RE: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

Maybe it's good to look at culture as more experiential. Based on some of my own experiences I'm beginning to look at culture as a sort of home base - where home is defined by Thomas Wolf (the good one) "Home is the place that you go when nobody else with take you." Maybe "Culture is the things that you do when nothing else makes sense."
 
Michael

________________________________

From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Paul Dillon
Sent: Wed 1/2/2008 6:45 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

Andy,
  
  I'm beginning to feel helpless actually since your answer about meaning seems circular to me and I still don't quite get it.
  
  The following sections of your post seem to me to represent your position pretty clearly but I also think they pretty clearly illustrate the circularity of your attempt to relate meanings and artefacts.
  
    "So culture, being made up of material things, has properties which are relatively independent of the activities in which they are used.Because activity, thought and artefacts (culture) have different aterial bases, they are never perfectly identified. A word may have different meanings in different contexts and among different people, but acquaintance with the word both conditions and affords certain kinds of activity and consciousness"
  The first sentence of this passage is rather unclear. The basic statement seems: culture, composed of artifacts, has properties independent of the activites. But in the last part of the sentence - "activites in which they are used" you appear to indicating the artefacts themselves. The distinction between artefacts and culture isn't clear to me. Further along you state that "activity, thought, and culture(artefacts)" have different material bases. Admitting my ignorance, I would really like to know what these different matterial bases are. Also, I'm not totally clear whether "meaning" is an attribute of one, two, or all of these categories, especially since thought is separated from artefacts and hence culture, as you have defined it. So exactly where does meaning (which in your earlier post was the essential characteristic of culture)exist?
  
  You identify meaning in the uses and "affordances" that artefacts enable. You also equate meaning and use and implicitly include language among artefacts.
  
    Meaning is, I would say, the place of an artefact in some specific activity. Meaning is particular, artefact is universal. So one and the same artefact may have different meanings because it will play a part in different systems of activity. And actually, it can mean different Things in one and the same system of activity because I have skated over the role of consciousness in this explanation.
  In the above passage you have equated meaning with the (particular) and artefact with the universal (universal). I'm not sure the comparison really clarifies much since it is not the artefact in itself, for example, the archaeoogical remains of neolithic tool kits, that "contains" meaning but its relation to a subject and object; different relations between the three would imply that the activity system as a whole determines the meaning, e.g., to clean animal skins for the neolithic hunter. to prepare a thesis on late neolithic stone tools, etc. , to hang on a wall in ones house, etc. Where is the universal of which the different systems of meanings arising in these different activity systems are instances, particulars? A universal able to account for the variations in the systems of meaning ?
  
  You also use the term "artefacts" broadly to include any products of human activity, including language, with two consequences. 1. This seems to imply that thought and language are in some way independent from rather than reflections of each other. 2.The placement of language as an artefact with some kind of "position" in the activity system is problematic; what position would language occupy? Would you consider it a tool for conveying various kinds of "meaning" ranging from those of "common sense in the everyday life-wordl" to those of rigorously developed conceptual systems. But what other position could the language artifact" occupy in an activity system? But this seems circular to me since it seems to presuppose "meaning", the very thing that you set out to explain. Of course there are many other semiotic systems besides language. n some of which meaning inheres in the artefact itself; the artefact allows the reconstruction of the "universal" and to
 reproduce to some degree the activities in which it was used . There are also examples of decoding ancient writing systems such as the Mayan hieroglyphs. I think these cases illustrate cases of a universal/artefact-particular/meaning relationship, but not in spoken languaqe as a rule.
  
