Re: [xmca] The social origins of pointing??

The following summary seems compatible with your interpretation, Carol. It
was sent by a student in our mediational theories of mind seminar and I do
not think reached XMCA>
mike

=-------------------

Here's one attempt at an answer.

In *A New Look at Infant Pointing* (Tomasello, Carpenter, and Liszkowski,
2007) the authors describe some experiments that provide evidence to show
that the infant realizes that the act of pointing draws the attention of the
caregiver.

In experimental settings, infants were shown sudden and/or interesting
actions of puppets in the distance that caused the babies to point to the
puppets, presumably in an effort to draw the attention of the adult (assumed
to be the caregiver). The infants then looked at their caregivers for a
reaction. Adults were experimentally directed to express positive emotion
and alter their gaze in all trials but to react to the pointing in different
ways. Infants' responses to the reactions of the adult were observed and
interpreted as follows:

· When the adults responded to the infant pointing by alternating
their gaze between the correct referent and the child while emoting
positively, the infants continued to share attention and interest and did
not repeat their pointing (Joint Attention condition).

In the Joint Attention condition, the typical infant response was one long
point gesture and continuation of attention and interest in the puppets. The
infants did not engage in repeated pointing after they saw the adult
reaction to their point gesture. Under this condition, the infants pointed
more often across trials than in the other conditions described below. This
was interpreted as a sign of satisfaction that the efforts of their pointing
had resulted in intended shared attention and interest and were, therefore,
effective.

In contrast,

· When the adults responded to the infant pointing by simply emoting
directly to the child and ignoring the referent, the infants repeated their
pointing (Face condition);

· When the adults responded to the infant pointing by looking at the
referent without returning attention to the infant, infants repeated their
pointing gestures (Event condition);

· When the adults responded to the infant pointing by doing nothing,
the infants repeated their pointing (Ignore condition); and

· In a similar, earlier experiment, when the adults responded to the
infants' pointing by looking at an incorrect nearby referent, the infants
repeated their pointing to the intended referent.

Tomasello interpreted the infants' responses of repeated pointing in the
last four trial conditions as "persistent attempts to establish shared
attention and interest" (p. 713). The infants did not seem to be satisfied
with the adults' reactions to their pointing. Under these conditions, the
infants' pointing decreased across trials, suggesting that the infants
realized that their pointing gestures were not drawing the intended
attention of the adult and were, therefore, ineffective or not worth doing.

These experiments indicate that infants intend that their pointing gestures
will get the caretakers' attention and that they realize by observing the
caretaker's reaction whether or not they have been successful.

Diane

Diane Sweeney

On Nov 5, 2007 3:39 AM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:

