RE: [xmca] Peirce as Hegel, but "in costume"

From: Tony Whitson <twhitson who-is-at UDel.Edu>
Date: Sat Nov 03 2007 - 19:07:59 PDT


There was no doubt a great deal of kinship and cross-fertilization. When I
read Dewey writing on Peirce, Dewey's Peirce is recognizable to me. I also
see an almost uncanny like-mindedness with Peirce (which I don't read
simply as influence) in Dewey's "Reflex Arc" paper -- where it might not
be expected, since this was physiological psychology rather that logic or
semiotic as most would expect to find it.

I've never seen the same commonality between Peirce and Dewey. Where
Peirce sees James' "pragmatism" as a different theory from his own, I've
never seen in James a recognition of his differences from Peirce, which
leave me thinking James might not have been so acutely conscious of those

On Sat, 3 Nov 2007, Michael Glassman wrote:

> Tony,
> Wouldn't you say that Instrumental Pragmatism included the development of a different way of thinking within the Pragmatic tradition?
> I'm interested, do you think there is not a Hegelian deposit within Dewey? Or at least one that was not really critical to Dewey's ideas? I actually think Rorty might make that argument.
> What would you see as the profound difference between Peirce and James? While Peirce was inconoclastic and seemed to enjoy annoying people (and continues to do so from the grave), and perhaps James was more of a Romantic and definitely less of a logician - I'd be interested to hear what you feel are the profound differences between them. I think who was developing ideas with who is critical. Peirce and James were in Boston (didn't James actually set up the Lowell lectures that are being quoted). Dewey obviously read them, and James and I think Peirce read Dewey, but he was in Chicago at this critical point (eventually with Mead). I think this has to be taken in to account.
> Michael
> ________________________________
> From: on behalf of Tony Whitson
> Sent: Sat 11/3/2007 9:23 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Peirce as Hegel, but "in costume"
> Andy,
> There are four paragraphs in the Collected Papers that include "Hegel"
> "logic" and "false." One of those is your quote with the "Nantucket"
> phrase. None resembles what you're remembering, although of course it
> might be in CSP's writing not included in the Collected Papers.
> It would not actually surprise me if he did write that, and it wouldn't
> necessarily (without context) force a reconsideration of how I understand
> CSP's attitude toward Hegel. In fact, it's probably possible to read the
> quotes that we've been looking at in a way that foregrounds the criticism
> and backgrounds the appreciation, to yield a reading like your remembered
> quote.
> To compare with Marx: I expect it's easy to find paragraphs in which Marx
> has nothing good to say about Hegel, and runs through what look like a
> series of blistering criticisms -- not short of saying things like
> "Hegel's wrong at every point." Yet, I don't think we would say that "Marx
> hated Hegel."
> I have no doubt that Peirce and James each had differences with Dewey. But
> the differences between Peirce and James seem at least as profound. I'm
> just resisting a tendency to draw a line with Peirce and James on one side
> vs. Dewey and Hegel on the other side, and the tendency to assimilate CSP
> to what some folks might find more comfortable in James.
> On Sun, 4 Nov 2007, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> Yes, I accept, Tony, that I was too hasty in my characterisation of Peirce's
>> attitude to Hegel. Haste is one of my vices, I'm afraid. :( There was a quote
>> which I can't find and may turn out to have been someone else where (I
>> thought) Peirce was saying of the Logic that every one of Hegel's deductions
>> was false. It may have been someone else.
>> Re calling Peirce "Pragmatist". With some difficulty, I have come to the way
>> of using the word "pragmatism" to include all theories of activity, all those
>> theories that usng some kind of activity theory, with or with mediation by
>> artefacts, so as to do away with reference to all other-worldly entities
>> (espcially ideas, universals or concepts) supposed to exist outside the
>> social activity of human beings. So Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Vygotsky,
>> Leontyev all qualify, and I sort of include myself now. Habermas could
>> qualify on this basis, but it does seem a strange label in his case, I think.
>> Of course, one could take the view that every one of the writers just
>> mentioned had their own, unique incomparable "ism" (and I am sure they do,
>> each have several in fact), but I think one still needs words to grasp these
>> very broad methodological, cultural-historical associations between writers.
