[xmca] unsubscribe me

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Thanks,

LS

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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: Wrap up on discussion of paper (Andy Blunden)
> 2. Wrap up on discussion of paper: HA!! Good luck!! (Mike Cole)
> 3. Re: Silly Offshoots and Dropped Subjects (David Kellogg)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 04 Jan 2008 12:49:22 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Wrap up on discussion of paper
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <5.2.1.1.0.20080104123224.03ad3b20@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
> No I have plenty of time, Bruce, I was just picking a natural break.
>
> Firstly, apologies to Peter, in that I forwarded his great message to the
> list without his permission, so please David, tolerance for remarks which
> were intended to be private and not offensive.
>
> One weakness of this article which bears on points that both Bruce and
> Peter raise. ...
>
> Karl Marx and Margaret Thatcher agreed on one thing, that "society" does
> not exist. Well, not quite because for Marx "society" meant as in
> Victorian
> England, just the ruling clique, and for Thatcher it meant the bunch of
> human atoms to which she was trying to reduce her country. In this article
> I use the word "society" far too loosely, and in one crucial place I use
> "society" instead of "activity" or maybe "social practice," i.e., the
> third
> to individual psyche and material artefact. This error may have made one
> of
> my points opaque.
>
> Although Leontyev advises us not to talk of the individual as counterposed
> to "society" this is a very frequent theme, everywhere. I think the notion
> of "society" conflates both culture and activity, not to mention eliding
> the fact that "society" can have no immediate existence other than in and
> through individuals. But it is the failure to clearly distinguish between
> the *material culture* which is shared by everyone in a certain society so
> as to know what to do and what attitude to take, what genre to adopt,
> etc.,
> and the *activities* that actually constitute the institutions, events,
> practices, rituals, etc., of a society, which leads the word "society"
> into
> such confusion.
>
> So I am interested in drawing the insights of CHAT into the renovation of
> social theory. Social theory always relies on some kind of psychology.
> American social theory I think often draws on G H Mead, all kinds of
> economics draw on a kind of naive psychology or some kind of behaviourism;
> Coleman's social capital theory is explicitly based on a "theory of the
> self", Marxism obviously, Foucauldian poststrucuralism, the various
> Freudian "theories" of society, the Critical Theorists like Habermas use
> Piaget as Freud, Axel Honneth uses Mead and Winnicott -- OK so all these
> social theorists are using one or several psychologies - in every single
> case, inadequate psychologies.
>
> We need to make an effort to encourage our political science and sociology
> colleagues to start "appropriating" or "mastering" CHAT. And we need to be
> looking in the converse direction, critically.
>
> Andy
> At 12:03 AM 4/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
>>Andy,
>>Oh.. I'd just got round to starting to write something. Late as usual.
>>Does this mean you haven't really got time to carry on or just that you
>>think things have come to a natural break?
>>I ask as I think the issues I would raise perhaps haven't been the main
>>ones in the discussion up to now (though I think they follow on from your
>>response to Steve G, relating to the question of whether CHAT can be
>>extended to be a general social theory and if indeed that is what your
>> are
>>trying to do). Is that a separate discussion perhaps? Or are you prepared
>>to carry on?
>>
>>Bruce R
>>
>>
>>Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>Well, I think it's time for me to thank everyone for their input on my
>>>paper. I knew that it was going to be difficult, and it was, but we
>>>managed it, and I am particularly thankful for those of you who really
>>>took the time to sweat over my arcane thoughts and crack them open for
>>>you, whether you actually spoke up in the chat or not. I think Bourdieu
>>>has really staked his claim for contributing to a resolution of the
>>>problems I have had in mind, so thanks to those who introduced him to
>>> the
>>>discussion.
>>>
>>>A final (?) response to Mike. Yes, one of the conclusions which is
>>>implicit in this ontology is that the line between nature and nurture is
>>>not one which can be set in principle from the outset. It is an
>>>always-open distinction. Therefore, the category of "artefact" always
>>>indicates a product of nature which has been worked upon for human
>>>purposes. Whether it is 90% nature and 10% nurture or vice versa, will
>>>always be, I think, an open question. Therefore an ontology cannot draw
>>>such a line. But we can distinguish between what is material and what is
>>>thought and what is a form of activity "trafficking" between the two.
>>> And
>>>yes that adds up to a "circular definition." It could not be otherwise.
