Re: [xmca] The social origins of pointing??

In his 2003 book "Constructing a Language", Tomasello describes three
kinds of early gestures.
"Ritualizations" (non-symbolic communicative gestures), "deictic
gestures" (maybe symbolic -- "it depends" -- communicative gestures) and
"symbolic gestures" (definitively symbolic).

It seems that what the following description by Vygotsky is more in line
with what Tomasello would call "ritualizations":

"pointing as a communication
gesture arises out of a failed grasping motion. An adult, seeing an infant
unsuccessfully grasp for an object, interprets the grasping as pointing at
the object and treats it as a communicative act. The movement "becomes a
gesture for others" (56, Vygotsky /Mind in /Society), and the adult gives
the movement meaning."

Tomasello, describes "ritualizations" as follows (Constructing a Language, p. 32):
"Ritualizations are gestures in which the infant simply employs an effective procedure for getting something done. For example, many infants from around the world learn to request being picked up by raising their arms over their heads while approaching an adult. This act is not symbolic, as becomes clear if we examine the learning processes involved. Most likely, infants do not learn this gesture by imitating other infants but rather in a more direct way (Locke, 1978: Action Gesture and Symbol: The emergence of language). For instance, the infant first attempts to crawl up the adult's body, or reaches for the adults arm, or grabs at the adult's waist; that is, she engages in an activity designed to bring about the desired result physically. The adult understands what the infant wants and so responds accordingly. On a future occasion, the adult sees the infant approach and prepare for the same activity - her arms begin to go up - and so responds appropriately to these very first signs (the infant's "intention movement" in ethological terminology;...). The infant, for her part, notices that as soon as she raises her arms the adult springs into action, and so she learns that just the initial part of the sequence, the "arms up" (often in a stylized version; Bates, 1979: The emergence of symbols: Cognition and communication in infancy), in order to obtain the desired result not physically but socially and communicatively through adult assistance."

The other type of gestures are _deictic_, according to Tomasello. Children use them "to direct the adults attention to outside entities. The prototypes are showing (as in holding up an object to the adult) and pointing. Infant pointing has not been studied in great detail, but several important facts about how infants learn and use pointing gestures are known.
The most important fact is that, unlike most ritualizations that only involve the signaler and an interactant dyadically, pointing is generally triadic; there is some third entity involved. But this does not automatically mean that the infant is pointing in order to induce the adult to share attention with her on that third entity. Indeed, for some infants pointing is just another ritualization. For example, many infants use arm and index finger extension to orient their own attention to things. If an adult were to respond to this by attending to the same thing and then share excitement with the infant by smiling and talking to her, then this kind of pointing might also be ritualized -- as a kind of request for increased social interaction with the adult (). In this scenario, it would be possible for an infant to point for others while still not understanding the function of other persons' pointing. [...]
The alternative is that the infant sees an adult pointing for her and comprehends that the adult is attempting to induce her to share attention to something, and then imitatively learns that when she has the same goal she can use the same means, with roles reversed, thus creating an intersubjective symbolic act for sharing attention.[...] ...a bi-directional symbol can only be created when the child first understands the intentions behind the adult's communicative act, and then identifies with those intentions herself as she produces the "same" means for the "same" end." (Tomasello, p.33).

Finally, the third kind of gestures Tomasello describes are symbolic. --
"These are communicative acts that are associated with a referent either
metonymically or iconically. Examples include such things as sniffing
for a flower, panting for a dog, holding arms out for an airplane,
raising arms for big things, and blowing for hot things....in most cases
the infants are learning these symbolic gestures via imitation. That is,
they are learning exactly as some infants learn to point symbolically
via imitative learning or use linguistic symbols: by first understanding
an adult's communicative intention in using the gesture and then
engaging in role reversal imitation to use the gesture herself when she
has the "same" communicative intention."(p.34)

