Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics

At 11:01 AM 9/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>Hi Andy, I think these "experts" are confounding two types of acts.
>Those that are already habits (like motor function) and those that are
>arise out of having to deal with a change in how we relate to the
>world, where our habits fail us because of some sort of contextual or
>relational change. (Life!)
>
>Is a person able to lift their arm because they want to? No. They can
>only "do" it because the act of lifting their arm has been habituated
>from an early age. We know this because we DON"T have to think about
>lifting our arm - it just "happens" when we "need" it to. We are all
>"expert" arm lifters. Now, this expertise provides us with a standard
>of ability that may be used agentively. The first time we ride the
>pack to take a high mark (any other readers, please excuse the
>Australiana) is an agentive use our arms. Once we've done this
>repeatedly, creating a new practice/habit, built on the old ability,
>then this act then, I would argue is no longer agentive. My new
>"expert" skill in football does, though, provide me with the potential
>for other feats of agency, like the one handed spekie!

Go Mark Franklin!! But really Geoff, what does this mean - "agentive"? Is
this a new Australianism? Are you saying that Tony Lockett had agency in
kicking his first few goals, but by the time he was getting 100 every
season this was just a habit, or something, and he cannot be seen as the
agent for these goals? I really don't understand this.

Andy

>As for the leader on a historical mission, I think they undersell
>their own role. Yes there must be historical constituted context that
>allows for the change, and possibly that revolution could have been
>led by another person, but is still requires the agentive leaps into
>the unknown. Mistakes are made, there are victories and losses because
>our habituated practices, by definition are not up to the job. We
>after all, CREATE our own history. If life is dialectical, and I
>believe it is, then any change has to be created, and by definition
>this means going beyond current practice. A leader that relies on
>existing practice is a dogmatist and I suspect unlikely to succeed. I
>think effective leadership, as do all creative enterprises, rely of
>being on the cusp of what is, pushing for the what can be. Habitus
>defines the what is, I'm wanting to invoke agency as the what can be.
>
>I think "choice" is overrated. I can chose to fly, but my batman
>suit's just not up to the task. But if I "choose" to buy a plane
>ticket.....
>
>Passion does not equal agency but certainly helps fuel it. But we're
>always stuck with the practices and habits of our own and of others.
>This sets the boundaries for agency, establishes the possible.
>
>Regrding Bourdieu's "objectivism", I'm not convinced it's a problem,
>once you work out a way for it not to be deterministic. While tastes
>are quite stable, (habituated) they nevertheless can (but don't
>necessarily) change. I'm arguing that this potential for change is
>bounded, but change can arise when the social conditions are such that
>we "could". For me to develop a taste for Vietnamese "guts" soup, as
>I have, I needed to have a pre-exiting attitude to offal, a love of
>chilli, and an eye for a bargain. When I "discovered" Pho this fitted
>into and extended my tastes. Some people just don't "get" Pho, I'd
>argue that this is because their all ready existing tastes don't
>provide the necessary conditions for them to make the leap. At the
>moment of the "could" we can either adapt and change or hold on
>faithfully to our habits and rely on them.
>
>
>
>
>On 08/09/07, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > Fair enough Geoff.
> >
> > But the problem is like this for me. I have known "experts" who claim that
> > their ability to raise their arm when they want to and their ability to
> > know when it is them that is raising their arm and not someone else, is
> > evidence of their agency - analytical, positivist types. I have also known
> > "experts" who claim that great leaders who have led revolutions which
> > overthrew entire states were after all only carrying out an historical task
> > that someone else would have done if they hadn't, that history worked
> > "through" them, so to speak. Indeed, if I look back across my own life,
> > while I know that I made choices for better or worse in my own life and
> > bore the consequences, the ideas I had as a teenager, as a young adult, the
> > political choices I made in my late-20s, etc., etc., although I
> > passionately believed in them at the time, even thought I was original, I
> > now know were little more than stereotypical versions of ideas that were
> > quite typical of the social stratum (habitus) of which I was a part. So, is
> > there a line, this side of which we have agency in and the other side of
> > which we don't? And where the hell would that line be if our passionate
> > beliefs are on the far side of it? I like Bourdieu as well, and I too think
> > his idea of habitus is a useful concept for dealing with this problem, but
> > most people regard him as an extreme objectivist, i.e., that even our
> > highly personal tastes and preferences are actually "programmed" by our
> > social environment.
