RE: [xmca] a materialist *dialectical* psychology

Dear Steve,
I took long on coming back to this because I had not read Andy’s article and I wanted to do it before writing.
 
You said several days ago:
“Mabel, I am impressed with your comment that "gross" (what I am calling "plain," and is traditionally by Marxists called "vulgar") materialism is "ontologically" dualist. Could you elaborate a little on that?”
 
Interestingly, I find some hints of the answer in one of your paragraphs about Ilyenkov. You say:
“Ilyenkov explains that both perspectives, plain materialism and plain idealism, tend to see the human skull as the essential boundary between the "mental" and the "physical." This is a major source of *agreement* between the two. That was a new, eye-opening idea for me.”
 
This is what I was talking about when we spoke, in the cafe of the Big Apple Hostel, about the dualism implicit in both ‘plain’ materialism and idealism. If you have a boundary (to which I previously referred as an outline), like the skull, that delineates two entities: “mental” and “physical” and you have a philosophical dualism, or what we come to call a Cartesian perspective.
 
I can give you two other sources that sustain the dualism of ‘plain’ materialism: Marx and Vygotsky.
Marx says in the thesis I on Feuerbach:
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity.
 
So, on the one hand, you have “the thing, reality, sensousness” as object of contemplation. The subject and the object are separated; there is not recognition of the human activity that links them. In this perspective, Feuerbach ‘plain’ materialism, the subject seems passive, but mainly separated from the object. And so, you have two kind of objects: the sensuous ones and the thought ones, and there is not a conception of the actual minded practice. Practice is conceived “in its dirty-judaical manifestation” as mechanical.
 
Here also, Marx points to the criticism of Hegel (“the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such”), but I will not go into this. I only wonder if ‘practice’ is then the third element of what Andy talks about in his tripartite ontology? I understand that the article was discussed in the list in January, and I still have not been able to read the thread.
 
Then, coming to Vygotsky, I find lots of references on this. I have to take it to the terrain of emotions, that is my subject of study. For example he refers to James and Lange, who focus on the ‘plain’ material and ‘objective’ existences of emotions. Emotions are in the body, to the extreme that “we are sad because we cry”, says James. Vygotsky points out that this theory brings “organic base of emotions to the forefront and for this reason poses as a strictly physiological, objective, and even uniquely materialistic conception of emotions and feelings.” (Vygotsky’s Collected Works Vol. p. 74). Paradoxically, this theory also accept the existence of higher or possibly “sublime” emotions (for example the satisfaction for finishing a task), that live together, but do not mix with the inferior ones such as angry. There is not link or understanding of the relationship between emotions and consciousness, and so between emotions and practices.
 
Do you remember that I was talking about the ‘two legs’ of dialectic materialism? Possibly a better metaphor would be the two streams that tribute to the river of dialectic materialism. They are idealism a ‘plain’ materialism. Both, as Ilenkov points out in your citation, dualist. The task is then the construction of an ontology that is not dualist, as Andy states in his paper. At this stage I have other urgencies that stop me from studying Hegel and being able to discuss with him about the differences that Vygotsky and Marx have with Hegel, but I have had the goal to read German philosophy when I am 50 (I am a bit late though), and then I hope to be able to discuss this issues… At this stage, I only can say these things about dualisms.
I think that philosophically speaking the dualism of ‘plain’ materialism is actually the difference with dialectic materialism of which I was discussing with Martin. And Vygotsky says that “the opposite poles of contemporary psychology (he refers here to materialistic and idealistic psychologies) are internally united with each other and presume each other, that their combination goes back to Descartes… the father of mechanistic psychology and spiritualistic psychology, which do not exclude, but complement each other.” (Collected Works Vol. 6, p. 230). In few words, as you point out referring to Ilenkov: both ‘plain’ materialism and idealism are dualist.
 
What do you think?
 
Mabel

 
 
> From: stevegabosch@mac.com> To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Subject: Re: [xmca] a materialist *dialectical* psychology> Date: Thu, 15 May 2008 23:49:20 -0700> CC: > > I have found myself using the term "plain" materialism to convey the > meaning of "vulgar" materialism from time to time, wanting to avoid > the unfortunate pejorative sense the term "vulgar" usually carries in > English. The term "gross" materialism is interesting, and refreshing, > but still has an unfortunately disparaging ring to it in US English > language use. "Common" or "ordinary" materialism possibly sound less > like put-downs. I find myself liking "plain" materialism even > better. US Americans anyway often don't mind preferring "plain" > things, so calling someone a "plain" materialist probably would not be > seen as offensive to the usual US American ear, (unless you are a > Marxist, who would immediately hear, and correctly so, the term > "plain" to mean "undialectical.") The essential distinction being > made is the one Mabel emphasizes, between mechanical and dialectical > materialist thinking.> > Ilyenkov makes a very interesting point in The Concept of the Ideal > about the dualism of both "plain" materialism and "plain" idealism.> > (Ilyenkov uses, or at least, his translator uses, as Andy points out > is the Marxist norm, the term "vulgar." Isn't "plain" a little easier > on the ears? Or am I trying to be too polite? Whichever term one > prefers, I believe the terms "plain" or "vulgar" are being used here > to mean "undialectical" and "mechanical," to distinguish these forms > from their dialectical counterparts, originated by Marx and Engels on > the materialist side, and Hegel on the idealist.)> > Ilyenkov explains that both perspectives, plain materialism and plain > idealism, tend to see the human skull as the essential boundary > between the "mental" and the "physical." This is a major source of > *agreement* between the two. That was a new, eye-opening idea for me.> > This insight helps me see how this dualist perspective has become so > deeply rooted in "common sense." Everyday, "plain" thinking from > either of the major ontological persuasions tends to divide "reality" > and "mind" in a similar way. The assumption of the "skull boundary" > has consequently become universal over the millennia. This "skull > boundary" concept permeates traditional philosophical discourse, and > is a core principle of idealist psychology.> > By thinking about these boundaries in a very new and different way, as > developed in the Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky tradition, by seeing > consciousness in all its manifestations as located not just in > individual human heads, but in **activity** (social relations, > history, culture, etc.) - and *at the same time* by seeing activity as > not just physical and external, but *simultaneously*, mental and > internal (cognitive, emotional, etc.) - cultural-historical thinkers > make a giant methodological leap toward overcoming "plain," everyday > common-sense dualism.> > Mabel, I am impressed with your comment that "gross" (what I am > calling "plain," and is traditionally by Marxists called "vulgar") > materialism is "ontologically" dualist. Could you elaborate a little > on that?> > - Steve> > > > >
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Received on Wed May 28 00:18 PDT 2008