Re: [xmca] Re: Boris assists Mike assists Eric

Wonderful question, Lisa.
There are several generations of interconnected scholars and scholarship
intertwined here. I have written about the relationships you are asking
about
in a PRIOR generation (Jean Lave and I have a long history of collaboration
which goes back to 1966 and which you can find traces of if you google
jean on lchc.ucsd.edu, but I have never interacted with Etienne so far
as I can remember (my memory being unreliable as already established
in this discussion early today-- or tomorrow-- depending on where you live).

I can post the short form of my take on the relationship between terms such
as activity, practice, situation, context, etc from Cultural Psychology, but
there
is a more extended form that I could access but only by scanning a pdf. And
even
then, all of this predates Wenger's recent work. So, no ANSWERS but some
parts of achieving a contemporary aNSWER could be provided.

Question: What is the contemporary (2006/2007) relationship between the
ideas
of Lave and Wenger? I have zero idea.
mike

On Nov 25, 2007 6:42 PM, Lisa Kuh <lpk2@u.washington.edu> wrote:

> As Wenger (and Lave) have recently been entered into the conversation, I
> shift from the conversatin on identity and pose a question that has been
> on
> my mind for a while regarding the relationship between Wenger's focus on
> characteristics of "practice" and a CHAT perspective on "activity".
> Having
> moved a bit between a theoretical lens that looks at teacher collaboration
> via a community of practice perspective and an activity theory
> perspective,
> I am wondering if folks have any thoughts about the relationship between
> these two. How does Wenger's conception of practice- a community of
> practice - fit with CHAT? Wenger, in his notes from Ch. 1 in Communities
> of
> Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity distinguishes his work from
> activity theory and states:
>
> "I would argue that our actions do not achieve their meanings in and of
> themselves, but rather in the context of a broader process of negotiation.
> By startging iwth practice as a context for the negotiation of meaning, I
> do
> not assume that activities carry their own meaning. This is one reason
> that I will not take discrete activities, or even systems of activities,
> as
> a fundamental unit of analysis. In this reagrd, theories based on
> practice
> have a different onotological foundation than activity theory." (He cites
> Leont'ev 1981 and Wertsch, 1985).
>
> Yet, I have spoken to many who belive that Wenger "counts" as activity
> theory. Any clarification on this would be most helpful to my work.
>
> Lisa P. Kuh, M.Ed.
> Eliot-Pearson Children's School
> Tufts University
> PhD Candidate, Teacher Education
> University of Washington
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> To: "Wolff-Michael Roth" <mroth@uvic.ca>
> Cc: <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>; "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity"
> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2007 12:00 PM
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Boris assists Mike assists Eric
>
>
> Oh Gosh! I forgot something and only hedged with "as I recall." !! And my
> copy of the book was not 5 minutes, but 10 miles away.
> Sloppy sloppy. :-(
> Sigh.
>
> Thanks for your lesson in using the environment to remember, Michael.
> Thanks for your selection of quotes, Adam.
>
> Going through all the places where identity is invoked in the book, I come
> away confused about warrants for statements
> about identity that imply claims about subjectivity as seen from the
> perspective of the individual. They quote Cain about the way
> "a person understands and views himself" but how does this fit with the
> epistemological position from the p. 53 quote?
>
> Similarly, these statements confuse me:
> In the section on motivation and identity (starts on 110) they claim that
> motivation is linked to "an increasing sense of identity as a master
> practitioner" (111). Later in that same section they adamantly argue
> against
> a "view of 'self' as object" or schooling practices that view a learner's
> identity as "an explicit object of change" (112).
>
> what view of identity is used in the first statement? How others view and
> position one
> as a master practitioner of one's understanding and views of himself? If
> the
> latter, what
> is the evidentiary basis for such a claim?
>
> I assume the purport of the p. 112 statement is to focus on participation
> in
> practices as the
> desired focus of efforts to promote change. "Self" does not appear in the
> index.
>
> It was my impression (no checking any refs or past messages as I write
> this)
> that in our discussion
> vis a vis identity as a concept, we were in part addressing its double
> sided
> nature, as created by
> others and by the conscious/self-conscious individual acting in the world.
> How does a social ontology
> get you the later perspective? The answer is probably obvious to those in
> the know. I am not one of them.
> Some members of xmca are.