>> Andy
>> At 08:12 PM 3/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>> Interesting quotes. I was particularly intrigued by the phrase "that
>>> Nantucket of thought." I think it's most likely a reference to "One of
>>> Robert Lowell's most famous early poems, "The Quaker Graveyard in
>>> Nantucket," with rich allusions to whaling and death at sea ..." See
>>> In at least some of these quotes posted by Andy and me, Peirce is
>>> crediting Hegel as superior to all the other modern philosophers, while
>>> critiquing his failure to follow through on his more promising insights,
>>> and faulting Hegel's followers for not having critiqued and advanced upon
>>> those insights as would have served Hegel better.
>>> That's not an attitude that I'd characterize as one of "hating" Hegel.
>>> Since we have the same language in front of us, what difference there is
>>> here must be over usage of "hating," rather than over CSP's esteem for
>>> Hegel.
>>> As for the evolution of CSP's thought over his career, both Parmentier and
>>> Bergman are writing about changes in the course of that evolution; but I
>>> don't see support in those texts for either Yrjo's or Michael's
>>> characterizations of how Peirce's thinking changed (which I also don't see
>>> as mutually equivalent, either -- so I don't see Michael's interpretation,
>>> if valid, as necessarily supporting Yrjo's in any case).
>>> The identification of Peirce and James on "Pragmatism" is also curious,
>>> since Peirce famously renamed his own philosophy as "pragmaticism"
>>> specifically to deny its identification with James' "pragmatism," which
>>> had become what people thought of by the word first coined by Peirce.
>>> Peirce added that the new word "pragmaticism" was so ugly that it stood in
>>> less danger of being kidnapped.
>>> On Sun, 4 Nov 2007, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>> In the light of day, I accept that it was far too bland to claim Peirce
>>>> "hated" Hegel. Clearly his view was more nuanced.
>>>> Some more of Peirce on Hegel:
>>>> -----------------------
>>>> The Hegelian system recognises every natural tendency of thought as
>>>> logical, although it be certain to be abolished by counter-tendencies.
>>>> Hegel thinks there is a regular system in the succession of these
>>>> tendencies, in consequence of which, after drifting one way and the
>>>> other for a long time, opinion will at last go right. And it is true
>>>> that metaphysicians do get the right ideas at last; Hegels system of
>>>> Nature represents tolerably the science of his day; and one may be sure
>>>> that whatever scientific investigation shall have put out of doubt will
>>>> presently receive a priori demonstration on the part of the
>>>> metaphysicians. [from 'Fixation of Faith'CP 5.358-87]
>>>> -----------------------
>>>> Had Kant merely said, I shall adopt for the present the belief that the
>>>> three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles because nobody
>>>> but brother Lambert and some Italian has ever called it in question, his
>>>> attitude would be well enough. But on the contrary, he and those who
>>>> today represent his school distinctly maintain the proposition is
>>>> proved, and the Lambertists refuted, by what comes merely to general
>>>> disinclination to think with them.