  My difficulty with the word "culture", comes from the serious doubt I have about the utility of the notion it expresses, It's used as what could almost be called an existential operator : US culture, Russian culture, Islamic culture, etc., This has (at least) two effects: (1) it is a reification in which certain "patterns", "traits", "structures" or "groups of artefacts and signs " that are used and shared in a population are selected as the basis. . But the have porous and hybrid boundaries and made up of differently patterned webs of practices and activities that come into existence and go out of existence, transform themselves internally, and from adpoting, modifying and integrating practices and activities of other communities. (2) If my argument is correct and "culture" is an abstract category that could be considered the creation of academic antrhopology especially in the US under the influence of Franz Boas whose particularist orientation asserted
 itself from the turn of the 20th century into the 60s. I think the concept represents a moment in the development of the non-religious theoretical understanding of homo sapiens. This abstract category creation and primary focus of anthropology a field that developed. in close relationship to the historical processes of European imperialism around the globe and the US conquest and desctruction of the native North American populations.
  
  Paul
  
  
  
  Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
  I plead guilty to all charges of misuse of the names of parts/types of
psychology.

Re culture as both material and ideal. Let's take an example, the American
gun culture. Now, it's true as the NRA always say "It is people that commit
murder, not guns". But, nonetheless, the presence of 500 million guns
scattered around suburban America is a danger, isn't it? because people
*can* use them to murder .... and do. So culture, being made up of material
things, has properties which are relatively independent of the activities
in which they are used. But if the country was populated solely by
pacifists they would not be a danger. Clearing land makes for consequences
which were not intended by the people who cleared the land. (land=artefact,
erosion and farming=meaning).

Conversely, a library full of book written in the Gothic script is no use
when Germans can no longer read the old fashioned script. "Affordances" is
a word which is relevant here I guess.

Jim Wertsch's article on narrative tools which was circulated earlier this
week, was full of observations about the fact that cultural tools are
involved in shaping action, but never determine it. (Great article BTW. I
am now an admirer of Jim W.)

Because activity, thought and artefacts (culture) have different material
bases, they are never perfectly identified. A word may have different
meanings in different contexts and among different people, but acquaintance
with the word both conditions and affords certain kinds of activity and
consciousness.

So an artefact and its use (meaning) necessarily coincide at a certain
point, but the artefact may have existed before people found that it could
have a certain use and later on, the artefact may find different uses. Like
words and meanings and "intelligent speech".

Meaning is, I would say, the place of an artefact in some specific
activity. Meaning is particular, artefact is universal. So one and the same
artefact may have different meanings because it will play a part in
different systems of activity. And actually, it can mean different things
in one and the same system of activity because I have skated over the role
of consciousness in this explanation. "Christmas" means something different
to a housewife, a child, a parent, a moslem, etc., etc. even though the
festival is the self-same one. Different people see it and participate in
it differently.