> mike
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 24, 2007 5:20 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca> wrote:
>
> >
> > On 24-Nov-07, at 12:52 PM, Tony Whitson wrote:
> >
> > Identity is one of the most central and prominent themes in Wenger's
> work.
> >
> > On Sat, 24 Nov 2007, Mike Cole wrote:
> >
> > I am not sure how our multi-log has helped your understanding, Eric, but
> >
> > glad it was useful to you.
> >
> > As I understand them, Lave and Wenger espouse a social ontology and I
> > do not recall them having talked about identity.
> >
> > I you looked at the index of their book, you would find a lot of
> entries,
> > a number of them in bold. I don't want to be picky, but don't we want to
> > have informed discussions. I knew they were all about identity, and it
> > took
> > me only 5 seconds to go to the book shelves, get the book and find the
> > index
> > entry.
> > :-)
> > Michael
> >
> > But they do use the quasi
> > dimension, peripheral-->central which implies some sort of common set
> > of social norms and expectations, a.k.a. superego bound up with what
> > is considered central.
> >
> > Being peripheral (what might have been refered to at other times as
> > marginal)
> > is not all that bad a subject position. Some might even argue that it
> > provides
> > a privileged view of the workings of the system that is human life.
> > mike
> >
> > On Nov 24, 2007 12:20 PM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Wow, Boris & Mike:
> >
> > That is truely enlightening. I appreciate the formation of the ideal
> that
> > has evolved from this discourse. I was floundering at first Mike,
> > regarding your comment on superego, but having read and reread the post
> > from Boris I now concur that personality research is not for the
> > collective
> > but rather for the understanding of cultural influences upon
> development.
> > Mike, in your opinion does Lave and Wagner's research on legitimate
> > peripheral participation assist in the research pertaining to identity?
> >
> > Thank you Andy for beginning this fabulous thread
> >
> > grateful for the discourse,
> > not dead yet,
> > eric
> >
> >
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > cc: Boris Meshcheryakov <borlogic@orexovo.net>
> > bcc:
> > Subject: Fwd: Fwd: [xmca] Vygotsky on Identity?
> > "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > 11/23/2007 08:50 AM PST
> > Please respond to mcole <font size=-1></font>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > In red below is my attempt at translation of a note from Boris
> > Mescheryakov
> > re identity and personality in LSV. Boris, whose work you can read in
> the
> > Companion to Vygotsky and elsewhere
> > was kind enough to look up relevant passages from LSV. I probably have
> not
> > done the translation justice, but most all of this exists in English and
> > others more knowledgeable of Russian
> > can straighten things out.
> >
> > It appears were are dealing with issues that are not usefully reduced to
> > either or....... again.
> > mike
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > From: Boris Meshcheryakov < borlogic@orexovo.net>
> > Date: Nov 23, 2007 12:01 AM
> > Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] Vygotsky on Identity?
> > To: Mike Cole <mcole@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >
> >
> > úÄÒÁ×ÓÔ×ÕÊ, Mike.
> > ðÏ-×ÉÄÉÍÏÍÕ, ÐÒÁ×Ù ÔÅ, ËÔÏ ÓÞÉÔÁÅÔ, ÞÔÏ ÐÒÏÂÌÅÍÁ ÉÄÅÎÔÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ,
> > ÉÄÅÎÔÉÆÉËÁÃÉÉ, ÓÁÍÏÏÐÒÅÄÅÌÅÎÉÑ (ÓÁÍÏÄÅÔÅÒÍÉÎÁÃÉÉ) ÎÅ ÂÙÌÉ
> ÓÁÍÏÓÔÏÑÔÅÌØÎÙÍ
> > ÐÒÅÄÍÅÔÏÍ ÒÁÚÍÙÛÌÅÎÉÊ É ÉÓÓÌÅÄÏ×ÁÎÉÊ ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÏÇÏ. íÏÇÕ ÌÉÛØ ÐÒÅÄÌÏÖÉÔØ
> > ÎÅËÏÔÏÒÙÅ ÅÇÏ ×ÙÓËÁÚÙ×ÁÎÉÑ Ï ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÉ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ É ÓÁÍÏÓÏÚÎÁÎÉÉ (ÜÔÕ Ó×ÑÚØ
> > ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÉÊ ÞÅÔËÏ ÏÐÉÓÙ×ÁÌ):
> >
> > Apparently, those who believe that the problem of identity,
> > identification,
> > self determination were not independent subjects of thought and
> > investigation by LSV are correct. I can only propos a few of his
> > statements
> > on the development of personality and self consciousness (this
> connection
> > Vygotsky clearly did describe)
> >
> >
> > ?...ÏÔÌÉÞÉÅ ÒÅÂÅÎËÁ ÏÔ ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÁ ÍÏÖÅÔ ÂÙÔØ ÌÕÞÛÅ ×ÓÅÇÏ ×ÙÒÁÖÅÎÏ
> > ÐÏÌÏÖÅÎÉÅÍ
> > çÅÇÅÌÑ, ËÏÔÏÒÙÊ ÒÁÚÌÉÞÁÌ ×ÅÝÉ × ÓÅÂÅ É ×ÅÝÉ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ. ïÎ ÇÏ×ÏÒÉÌ, ÞÔÏ
> ×ÓÅ
> > ×ÅÝÉ ÓÕÔØ ÓÎÁÞÁÌÁ × ÓÅÂÅ, ÎÏ ÎÁ ÜÔÏÍ ÄÅÌÏ ÎÅ ÏÓÔÁÎÁ×ÌÉ×ÁÅÔÓÑ É ×
> ÐÒÏÃÅÓÓÅ
> > ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÑ ×ÅÝØ ÐÒÅ×ÒÁÝÁÅÔÓÑ × ×ÅÝØ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ. ôÁË, ÇÏ×ÏÒÉÌ ÏÎ, ÞÅÌÏ×ÅË ×
> > ÓÅÂÅ
> > ÅÓÔØ ÒÅÂÅÎÏË, ÚÁÄÁÞÁ ËÏÔÏÒÏÇÏ ÓÏÓÔÏÉÔ ÎÅ × ÔÏÍ, ÞÔÏÂÙ ÏÓÔÁ×ÁÔØÓÑ × ÜÔÏÍ
> > ÁÂÓÔÒÁËÔÎÏÍ É ÎÅÒÁÚ×ÉÔÏÍ "× ÓÅÂÅ", Á × ÔÏÍ, ÞÔÏÂÙ ÓÔÁÔØ ÔÁËÖÅ É ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ
> > ÔÅÍ, ÞÅÍ ÏÎ ÐÏËÁ ÅÓÔØ ÌÉÛØ × ÓÅÂÅ, ÉÍÅÎÎÏ ÓÔÁÔØ Ó×ÏÂÏÄÎÙÍ É ÒÁÚÕÍÎÙÍ
> > ÓÕÝÅÓÔ×ÏÍ. ÷ÏÔ ÜÔÏ ÐÒÅ×ÒÁÝÅÎÉÅ ÒÅÂÅÎËÁ ÉÚ ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ × ÓÅÂÅ × ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÁ ?
> > ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ ? É ÓÏÓÔÁ×ÌÑÅÔ ÇÌÁ×ÎÏÅ ÓÏÄÅÒÖÁÎÉÅ ×ÓÅÇÏ ËÒÉÚÉÓÁ
> > ÐÅÒÅÈÏÄÎÏÇÏ ×ÏÚÒÁÓÔÁ. üÔÏ ÅÓÔØ ÜÐÏÈÁ ÓÏÚÒÅ×ÁÎÉÑ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ É
> > ÍÉÒÏ×ÏÚÚÒÅÎÉÑ...?
> > (ðÅÄÏÌÏÇÉÑ ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÁ, óÏÂÒ. ÓÏÞ., Ô. 4, Ó. 199).
> >
> > "the difference between child and adolescent may be best expressed by
> > Hegel's position that distinguished things in themselves and things for
> > oneself. He said that the all things are initially in themselves, but
> > matters do not stop at this point and in the process of development the
> > thing turns into a thing for onself. Thus, he said, a person (man) in
> > himself is a child, whose task is to leave behind that abstract and
> > undeveloped "in himself" and in so doing, in order to become for himself
> > in
> > a way that he is in the meantime only in himself, that is, to become a
> > free
> > and intelligent being. This very transformation of the child into an
> adult
> > (man) in himself in the adolescent -- a person (man) for himself--
> > constitutes the major content of the entire crisis of this transitional
> > age.