> >
> > What do you think?
> > Andy
> >
> > At 03:45 PM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> > >Thanks for the welcome Andy.
> > >
> > >Yes, I'd agree with the idea that we adapt to and add to culture. I've
> > >been wrestling with the idea of agency to identify the "add to" part of
> > >this process. I think I want to define agency as a type of doing where
> > >we have to respond beyond what is already habitual (learned). This would
> > >range from an average driver (as far as skill is concerned) having to
> > >respond immediately to avoid an impending car accident, through to
> > >working creatively. I'm not sure if this is a valid definition of
> > >agency, but it's one that I've come to after thinking about innovation.
> > >I think Vygotsky's ZPD could be used to describe how humans live, not
> > >just "learn" vis a vie pedagogy. And that Vygotsky's idea that
> > >development is scaffolded, the new being built upon the old, seems to
> > >fit nicely with Bourdieu's idea of habitus, the habitus being the "old".
> > > (I don't have a sense of what Bourdieu's position would be on how
> > >habitus is added to.)
> > >
> > >I haven't give animal bahaviour a lot of thought regarding agency, but
> > >off the top of my head I don't think that animals are capable of agency,
> > >or if they are it is limited because they lack a developed culture to
> > >transmit what is learned and can only learn in limited contexts or
> > >periods, like chicks imprinting who (or what) their mums are. Non human
> > >animals don't seem to be able to adapt inter-generationally - one
> > >generation bootstrapping itself. Humans on the other hand........ :-)
> > >
> > >Cheers, Geoff
> > >
> > >PS, do chicks learn a fear of hawk-like silhouettes or is it hard wired?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> 08/09/07 12:40 PM >>>
> > >Welcome Geoff. It's good to hear new voices.
> > >
> > >Many animals are intelligent though, and respond to their environment by
> > >
> > >learning. Whatever "agentive" means, I don't think that a chick learning
> > >to
> > >recognise and a avoid a predator by learning the shape of their
> > >silhouette
> > >is thereby "agentive". Surely it's what you mention in passing, that our
> > >
> > >environment is cultural, that is, we adapt to products of previous
> > >generations and create more cultural artefacts in the process?
> > >
> > >BTW, what *do* you mean by "agentive"? :-)
> > >
> > >Andy
> > >At 11:50 AM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> > > >Hi I'm new here and feeling my way through these ideas.....
> > > >
> > > >On natural selection, while a driver might be chaos and random
> > > >mutation, the important thing is not the mutation but the adaptation.
> > > >What matters is the relationship between the organism and its context.
> > > >Human learning is not best described in these terms but as a fast
> > > >track (non genetic) form of adaptation. The difference between our
> > > >genetic and cultural adaptations is that our cultural adaptations are
> > > >not random but responsive (agentive) to the physical and cultural
> > > >niches that we are adapted to via our abilities to, amongst others,
> > > >learn and, importantly to forget. Our practices, those things that
> > > >we've already learned, underpin our ability to learn and or respond to
> > > >changes in our relationships to our physical/cultural world(s).
> > > >
> > > >Cheers, Geoff
> > > >
> > > >On 08/09/07, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > Steve and Andy:
> > > > >
> > > > > Here's a puzzle. On p. 120 of "Mind in Society", the Afterword by
> > > > Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman begins with the following
> > >epigraph
> > > > (pardon the long quote, but it's necessary to explain the puzzle):
> > > > >
> > > > > "The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as a
> > >complex
> > > > of fully fashioned objects but as a complex of processes in which
> > > > apparently stable objects, no less thatn the images of them inside our
> > >
> > > > heads (our concepts) are undergoing incessant changes. (...) In the
> > >eyes
> > > > of dialectical philosophy, nothing is established for all time,
> > >nothing
> > > > is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees the
> > >stamp
> > > > of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it sav the unceasing process
> > >of
> > > > formation and destruction, the unending ascent form lower to higher--a
> > >
> > > > process of which that philosophy itself is only a simple reflection
> > > > within the thinking brain."