>>>And that is, I think, a simple rendering of Hegel's "logical" rendering
>>>of the same idea as Universal, Individual and Particular,
>>>
>>>Thanks all,
>>>Andy
>>>
>>>At 08:15 AM 3/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>>>>The conclusion I take away from this discussion is that there is an
>>>>ineluctable-
>>>>a "hazy borderland" where the borders of what we can imagine (a
>>>> cultural
>>>>process) and what is "really there" 'in the sense that it is resisting
>>>>my actions"
>>>>(a natural process).
>>>>
>>>>Is that an acceptable formulation of Andy's Hegel-derived ontology?
>>>>
>>>>mike
>>>>.
>>>>
>>>>On Jan 2, 2008 6:31 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > This idea is something that has become clearer to me since
>>>> completing
>>>> this
>>>> > article about a year ago.
>>>> >
>>>> > It is an ontology for the purpose of understanding human
>>>> subjectivity,
>>>> > Steve, so it is concerned with the kind of "things" we can perceive
>>>> or
>>>> > sensibly talk about. (Just like one has a "unit of analysis" for a
>>>> certain
>>>> > project, one has an ontology for a certain project.) So for example,
>>>> you
>>>> > can say that a certain kind of thing (such as a comet for example)
>>>> exists
>>>> > and we all understand that it would be absurd to claim that the
>>>> existence
>>>> > of the comet depended on us thinking about it. But if you get right
>>>> down
>>>> > to
>>>> > what you mean by the word "comet" then I would have to say that
>>>> while the
>>>> > claim has a basis in nature, nature does not know about "things" or
>>>> > "theories" or "forces" or any such thing. Nature is what is not a
>>>> human
>>>> > labour process. We know it is such that it constrains our activity,
>>>> and we
>>>> > test out that boundary in making and using artefacts - all of which
>>>> must
>>>> > obey "the laws of nature" - and engaging in practical activity -
>>>> which is
>>>> > also subject to the laws of physics insofar as we do anything with
>>>> an
>>>> > artefact (including our own body).
>>>> >
>>>> > Of course Steve, I am open to persuasion!! This idea is only a
>>>> couple of
>>>> > months old. But I really do think that if we establish this at the
>>>> outset,
>>>> > we can clear up a lot of confusion in psychology. There is nothing
>>>> in
>>>> this
>>>> > claim that denies that nature exists and has its own ways
>>>> independently of
>>>> > us. But there is nothing that can be said of it which does not
>>>> entail
>>>> > reference to artefacts (such as instruments or bits of matter),
>>>> ideas
>>>> > (such
>>>> > as theories, concepts) and practical activity. Theses on Feuerbach
>>>> agrees
>>>> > with me on that.
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/hegels-spirit.htm<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/works/hegels-spirit.htm>argues
>>>> the idea at
>>>> > slightly greater length in the context of Hegel critique.
>>>> >
>>>> > Some people want an ontology that says there are signs and tools. An
>>>> > ontology like that just generates confusion, IMHO. Some people use
>>>> an
>>>> > ontology which says there are ideas and matter. Equally, this leads
>>>> only
>>>> > to
>>>> > confusion. Having the right ontology helps a lot in step two. But I
>>>> am
>>>> > most
>>>> > certainly open to persuasion.
>>>> >
>>>> > Andy
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>xmca mailing list
>>>>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>
>>>_______________________________________________
>>>xmca mailing list
>>>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>xmca mailing list
>>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> mobile 0409 358 651
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2008 20:05:30 -0800
> From: "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: [xmca] Wrap up on discussion of paper: HA!! Good luck!!
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> <30364f990801032005t4bf642derf3842df45429fdd8@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Yo! Andy!!
> First you lead us through a great discussion about the limitations on
> individual agency and then
> you declare, *"agentively" that the discussion is over!!! *
>
> :-)) good luck. The collective has something to say about when things
> begin
> and end and Bruce has, all too tentatively, noted that there is plenty
> more
> to talk about.
> Too bad that Professor/Doctor Sawchuk is not involved in this discussion
> as
> a matter of course. He would be so welcome!!
>
> non agentively yours
> Her Unter Professor, sans mente, i sin mente
> ms cole, etc and interalia
>
> ( thank you all after the fact for not reading this far so that I do not
> have to respond to messages from the future which is, after all, just a
> figment of our
> collective imaginaions!!!!!)
