following
> might be of interest in this respect :
> Quote by Lazarev from Davydov :
> {In the course of many years of experimental and theoretical study
> of the
> problems of activity in the framework of Vygotsky's scientific school,
> we arrived at the following conclusions. First, the origin of
> activity in
> the individual cannot be understood without uncovering its
> *primordial* --my emphasis--
> connections with communication and with semiotic-symbolic systems.
> Consequently, activity, communication, dialogue, and semiotic-symbolic
> systems need to be studied together. Second, such study requires a
> multidisciplinary approach, the combined efforts of various
> specialists.
> Third, investigation of the development of activity in ontogenesis can
> lead to positive results only in parallel with study of its
> development in
> *the history of culture*--my emphasis-- . One or another kind of
> activity cannot be studied
> outside of its cultural-historical context. [5, pp. 505–6]
> These propositions point to a radical reconstruction of the
> foundations
> of the psychological theory of activity.}
> V.V.Davydov was a great theoretician as well as a practitioner ; yet
> I don't know if one is allowed to ask such a question : " Were they
> to communicate because of the needs (activity) or were they to go
> for the needs because of their requirement of communication ? "
> Now , from A.N.Leontiev's A,C,P :
>
> [Such a description of the process of perception appears to be
> incomplete, however. In order for this process to take place, the
> object must appear before a man precisely as registering the psychic
> content of activity, that is, its theoretical side. Isolated
> activity, however, cannot be understood apart from social ties or
> from the contacts that inevitably bind those participating in work.
> Entering into contact with each other, people also formulate a
> language that serves to represent the objects, the means, and the
> very process of work itself. The acts of signifying are in essence
> nothing but acts of isolating the theoretical side of objects, and
> the acquisition by individuals of language is the acquisition of
> their signification in the form of perception. "Language," note Marx
> and Engels, "is practical, existing for other people as well as for
> me alone, a real consciousness. ..."
> This position, however, can by no means be interpreted as meaning
> that consciousness has its origin in language. Language is not its
> demiurge, but a form of its existence. Moreover, words, the language
> signs, are not simply replacements for things, their conditional
> substitutes. Behind philological meanings is hidden social practice,
> activity transformed and crystallized in them; only in the process
> of this activity is objective reality revealed to man.
> Of course, the development of consciousness in every individual does
> not repeat the social- historical process of the formation of
> consciousness. Neither does a conscious reflection of the world
> spring up in the individual as a result of a direct projection on
> his brain of the ideas and concepts worked out by preceding
> generations. His consciousness too is a product of his activity in
> an object world. In this activity, mediated by contact with other
> people, is realized the process of the individual's acquisition
> (Aneignung) of the spiritual riches accumulated by the human race
> (Menschenguttung) and embodied in an objective, sensible form. Thus,
> the objective existence of human activity itself (Marx says
> industry, explaining that up to this time work - that is, industry -
> was the whole of human activity) appears as "human psychology
> appearing sensually before us "
> Thus, this discovery of Marx, radical for psychological theory,
> consists in the idea that consciousness is not a manifestation of
> some kind of mystical capability of the human brain to generate a
> "light of consciousness" under the influence of things impinging on
> it - stimuli - but a product of those special - that is, social -
> relations into which people enter and which are realized only by
> means of their brains, their organs of feeling, and their organs of
> action. The processes evoked by these relations also lead to the
> acceptance of objects in the form of their subjective images in the
> head of man, in the form of consciousness.]
>
> [Marxism especially emphasizes the primordial tie of thought with
> practical activity. "The production of ideas," we read in German
> Ideology, "originally was directly incorporated into material
> activity and into material contacts of people in the language of
> real life. The formation of ideas, thought and spiritual contacts of
> people appear here still as a direct result of material
> relationships of people." Engels expressed this in a more general
> way he wrote, "A more real and closer basis for human thought
> appears to be the way man changes nature, and not nature alone as
> such. ..."
> These positions have a fundamental significance not only for the
> theory of cognition but also for the psychology of thought. They not
> only destroy the naive, naturalistic, and idealistic views of
> thought that were entertained in the old psychology but formulate a
> basis for adequate consideration of the numerous scientific facts
> and concepts that appeared as a result of the psychological study of
> thought processes in the last decades.]