Does that help?
Andy

At 06:24 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>Andy,
>
> This definition of culture as mediating artefcts given in your message:
> "an artefact is what it is only in connection with its use in a certain
> range of activities with a certain meaning."
> simply moves the problem onto "a certain meaning".
>
> Coud you explain how to distinguish meaning from meaninglessness and
> how it is possible to separate the meanings from the activities in which
> ?it? is inscribed.
> .
>
> Paul
>
>
>Andy Blunden wrote:
> Paul,
>my understanding is that in the CHAT tradition, "culture" has a specific
>meaning, being the sum of artefacts produced and consumed by a group of
>people, inclusive of the understanding that an artefact is what it is only
>in connection with its use in a certain range of activities with a certain
>meaning.
>
>Nevertheless, the use of the word to indicate the *society* (as a
>continuing self-reproducing collectivity of communities) which produces and
>consumes the given collection of artefacts is so deeply embedded, I think
>that we have to accept that as a legitimate usage of the word. Mike is the
>person who has defined "cultural psychology" so maybe Mike will tell us
>what he means?
>
>Andy
>At 04:35 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> >great, but would someone please tell me exactly what "culture" means.
> >
> > Paul
> >
> >Andy Blunden wrote:
> > Sure.
> >Andy
> >At 10:43 PM 1/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
> > >Andy
> > >... why not "cultural psychology"?
> > >
> > >Luísa Aires
> > >
> > > > Good question Mike. I never thought about that, and it is certainly in
> > > > ignorance of how these terms are used in academia generally.
> > > >
> > > > I suppose by 'social psychology' I mean a current of psychology which
> > > > utilises a concept of 'extended mind' as its foundational principle.
> > It is
> > > > always the case that other currents contribute insights which are
> not so
> > > > easily accessible from one's own (so to speak) - even if you don't
> accept
> > > > the principles of Psychoanalysis, there are still things to learn
> > from it;
> > > > and the same goes for all currents and schools of psychology. But by
> > > > 'social psychology' I mean a real psychology, that is practical and
> > useful
> > > > in dealing with psychological problems and copes with the reality of
> > > > individual difference and so on. A 'social psychology' which sees
> > > > individuals as purely and simply instances of their social position
> does
> > > > not warrant the name in my opinion. And 'social psychology' in the
> sense
> > > > that Max Horkheimer (I think) used it, which deal only with the
> phenomena
> > > > of crowds and so on, is also 'not worthy' of the name.
> > > >
> > > > So I am looking for a tool which can give me a way of understanding how
> > > > the
> > > > Zeitgeist is formed, how it is changed, practically how to intervene in
> > > > it.
> > > > I do not expect a 'social psychology' to go further and provide me
> with a
> > > > social or political theory as such, but it need to be able to
> bridge the
> > > > gap, so to speak. Let's face it! If we can change the Zeitgeist which
> > gets
> > > > people like George W Bush and John Howard elected in democratic
> > countries,
> > > > into one in which genuinely good people get elected, then the rest will
> > > > look after itself and I can enjoy my retirement.
> > > >
> > > > Why not a meta-psychology? Apart form my idiosyncratic dislike of
> > "meta" I
> > > > don't want a metapsychology, I want a psychology which has a
> > > > metapsychology
> > > > which is sound and able to cope with the sociality of consciousness.
> > > >
> > > > Why not a "science of human nature"? "Human nature" is such a
> problematic
> > > > term, it carries such a lot of unwanted 19th century baggage. And I am
> > > > interested in consciousness, not "nature" in general.
> > > >
> > > > Sure, social psychology is a sub-discipline within psychology.
> There are
> > > > things which belong to psychology which are not centre-stage for me.
> > Sure,
> > > > brain injury or other defects are a serious topic, as is child
> > > > development,
> > > > etc., etc.. I guess I am talking about a psychology whose central
> thread
> > > > is
> > > > a social psychology rather than a neurobiology, for example.
> > > >
> > > > I need a social psychology which recognises that social movements
> are not
> > > > just large numbers of people with the same feeling, but subjects, and
> > > > individuals are neither passive victims of social processes nor
> > absolutely
> > > > free agents. But a *real*, practical, living school of psychology, with
> > > > people using it in designing curricula, healing depressed people,
> running
> > > > half-way houses, training teachers, organising self-help groups, etc.,
> > > > etc.
> > > > and doing real, experimental science with it, critiquing and
> > improving its
> > > > concepts down the years.
> > > >
> > > > Does that make sense?