> > It is an epoch of the maturation of personality and world view (Pedology
> > of
> > the Adolescent, Comp Works, v4, p. 199)
> >
> > "ìÉÞÎÏÓÔØ ÓÔÁÎÏ×ÉÔÓÑ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ ÔÅÍ, ÞÔÏ ÏÎÁ ÅÓÔØ × ÓÅÂÅ, ÞÅÒÅÚ ÔÏ, ÞÔÏ
> ÏÎÁ
> > ÐÒÅÄßÑ×ÌÑÅÔ ÄÌÑ ÄÒÕÇÉÈ. üÔÏ É ÅÓÔØ ÐÒÏÃÅÓÓ ÓÔÁÎÏ×ÌÅÎÉÑ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ"
> (éÓÔÏÒÉÑ
> > ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÑ ÷ðæ, óÏÂÒ. ÓÏÞ., Ô. 3, Ó. 144). (A) Personality becomes for
> > itself, when it has previously been in itself, through what it
> > manifests
> > through others (History of Dev of HPF, Coll. Works, Vol 3, p. 144)
> >
> > ïÞÅÎØ ×ÁÖÎÏÅ ÄÏÂÁ×ÌÅÎÉÅ ÉÚ "éÓÔÏÒÉÉ ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÑ ÷ðæ": "The following
> addition
> > from same work is very important:
> >
> > ?äÖ. âÏÌÄÕÉÎ ÓÐÒÁ×ÅÄÌÉ×Ï ÏÔÍÅÔÉÌ, ÞÔÏ ÐÏÎÑÔÉÅ Ï "Ñ" ÒÁÚ×É×ÁÅÔÓÑ Õ
> ÒÅÂÅÎËÁ
> > ÉÚ
> > ÐÏÎÑÔÉÑ Ï ÄÒÕÇÉÈ. ðÏÎÑÔÉÅ ?ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔØ? ÅÓÔØ, Ô.Ï., ÓÏÃÉÁÌØÎÏÅ, ÏÔÒÁÖÅÎÎÏÅ
> > ÐÏÎÑÔÉÅ, ÓÔÒÏÑÝÅÅÓÑ ÎÁ ÏÓÎÏ×Å ÔÏÇÏ, ÞÔÏ ÒÅÂÅÎÏË ÐÒÉÍÅÎÑÅÔ ÐÏ ÏÔÎÏÛÅÎÉÀ Ë
> > ÓÁÍÏÍÕ ÓÅÂÅ ÔÅ ÐÒÉÅÍÙ ÐÒÉÓÐÏÓÏÂÌÅÎÉÑ, ËÏÔÏÒÙÅ ÏÎ ÐÒÉÍÅÎÑÅÔ ÐÏ ÏÔÎÏÛÅÎÉÀ
> Ë
> > ÄÒÕÇÉÍ. ÷ÏÔ ÐÏÞÅÍÕ ÍÏÖÎÏ ÓËÁÚÁÔØ, ÞÔÏ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔØ ÅÓÔØ ÓÏÃÉÁÌØÎÏÅ × ÎÁÓ?
> (Ô.
> > 3, Ó. 324/ ÖÉÒÎ. ÛÒÉÆÔ ÍÏÊ ? â.í.).
> >
> > James Baldwin correctly noted that the concept of "I" develops in a
> child
> > from the concept of others. The concept, personality, that is, the
> social,
> > reflected, concept, is built on the basis of the fact that the child
> uses
> > in
> > relationship to himself those means of adaptation which he uses in
> > relationship to others. This is why it is possible to say that
> personality
> > is the social in us. (vol 3, p. 324)
> >
> >
> >
> > éÚ "ðÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÞÅÓËÏÇÏ ÓÌÏ×ÁÒÑ" ÷ÁÒÛÁ×Ù É ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÏÇÏ (1931) >From Varshava
> > and
> > Vygotsky (1931) *Psychological Dictionary*:
> >
> > "éÄÅÎÔÉÆÉËÁÃÉÑ (æÒÅÊÄ) - ÏÔÏÖÄÅÓÔ×ÌÅÎÉÅ, ÕÐÏÄÏÂÌÅÎÉÅ ÓÅÂÑ ÄÒÕÇÏÊ
> ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ,
> > ÐÒÉÐÉÓÙ×ÁÎÉÅ ÓÅÂÅ ÐÒÉÚÎÁËÏ× ÏÐÒÅÄÅÌÅÎÎÏÇÏ ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ. éÄÅÎÔÉÆÉËÁÃÉÑ ÉÇÒÁÅÔ
> > ÏÇÒÏÍÎÕÀ ÒÏÌØ × ÓÎÏ×ÉÄÅÎÉÑÈ, × Ô×ÏÒÞÅÓÔ×Å, × ÍÅÞÔÁÈ. ðÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÞÅÓËÉÊ
> ÓÍÙÓÌ
> > é. Ó×ÏÄÉÔÓÑ Ë ÒÁÓÛÉÒÅÎÉÀ ËÒÕÇÁ ÐÅÒÅÖÉ×ÁÎÉÊ, Ë ÏÂÏÇÁÝÅÎÉÀ ×ÎÕÔÒÅÎÎÅÇÏ
> > ÏÐÙÔÁ".