> > > > >
> > > > > You can see that this quote, if accurate, answers quite well
> > >Andy's
> > > > question about in what sense nature can be said to be dialectical. It
> > >is
> > > > the same sense in which dialectical philosophy can be said to be
> > > > dialectical, and for the one and same reason: dialectics is simply a
> > > > description of how change takes place.
> > > > >
> > > > > But IS the quote accurate? Here's the SAME passage from my copy of
> > >
> > > > Marx and Engels' selected works (Moscow: Progress, 1970, Vol. 3, pp.
> > >362-363):
> > > > >
> > > > > "The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended
> > >as
> > > > a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in wich
> > >the
> > > > things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads,
> > >the
> > > > concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and
> > > > passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality and of
> > >all
> > > > temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in
> > >the
> > > > end--this great fundametnal thought has, especially since the time of
> > > > Hegel, so throughly permeated ordinary conscousness that in this
> > > > generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge
> > >this
> > > > fundamental though in words and to apply it in reality in detail to
> > >each
> > > > domain of investigation are two different things. If, however,
> > > > investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for
> > >final
> > > > soclutions and eternal truth ceases once and for all; one is always
> > > > conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of
> > > > > the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it
> > >was
> > > > acquired."
> > > > >
> > > > > NOTHING here about the "reflection of the dialectics of nature" in
> > >
> > > > the thinking brain--only the much weaker idea that the transience of
> > > > concepts is reflected in the limited nature of human knowledge! That's
> > >
> > > > the puzzle.
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm sorry if I sounded flippant in my last post--my position is
> > > > rather like that in the SECOND version of Engels' quote (not the
> > >version
> > > > in Mind in Society), and it's quite serious. I think that the idea
> > >that
> > > > Jews are a particularly intelligent race (and also the idea that
> > > > fertility and intelligence are inversely correlated, and this somehow
> > > > represents a threat to human survival) is a very serious misconception
> > >
> > > > about the relationship between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Humans
> > > > "choose"; nature "selects", and for humans to "choose" to select when
> > > > they cannot even manage to make economic and social relations obey
> > > > rational will is a little like a lay person trying to cure obesity by
> > > > vivisection rather than by diet and self-control.
> > > > >
> > > > > Right now, I think that the attempt to reduce human creativity to
> > > > chaos/complexity is flawed in the opposite direction; not too much
> > > > chutzpah but too little. It reduces learning to a trial-and-error
> > >process
> > > > driven by random variations. Lorenz's wonderful book "The Origins of
> > > > Chaos" points out that MOST games are not good producers of chaos,
> > >either
> > > > because they are really random (and chaos is only apparently random)
> > >or
> > > > contrariwise, because they are subject to deliberate strategy and
> > >skill
> > > > (he gives the marvelous example of pinball, which was initially banned
> > >in
> > > > his hometown as a game of chance, but then legalized as a game of
> > >skill).
> > > > >
> > > > > Natural selection really is random and bottom up, at least at
> > >first.
> > > > But it gives rise to humans, and these replace natural selection with
> > > > human choices, at least in the terrain of ideas. Learning is not
> > >usefully
> > > > described in chaos/complexity terms; the principle of human choice has
> > >
> > > > clearly replaced random variation and natural selection as soon as the
> > >
> > > > process of variation itself is subject to volitional control (as soon
> > >as
> > > > people start to generate particular language strings and not others
> > >and
> > > > then select these).
> > > > >
> > > > > Amongst humans, at the level of culture, language, games, and that
> > >
> > > > great cultural language game we call philosophy, the idea of
> > >deliberate
> > > > choice is clearly more powerful than the principle of natural
> > >selection.
> > > > That is why I think nature is dialectical, at least in the weak sense
> > >of
> > > > incompletable (if you will pardon a bit of volitional linguistic
> > > > creativity) indicated by Engels.But dialectical philosophy is a
> > > > non-natural selection rather than a natural reflection of the
> > >dialectics
> > > > of nature in the human brain.
> > > > >
> > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > Seoul National University of Education
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > > Steve, could you give a simple, 2 or 3 lines maybe, explanation of
> > >
> > > > what you
> > > > > *mean* by "nature is dialectical"?
