Re: [xmca] Compatible

I haven't yet read all of Tomasello's paper, and so I haven't got to his
discussion of ontogenesis. But it's clear that he is assuming what the
majority of cognitive scientists assume, that recognition of intentionality
in another's actions requires a mental representation of their mental
representations. 'Theory of mind' is just this: the child must have a theory
- an explicit representation - of the mental states - themselves
representational - of the other, in order to understand their actions.

Even Searle (on whose speech act theory a lot of this paper is based)
recognized that there are 2 kinds of intention: prior intention (in mind, in
his view), and intention-in-action. If we attribute all intentionality to
mental representation then the child must be a little psychologist, shortly
after or even at birth. If we recognize that action itself has intrinsic
intentionality, then certainly the child can live in a social, interpersonal
unity without forming (yet) *representations* of it.

I have other questions too, but this will suffice for now.

On 11/7/07 1:27 PM, "Carol Macdonald" <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:

> A theory of mind is essentially interested in how soon young children
> realise that other people have minds. Instrumentality is not part of *their
> * theory, but Mike you are of course right, and we might say that getting
> attention is the primary act of instrumentality and getting the adult (maybe
> a willing sibling) to do something would be the secondary level/kind of
> instrumentality.
>
> It's such an interesting topic that maybe one of our lurkers would want to
> do a study for a graduate study? How about that?
>
> Carol
>
>
> On 07/11/2007, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Carol-- I found this comment interesting: "However, a theory of mind
>> would
>> not
>>> get as far as instrumentality." What do you have in mind here? Isn't
>> pointing to get the attention of another an instrumental act?
>>
>> Presumably, what Tomasello and a LOT of others seem to arguing is that
>> there
>> is a primal, ready at birth, inter-personal/social unity of self and other
>> that serves as the grounding for all forms of further development.
>> Development from this already and always there foundation involves forms
>> of
>> differentiation and incorporation/appropriation that are also mutually
>> accomplished.
>>
>> A huge subject.
>> mike
>>
>> On Nov 7, 2007 9:35 AM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Nov 7, 2007 8:45 AM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello Mike
>>>> Yes, this is definitely compatible. However, a theory of mind would
>> not
>>>> get as far as instrumentality. The research is certainly very
>>> interesting,
>>>> but I think that it could go further by testing the instrumentality
>> and
>>> may
>>>> give some kind of rating of the infant's pleasure. This may be for
>> other
>>>> people to try.
>>>> Regards
>>>> Carol
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> "Pax Te Cum"
>>>> 6 Andover Road
>>>> Westdene
>>>> 2092 Johannesburg
>>>> 011 673 9265 082 562 1050
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> "Pax Te Cum"
>>> 6 Andover Road
>>> Westdene
>>> 2092 Johannesburg
>>> 011 673 9265 082 562 1050
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>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>
>

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Received on Wed Nov 7 12:08 PST 2007