>>>> As for Hegel, who led Germany for a generation, he recognises clearly
>>>> what he is about. He simply launches his boat into the current of
>>>> thought and allows himself to be carried wherever the current leads. He
>>>> himself calls his method dialectics, meaning that frank discussion of
>>>> the difficulties to which any opinion spontaneously gives rise will
>>>> lead to modification after modification until a tenable position is
>>>> attained. This is a direct profession of faith in the method of
>>>> inclinations. [Note to 'Fixation of Faith', 1893]
>>>> -----------------------
>>>> Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined
>>>> line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to
>>>> steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel
>>>> first made the world understand this; and he seems to make logic not
>>>> merely the subjective goal and monitor of thought, which was all it had
>>>> been ambitioning before, but to be the very mainspring of thinking, and
>>>> not merely individual thinking but of discussion, of the history of the
>>>> development of thought, of all history, of all development. This
>>>> involves a positive, clearly demonstrable error. Let the logic in
>>>> question be of whatever kind it may, a logic of necessary inference or a
>>>> logic of probable inference (the theory might perhaps be shaped to fit
>>>> either), in any case it supposed that logic is sufficient of itself to
>>>> determine what conclusion follows from given premises; for unless it
>>>> will do so much, it will not suffice to explain why an individual train
>>>> of reasoning should take just the course it does take, to say nothing of
>>>> other kinds of development. It thus supposes that from given premises,
>>>> only one conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no scope
>>>> at all for free choice. That from given premises only one conclusion can
>>>> logically be drawn, is one of the false notions which have come from the
>>>> logicians' confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the
>>>> logic of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold
>>>> good. [from CP 6.287-90, 1893]
>>>> Andy
>>>> At 05:25 PM 3/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>> Tony,
>>>>> Are you saying that you are arguing that Peirce's thinking didn't go
>>>>> through an evolution and change as he became invested in Pragmatism,
>>>>> or are you simply arguing that Peirce didn't hate Hegel. As far as
>>>>> the first one goes we can have a discussion about that based on
>>>>> Bergman's article some time I suppose. If it is the latter, I have to
>>>>> tell you that I don't read the quotes you offered as being
>>>>> particularly sympathetic to Hegel. Of course he didn't think Hegel was
>>>>> a fool or a bad philosopher. But he makes the same points I have read
>>>>> elsewhere which is the critique of an idealist based movement,
>>>>> suggesting any movement towards an end point is idealist.
>>>>> The issue was Hegel's organicism, which I think you can really read
>>>>> Peirce as critiqueing in the quotes you offered. I believe there are
>>>>> letters between James and Dewey where James chastises Dewey for
>>>>> holding on to this organicism. I have read in more than one place
>>>>> that Peirce was complaining to James about Dewey. I think the quotes
>>>>> offered sort of suggest this was Peirce's view of Hegel.
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>> From: on behalf of Tony Whitson
>>>>> Sent: Sat 11/3/2007 10:23 AM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: [xmca] Peirce as Hegel, but "in costume"
>>>>> Thanks, Michael G., for calling attention to Bergman's article in
>>>>> Semiotica 144-1/4 (2003) 1-17.
>>>>> After reviewing both Bergman and Parmentier, I'm afraid I can't find
>>>>> the
>>>>> basis for either Engstrom's comments or your observations (Nov 1,
>>>>> below).
>>>>> but I see you didn't have Bergman's paper at hand then.
>>>>> I was surprised by the comment that Peirce & James "hated Hegel"
>>>>> (below).
>>>>> I don't know about James, but I don't remember Peirce ever expressing
>>>>> such
>>>>> an attitude toward any philosopher worth reading at all.
>>>>> It's a bit late for Halloween (when kids and, increasingly, adults,
>>>>> dress
>>>>> up in costumes in the US), but I think these paragraphs better
>>>>> represent
>>>>> Peirce's view of Hegel:
>>>>> Peirce: CP 1.40-42 (40 and 41-2 are from separate unidentified
>>>>> fragments,
>>>>> c. 1892.)
>>>>> 5. HEGELISM
>>>>> 40. The critical logicians have been much affiliated to the
>>>>> theological
>>>>> seminaries. About the thinking that goes on in laboratories they have
>>>>> known nothing. Now the seminarists and religionists generally have at
>>>>> all
>>>>> times and places set their faces against the idea of continuous
>>>>> growth.
>>>>> That disposition of intellect is the most catholic element of
>>>>> religion.
>>>>> Religious truth having been once defined is never to be altered in the
>>>>> most minute particular; and theology being held as queen of the
>>>>> sciences,
>>>>> the religionists have bitterly fought by fire and tortures all great
>>>>> advances in the true sciences; and if there be no true continuous
>>>>> growth
>>>>> in men's ideas where else in the world should it be looked for?
>>>>> Thence, we
>>>>> find this folk setting up hard lines of demarcation, or great gulfs,
>>>>> contrary to all observation, between good men and bad, between the
>>>>> wise
>>>>> and foolish, between the spirit and the flesh, between all the
>>>>> different
>>>>> kinds of objects, between one quantity and the next. So shut up are
>>>>> they
>>>>> in this conception of the world that when the seminarist Hegel
>>>>> discovered
>>>>> that the universe is everywhere permeated with continuous growth (for
>>>>> that, and nothing else, is the "Secret of Hegel") it was supposed to
>>>>> be an
>>>>> entirely new idea, a century and a half after the differential
>>>>> calculus
>>>>> had been in working order.