>
> Mike
>
>
>
>
> On Jan 3, 2008 5:49 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
>> No I have plenty of time, Bruce, I was just picking a natural break.
>>
>> Firstly, apologies to Peter, in that I forwarded his great message to
>> the
>> list without his permission, so please David, tolerance for remarks
>> which
>> were intended to be private and not offensive.
>>
>> One weakness of this article which bears on points that both Bruce and
>> Peter raise. ...
>>
>> Karl Marx and Margaret Thatcher agreed on one thing, that "society" does
>> not exist. Well, not quite because for Marx "society" meant as in
>> Victorian
>> England, just the ruling clique, and for Thatcher it meant the bunch of
>> human atoms to which she was trying to reduce her country. In this
>> article
>> I use the word "society" far too loosely, and in one crucial place I use
>> "society" instead of "activity" or maybe "social practice," i.e., the
>> third
>> to individual psyche and material artefact. This error may have made one
>> of
>> my points opaque.
>>
>> Although Leontyev advises us not to talk of the individual as
>> counterposed
>> to "society" this is a very frequent theme, everywhere. I think the
>> notion
>> of "society" conflates both culture and activity, not to mention eliding
>> the fact that "society" can have no immediate existence other than in
>> and
>> through individuals. But it is the failure to clearly distinguish
>> between
>> the *material culture* which is shared by everyone in a certain society
>> so
>> as to know what to do and what attitude to take, what genre to adopt,
>> etc.,
>> and the *activities* that actually constitute the institutions, events,
>> practices, rituals, etc., of a society, which leads the word "society"
>> into
>> such confusion.
>>
>> So I am interested in drawing the insights of CHAT into the renovation
>> of
>> social theory. Social theory always relies on some kind of psychology.
>> American social theory I think often draws on G H Mead, all kinds of
>> economics draw on a kind of naive psychology or some kind of
>> behaviourism;
>> Coleman's social capital theory is explicitly based on a "theory of the
>> self", Marxism obviously, Foucauldian poststrucuralism, the various
>> Freudian "theories" of society, the Critical Theorists like Habermas use
>> Piaget as Freud, Axel Honneth uses Mead and Winnicott -- OK so all these
>> social theorists are using one or several psychologies - in every single
>> case, inadequate psychologies.
>>
>> We need to make an effort to encourage our political science and
>> sociology
>> colleagues to start "appropriating" or "mastering" CHAT. And we need to
>> be
>> looking in the converse direction, critically.
>>
>> Andy
>> At 12:03 AM 4/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
>> >Andy,
>> >Oh.. I'd just got round to starting to write something. Late as usual.
>> >Does this mean you haven't really got time to carry on or just that you
>> >think things have come to a natural break?
>> >I ask as I think the issues I would raise perhaps haven't been the main
>> >ones in the discussion up to now (though I think they follow on from
>> your
>> >response to Steve G, relating to the question of whether CHAT can be
>> >extended to be a general social theory and if indeed that is what your
>> are
>> >trying to do). Is that a separate discussion perhaps? Or are you
>> prepared
>> >to carry on?
>> >
>> >Bruce R
>> >
>> >
>> >Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>Well, I think it's time for me to thank everyone for their input on my
>> >>paper. I knew that it was going to be difficult, and it was, but we
>> >>managed it, and I am particularly thankful for those of you who really
>> >>took the time to sweat over my arcane thoughts and crack them open for
>> >>you, whether you actually spoke up in the chat or not. I think
>> Bourdieu
>> >>has really staked his claim for contributing to a resolution of the
>> >>problems I have had in mind, so thanks to those who introduced him to
>> the
>> >>discussion.
>> >>
>> >>A final (?) response to Mike. Yes, one of the conclusions which is
>> >>implicit in this ontology is that the line between nature and nurture
>> is
>> >>not one which can be set in principle from the outset. It is an
>> >>always-open distinction. Therefore, the category of "artefact" always
>> >>indicates a product of nature which has been worked upon for human
>> >>purposes. Whether it is 90% nature and 10% nurture or vice versa, will
>> >>always be, I think, an open question. Therefore an ontology cannot
>> draw
>> >>such a line. But we can distinguish between what is material and what
>> is
>> >>thought and what is a form of activity "trafficking" between the two.
>> And
>> >>yes that adds up to a "circular definition." It could not be
>> otherwise.