> Mike,
> Although Halliday (1975) is dated, I think he would come in somewhere
> along the lines of Tomasello. The first four functions he identifies for
> language are instrumental, regulatory, interpersonal and personal. However,
> the pointing as referential/representational would come in later, on my
> reading of him--so perhaps we should be aware of this. My perception (and of
> course of more eminent people like Piaget) of young children is their
> overwhleming egocentricity, so instrumentality for the sake of one's own
> needs would rank as primary. Adults get things done for you. Don't bother
> pointing if they aren't in the room, or you can't get their attention.
> Carol
>
>
> On 04/11/2007, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Dear XMCA-ites
> >
> > A few weeks ago in our seminar on mediational theories of mind, we
> > read recent work by Tomasello and colleagues on the ontogeny of pointing
> > as
> > communicative gesture. Tomasello
> >
> > does not cite the work of Vygotsky on this topic because in his opinion,
> > Vygotsky's oft-cited views about the social origins of pointing have
> > been
> > definitively proven erroneous.
> >
> > Given how often the example of the social origins of pointing are
> > repeated in chat-inspired writings, it seems worthwhile in light of
> > current
> > research to question his views and to ask what difference it would make
> > to
> > our ways of theorizing if we were to incorporate current work such
> >
> > as that of Tomasello and others.
> >
> > What follows is a brief descriptions of the issues. If people are
> > interested, we could go into this more deeply. If not, not.
> >
> >
> >
> > 1. (From out Group's discussion). For Vygotsky, pointing as a
> > communication
> > gesture arises out of a failed grasping motion. An adult, seeing an
> > infant
> > unsuccessfully grasp for an object, interprets the grasping as pointing
> > at
> > the object and treats it as a communicative act. The movement "becomes a
> > gesture for others" (56, Vygotsky /Mind in /Society), and the adult
> > gives
> > the movement meaning. Through this interaction, the original
> > unsuccessful
> > grasping-motion is transformed into pointing, which becomes more refined
> > and
> > simplified over time. Vygotsky interpreted the pointing gesture as an
> > example of internalization and transformation of the intermental to the
> > intramental.
> >
> >
> >
> > 2. (From Cole and Cole, The development of Chidlren (2001), p. 295)
> >
> > Between 9 months and a year, babies acquire *secondary
> > intersubjectivity,*the ability to share mental states with another
> > person and to understand
> > what they are intending to do (Chapter 5, p. 197). The close link
> > between
> > secondary intersubjectivity and communication is evident in the form of
> > behavior called *social referencing,* the process through which babies
> > check
> > their caregiver's reactions to an uncertain event or an unfamiliar
> > person as
> > a guide to their own behavior. Secondary intersubjectivity is a crucial
> > precursor to language acquisition because babies and their caregivers
> > are
> > sharing knowledge about the objects and events that are the focus of
> > their
> > joint attention.
> >
> > Secondary intersubjectivity is also apparent when babies begin to point
> > at
> > objects (Butterworth, 2003). Pointing is clearly a communicative act
> > intended to create a joint focus of attention, but it is a primitive
> > one.
> > When 12-month-olds see a remote-controlled car roll past them, first
> > they
> > point at it and then they look to see how their caregivers react to it
> > (social referencing). At 18 months of age, the function of pointing
> > becomes
> > communicative in a more complex way. Now children are more likely first
> > to
> > look at their caregivers to see if they are looking at the car and then
> > to
> > point to it. If babies this age are alone in the room when the electric
> > car
> > appears, they do not point until the caretaker walks back into the room,
> > clearly demonstrating that their pointing has a purpose and is meant to
> > communicate to another person (Butterworth, 2003).
> >
> >
> >
> > 3. (From Class discussion)
> >
> >
> >
> > Tomasello, on the other hand, argues that pointing arises as a
> > pre-linguistic communicative gesture. Instead of viewing pointing as
> > something that acquires a communicative meaning through interaction,
> > Tomasello argues that pointing has a communicative meaning from its
> > initial
> > formation because the infant has acquired the social-cognitive skills to
> >
> > share experiences with others, view others as mental agents,
> > and form goals with others. Pointing initiates joint attention of the
> > infant
> > and another towards an object because of a shared communicative
> > intentionality. The infant points because he wishes to inform, request
> > information from, or share an emotional expression with an adult about
> > an
> > object. For Tomasello, pointing is more than just a request for an
> > object, as Vygotsky seemed to imply.
> >
> > Not only does pointing serve various communicative functions, but
> > Tomasello
> > also argues that human pointing forms the basic foundation for language.
> > Both pointing and language both require the same social-cognitive skills
> > of
> > requiring infants to see others as "intentional agents with whom one can
> >
> > share experience" (Tomasello et al. "A New Look at Infant Pointing,"
> > 718).
> > Pointing serves the same purpose as an utterance: it introduces a topic
> > (old
> > or new) for communication.
> >
> >
> >
> > 4 (Some questions).
> >
> > What is significant about the following?
> >
> > a)Tomasello does not cite the work of Butterfield and Butterfield's
> > account
> > does not appear to lean heavily on the idea of secondary
> > intersubjectivity.
> >
> > b). There is still an obviously important role for the adult
> > in
> > ontogeny of pointing in Tomasello, but it attributes communicative
> > intent to
> > the child from the onset. So clearly the role of the social other is
> > different.
> >
> >
> >
> > Overall, however, it seems wise to me that people seeking to illustrate
> > Vygotsky's ideas about the social origins of higher psychological
> > functions
> > not use the example of pointing unless or until they
> >
> > can take account of the research briefly noted above.
> >
> >
> >
> > mike
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
>
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Received on Wed Nov 7 08:40 PST 2007