>>>>> 41. Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his
>>>>> chief
>>>>> topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the
>>>>> mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following
>>>>> out
>>>>> for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent
>>>>> in
>>>>> itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode
>>>>> of
>>>>> affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race
>>>>> had
>>>>> been chiefly laid up. It was a misfortune for Hegelism, a misfortune
>>>>> for
>>>>> "philosophy," and a misfortune (in lesser degree) for science.
>>>>> 42. My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume.
>>>>> On Thu, 1 Nov 2007, Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>> I'm going to try and find the reference, but there is this great
>>>>> article that I think eloquently argues that Peirce made a turn from
>>>>> concentrating on language per se, where he was more interested in
>>>>> semiotics, to being more interested in relations. I can't remember if
>>>>> he said this is when Peirce started referring to semiosis. Once he
>>>>> started talking about relations the issue of mediation became far less
>>>>> important in his work - again not in terms of existing, but in terms
>>>>> of study.
>>>>>> So Engestrom is right, but depending on which Peirce you are reading
>>>>> at the moment. Of course Peirce is terribly opaque, and any
>>>>> discussion I have ever had about him eventually winds up going down
>>>>> the rabbit hole. But I think you can make the argument that as James
>>>>> and Peirce were becoming invested in the Peircian named Pragmatism his
>>>>> thinking did change - and actually become more challenging - if that
>>>>> was possible.
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>> Sent: Thu 11/1/2007 6:30 PM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>> Thank you Michael, and Eric and Mira and others too. My questions
>>>>> have all
>>>>>> been wonderfully answered (unless, Michael, you tell me that you are
>>>>> really
>>>>>> Mikhail Glashchmanovich writing under an assumed name, in which case
>>>>> I'll
>>>>>> have to go back to the drawing board).
>>>>>> Another question for you all. Recently I criticised Sasha because I
>>>>> thought
>>>>>> he had misunderstood Peirce. Reading Engstrom's book, I find what I
>>>>> take to
>>>>>> be the same misunderstanding.
>>>>>> He says: "For the sake of clarity, Peirce's excessive and often
>>>>> opaque work
>>>>>> is here discussed only through the concise but balanced
>>>>> interpretation of
>>>>>> Parmentier" - something we can all sympathise with I am sure, but
>>>>> then goes
>>>>>> on to claim "The mediating sign is here [with Peirce], in the
>>>>> context of
>>>>>> human action, treated as something purely mental and intentional. It
>>>>> thus
>>>>>> loses its potentially anti-Cartesian, cultural quality and reverts
>>>>> to
>>>>>> individualism and rationalism."
>>>>>> This was never my view of Peirce. Do you Americans have a view on
>>>>> this?
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>> At 02:44 PM 1/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>>>> Mira,
>>>>>>> I know Dewey studied Hegel with George Morris, but James and Peirce
>>>>>>> hated Hegel - and criticized Dewey for holding on to him. I don't
>>>>> think
>>>>>>> it had much to do with Feuerbach's critique though. I think it was
>>>>> more
>>>>>>> a reaction against idealism, which Eric talks about. Pragmatic
>>>>>>> philosophy is not as abstract as other philosophical traditions,
>>>>> and it
>>>>>>> emerges out of a number of issues that would in many ways be alien
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> continental philosophy (for instance I would argue that the
>>>>> exploration
>>>>>>> of the frontier, the settling of the mid-western and western
>>>>> states, and
>>>>>>> the need for communal problem solving that accompanied it had an
>>>>>>> important impact (even though Pragmatism started in Boston, it
>>>>> really
>>>>>>> reached fruition in Chicago just as it was emerging as the type of
>>>>>>> metropolis that grows from a frontier town). I also think Lincoln
>>>>> had a
>>>>>>> tremendous influence on the development of at least instrumental
>>>>>>> Pragmatism. All this and more combined with the emergence of
>>>>> Darwin's
>>>>>>> ideas of adaptation probably had far more to do with the
>>>>> development of
>>>>>>> Pragmatic thought than continental philosophy in general. It was a
>>>>>>> different idea and by trying to bring the two together I'm not sure
>>>>> if
>>>>>>> we are trying to fit a square peg in to a round hole.