The difference between Vygotsky and Tomasello, is that Tomasello locates
the activity of meaning construction as the achievement of the child who
act as if deciphering the behavior of others, and then starts to use the
deciphered gestures toward the adult. If the child initiates the
communication (as in "ritualization" gestures), Tomasello does not take
them for symbolic -- or meaning making gestures. The child is the one
who has to "intend" to communicate a meaning and the one who first has
to understand intentions behind the adults' communicative acts. On the
other hand, Vygotsky's notion is that an adult reinterprets the child's
(pointing) gestures and thus transforms these gestures into symbolic
signs tat gain their meaning within the communicational frame. It is not
necessary for the child to first understand the adult's intentions
behind the adult's signs and then imitate them with reversed roles. By
participating in a joint activity, the child's and the adult's gestures
are both transformed into communicational devices.

The biggest difficulty I see with Tomasello's model (regarding gestures)
is that there is a real disconnect between what he calls
"ritualizations" -- acts that are not meant to communicate, but to
achieve a practical result, and true symbolic gestures, as he describes
them ("sniffing for a flower"). He introduces deictic gestures
(pointing) as a kind a bridge between the ritualizations and symbolic
gestures -- but it is hard to imagine how some deictic gestures are
still ritualizations and then they become bi-directional gestures in
which the child first understand the adults' communicative intention,
and then uses the "same" gestures for the same communicative intention
that is her own. It is even harder to understand the connection between
these two types of gestures and what he describes as true symbolic
gestures.

In the summary (for this chapter of the book), Tomasello, reverts to a
biological explanation: "The symbolic dimensions of language derive from
a uniquely human biological adaptation for things cultural. This
adaptation may be characterized as the ability to understand that other
persons have intentional and mental states like one's own - which leads,
quite naturally (SIC!), to a desire to manipulate those intentional and
mental states via social conventions."( p.40).

It looks like, Tomasello is somewhere between an individual who
possesses an "intention-reading" skill as a unit of analysis, on one
hand, and constructing "joint attentional frames" as a unit of
analysis, on the other.