>
> [In addition, the expression in language of what is initially an
> external object form of cognitive activity formulates a condition
> that allows a subsequent carrying out of its separate processes on
> the plane of speech alone. Inasmuch as speech loses its
> communicative function here and fulfills only a function of
> cognition, then its pronouncing, sound facet is gradually reduced
> and corresponding processes take on all the more a character of
> internal processes carried out for themselves "in the mind." Between
> the initial conditions and the practical carrying out of the action,
> there is now an ever longer and longer chain of internal processes
> of thought, comparison, analysis, etc., which finally assume
> relative independence and the capacity to be separated from
> practical activity.
> Such separation of thought from practical activity takes place
> historically, however, not through itself and not only through the
> force of its own logic of development, but is engendered by a
> division of labor that results in mental activity and practical,
> material activity being assigned to different people. When private
> ownership of means of production develops and society is
> differentiated into antagonistic social classes, the activity of
> thought is tom from physical work and contrasted with practical
> activity. It now seems completely independent from the latter, which
> has a different source and a different nature. Such representations
> of thought activity are also found in the idealistic theory of
> thought.]
> If only Andy Blunden helped us with a full copy of L's " Problem of
> the Development of the Mind "
> Appologies if this reaches you scrambled .
> Best
> Haydi
>
>
>
> --- On Fri, 10/17/08, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com> wrote:
>
> From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] PoTAYto and PoTAHto
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Friday, October 17, 2008, 11:50 AM
>
> Michael, I certainly agree with your latter point about individualism,
> which is indeed more entrenched in the US than anywhere. And I agree
> that there is a distrust of socialist and and similar collectivist-
> oriented ideologies especially by those who subscribe to an
> individualist outlook.
>
> But I am guessing about your first points. Here are some of the terms
> and phrases you use that I don't think I understand as you mean them:
>
> radical passivity
> absolutely active
> absolutely passive
> the Other
> radically passive elements that come with language, with
> understanding, etc.
>
> Your help would be appreciated!
> - Steve
>
>
>
>
> On Oct 14, 2008, at 7:22 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>
>> Steve,
>> it is not just that we strive but that we are part of worldly and
>> world-generating events that we have no control over; but this is
>> only the effect of the radical passivity that characterizes our
>> experience----even if David does not want to admit to it. In the
>> very process of writing these words, I am absolutely active writing
>> the sentence to become what it will be and absolutely passive with
>> respect to the language I realize in writing, for it is a language
>> that has come to me from the other, which I use for the other, and
>> which therefore returns to the other (pace Derrida). With respect to
>> the functioning of the language, the meaning that straddles the
>> writer of these lines with the Other more generally, and many other
>> things are totally out of my control while they are within. We
>> cannot think agency, the fact of writing, without also attending to
>> the radically passive elements that come with language, with
>> understanding, etc.
>> "I . . . I . . . I" there is an ideology that I can do all, that
> if
>> I want I can lift the earth, become a creator of myself . . .. It is
>> an ideology (in the positive sense of the word) that is especially
>> characteristic of the US (where any hint of assisting the collective
>> is stamped and branded as "socialism")
>> Michael
>>
>>
>> On 14-Oct-08, at 6:13 AM, Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>
>> The solution in my mind is that we need to strive to be collective
>> in our approach - while individually we sway, in groups we stand a
>> better chance against the winds and storms that buffet us in all
>> directions. One of course needs to choose the right group that
>> corresponds to their core sense of the world, and the right group
>> for one's group to work within, perhaps ultimately entailing
>> numerous nested groups, (not all of our choice) and then changing
>> groups as needed (when possible), but even within such complex
>> situations, we still need to rely on others to help us guide
>> ourselves. This means needing to cultivate a strong sense of
>> cooperation and teamwork that is mixed with straightforward (while
>> hopefully tactful) criticism, with the goal of mutual growth and
>> empowerment. (That sounds a bit starry-eyed, I admit, but what the
>> hell - cynicism is too easy).
>>
>
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Received on Tue Oct 28 03:20:18 2008