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From:
>>>>> []
>>>>>>> On Behalf Of Branimira Slavova
>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2007 9:03 AM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>> I was trying to understand the differences among these philosophies
>>>>> some
>>>>>>> time ago. So I'll pitch in my 2 cents. I was led to believe that
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> main difference between the American pragmatist philosophers and
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> Russians is based on their different stances on the Feuerbach's
>>>>> critique
>>>>>>> of Hegel. My sense was that the pragmatists had more of a
>>>>> reductionist
>>>>>>> view, while the Russians were anti-reductionist which allowed them
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> consider more sophisticated basic units of analysis. Is that a fair
>>>>>>> thing to say?
>>>>>>> m
>>>>>>> Dr Mira Slavova
>>>>>>> Research Fellow in Information Management
>>>>>>> AIM TECH
>>>>>>> Maurice Keyworth Building
>>>>>>> The University of Leeds
>>>>>>> Leeds LS2 9JT
>>>>>>> Tel: 0113 343 7818
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: on behalf of Michael Glassman
>>>>>>> Sent: Thu 11/1/2007 13:24
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>>> I think the response is a kind of complicated and it relates back I
>>>>>>> think to an earlier comment you made about unity or whether you
>>>>> consider
>>>>>>> communication as products of labor. There was a difference between
>>>>>>> Peirce/James and Dewey/Mead when it comes to Pragmatism - which
>>>>> involves
>>>>>>> whether activity builds upon itself, making life better and
>>>>> adaptation
>>>>>>> easier, or whether all activity is situation specific and doesn't
>>>>> really
>>>>>>> have a larger social meaning beyond solving a problem. James (and
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> assume Peirce) believed that Dewey (and by extension Mead) saw
>>>>> social
>>>>>>> progress in activity because of a Hegelian deposit that remained in
>>>>>>> Dewey's thinking even after he left Johns Hopkins. It has been a
>>>>>>> continuous argument about whether Dewey has a Hegelian deposit for
>>>>> about
>>>>>>> a century now. But James was much more interested in the
>>>>> individual
>>>>>>> while Dewey/Mead because of their interest in progress were
>>>>> necessarily
>>>>>>> more socially or societally oriented - Is that what you mean by the
>>>>>>> difference between narrow and broad Pragmatism? Pepper separated
>>>>> them
>>>>>>> by calling one contextualism and one organicism (though the
>>>>>>> differentiation seem to be to be a short at Dewey).
>>>>>>> But the idea that there are materials that can somehow be thought
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> separate from practical activity and problem solving - now I think
>>>>> they
>>>>>>> all pretty much would have argued against that by the mid 1890s.
>>>>> The
>>>>>>> big issue I think is their thinking was a fear of dualism. Once
>>>>> you
>>>>>>> assume that there are materials that are separate from actions in
>>>>> any
>>>>>>> way, including any types of universals, then you are somehow
>>>>> separating
>>>>>>> the human condition from nature itself. What you run in to is
>>>>> control
>>>>>>> of these things, or attempts to control these things, outside of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> problem based interaction/transaction itself. For instance if you
>>>>> posit
>>>>>>> that discourse is somehow a product, are you making the assumption
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> claim that you can somehow control discourse and they way it is
>>>>>>> manipulated outside of the process itself? I think this is the
>>>>> reason
>>>>>>> that, at least to my reading, even though Dewey believed there was
>>>>>>> mediation he questioned the worth of studying and understanding it,
>>>>>>> because that assumed that you could transfer this meaning to the
>>>>> next
>>>>>>> situation - because you can't separate language or anything else
>>>>> from
>>>>>>> the actual activity.
>>>>>>> I'm not sure I understand your point about one group of theorists
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> Russia and one group of theorists in the United States. What is
>>>>> true is
>>>>>>> that there were a number of forces in the United States that were
>>>>>>> pushing thinking about human condition towards more practical
>>>>> aspects of
>>>>>>> human problem solving.