Ana

Mike Cole wrote:
> I can point like this, Martin. I will write Mike and ask if I can distribute
> the pdf file. Butterworth's earlier work is also very
> relevant. Tomasello et al. A new look at infant pointing, 2007, vol 78, pp.
> 705-722.
> mike
> I will send anyone who asks me outside of xmca for a copy a pdf, figuring
> that would be fair use.
>
>
> On Nov 4, 2007 12:35 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>
>
>> Mike,
>>
>> What ages is Tomasello talking about? Can you point us to his text(s)?
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>> On 11/4/07 1:47 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Dear XMCA-ites
>>>
>>> A few weeks ago in our seminar on mediational theories of mind, we
>>> read recent work by Tomasello and colleagues on the ontogeny of pointing
>>>
>> as
>>
>>> communicative gesture. Tomasello
>>>
>>> does not cite the work of Vygotsky on this topic because in his opinion,
>>> Vygotsky's oft-cited views about the social origins of pointing have
>>>
>> been
>>
>>> definitively proven erroneous.
>>>
>>> Given how often the example of the social origins of pointing are
>>> repeated in chat-inspired writings, it seems worthwhile in light of
>>>
>> current
>>
>>> research to question his views and to ask what difference it would make
>>>
>> to
>>
>>> our ways of theorizing if we were to incorporate current work such
>>>
>>> as that of Tomasello and others.
>>>
>>> What follows is a brief descriptions of the issues. If people are
>>> interested, we could go into this more deeply. If not, not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. (From out Group's discussion). For Vygotsky, pointing as a
>>>
>> communication
>>
>>> gesture arises out of a failed grasping motion. An adult, seeing an
>>>
>> infant
>>
>>> unsuccessfully grasp for an object, interprets the grasping as pointing
>>>
>> at
>>
>>> the object and treats it as a communicative act. The movement "becomes a
>>> gesture for others" (56, Vygotsky /Mind in /Society), and the adult
>>>
>> gives
>>
>>> the movement meaning. Through this interaction, the original
>>>
>> unsuccessful
>>
>>> grasping-motion is transformed into pointing, which becomes more refined
>>>
>> and
>>
>>> simplified over time. Vygotsky interpreted the pointing gesture as an
>>> example of internalization and transformation of the intermental to the
>>> intramental.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2. (From Cole and Cole, The development of Chidlren (2001), p. 295)
>>>
>>> Between 9 months and a year, babies acquire *secondary
>>> intersubjectivity,*the ability to share mental states with another
>>> person and to understand
>>> what they are intending to do (Chapter 5, p. 197). The close link
>>>
>> between
>>
>>> secondary intersubjectivity and communication is evident in the form of
>>> behavior called *social referencing,* the process through which babies
>>>
>> check
>>
>>> their caregiver's reactions to an uncertain event or an unfamiliar
>>>
>> person as
>>
>>> a guide to their own behavior. Secondary intersubjectivity is a crucial
>>> precursor to language acquisition because babies and their caregivers
>>>
>> are
>>
>>> sharing knowledge about the objects and events that are the focus of
>>>
>> their
>>
>>> joint attention.
>>>
>>> Secondary intersubjectivity is also apparent when babies begin to point
>>>
>> at
>>
>>> objects (Butterworth, 2003). Pointing is clearly a communicative act
>>> intended to create a joint focus of attention, but it is a primitive
>>>
>> one.
>>
>>> When 12-month-olds see a remote-controlled car roll past them, first
>>>
>> they
>>
>>> point at it and then they look to see how their caregivers react to it
>>> (social referencing). At 18 months of age, the function of pointing
>>>
>> becomes
>>
>>> communicative in a more complex way. Now children are more likely first
>>>
>> to
>>
>>> look at their caregivers to see if they are looking at the car and then
>>>
>> to
>>
>>> point to it. If babies this age are alone in the room when the electric
>>>
>> car
>>
>>> appears, they do not point until the caretaker walks back into the room,
>>> clearly demonstrating that their pointing has a purpose and is meant to
>>> communicate to another person (Butterworth, 2003).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 3. (From Class discussion)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tomasello, on the other hand, argues that pointing arises as a
>>> pre-linguistic communicative gesture. Instead of viewing pointing as
>>> something that acquires a communicative meaning through interaction,
>>> Tomasello argues that pointing has a communicative meaning from its
>>>
>> initial
>>
>>> formation because the infant has acquired the social-cognitive skills to
>>> share experiences with others, view others as mental agents,
>>> and form goals with others. Pointing initiates joint attention of the
>>>
>> infant
>>
>>> and another towards an object because of a shared communicative
>>> intentionality. The infant points because he wishes to inform, request
>>> information from, or share an emotional expression with an adult about
>>>
>> an
>>
>>> object. For Tomasello, pointing is more than just a request for an
>>> object, as Vygotsky seemed to imply.
>>>
>>> Not only does pointing serve various communicative functions, but
>>>
>> Tomasello
>>
>>> also argues that human pointing forms the basic foundation for language.
>>> Both pointing and language both require the same social-cognitive skills
>>>
>> of
>>
>>> requiring infants to see others as "intentional agents with whom one can
>>> share experience" (Tomasello et al. "A New Look at Infant Pointing,"
>>>
>> 718).
>>
>>> Pointing serves the same purpose as an utterance: it introduces a topic
>>>
>> (old
>>
>>> or new) for communication.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 4 (Some questions).
>>>
>>> What is significant about the following?
>>>
>>> a)Tomasello does not cite the work of Butterfield and Butterfield's
>>>
>> account
>>
>>> does not appear to lean heavily on the idea of secondary
>>>
>> intersubjectivity.
>>
>>> b). There is still an obviously important role for the adult
>>>
>> in
>>
>>> ontogeny of pointing in Tomasello, but it attributes communicative
>>>
>> intent to
>>
>>> the child from the onset. So clearly the role of the social other is
>>> different.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Overall, however, it seems wise to me that people seeking to illustrate
>>> Vygotsky's ideas about the social origins of higher psychological
>>>
>> functions
>>
>>> not use the example of pointing unless or until they
>>>
>>> can take account of the research briefly noted above.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> mike
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
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