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > At 05:14 PM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > >>Andy-- This is the second time you have declared your goal to be
> > > >> answering
> > > >>questions within the framework of social psychology. Why do you use
> this
> > > >>term? Why not a
> > > >>meta-psychology? Why not a "science of human nature"?
> > > >>
> > > >>I ask because I am used to social psychology being viewed as a
> > > >>sub-discipline within psychology.
> > > >>The only dept of social psych I know of that takes on your questions
> > > >>seriously is at the LSE. One branch of cultural psychology in the US
> > > >> comes
> > > >>out of experimental social
> > > >>psychology here, but I do not think you have that in mind.
> > > >>
> > > >>This query is not to distract from the main line of discussion, but
> > > >> rather
> > > >>to locate what you are striving for better.
> > > >>
> > > >>mike
> > > >>On Dec 30, 2007 4:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> > I think David and Peg's messages were out of sync., yes?
> > > >> >
> > > >> > This all raises that most difficult of questions for a social
> > > >> psychology
> > > >> > that wants to deal with the tasks I am asking it to deal with,
> how do
> > > >> you
> > > >> > deal with the knock-on effect of an action, which is predictable
> from
> > > >> > on-high, but unknown to the actors themselves? We rely on the basic
> > > >> > insight
> > > >> > that what goes on in the head first went on between people - whether
> > > >> in
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > form given to it by Fichte, Hegel, Marx, CS Peirce or Vygotsky. What
> > > >> is
> > > >> > Hegel's Logic about? About the underlying "logic of events", how
> this
> > > >> or
> > > >> > that policy or statement or whatever ultimately leads to this or
> that
> > > >> > problem which was at first invisible. Life experience will tell you
> > > >> this,
> > > >> > but if you don't have life experience, it will happen according
> to the
> > > >> > logic of events anyways and you should learn. Basically, I think we
> > > >> can
> > > >> > only make sense of this if we get right away from the idea of the
> > > >> > "individual-as-subject" but remember that no subject exists
> other than
> > > >> in
> > > >> > and through individual human beings.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > With the ANL example of the child and the father, I have always had
> > > >> > trouble
> > > >> > with "examples" and methods which presuppose a leader or a
> father or a
> > > >> > facilitator, a person who knows what the experimental subject or
> > > >> student
> > > >> > or
> > > >> > self-help group really needs to do, and organises things
> accordingly.
> > > >> Of
> > > >> > course, I understand that all you teachers and teacher-trainers,
> child
> > > >> > psychologists, etc., work and have a responsibility to work in
> > > >> precisely
> > > >> > that circumstance. But I do not think this is the paradigmatic
> > > >> > relationship. The father can only do his bit in "leading" the child
> > > >> into
> > > >> > an
> > > >> > activity where its "best interests" will be served if the father can
> > > >> act
> > > >> > as
> > > >> > a kind of transmitter of life experience, and kind of short-cut the
> > > >> > process
> > > >> > for the child. So it is not the father's technique which is the
> > > >> paradigm,
> > > >> > but the bitter life experience which the child may or may not
> have as
> > > >> a
> > > >> > result of choosing to do this or that.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Andy
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> >
> > > >> > At 07:54 AM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > >> > >Dear Andy and Peg:
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Here's some stuff from my notes; I happen to know that Andy can't
> > > >> get
> > > >> > > ahold of a copy of ANL's Problems of the Development of the
> Mind. I
> > > >> hope
> > > >> > > I don't get those funny marks that always show up when I paste
> in...
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > p. 402 ANL points out how 'only understandable' motives for
> > > >> homework
> > > >> > > such as wanting to get a good mark can be replaced by 'really
> > > >> effective'
> > > >> > > motives such as doing it so you can go out to play. However, after
> > > >> some
> > > >> > > weeks of really effective motives, it is also possible that the
> > > >> child
> > > >> > > will find that the only understandable motives become really
> > > >> effective,
> > > >> > > e.g. the child will leave off doing homework because it¡¯s untidy
> > > >> and
> > > >> > the
> > > >> > > child is now afraid of getting a bad mark.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > p. 403: ANL writes: 'It is a matter of an action¡¯s result being
> > > >> more
> > > >> > > significant in certain conditions than the motive that actually
> > > >> induces
> > > >> > > it. The child begins doing its homework conscientiously because it
> > > >> wants
> > > >> > > to go out quickly and play. In the end this leads to much more not