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>> _____
>>>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>> Sent: Thu 11/1/2007 8:49 AM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>>> Mmm, that's an answer, Micharl.
>>>>>>> Engstrom seems to be saying, amongst other things, that Mead was
>>>>> much
>>>>>>> better than his interpreters of the 1980s/90s. The question arose
>>>>> for me
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> connection with a paper I am writing about Axel Honneth, including
>>>>> his
>>>>>>> appropriation of Mead in the 90s. I had the same view, i.e., that
>>>>> what
>>>>>>> Mead
>>>>>>> said was OK, but Honneth just missed it, and transformed his theory
>>>>> into
>>>>>>> typical postmodern "intersubjectivity" (social rather than societal
>>>>> some
>>>>>>> would say). When I was challenged and asked to say why I thought
>>>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>>>> and Leontiev should be used as a foundation in social psychology,
>>>>>>> instead
>>>>>>> of Mead, it was confusing to answer. I actually think that the main
>>>>>>> differences between Vygotsky/Leontyev/Luria and Mead/Peirce/Dewey
>>>>> is
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> the first group were Russians living in the USSR and the second lot
>>>>> were
>>>>>>> Americans living in the USA. - not so much in the actually
>>>>> theoretical
>>>>>>> differences between these early figures.
>>>>>>> One of the ideas I use in my paper is the contrast between
>>>>> pragmatism in
>>>>>>> the "narrow" sense an pragmatism in the "broad" sense. People said,
>>>>> you
>>>>>>> mean Mead was pragmatic in the narrow sense and Vygotsky in the
>>>>> broad.
>>>>>>> No!
>>>>>>> Mead is pragmatic in the broad sense, but the "spirit" of American
>>>>>>> pragmatism is narrow, and the ideas of great thinkers cannot
>>>>> survive the
>>>>>>> spirit of their times and the spirit of their people. (By narrow
>>>>>>> pragmatism
>>>>>>> I mean pragmatism that reduces everything to interactions between
>>>>>>> individuals deemed to be the bearers of needs, knowledge etc., and
>>>>>>> denies
>>>>>>> the real existence of universals. By pragmatism in the broad sense,
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> mean
>>>>>>> pragmatism which understands that interactions between individuals
>>>>>>> happen
>>>>>>> by means of universals, which are material artefacts, culture -
>>>>> public
>>>>>>> property, so to speak, and this material culture constitutes the
>>>>>>> objectivity of universals. The ordinary American pragmatist of the
>>>>> kind
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>> think you are talking about Michael, if I'm not mistaken, doesn't
>>>>>>> believe
>>>>>>> in theories and ideas, it all comes down just to whether its useful
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> not.
>>>>>>> But Mead and Dewey and Perice were better than that.
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> (PS Engstrom answer my question about communicative and
>>>>> instrumental
>>>>>>> action
>>>>>>> a few paragraphs later. Sorry for the stupid question in that other
>>>>>>> thread
>>>>>>> I started, and apologies for forgetting to set "Send text only")
>>>>>>> At 08:02 AM 1/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>>>>> It's difficult to describe, but even though the theorists don't
>>>>> get so
>>>>>>>> much play, much of the theory of Mead and the others is integrated
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> everyday activity in United States society (why the
>>>>>>>> disconnect? Hmmmm.) Every time somebody does Case Management
>>>>> they are
>>>>>>>> testing this theory. Many drug programs and housing programs are
>>>>>>> testing
>>>>>>>> this theory. Most street level social work is working within and
>>>>>>> testing
>>>>>>>> this theory. Many teachers, inside the classroom, are
>>>>> continuously
>>>>>>>> testing this theory (Standardized Curriculums can be seen as a
>>>>> frontal
>>>>>>>> political attack on these ideas). The results need to be
>>>>> empirical but
>>>>>>>> they are not positivist, and they are not generalizable - which in
>>>>>>> itself
>>>>>>>> is part of Pragmatic thought. It is not so much these ideas
>>>>> aren't
>>>>>>>> constantly used and tested, but perhaps more the way we view
>>>>> testing
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> evidence.