> > > > > Andy
> > > > > At 09:23 AM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> > > > > >This is a dense but not too long post on this discussion of
> > >volition and
> > > > > >complexity theory. I think we bump into the question of whether
> > >"nature
> > > > > >is dialectical" in thinking about the question of how complexity
> > >theory
> > > > > >can figure into the study of consciousness. Yesterday I sent David
> > > > > >Kellog some links to Ethel Tobach (integrative levels) and Ken
> > >Richardson
> > > > > >(levels of self-regulation), two authors I find to be on the right
> > > > > >track. Both Tobach and Richardson use important ideas from CHAT in
> > >their
> > > > > >theorizing, and have a strong leaning toward integrating natural
> > >and
> > > > > >social science, in ways I find both dialectical and materialist.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Vygotsky was a strong advocate of Engels' position that nature is
> > > > > >dialectical, as was of course Marx, who I believe contributed two
> > >chapters
> > > > > >to the book Anti-Duhring, where Engels develops this concept. The
> > > > > >Dialectics of Nature by Engels, a manuscript never published in
> > >Engels'
> > > > > >lifetime, was first published in Russia in the 1920's and is
> > >clearly
> > > > > >influential on Vygotsky, who quotes it favorably numerous times in
> > >his
> > > > > >manuscript "The Meaning of the Historical Crisis of Psychology"
> > > > > >(1927). But this is a minority viewpoint today, it seems.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >I found myself spending some time browsing the book Mike mentioned
> > >earlier
> > > > > >this week, Human activity - contributions to the anthropological
> > >sciences
> > > > > >from a perspective of activity theory by Benny Karpatschof,
> > >available
> > > > > >online at http://informationr.net/ir/12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html .
> > >This
> > > > > >book is a rich and highly worthy exploration of the philosophical
> > > > > >underpinnings of CHAT, one of the best I have seen on that level,
> > >but
> > > > > >Benny adopts the position that nature is not dialectical,
> > >disagreeing
> > > > > >sharply with Engels - and therefore, Marx, Vygotsky, Leontiev, and
> > >all the
> > > > > >classical Marxists on this question. This idea that Engels was
> > >wrong,
> > > > > >that nature is not dialectical, that dialectics does not apply to
> > >nature
> > > > > >(Karpatschof allies with Sartre on this), is quite popular among
> > >many
> > > > > >dialectical thinkers today, all around the world. The position I
> > >lean
> > > > > >toward, that nature is dialectical, is a minority view today.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >I think we bump into this question of the dialectics of nature
> > >every time
> > > > > >we try to integrate explanations across different domains of
> > >complexity -
> > > > > >from the behavior of atoms, to genes, to embryos, to children
> > >learning to
> > > > > >speak, for example - so the question "is nature dialectical?" is
> > >both an
> > > > > >ontological question (what is the nature of reality) and
> > >epistemological
> > > > > >(how do we know anything). I think Andy's remarks offer an
> > >excellent
> > > > > >basis for a critique of the incorrect view that conscious human
> > >behavior
> > > > > >(volition) can be reduced to the laws of complexity science. But if
> > >we go
> > > > > >the route Benny Karpatschof suggests and reject the thesis that
> > >nature is
> > > > > >dialectical altogether, I think we can lose a vital link between
> > >the
> > > > > >natural and the social, both ontologically and epistemologically,
> > >and how
> > > > > >we can use, as Engels began to, the discoveries of natural science
> > >(laws
> > > > > >of mechanics, chemistry in his time, quantum electrodynamics,
> > >complexity
> > > > > >theory, etc. in our time) to understand how the even more complex
> > > > > >activities of human society and the still even more complex and
> > >chaotic
> > > > > >actions and operations of the human individual, emerge. In that
> > >way, I
> > > > > >think complexity theory is very much a powerful tool in trying to
> > >link the
> > > > > >explanatory laws of nature and society, although by no means is it
> > > > > >sufficient. That will require a new level of integrated science and
> > > > > >general psychology along the lines that Vygotsky envisioned.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >- Steve
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >At 04:18 PM 9/7/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> > > > > >>Welcome aboard Steve.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>I have always thought that the proposition that thinking is like
> > > > > >>computation is so barren, so stupid and so obviously an reflected
> > > > > >>projection, that to argue against it is to enter into the
> > >stupidity, and
> > > > > >>I would rather not. It's similar to people finding proof of
> > >neo-liberal
> > > > > >>economics in Darwinian biology, overlooking the fact that Darwin
> > >imported
> > > > > >>liberal economic ideas into his view of Nature in the first place.