> > > >> > simply
> > > >> > > that it will get the chance to go and play but also that it
> will get
> > > >> a
> > > >> > > good mark. A new "objectivation" of its needs come about which
> means
> > > >> > they
> > > >> > > are understood at a higher level.'
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > 'The transition to a new leading activity differs from the process
> > > >> > > described simply in the really effective motives becoming in the
> > > >> case of
> > > >> > > a change of leading activity, those understandable motives that
> > > >> exist in
> > > >> > > the sphere of relations characterizing the place the child can
> > > >> occupy
> > > >> > > only in the next higher stage of development rather than in the
> > > >> sphere
> > > >> > of
> > > >> > > relations in which it still actually is. The preparation of these
> > > >> > > transitions therefore takes a long time because it is
> necessary for
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > child to become quite fully aware of a sphere of relations
> that are
> > > >> new
> > > >> > > for it.¡±
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > ANL compares a child¡¯s performance in a school play with the
> > > >> child¡¯s
> > > >> > > learning of study as an independent activity. The child begins the
> > > >> > school
> > > >> > > play as an assignment, and later continues for the approbation the
> > > >> child
> > > >> > > receives during a successful performance. As with learning to
> study
> > > >> for
> > > >> > a
> > > >> > > good mark instead of just studying for the opportunity to go
> out and
> > > >> > > play, a ¡°merely understandable¡± motive has now become ¡°really
> > > >> > > effective¡± and a new activity is established.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > But only in the case of independent study (according to ANL) is
> > > >> the
> > > >> > new
> > > >> > > activity developmentally significant (¡°objectively¡±) because the
> > > >> child
> > > >> > > is not going to become a professional dramatist (if the child
> were,
> > > >> then
> > > >> > > the performance in the play would be study). Thus only in the
> latter
> > > >> > case
> > > >> > > can we say there is a new leading activity.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > Here's what I make of this:
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > a) ANL really does NOT interrogate the subject as to the object
> > > >> > > orientation of the activity: the object (study, the completed
> play)
> > > >> is
> > > >> > > indeed given in advance. As far as ANL is concerned, ONLY
> Chaiklin's
> > > >> > > "objective" ZPD exists, and there is NO subjective ZPD. But Andy's
> > > >> idea
> > > >> > > of "immanent critique" is NOT an objective critique; it has to do
> > > >> with
> > > >> > > following up (just like Sarah's) the subject's way of seeing
> things
> > > >> and
> > > >> > > seeing where it leads.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > b) In the development discussion (San Diego-Helsinki) Dr. Olga
> > > >> Vasquez
> > > >> > > raised the question of whether "leading activity" is the same as
> > > >> > > "neoformation", and Dr. Pentti Harakarainnen really did not answer
> > > >> it
> > > >> > and
> > > >> > > instead talked about Dr. Engestrom's even more general concept of
> > > >> > > activity. But here we can see that "leading activity" and
> > > >> "neoformation"
> > > >> > > are quite different: LSV used "neoformation" to talk about
> > > >> transitional
> > > >> > > structures during crisis periods that COMPLETELY disappear (for
> > > >> example,
> > > >> > > the child's autonomous speech at one and the child's
> "negativism" at
> > > >> > > three) as well as neoformations which become the leading activity
> > > >> during
> > > >> > > normal growth. Only the latter is a "leading activity" for ANL.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > c) There is still a STRONG behaviorist streak in ANL's reasoning:
> > > >> the
> > > >> > > difference between the "really effective" and "merely understood"
> > > >> > > reasoning can very easily be described, in ALL of ANL's
> examples, as
> > > >> a
> > > >> > > simple lengthening of the time distance between the behavior
> and the
> > > >> > > positive reinforcement. Bruner, in a quote that I have long since
> > > >> lost,
> > > >> > > suggests that development can be described this way, but I don't
> > > >> think
> > > >> > > LSV ever would have done so: for LSV the key thing about humans is
> > > >> that
> > > >> > > they are dogs that can ring their own bells.
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > > David Kellogg
> > > >> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >
> > > >> > >---------------------------------
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> > > >> >
> > > >> > Andy Blunden :
> > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/tel (H) +61 3
> > > >> 9380 9435,
> > > >> > mobile 0409 358 651
> > > >> >
> > > >> > _______________________________________________
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