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>> Sent: Wed 10/31/2007 9:14 AM
>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>>>> Please understand Michael that my knowledge of Mead is very thin;
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>> know what have read in terms of a couple of hundred pages of his
>>>>>>> writings,
>>>>>>>> a couple of biographical articles and of course I am familiar with
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Progressive Movement, Dewey, Peirce and everyone, of which he was
>>>>> a
>>>>>>> part.
>>>>>>>> But I get the impression that he worked out these ideas, as you
>>>>> say, in
>>>>>>>> dialogue especially with Dewey and in the midst of that milieu,
>>>>> but I
>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>> imagine that there was a lot of laboratory work involved,
>>>>> controlled
>>>>>>>> experiments and observation, and so on, by Mead, during his own
>>>>>>> lifetime.
>>>>>>>> The Vygotsky school on the other and incorporates today many
>>>>> decades of
>>>>>>>> empirical and practical experimental work and observation by
>>>>> scores of
>>>>>>>> psychologists. Yes? How many research groups or psychological
>>>>>>> practitioners
>>>>>>>> use Symbolic Interactionism specifically today, as their
>>>>> comprehensive
>>>>>>>> theoretical paradigm?
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>> At 08:58 AM 31/10/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>>>>> Mead's work was not just one man - he was surrounded by an entire
>>>>>>> group at
>>>>>>>>> the University of Chicago that had come together under the
>>>>> umbrella
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> this type of Pragmatic thought. John Dewey recruited him to the
>>>>>>>>> University of Chicago from the Univfersity of Michigan, and they
>>>>> were
>>>>>>> best
>>>>>>>>> friends - both intellectually and socially. There was also a
>>>>> large,
>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>>> application oriented group centered around Jane Addams and Hull
>>>>>>> House, and
>>>>>>>>> the nascent labor movement. When Dewey went to Columbia, there
>>>>> was a
>>>>>>>>> great deal of cross-pollination between the group he started at
>>>>>>> Columbia
>>>>>>>>> and Mead who stayed at the University of Chicago and the remains
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> group. Mead's ideas are not the ideas of one man but a brilliant
>>>>>>>>> philosophical movement that helped to create what we now call
>>>>>>> psychology,
>>>>>>>>> and sociology, and qualitative methodology, and even to a certain
>>>>>>> extent
>>>>>>>>> much of modern anthropology (Boas was also a marginal member of
>>>>> this
>>>>>>> whole
>>>>>>>>> group).
>>>>>>>>> I'm interested, why would you think the ideas are so much more
>>>>>>> speculative
>>>>>>>>> than say CHAT?
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Wed 10/31/2007 8:21 AM
>>>>>>>>> To:
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>>>>> I'm currently reading a collection of George Herbert Mead, which
>>>>>>> confirms
>>>>>>>>> my view that his ideas on social psychology were very close to
>>>>> our
>>>>>>> own,
>>>>>>>>> though inevitably, as the work of just one man, relatively
>>>>>>> speculative.
>>>>>>>>> Can anyone recommend to me a critique of Mead by a CHAT person,
>>>>>>> perhaps a
>>>>>>>>> message in the XCMA archive or a paper available in HTML or PDF?
>>>>> I
>>>>>>> know
>>>>>>>>> that you guys cover him in your courses at UCSD.
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380
>>>>>>> 9435,
>>>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380
>>>>> 9435,
>>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380
>>>>> 9435,
>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> Tony Whitson
>>>>> UD School of Education
>>>>> NEWARK DE 19716
>>>>> _______________________________
>>>>> "those who fail to reread
>>>>> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>>>>> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> Tony Whitson
>>> UD School of Education
>>> NEWARK DE 19716
>>> _______________________________
>>> "those who fail to reread
>>> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>>> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, mobile
>> 0409 358 651
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
> Tony Whitson
> UD School of Education
> NEWARK DE 19716
> _______________________________
> "those who fail to reread
> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)

Tony Whitson
UD School of Education

"those who fail to reread
  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                   -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)

xmca mailing list
Received on Sat Nov 3 19:18 PDT 2007

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