> > > > > >>Computers are the latest thing, and information scientists develop
> > >tools
> > > > > >>for humans to use by emulating human activity, and then other
> > >people
> > > > > >>discover that people think like computers. Upside-down. Generates
> > >lots of
> > > > > >>academic salaries and popular book sales anyway.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>Although I think complexity theory and the concept of chaos are
> > >very rich
> > > > > >>and interesting ideas, I think they are out of place in describing
> > >the
> > > > > >>working of such a "well-oiled machine" (he, he) as the human mind.
> > >One
> > > > > >>thing about the application of this theory to the mind, and this
> > >is
> > > > > >>David's issue I believe, is that it is a radically unfree concept
> > >of the
> > > > > >>human condition. Allied with the concept of emergence, it is a fig
> > >leaf
> > > > > >>to cover a lacuna in positivist knowledge of the mind. We cannot
> > >explain
> > > > > >>how a few bits of flesh can be so creative and so clever, so its
> > >must be
> > > > > >>emergence, complexity, chaos, etc., etc.,
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>I am intrigued also by David's question as to why learners should
> > >be so
> > > > > >>in favour of learning theories which give them no power. Perhaps
> > >it is
> > > > > >>because those learning theories also give them no responsibility?
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>Andy
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>At 09:41 PM 6/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> > > > > >>>First time poster here and this may be from out of
> > > > > >>>left field, I'm not sure. I am not active in the
> > > > > >>>field so forgive me if but:
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>Roger Penrose, a prominent asttrophysicist, (among
> > > > > >>>others) has advanced the case that human
> > > > > >>>thinking/consciousness/cognition is not
> > > > > >>>"computational". Here he follows Kurt Goedel in the
> > > > > >>>use of the term computational. He wrote a book that
> > > > > >>>started with this premise and then further wrote a
> > > > > >>>response to a chorus of influential academics, all of
> > > > > >>>whom issued polemics against his book and especially
> > > > > >>>the "non-computational" thesis.
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>The contents of his reply somewhat step into the
> > > > > >>>middle of the debate but should be perfectly
> > > > > >>>understandable even to someone who hasn't read the
> > > > > >>>book or the scathing reviews. The Contents are
> > > > > >>>numbered and I recommend especiallyr reading #s 3 and
> > > > > >>>4 and then some of the later items at your own
> > > > > >>>discretion, evocatively titled "Free Will", "What Is
> > > > > >>>Consciousness?" and so on.
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>Penrose is not really trying to answer those
> > > > > >>>questions, by the way, only remove them from a
> > > > > >>>reductive, emergent from matter, reducible to physical
> > > > > >>>properties and laws, perspective.
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>Might at least help center your search for how and
> > > > > >>>where volition fits into the puzzle.
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>This is a wonderful list by the way, thanks guys
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>> > It's a good read too, but it wasn't what I was
> > > > > >>>looking for. I need
> > > > > >>> some
> > > > > >>> > > way of integrating complexity theory and VOLITION
> > > > > >>>(or
> > > > > >>> CONSCIOUSNESS). In
> > > > > >>> > > language teaching (which is what I do)
> > > > > >>>volition-free approaches are
> > > > > >>> very
> > > > > >>> > > popular (nativism, subconscious acquisition, and
> > > > > >>>now
> > > > > >>> chaos-complexity
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > >
> > > >>>_____________________________________________________________________
> > >
> > > > _______________
> > > > > >>>Need a vacation? Get great deals
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> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> > >9435, AIM
> > > > > >> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>_______________________________________________
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> > > > >
> > > > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > >AIM
> > > > > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> > > > >
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> > > >
> > > >--
> > > >Geoffrey Binder
> > > >BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > >PhD Candidate
> > > >Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > >Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > >M. 0422 968 567
> > > >_______________________________________________
> > > >xmca mailing list
> > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > >AIM
> > >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> > >
> > >_______________________________________________
> > >xmca mailing list
> > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >_______________________________________________
> > >xmca mailing list
> > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
>--
>Geoffrey Binder
>BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>PhD Candidate
>Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>Ph B. 9925 9951
>M. 0422 968 567
>_______________________________________________
>xmca mailing list
>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

  Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Sat Sep 8 20:39 PDT 2007