> >
> > Identification (Freud) - the equating, making similar, of oneself to
> > another
> > personality, the adoption by oneself of the characteristics of a
> specific
> > person. Identification plays a huge role in reminisences, dreams and
> > creativity. The psychological sense of identification comes down to the
> > widening of one's circle of experiences (perezhivania), to the
> enrichment
> > of
> > innner life.
> >
> > "ìÉÞÎÏÓÔØ - ÔÅÒÍÉÎ, ÏÚÎÁÞÁÀÝÉÊ ÅÄÉÎÓÔ×Ï É ÉÎÄÉ×ÉÄÕÁÌØÎÏÓÔØ ×ÓÅÈ
> ÖÉÚÎÅÎÎÙÈ
> > É
> > ÐÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÞÅÓËÉÈ ÐÒÏÑ×ÌÅÎÉÊ ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ; ÞÅÌÏ×ÅË, ÓÏÚÎÁÀÝÉÊ ÓÁÍ ÓÅÂÑ ËÁË
> > ÏÐÒÅÄÅÌÅÎÎÏÅ ÉÎÄÉ×ÉÄÕÁÌØÎÏÅ ÅÄÉÎÓÔ×Ï É ÔÏÖÄÅÓÔ×Ï ×Ï ×ÓÅÈ ÐÒÏÃÅÓÓÁÈ
> > ÉÚÍÅÎÅÎÉÑ, ÐÒÏÉÓÈÏÄÑÝÉÈ × ÏÒÇÁÎÉÚÍÅ É ÐÓÉÈÉËÅ, ÅÓÔØ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔØ. âÏÌÅÚÎØ ì.
> > ×ÙÒÁÖÁÅÔÓÑ × ÒÁÓÐÁÄÅ ÜÔÏÇÏ ÅÄÉÎÓÔ×Á"
> >
> > Personality is a term indicating a unity in the indivualenss of all
> > everyday
> > life and psychological manifestation of persons; a person (man)
> accepting
> > himself as a certain individual unity and entity in all processes of
> > change
> > that take place in the organism and the psyche - this is personality.
> > Disease of personality is expressed in the disintegration of this unity.
> >
> > é ÅÝÅ: ÷ "ðÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÉ ÉÓËÕÓÓÔ×Á" × ÇÌÁ×Å Ï "çÁÍÌÅÔÅ" ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÉÊ
> ÁËÃÅÎÔÉÒÕÅÔ
> > ÐÏÎÑÔÉÅ "×ÔÏÒÏÇÏ ÒÏÖÄÅÎÉÑ" . ÷ ÒÁÂÏÔÁÈ á.î. ìÅÏÎÔØÅ×Á ÔÏÖÅ ×ÓÔÒÅÞÁÅÔÓÑ
> > ÜÔÏÔ
> > ÔÅÒÍÉÎ × Ó×ÑÚÉ Ó ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÅÍ ÓÁÍÏÓÏÚÎÁÎÉÑ × ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÏ×ÏÍ ×ÏÚÒÁÓÔÅ. And
> > also:
> > In *Psychology of Art *in the chapter on Hamlet Vygotsky accentuates the
> > concept, "second birth." In the works of AN Leontiev one also encounters
> > this term in connection with the development of selfconsciousness during
> > adolescence.
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > ó Õ×ÁÖÅÎÉÅÍ,
> >
> > â.í.
> > mailto:borlogic@orexovo.net <borlogic@orexovo.net><borlogic@orexovo.net>
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Tony Whitson
> > UD School of Education
> > NEWARK DE 19716
> >
> > twhitson@udel.edu
> > _______________________________
> >
> > "those who fail to reread
> > are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > -- Roland Barthes, S/Z
> > (1970)_______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
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>
>
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Received on Sun Nov 25 18:52 PST 2007