>> >>And that is, I think, a simple rendering of Hegel's "logical"
>> rendering
>> >>of the same idea as Universal, Individual and Particular,
>> >>
>> >>Thanks all,
>> >>Andy
>> >>
>> >>At 08:15 AM 3/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>> >>>The conclusion I take away from this discussion is that there is an
>> >>>ineluctable-
>> >>>a "hazy borderland" where the borders of what we can imagine (a
>> cultural
>> >>>process) and what is "really there" 'in the sense that it is
>> resisting
>> >>>my actions"
>> >>>(a natural process).
>> >>>
>> >>>Is that an acceptable formulation of Andy's Hegel-derived ontology?
>> >>>
>> >>>mike
>> >>>.
>> >>>
>> >>>On Jan 2, 2008 6:31 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> > This idea is something that has become clearer to me since
>> completing
>> >>> this
>> >>> > article about a year ago.
>> >>> >
>> >>> > It is an ontology for the purpose of understanding human
>> subjectivity,
>> >>> > Steve, so it is concerned with the kind of "things" we can
>> perceive
>> or
>> >>> > sensibly talk about. (Just like one has a "unit of analysis" for a
>> >>> certain
>> >>> > project, one has an ontology for a certain project.) So for
>> example,
>> you
>> >>> > can say that a certain kind of thing (such as a comet for example)
>> exists
>> >>> > and we all understand that it would be absurd to claim that the
>> existence
>> >>> > of the comet depended on us thinking about it. But if you get
>> right
>> down
>> >>> > to
>> >>> > what you mean by the word "comet" then I would have to say that
>> while the
>> >>> > claim has a basis in nature, nature does not know about "things"
>> or
>> >>> > "theories" or "forces" or any such thing. Nature is what is not a
>> human
>> >>> > labour process. We know it is such that it constrains our
>> activity,
>> >>> and we
>> >>> > test out that boundary in making and using artefacts - all of
>> which
>> must
>> >>> > obey "the laws of nature" - and engaging in practical activity -
>> which is
>> >>> > also subject to the laws of physics insofar as we do anything with
>> an
>> >>> > artefact (including our own body).
>> >>> >
>> >>> > Of course Steve, I am open to persuasion!! This idea is only a
>> couple of
>> >>> > months old. But I really do think that if we establish this at the
>> >>> outset,
>> >>> > we can clear up a lot of confusion in psychology. There is nothing
>> in
>> >>> this
>> >>> > claim that denies that nature exists and has its own ways
>> >>> independently of
>> >>> > us. But there is nothing that can be said of it which does not
>> entail
>> >>> > reference to artefacts (such as instruments or bits of matter),
>> ideas
>> >>> > (such
>> >>> > as theories, concepts) and practical activity. Theses on Feuerbach
>> agrees
>> >>> > with me on that.
>> >>> >
>> >>> >
>> >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/hegels-spirit.htm<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/works/hegels-spirit.htm>
>> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/works/hegels-spirit.htm>argues
>> >>> the idea at
>> >>> > slightly greater length in the context of Hegel critique.
>> >>> >
>> >>> > Some people want an ontology that says there are signs and tools.
>> An
>> >>> > ontology like that just generates confusion, IMHO. Some people use
>> an
>> >>> > ontology which says there are ideas and matter. Equally, this
>> leads
>> only
>> >>> > to
>> >>> > confusion. Having the right ontology helps a lot in step two. But
>> I
>> am
>> >>> > most
>> >>> > certainly open to persuasion.
>> >>> >
>> >>> > Andy
>> >>> >
>> >>> >
>> >>> >
>> >>>_______________________________________________
>> >>>xmca mailing list
>> >>>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>
>> >> Andy Blunden :
>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>tel (H)
>> +61 3 9380 9435,
>> >> mobile 0409 358 651
>> >>
>> >>_______________________________________________
>> >>xmca mailing list
>> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>
>> >_______________________________________________
>> >xmca mailing list
>> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>> Andy Blunden :
>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>tel (H) +61 3
>> 9380 9435,
>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2008 11:20:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Silly Offshoots and Dropped Subjects
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <261849.94826.qm@web51811.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> To tell you the truth, Tony, my relentlessly GRAMMATICAL analysis of
> "thank you" is a response to Mike's interest in etymology, in which I
> recognize the ingrained habits of a life-long language learner.
>
> Anyone who has really mastered a foreign language to the point where
> they can actually work in it knows that one reason why it takes so long
> is that you just have to learn a lot of vocabulary. Unfortunately,
> vocabulary is learnt in a piecemeal fashion (I am deliberately avoiding
> the word "arbitrary", because I think saying that the relationship of
> words to meanings is aribtrary is essentially the same as saying it is
> entirely decontextual).
>
> One way of overcoming the extended and piecemeal nature of vocabulary
> learning is by taking a lively interest in how word meanings derive from
> other word meanings. When we learn, for example, that "immediate",
> "remedial" and even "mediation" are sisters under the skin, we find it
> easier to remember all three. Sometimes more (meaning) really is less
> (effort).
>
> I agree with Mike (and disagree with Pinker) that the
> cultural-historical link between words represented by etymology never
> entirely goes away; it is always there, even when the words are stored
> as purely psychological entities in Steven Pinker's "mental lexicon" and
> it is a part (but only a SMALL part) of the "technical means" by which
> word meanings are used to carry out speech acts.
>
> Wittgenstein says that meaning something really is going up to someone,
> but it is not JUST going up to someone. It is also saying something and
> that something that we say is connected "qian si wan lu" (I mean, by a
> thousand cultural strands and ten thousand historical threads) to other
> things.
>
> I think this is what Andy means when he says that the diction of his
> article is a re-enactment of the Battle of Hastings. When you read
> Ruskin or Carlyle, you can see that they are very conscious of this, and
> their deliberate selection of Anglo-Saxon words is a matter of
> Francophobia.
>
> So why do Carlyle and Ruskin insist on Latinate grammar? Well, I think
> people are less conscious of the cultural-historical tails of sentence
> patterns, and that is also why you consider my grammatical discussion of
> "thank you" to be "overanalysis". But if culture and history are part of
> the way in which word meanings carry out speech acts, then they are an
> even bigger part of the way in which whole utterances do so. What is
> true of the more internalized lexical end of lexicogrammar is even more
> true for the more externalized grammatical end.
>
> I think that, lying at a layer closer to inter-mental interaction, the
> GRAMMAR of speech acts gives us an even more undigested form of their
> cultural and historical roots than the etymology of words. The phrase
> "Congratulations" is not at all grammarless (not even to the extent that
> lexicalizations such as "Hello" or "Goodbye" are grammarless).
>
> "Congratulate" is a performative verb; like "promise" or "bet" or
> "apologize". It does the very thing it describes, and to say "I offer
> you my congratulations" is to congratulate someone as surely as to say
> "I plight you my troth" is to marry them.
>
> You know that in China (in which I include Taiwan) it's pretty easy to
> find signs using "Congratulations" that are agrammatical (e.g. "Warmly
> Congratulate the Successful Conclusion of the Third International
> Conference on English Language Teaching in a Chinese Context"). I think
> that the grammatical reduction of "congratulations" is probably very
> similar to that of "thanks" and therefore this use of "congratulate" is
> no more grammatical than "warmly thank our invited speaker for your
> perspicacious presentation" or "warmly welcome the visiting inspection
> team from the central control commission". By dropping the subject we
> suggest an imperative where no imperative is pragmatically possible
> (because to order someone to congratulate themselves is NOT to
> congratulate them, any more than telling somebody to thank themselves is
> thanking them.
>
> So why is it possible to drop the subject with "thank you" WITHOUT
> suggesting the imperative but NOT possible to drop the subject in
> "congratulate"? Why does "thank you" NOT suggest that I am telling you
> to go thank yourself, but "warmly congratulate" somehow does suggest
> that the parties named should indulge in an orgy of self-congratulation?
>
> For the same reason it's possible to drop the subject in "Sorry!" but
> not in "apologize". On the one hand, we have the weight of the past
> which assumes that sincerity is represented or at least expressed by
> explicitness and verbosity, and on the other we have the pressure of the
> future which demands economy and succinctness. When we go up to somebody
> to mean something, it is the latter consideration which outweighs the
> former, while in writing banners for visiting delegations, it is always
> the former obligation that lies heaviest upon us. E-mail, as usual, is
> somewhere in between.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------
> Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
> End of xmca Digest, Vol 32, Issue 29
> ************************************
>

-- 
Lila Sharif
Sociology Ph.D Program
University of California, San Diego
lsharif@ucsd.edu
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